



Out of the Blue or a Long Time Coming? The Conservative Party's Demands for an EU Referendum in Parliamentary Discourse (1997-2010)

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Introduction

The term 'New Right' refers to a strand of Conservative politics emerging in the UK during the 1970s, and flourishing mainly under Margaret Thatcher (Beech 2016: 23). The Conservative Party continued to dominate British politics until 1997, when a period of 13 years of Labour governments, from 1997 until 2010, would follow, with Tony Blair pursuing an arguably rather EU-friendly course. When the Conservatives came back to government in a coalition in 2010 and subsequently won the 2015 general election, however, Prime Minister David Cameron tried to renegotiate the relationship with the EU before implementing the election promise to hold a referendum, which resulted in the pro-Brexit vote last June and Cameron's resignation. Cameron's successor, Theresa May, formally notified the EU of the UK's intention to leave on 29 March 2017, while the ultimate consequences of last year's referendum result – though still uncertain to say the least – are gradually taking shape. The question arises how this could have happened and why these developments seem to have taken many politicians, analysts, scholars and other observers by surprise.

Research Design

While the Conservative party was in government, it was comparatively easy to see where their priorities lay – but their time in opposition constitutes a veritable 'black-box' in terms of research on the evolving discourse. This paper will argue that to understand whether the Brexit referendum really came out of the blue or indeed has been a long time coming, it is necessary to explore how the Conservative party's discourse has developed during their time in opposition. This paper thus sets out to investigate how the Conservative discourse on Europe has developed during the 13 years of opposition, hoping to generate a better understanding of Conservative positions and policies today. The current challenges epitomised by the growing popularity of 'New



Right' thinking must be traced back in time to unearth their origin and to help explain their growing popularity.

Underlying my research design is the theoretical assumption that “[d]iscourse consists of coherent chains of propositions which establish a ‘discourse world’, or ‘discourse ontology’ – in effect, the ‘reality’ that is entertained by the speaker” (Chilton 2004: 54). This entertained reality is linked to questions of power in Foucault’s thinking: Storey summarises that according to Foucault, “[d]iscourses produce knowledge and knowledge is always a weapon of power” (2015: 135). In the words of the original: “It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (Foucault 2009: 318).

Clarifying the properties of power, Foucault rejects the notion that it always suppresses, but suggests that it can also be productive: “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (1979: 194). In addition to this point, Foucault explains that whole ‘regimes of truth’ govern discourses, i.e. they determine what is believed and what is rejected. Foucault insists that “[e]ach society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true” (2002a: 131). He thus advocates research into “how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth” (Foucault 2002b: 230). While Foucault’s thinking does not deny that anything exists non-discursively, he postulates that the way it is ‘constituted’, i.e. how it is interpreted, and whether it is accepted or rejected, has an influence on politics. Storey clarifies that “[w]hat Foucault calls ‘regimes of truth’ do not have to be ‘true’; they have only to be thought of as ‘true’ and acted on as if ‘true’” (2015: 135). Fairclough concurs in that, especially in political discourse, “how the context of action is represented [...] affects which course of action is proposed, which explains the intense competition and conflict over winning acceptance or imposing one account” (Fairclough/Fairclough 2012: 7).

The research questions I thus set out to answer are: When did Conservative party leaders first mention a referendum on EU policy? How is the line of argumentation in favour of a referendum justified? Which ‘discourse reality’ and values underlie such a proposed course of action? This necessitates an analysis of how the EU and EU projects are represented by Conservative party leaders in opposition to see whether they try to establish an alternative ‘discourse reality’ or ‘regime of truth’ to that of the governing Labour party, and one that is powerful enough to convince voters or force the government to change their policies.

In the British Westminster system, parliament is the “forum of popular debate” as well as “the constitutional seat of sovereignty in Britain. It is largely energized by political parties” (Kingdom/Fairclough 2014: 459). To follow up on the rise of ‘New Right’ thinking in connection to British EU policy, it therefore makes sense to look at the discourse influenced and shaped by leading politicians, more precisely by Conservative



party leaders. Thus, the focus is on the speeches they gave in the lower chamber during the period when the Conservative party constituted Her Majesty's Official Opposition, from 1997-2010. Although the material is publicly accessible online, there is a noteworthy research gap here. I prepared a corpus containing all oral interventions made by Conservative leaders in parliament during their time in opposition (recorded and published in *Hansard*, the 'Official Report' of parliamentary proceedings) and used it as a basis for my analysis.¹

I will apply a mixed-methods approach, using lexical search operations to lead me to relevant passages in the corpus. Occurrences are then counted to determine the importance of this particular thematic issues before I proceeded to analyse the speeches using a method called 'political discourse analysis' which was developed by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). They argue that political communication is mainly about argumentation. Their reflections result in a four-step analytical process: First, the description of the status quo is examined, focusing on word choice and normative judgements or evaluations made. In a second step, the presented goals are singled out and next, the values underlying these proclaimed goals are collected. The fourth step is then to find out how these goals are to be reached according to the speaker (Fairclough/Fairclough 2012: 11).

Usually, in political discourse, the argumentation will try to 'sell' an alternative to other politicians and listening voters, especially when the speaker is the leader of the biggest opposition party. Unsurprisingly, an alternative way of reaching goals opposing those of the governing party is often presented. It is very interesting to see, however, that even in cases where the goals are the same, the proposed ways to get there and/or the values underlying the line of argumentation are often fundamentally opposed.

Findings

Overall, Conservative party leaders made oral contributions to a total of 867 separate debates while in opposition during the period of Labour governments 1997-2010. The word 'referendum' (188 instances) and its plural form 'referendums' (22 instances) were mentioned a total of 210 times. All five Conservative leaders serving in that period, namely John Major, William Hague, Ian Duncan Smith, Michael Howard and David Cameron, explicitly mentioned referendums in a total of 68 different parliamentary debates.

¹ The full list of speeches containing the word 'referendum' can be found in the appendix.



A first read-through of all the speeches containing these instances led to the result that a total of 78 occurrences were not concerned with European policies, but instead primarily with the referendums on devolution (21 instances) and the possibility of a referendum on proportional representation (24 instances).

This left 132 mentions of the word 'referendum' in the context of a call for nationwide referendums on major European policy projects, which represents about 60% of all instances. These references to EU referendums were made in a total of 50 debates. European policies that were cited as necessitating a referendum included the (possible introduction of) the euro, the Treaty of Nice, the proposed EU Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon. An increase in both number and intensity of the calls for a referendum on European policy projects can be noticed over time, from the euro with 16 mentions, to the Constitution treaty with 48 mentions, and the Treaty of Lisbon with 59. The constitutional treaties taken together seem to have generated a veritable frenzy of calls for a referendum.

The calls for a referendum on European policy start surprisingly early: in June 1997, only one month after Labour had won their first term under Blair, John Major demanded a referendum on the possible introduction of the single currency in the UK:

A single currency may have rewards at the right time and in the right circumstances; but that is not now. [...] I set out some time ago the view that I believed that it was right to have a referendum, and I have not shifted, nor do I expect to shift, from that view. It is a decision unlike any other. (Major 09.06.1997: "European Union")

His successor William Hague upholds this demand and later adds calls for a referendum on the Treaty of Nice in 2000, as illustrated in the example below:

The Prime Minister emerged with a treaty that takes Europe in the wrong direction, and a Conservative Government will not ratify it as it stands. If the Government wish to sign up to the three major steps, including the charter of rights and the European army, they should first consult the people of this country in a referendum. (Hague 11.12.2000: "Nice European Council")

Clearly, Hague pitches his opposition to the Nice Treaty here as an election campaign promise, and uses the demand for a referendum to illustrate a discourse reality in which the contents of the treaty are so far-reaching that the government needs the population's approval to go ahead.

With the Treaty of Nice ratified nevertheless and Labour having won a second term, Ian Duncan Smith, Hague's successor as Conservative leader, keeps asking for a referendum on the Euro and then also for one on the European Constitution (from May



2003 onwards). An example for the continuing relevance of the introduction of the euro is the following contribution to Prime Minister Questions in 2003:

On 10 June the Prime Minister launched a roadshow to sell the single currency to the British people. Can he tell us where it has got to? [...] The whereabouts of the Prime Minister's roadshow are a mystery even to his Government. The Treasury, when asked, says: There are so many roadshow events we can't begin to list them all. The Foreign Office said: The roadshow hasn't actually begun. Meanwhile, the Minister for Europe said: It's not a literal roadshow, it's only a figure of speech. Given that the roadshow has not even got on the road, will the Prime Minister confirm that there will not be a referendum in this Parliament? [...] The Prime Minister is spinning roadshows, wasting public money and legislating for a referendum that he does not have the courage to hold. Why does he not admit what everybody else knows – that his dreams, his schemes and his hopes to scrap the pound are utterly wrecked? (Duncan Smith 17.09.2003: "Engagements")

Here, the expression "to sell the single currency to the British people" is a derogatory description of a planned information campaign. It implies that the referendum is not prepared in a fair way and objective information is withheld by the government in order to persuade voters of something they neither need nor want, like a dodgy salesman. This is coupled with accusations that the PM is "wasting public money" to implement "his schemes and his hopes to scrap the pound". This negative framing of losing the national currency instead of gaining a new one serves to further malign the proposal. It is a curious case of pre-emptively discrediting a possible positive referendum outcome by making out the campaign as unfair that betrays the fears that it might turn out to be a success for the government holding the referendum. This illustrates that the calls for a referendum might be used as an opportunistic strategy of opposing an unwanted policy by the Conservative leader.

While the euro drops off the agenda soon afterwards, the European Constitution continues to be a topic right into the tenure of Michael Howard as leader of the Conservative party. Occurrences are quite regular from 2003-2005. The next Conservative leader David Cameron is no exception to this pattern and insists on a referendum on the EU Constitution and then the Treaty of Lisbon after the ratification process of the former has been halted. Cameron claims that the Treaty of Lisbon is really the Constitution in disguise and links the two regularly in his speeches, thus establishing a discourse reality where the two are one and the same and the same need for a referendum therefore applies. Additionally, Cameron later introduces the proposal for a 'referendum lock' (which would later be part of the Con-LibDem coalition agreement) ensuring an automatic referendum should any more powers (competences) be transferred to the EU level.

After the chronological and quantitative aspects as well as the policy issues giving rise to the demands for a referendum have been clarified, the paper will address the



further research questions of how the calls for a referendum are justified and how the context is portrayed in more depth. One especially pertinent example is the following speech by Michael Howard on the proposed referendum on the (ultimately failed) EU Constitution treaty, which will be analysed in some detail here before the further findings are presented:

The British view is that there should be a modern, flexible, reformed Europe; a Europe ready for the challenges of the 21st century; a Europe that is truly free, based on co-operation and not coercion; a Europe that transfers powers back from Brussels to the nation state – truly a Europe of live and let live. That is what the Prime Minister should have been arguing for in Brussels last week. That is what the people of this country want. Let us have none of that nonsense about the referendum being a question of in or out of Europe; it is about the kind of Europe that we want to see. Let me make it clear: I am opposed to this constitution and I will play my part in a cross-party campaign, involving people from all parts of the country and all walks of life, to say no to this constitution. Britain does not need to wait until the last minute to decide; we do not need to wait until other countries have spoken. Why cannot Britain do what the Prime Minister says he wants to do and give a lead in Europe? Why does he not lead rather than just follow? The fact is that the Prime Minister knows that he has no mandate whatever for this constitution. There was nothing in his manifesto on the constitution and the British people rejected it at the polls only 10 days ago. The fate of this constitution will not be decided by the right hon. Gentleman; it will be decided by the British people, so why does he not let the British people speak, and let them speak now? (Howard 21.6.2004: “European Council”)

Lacking Mandate for European Integration

The Conservative leader argues that since a European Constitution was not in the Labour manifesto on which the party was elected, the Labour government has “no mandate” to take a decision. In a political system that has been characterized by parliamentary sovereignty for centuries, this seems quite a remarkable logic for a Conservative party; especially so since all party leaders invariably criticized the referendums on devolution, proportional representation, regional assemblies and local referendums on local matters.

Resisting Progress in European Integration Equals Strong Leadership

Howard expresses a preference for strong leadership and taking a stand in the face of resistance or adversity. In his view, insisting on special treatment within the EU can be one way of living up to this ideal. This is confirmed by accusations that the government is weak and neither providing leadership nor backbone whenever they agree to compromise on a European level. Other values summoned up in the Conservative line of argumentation include independence, democratic accountability,



the adherence to neo-liberal market principles and thus pragmatic and rational decision-making, flexibility, and freedom of choice.

A further example from the corpus is a contribution by Cameron in 2008, when he criticises the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown for a lack of coherence in his EU policy stance and a lack of leadership:

First the Labour Government said they did not want a constitution, then they said they would accept a constitution. They said they did not want a referendum, then they said they would have a referendum, then they cancelled the referendum and brought back the constitution. Now the constitution is half dead on the floor, they have not the courage to kill it. Frankly, I have seen more spine and leadership from a bunch of jellyfish. Why does the Prime Minister not give some leadership, tell us what he thinks, and kill this treaty today? (Cameron 18.6.2008: “Engagements”)

The EU Member States as Political Opponents and ‘Other’

The repeated portrayal of other EU member states as self-interested negotiators that do not hesitate to “fudge” policy decisions such as the exact terms of the EMU (Hague 25.3.1998: “Engagements”; 5.5.1998: “Economic and Monetary Union”) implies that they are not playing fair but cheating to get what they want. This portrayal of the decision-making process on the EU level as dishonest and not geared towards British interests is used as a justification for calling for a referendum on the single currency. This intensifies over time and is later coupled with expressions of distrust in the Labour government who cooperate with the allegedly untrustworthy EU leaders instead of prioritising British interests. The EU leaders and institutions are thus portrayed as undesirable and morally perverse partners as well as a source of metaphorical ‘contagion’, having persuaded the Labour government to go along with their “fudged” decisions.

The self-conception of the Conservatives, on the other hand, seems to be the defender of the will of the people, as well as the only rational and competent safeguard for jobs and political powers that would otherwise be transferred to Brussels. They claim to represent the “British view” (e.g. Howard 21.6.2004: “European Council”) on Europe, bringing up the idea of a national character or at least a unified opinion when it comes to policies affecting the relationship with Europe.

Elite vs. the people

Taking up another characteristic that is often associated with the debate leading up to the in-out referendum in 2016 (as well as the Trump campaign in the US), the populist idea that the political elite does not listen and is out of touch can be found as well. Moreover, the Conservative leaders portray themselves as not only knowing what “the people of this country want” (Howard 21.6.2004: “European Council”) but also as the only advocate for them since the government supposedly ignores their wishes.



A poignant example for this accusation is this passage from a speech by Ian Duncan Smith, where he insistently calls for a referendum on a EU Constitution treaty to be held in the UK and accuses the Prime Minister of elitist seclusion and ignoring the concerns and wishes of “the British people”:

We know that the British people overwhelmingly want to have their say. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but it is true. Has the Prime Minister become so out of touch, so arrogant, so reliant on a small group of people – oh yes – and so reliant on a small group of friends that he will not let the British people have their say? (Duncan Smith 14.5.2003: “Engagements”)

David Cameron’s contribution is also exemplary of this line of argument continuing to be used in the Conservative discourse and thus the repeated and sustained attempt to establish a discourse reality where the government cannot be trusted to respect the will of the people and the political legitimacy of an elected government is questionable:

On the Lisbon treaty – [Interruption.] Yes, I read it, actually – Europe’s leaders had to make a big decision: do they respect the wishes of the people? The answer was a resounding “no”. Just what is it with this Prime Minister and elections? An unelected Prime Minister wants to force the Irish people to vote twice because he did not like the result the first time, and he refuses to allow the British people to vote once because he is afraid that he would not like the result of that, either. Does he agree that one of the advantages of an early election here in Britain would be that the Lisbon treaty could be put to the people in a referendum, and we could let them decide? (Cameron 15.12.2008: “EU Council – Afghanistan, India and Pakistan”)

The ideas expressed here also serve to confirm the strategy of portraying European member state leaders as an out-of-touch elite who ignore the wishes and needs of their people. The claim that this holds now true for the national government embodied by the PM Brown is even more drastically put in the words of Cameron from 2009 when he explains “the central question that we believe should lie behind any programme for constitutional reform: how do we take power away from the political elite, and give it to the man and woman in the street?” (Cameron 10.6.2009: “Constitutional Renewal”).

The EU as an Obstacle for British Economic Growth

Further characteristics of the Conservative discourse include the framing of the EU as an organisation in need of reform which presents an obstacle to a thriving economy: “Is not that an ideal opportunity for Britain to put the case for reform in Europe – the case for a Europe that gets out of the way of business, so that wealth and jobs can be created?” (Howard 20.12.2004: “European Council”). Clearly, the Conservatives present themselves as the party that has the economic situation in the UK at heart while the Labour government is portrayed as inactive on that score. The argument is also picked up by Cameron, for example, when he gives his verdict on the EU Council in 2010:



The summit conclusions mention the need for greater economic co-ordination. There was some controversy about whether we will end up with any new treaty changes. Should not the Prime Minister make three things clear today? First, any talk of “economic government” in Europe is wrong. If he agrees, can he explain why the phrase remains in the French version of the eurozone statement? Secondly, should we not rule out any new treaty change that increases EU control over our economic policies? Thirdly, should we not change the law in the UK so that any treaty that proposed handing over new areas of power from Britain to Brussels would automatically be subject to a referendum, as is the case in Ireland? (Cameron 29.03.2010: “European Council”)

Here, the argument in favour of retaining economic control rather than letting European institutions meddle is combined with the call for a general ‘referendum lock’ which would prevent any further transfer of competences unto the EU level without a prior referendum in the UK.

Enlargement as the exception from the ‘referendum rule’

The only major EU project during the researched period which can be described as an exception to the pattern of the Conservative party leader calling for a referendum on a major EU project is the 2004 Eastern enlargement, when 10 new members officially joined the EU. I found that the enlargement was welcomed and generally referred to in a positive way by Conservative party leaders (e.g. Duncan Smith 28.10.2002: “European Council”). Criticism in this context was mostly being directed at the costs, as well as delays concerning the implementation and not at the project itself. The Eastern enlargement of the EU was consequently not subject to any calls for a referendum. Against the background of the debate on immigration, one of the most salient issues in both the general election campaign in 2015 and in the EU referendum campaign (Glencross 2016: 3), this seems surprising indeed.

Conclusion

This paper set out to trace calls for a referendum on EU policies in parliamentary Conservative opposition discourse. I found that calls for a referendum on European policy started in 1997 already and increased in intensity and quantity right up until 2010. They were most frequent where the European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon were concerned. Interestingly, an in/out referendum was not openly demanded by the Conservative leaders in opposition – indeed, they outright denied that their opposition to further European integration was equivalent to opposing membership altogether. While the EU was heavily criticised by all of them, such a demand could possibly not have been squared with the economically rational and pragmatic qualities the Conservative party sought to represent. However, Conservative leaders called for



referendums on every European integration step from 1997 onwards with the notable exception of enlargement – but they did not act on it while in government until 2015.

Holding a referendum on European policy is argued to address democratic deficits and to help express the will of the people that is supposedly ignored by the government. This pitting of the national government or the “political elite” against the people occurred throughout the whole research period. However, when it comes to matters the Conservative party leaders do not endorse, namely devolution and proportional representation, they heavily criticise referendums and accuse the government of wasting money on policies nobody wants. It seems, therefore, that forcing a referendum on European policy was an opposition strategy of a party that could not expect to block unwanted decisions in parliament for thirteen years. A referendum would have handed Her Majesty’s Opposition the opportunity to oppose government decisions (Michael Howard, as we have seen, announced explicitly that he would campaign against the introduction of a European Constitution) where the chances of winning enough support in the House of Commons were doubtful. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty was to be circumvented in this way. Demands for a referendum on EU integration steps by opposition leaders can therefore be called a strategy rooted in political opportunism. This conclusion is further supported by the notable exclusion of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds from the chorus of referendum demands.

The findings suggest that the idea of holding a referendum was around for a long time and after calling for one for 13 years, the Conservatives would have faced a serious credibility issue had they not implemented an EU referendum when they finally came into office again without a coalition partner to hide behind in 2015. Without the Liberal Democrats, there seems to have been no choice but to follow through and face a referendum, and this time on the more fundamental question of remaining or leaving the EU altogether. This political strategy implemented by the former opposition leader and then Prime Minister David Cameron, who then campaigned to remain inside the formerly vilified organisation, backfired spectacularly and cost him his office and the UK its place in the European Union.

Outlook: Some Remarks on the Role of Cultural Studies as a Political Project

The question of what Cultural Studies can contribute to the debate around the rise of a ‘New Right’ is a very topical one. Having started focusing on the study of the relationship between the UK and the EU in 2012, I was surprised that this subject, even though touching on the nexus of the political and the cultural, of identity and the representation of an ‘other’ and thus on prime Cultural Studies research perspectives, has mostly been left to other disciplines such as Political Science and International Relations. Although



numerous conferences on the subject were held in the last years, there seemed not to be much concern until the Brexit campaign was well under way (or indeed only after the referendum result was published). Not even dedicated scholars seemed to believe the Brexit could really happen. I would argue that this underestimation of the dynamics at work and possible political consequences is dangerous.

Of course, a chain of events always seems more clearly visible from an ex-post perspective. Still, I believe a warning should have been issued long ago and that academics and politicians interested in European cooperation should not have been surprised that much by the recent developments, since basically all the ideas have been voiced publicly for more than 15 years – and not only by smaller actors which have only recently risen to prominence, like UKIP, but by leaders of the party that is presently in government.

The idea that we can intervene in or at least pick up on discourses appears to have been left to newspapers and bloggers. I include myself in the group of people who have observed but not become actively engaged (yet). It seems to me that the credentials and credibility which academic scholars (still?) possess, at least to a certain degree, should have been used in public debate and that the risk of not appearing neutral should have been taken earlier, and should certainly be taken now. This also serves to preserve the foundations on which many academics working in the field of (British) Cultural Studies base professional and personal life plans.

Especially in situations where British Studies researchers also teach and are in contact with students on a regular basis, the current political situation in the UK should be thoroughly addressed. Furthermore, debating skills should be fostered, including the ability of our students not only to analyse and critically observe but also to think of and discuss possible ways of getting politically active. It is also in their interest as prospective exchange students and European citizens to ensure that the world they would like to see still exists in a few years. To this end, I suggest we drop the expression “of course” from our input to debates held in a seminar situation and show ourselves open to “taboo” questions and topics in order not to fall for the danger of taking a certain political view for granted or assuming it reflects the mainstream opinion.

A further conclusion I draw from my research is that more ways to communicate the results of our own observations early (enough) to the public are needed, and notifications if signs of major shifts in political dynamics are detected should be issued. This necessitates engaging with the following questions: does this violate the doctrine of neutrality, of detached observance favoured in (German) academia over taking a (political) stand? Does this compromise the quality of research or distort the perspective too much?



Organising exchange forums and workshops where advanced students but also the public can join is a good way of engaging with others. I am under the impression that living in a university 'bubble' and not confronting opposing views in the world outside academia is not conducive to winning support for ideas we deem important. Trying to encourage the voicing of opposing views and allowing them to be discussed instead of silently assuming a consensus or common ground is another way of meeting the challenge of an emerging 'New Right', since it does not leave discursive blanks to be filled by them. And lastly, not only contributing to a debate in dedicated journals but also in more widely read publications seems important. Open access plays an important role here, and I hope this will become a fertile ground for lively interaction. I look forward, therefore, to replies or comments to this paper.

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Appendix

List of all parliamentary contributions by Conservative party leaders in opposition 1997-2010 containing the code 'referendum(s)':

Speaker_Date_Name of debate_ Hansard Volume	Code (occurrences)	referendum EU-related
Major_1997:05:14_First Day_Vol. 294	referendum (2)	no (devolution)
Major_1997:06:04_Engagements_Vol. 295	referendum (6)	no (devolution)
Major_1997:06:09_European Union_Vol. 295	referendum (2)	yes (Euro)
Hague_1997:06:25_Engagements_Vol. 296	referendum (1)	no (devolution)
Hague_1997:07:23_Engagements_Vol. 298	referendum (1)	no (devolution)
Hague_1998:05:06_Engagements_Vol. 311	referendum (1)	no (devolution)
Hague_1998:05:13_Irish Referendums_Vol. 312	referendum (1)	no (devolution)
Hague_1998:11:04_Engagements_Vol. 318	referendum (4)	no (prop. representation)
Hague_1998:11:24_Debate on the Address_Vol. 321	referendum (6)	no (ref. organisation, PR)
Hague_1999:06:16_Engagements_Vol. 333	referendum (2)	yes (Euro)
Hague_1999:06:23_Engagement_Vol. 333	referendum (1)	no (devolution)



Hague_1999:11:17_Debate on the Address_Vol. 339	referendum (5)	yes (Euro)
Hague_2000:01:12_Engagements_Vol. 342	referendum (5)	no (PR)
Hague_2000:07:13_Government Annual Report_Vol. 353	referendum (5)	yes (Euro)
Hague_2000:10:25_Engagements_Vol. 355	referendum (2)	yes (Euro)
Hague_2000:12:06_Debate on the Address_Vol. 359	referendum (5)	no (devolution, PR)
Hague_2000:12:11_Nice European Council_Vol. 359	referendum (1)	yes (Treaty of Nice)
Hague_2001:02:07_Engagements_Vol. 362	referendum (1)	yes (Euro)
Hague_2001:06:20_First Day_Vol. 370	referendum (2)	yes (Treaty of Nice)
Duncan Smith_2002:03:20_Engagements_Vol. 382	referendum (2)	no (Gibraltar)
Duncan Smith_2002:05:22_Engagements_Vol. 386	referendum (6)	yes (Euro)
Duncan Smith_2002:06:24_European Council (Seville)_Vol. 387	referendum (1)	no (Gibraltar)
Duncan Smith_2002:11:06_Engagements_Vol. 392	referendum (3)	no (Gibraltar)
Duncan Smith_2003:05:14_Engagements_Vol. 405	referendum (4)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:05:21_Engagements_Vol. 405	referendum (4)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:06:18_Engagements_Vol. 407	referendum (5)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:06:23_European Council_Vol. 407	referendum (8)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:09:10_Engagements_Vol. 410	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:09:17_Engagements_Vol. 410	referendum (2)	yes (Euro)
Duncan Smith_2003:10:29_Engagements_Vol. 412	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Duncan Smith_2003:11:05_Engagements_Vol. 412	referendum (3)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2003:11:26_Debate on the Address_Vol. 415	referendum (8)	yes (Euro, EU Constitution)
Howard_2003:12:03_Engagements_Vol. 415	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2003:12:15_European Council_Vol. 415	referendum (3)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:04:19_Iraq and Middle East Peace Process_Vol. 420	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:04:20_Europe_Vol. 420	referendum (12)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:04:21_Engagements_Vol. 420	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:05:19_Engagements_Vol. 421	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:06:21_European Council_Vol. 422	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:11:08_EU Summit_Vol. 426	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:11:10_Engagements_Vol. 426	referendum (1)	no (devolution)
Howard_2004:11:23_Debate on the Address_Vol. 428	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2004:12:20_European Council_Vol. 428	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2005:04:06_Engagements_Vol. 432	referendum (1)	no
Howard_2005:05:17_Debate on the Address_Vol. 434	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2005:06:15_Engagements_Vol. 435	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Howard_2005:06:20_European Council_Vol. 435	referendum (1)	yes (EU Constitution)
Cameron_2006:06:19_European Council_Vol. 447	referendum (2)	yes (EU Constitution)
Cameron_2007:06:25_European Council_Vol. 462	referendum (10)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2007:07:03_Constitutional Reform_Vol. 462	referendum (1)	yes (power transfer to EU)
Cameron_2007:07:11_Draft Legislative Programme_Vol. 462	referendum (3)	yes (Lisbon Treaty)
Cameron_2007:07:25_Engagements_Vol. 463	referendum (4)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)



Cameron_2007:10:10_Engagements_Vol. 464	referendum (3)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2007:10:17_Engagements_Vol. 464	referendum (5)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2007:10:22_Intergovernmental Conference (Lisbon)_Vol. 465	referendum (7)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2007:11:06_Debate on the Address_Vol. 467	referendum (5)	yes (Lisbon Treaty)
Cameron_2007:12:17_European Council (Brussels)_Vol. 469	referendum (5)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2008:05:07_Engagements_Vol. 475	referendum (7)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2008:05:14_Draft Legislative Programme_Vol. 475	referendum (1)	yes (Lisbon Treaty)
Cameron_2008:05:14_Engagements_Vol. 475	referendum (3)	no (Scottish independence)
Cameron_2008:06:18_Engagements_Vol. 477	referendum (5)	yes (EU Constitution)
Cameron_2008:06:23_European Council_Vol. 478	referendum (3)	yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitution)
Cameron_2008:10:20_European Council_Vol. 481	referendum (1)	yes (Lisbon Treaty - Irish vote)
Cameron_2008:12:15_EU Council: Afghanistan, India and Pakistan_Vol.485	referendum (1)	yes (Lisbon Treaty - Irish vote)
Cameron_2009:06:10_Constitutional Renewal_Vol. 493	referendum (3)	yes (Lisbon Treaty)
Cameron_2009:06:10_Engagements_Vol. 493	referendum (3)	yes (EU Constitution)
Cameron_2009:06:23_European Council_Vol. 494	referendum (2)	no
Cameron_2010:03:29_European Council_Vol. 508	referendum (1)	yes (power transfer to EU)