



The Divi-dual: Marx, Deleuze, and the Emergence of a New Figure from Fetishism¹

SERCAN ÇALCI

İstanbul

1. Bad News

Gilles Deleuze breaks bad news: “we’re told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world” (1995: 181). A new illusion demands our future from us. The objective manifestations of our collective illusions are organized into a field of phenomena that traverses our contemporary social reality. Under capitalist conditions, social phenomena resembling paradoxical experiences follow and intensify the historical line of the capitalist order, hiding their own sources: “personification of things and reification of persons” (Marx 1976: 209). So, from which bodies do the souls of businesses derive today?

In order to answer this question, firstly I will demonstrate how the world indicated by Hegel’s notion of the “organic whole” (2008: 60) is constituted on the rationality of the hierarchical organism, producing the mode of subjectivity based on the *individual* that is subjected to the power relations of sovereignty. Here, the organic world will be portrayed within a logic of *externalization*. Secondly, I will focus on how the organic world is reversed by commodity fetishism which has provided a new mode of subjectivity – the *indivi-dual* – that is subjected to the disciplinary power relations. Then we will understand how the indivi-dual is produced within a logic of *reflection* created by the fetish character of commodities. Finally, I will show how the commodity fetishism evolves into money fetishism within the contemporary control society in which a new mode of subjectivity – the *divi-dual* – appears, according to a logic of *mobilization*. After discussing the constitution of the organic world image through one of Hegel’s important metaphors in order to understand the rationality of the whole and elaborating the sources of commodity fetishism based on Karl Marx’s analysis of abstract labor, labor time, reification and money, I will try to approach the issue of money fetishism from the perspective of Gilles Deleuze and analyze the individual in the control society in its fragmented and deconstructed form in connection with money fetishism. I will examine the transformation of a figure – the dividual – emerging from the world of commodities

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in contemporary subjectivity processes, starting from the points where the philosophies of Marx and Deleuze can converge. I prefer writing the mode of subjectification that Deleuze calls “dividual” (1995: 180-181) with a hyphen: the divi-dual. My intention of making this small intervention, which strengthens the emphasis on the dual, hopefully will be clarified towards the end of the text.

I must say in advance that what initially inspired me to formulate this insight into the divi-dual is an idea in Italo Calvino’s *The Cloven Viscount*, when Medardo of Terralba is divided into two living pieces in the first battle he enters. The only difference is that, unlike Medardo’s division into good and evil parts, the divi-dual is divided beyond good and evil. But what is striking is what they have in common: one of the pieces – the evil viscount – tries to build a world according to his own image after returning to his castle. Wherever he passes, the Viscount divides all the objects into two: he divides pears, mushrooms, bats, squirrels, and the castle into two parts (2017: 27-28) just as the contemporary world divides the individual in half for the second time. Medardo creates a world after his own image just like Marx and Engels say about the bourgeoisie: “In one word, it creates a world after its own image” (1988: 213). So, what does this image look like today? If we were to do a genealogy, how far could we follow the traces of this image? Is the contemporary world divided in two like Medardo’s? Is it possible to discern another news flash in the recent terrifying headlines revealed by Deleuze?

2. What Does a Hand Look Like?

The modern story of the establishment of the organic world image with the privileges and superiorities of the subject reaches its most developed version in Hegel’s philosophy of law. In the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel introduces an interesting metaphor that describes in a very striking way how the organic rationality works: the hand. In the third part, entitled “State,” Hegel explores how the actuality of the organic whole is expressed in its particular elements, emphasizing the close relationship between necessity and reality, and argues that a hand which is cut off no longer carries a real actuality even though it continues to look like a hand, and even if it continues to exist, it no longer has its reality (2008: 213). From this organismic perspective, in which the part and the whole are mediated by the dialectic between the organ and the organism, an autonomous entity separated from the organism to which it belongs has lost its actuality and disrupted the unity of the particular and the universal. In that case, the separated hand, which loses its organic character, is both exiled from reality because it is separated from the rationality of the organic whole, and loses its actuality because it cuts off the connection of the universal with the particular. The interesting part is that it still looks like a hand, but it is no longer itself. Hegel places the existence of the part right into the middle of the division between living and inanimate, organic and inorganic, for the sake of the rationality of the organic whole. The image of the world that emerges



from this perspective is now a foreign one to us. The world of the Hegelian organic whole: an imaginary world where the organic maintains its superiority over the inorganic, where the living gives the inanimate only the role of object to externalize its will. Everything has to fall under the logic of the whole and behave according to its position in a hierarchy that connects its singularity to the rationality of the universal which promises to overcome all of the contradictions in the organic world design. It's a world destined to be reversed and eroded by the recurring material and social contradictions within it as soon as it is being established. A world that strives to become more and more united and prevents the division of dualities. This world carries the rationality of the organic world. How does this rationality of the whole operate in the subject-object relation?

According to what Hegel wrote in the first part of *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, entitled "Property", this rationality is at work when the I and the object meet. First of all, this rationality puts the self and the object in a temporary conflict. Where will the power to resolve this conflict come from? Undoubtedly, from the authority that created the problem. The solution is given as follows: Either the object will lose its qualities or the I, an organic and living being, will disintegrate. However, in this encounter, since only I have the ability to will and I can affirm myself, the object is forced to retreat and hide (2008: 67). The power to discover the universal in the particular lies not in the one who withdraws and hides, but in the one who dares to express herself and reflects her will in the world. It is she who realizes the whole: movement from two to one, from multiplicity to unity, can only come from her. Therefore, it is not the I but the object that will lose its identity: the object is at best a surface on which the will of the I can be externalized. It is always the Owner who is the I. According to Hegel, the superiority of the organic world lies in this relationship.

The organic world is chained to an image in which use value can still dominate exchange value, in which the representation of the object remains tied to the axis of function and usefulness. However, in the world of commodities, this relationship is shattered: under capitalist conditions, a phenomenon called the commodity-form emerges, abstracted from its sensual properties, characterized by the subordination of use value to exchange value, which has managed to attract the forces of social labor. The position of the I vis-à-vis the commodity-form must change. The relationship of superiority that maintains the privilege of the organic disappears: objects cease to be surfaces on which the will is externalized and are redefined by a collective phantasmagoria that reveals the subjects as extensions of inanimate objects.



3. Marx and the Phantasmagoria in Commodity Fetishism

How does the object that retreats in the face of the organic superiority of the I come out of its hiding place and how does it reappear, what are the masks it wears? Obviously, this new appearance of the object brings about the establishment of a field of illusions. However, the character of the illusion has changed and it has jumped from the subjective plane to an objective one. As Althusser writes, “this appearance is not subjective at all” (2006: 191). The manifestations of commodity fetishism find their new meanings in a phantasmagoria in which the objective and collective illusions are imagined as the natural and social character of things.

At the end of the section titled “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret” in *Capital I*, Marx sets an ironic stage for the commodities to talk in their own voices as if they had the ability to express themselves. It’s a sarcastic moment in terms of both form and content. The commodity appears on the scene: as if addressing the bourgeois economists, it ironically expresses that it is not only a use value, but also an exchange value regarding other commodities, by displaying its supersensible character (1976: 176-177). The commodity is no longer impersonal, it has drawn the privileges of the organic onto itself and has gained the appearance of an independent object with a personal will. Even though people want to establish a relationship with commodities in terms of use value and attempt to relate to commodities within the framework of ownership, the relationship that defines the commodity as a commodity comes from its exchange value. The sensual object of the use value is surrounded by an axiomatic of social abstraction in terms of its exchange value. The commodity becomes personified, but it can only do so within a collective phantasmagoria. Where does this world of illusions arise from? How can it impose a relationship that overwhelms the organic?

In the rationality of the organic world, the object that had to retreat before the I now reappears with a mystical mask. The commodity has acquired such a feature that it reflects the social relations among those who produce it, just like the natural and social relations between commodities. However, Marx warns us that the mystical character of the commodity does not arise from its use value. Marx’s answer to the question of the source of commodity fetishism is clear: “it arises from this form itself” (1976: 164), that is, from the commodity-form. In other words, when the differences between the concrete labors of producers are eliminated – “only if we abstract from their real inequality” (1976: 166) – a quantitative abstraction that fully equalizes them begins to express the living subjectivity of labor in the very form of the commodity. Relations between producers have been transformed into relations between things, quality has turned into quantity, and the superiority of the organic world has come to an end.

At the beginning of the section in question, the example of a wooden table is brought up: when a wooden table is made from a piece of wood, even though the shape of the wood changes, the table continues to be wooden and preserves its natural properties.



This wooden table is a sensual thing, an ordinary natural object that can be described by its qualities. However, when this wooden table becomes a commodity, it becomes a magnitude of value that can no longer be defined by its sensual and natural qualities, but by its quantity compared to other commodities (1976: 163). This makes it a substitute entity, abstracted from its concrete and natural characteristics, capable of being replaced by other commodities as values and substituted for other commodities. The phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism is based on “substitutions” (1976: 165).

“One divides into two” (Debord 2006: 35) and everything is interchangeable in terms of exchange values. We do not have any substance or organic rationality that can hold together so many concrete-looking objects with mystical character. The condition for their coexistence is that they can confront each other as value-magnitudes. The exchange value now sets in motion the commodity-form to determine the mode of existence of everything, including labor power, which is also a commodity. Just as it is staged in Shakespeare’s play *Much Ado About Nothing*, which is quoted at the end of the aforementioned section in *Capital I*, commodities, like all the characters in this comedy, appear in various forms and attires like in a masquerade.

An interesting aspect is that Marx, who conceptually formulated the world of commodities and defined fetishism, continues to use the dualities on which the organic world is based by reversing them. Under capitalist conditions, the dead have begun to dominate the living, and the past has come to determine the present. The concrete can only gain meaning within the social abstractions of capital. In short, the organic cannot externalize its own will in the inorganic, on the contrary, the inorganic reflects the powers of the organic to itself, thereby keeping the producers under the spell of a collective illusion. *Externalization* is one of the constitutive moves of the subject of the organic world, whereas *reflection* rules the field of objective illusions that characterize the world of commodities. The idea of externalization defines the subject’s relationship to the world by revealing an implicit content that becomes manifest in the object. The world contains the living power of the subject. In short, this idea explains how a world emerges from the subject – a conscious and free person. By contrast, the idea of reflection articulates the world’s relation to subjects through the emergence in consciousness of a content situated between subject and object. It reveals how both subjects and objects are constituted within the world of commodities.

The phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism is based on a double reflection. One of them is the reflection of qualities (the social qualities of labor are reflected in the form of natural-social qualities of the products of labor), the other is the reflection of relations (the relations between the producers themselves are reflected in the form of a relationship belonging to things independent of the producers). It is only possible for



something to appear in this form of reflection.² Nothing that has not taken this form is visible, that is, something visible appears under the form of a commodity, as Guy Debord says: “commodities are now all that there is to see; the world we see is the world of the commodity” (2006: 29). Gradually, in the social phantasmagoria, an independent, transcendent field of things with qualities and interrelationships is formed.³ Even the forms of thought are not exempt from these illusions. So, while one is divided into two in terms of the commodities, what happens to those who produce them? In fact, commodity fetishism divides both the object and the subject: “this fragmentation of the object of production necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject” (Lukács 1971: 89). It is impossible for the worker to remain whole in the face of the disintegration of labor products. As soon as phantasmagoria is established, the individual loses the organic superiority and is divided into abstract and concrete, quantitative and qualitative, living and dead. Tracing this division gives us some indications of the genealogy of the divi-dual.

3.1. Abstract Labor

The first appearance of commodity fetishism, as expressed in *Capital I*, is as follows: “The equality of the kinds of human labor takes on a physical form in the equal objectivity of the products of labor as values” (1976: 164). How can an abstraction that equates human labor be reflected in labor products by gaining social characteristics? Here we witness Marx making another interesting reversal. According to him, the reason why people present the products of human labor as values to each other cannot be that they consider these products to be the product of the same type of human labor. Everyone is aware of the distinction between the nature of labor required to produce shoes and the qualitative capacities required to repair glasses or proofread a book. Looking at shoes, glasses and books, it cannot be said that the labor that produces them is the use of one and the same capacity: “Let us remember once again one of Marx’s caveats: we cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and the relations of productions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 24). The main reason is that a common abstraction has been developed that reflects all of these materially different labor products in the form of value. In short, it is the uniformization of all differences in human productive activities under the category of abstract labor by equalizing and exchanging labor products as values.

² Herbert Marcuse emphasizes the strong relation between appearance and illusion in the context of fetishism: “Illusion (*Schein*) really enables something to appear (*Erscheinen*)” (2009: 89).

³ One of Debord’s definitions of spectacle seems to describe the inversion of the organic world: “The spectacle in its generality is a concrete inversion of life, and, as such, the autonomous movement of non-life” (2006: 12).



One is divided into two in the forms of abstract and concrete at this point, connecting the differences between all labor forces in the form “and... and...”. This is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, a connective synthesis which creates an immanent field of production that connects the flows of singular forces, unless transformed into a transcendent form through its paralogical uses (1994: 68). Concrete labor preserves the difference in mental and physical capacities that the producer expends to meet specific requirements. In accordance with each different requirement, concrete labor is directed towards different skills. The organization of human activity in the form of concrete labor refers to a social organization in which use value is not yet completely controlled by exchange value. In a capitalist society based on commodity and surplus value production, the immediate existence of concrete labor is fragmented. Labor acquires at least a *dual* character: concrete labor forces with useful labor capacities begin to establish relations through exchange with all kinds of other concrete labor forces. This means that a new dynamic of social abstraction is developing that formally equalizes all labor. This social equation, which formally equalizes and homogenizes all kinds of different concrete labor capacities and makes it possible to organize them as commodities, is called abstract labor.⁴ According to Marx, equality between human labor takes the material form of value equations between the products of these labors.

So, what happens to the producer within this abstraction? If the producer is not an isolated hunter or fisherman on an island producing solely to meet her own needs, like Robinson Crusoe – an example Marx was fond of invoking – it is clear that she no longer lives in the concrete world of her labor capacity. Her relationship with other laborers is transformed: her relationship with other individuals with concrete labor capacities is quite different from the exchange of use values for the satisfaction of simple needs. For Robinson, the entire process of labor and production is transparent and direct: for him, an exchange value abstraction that covers the realm of things is impossible from the outset. By contrast, the life of the proletarian who produces under capitalist conditions is divided into abstract and concrete. If Robinson is an individual, the proletarian can only be an *indivi-dual*.

The proletarian who produces under capitalist conditions, the *indivi-dual*, belongs to a very different type of exploitation from the one that marked the European Middle Ages. In medieval societies dominated by the division between serfs and feudal lords, the dependency relations that form the basis of society are etched on the social surface in a very clear form of exploitation. The feudal lord confiscates the serfs’ products and imposes a kind of “debt of existence” on them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 215). This is a

⁴ In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze writes that the levels of abstraction of the concept of abstract labor are the qualities of the laborers and the qualities of the products of labor: “In what Marx calls ‘abstract labor,’ abstraction is made from the particular qualities of the products of labor and the qualities of the laborers, but not from the conditions of productivity, the labor-power and the means of labor in a society” (1994: 186).



practice of exploitation so naked and obvious that there is no need for the serf to represent the reality of his own activity in an abstract social phantasmagoria.

Marx states that in the structure of the patriarchal peasant family, individual concrete labor capacities appear “as instruments of the joint labor-power of the family” (1976: 171). The world can still be defined by the functions of organs that are inscribed in the organic whole. Here, the qualities of the social labor of the producers are preserved, and concrete labor is expressed in certain forms of subordination. The only factor that mediates concrete labor is the family organism that makes it its own. In such a mode of production, the fog that settles over social production, the commodity-form that adorns the objects of exchange with theological ornaments, has not yet appeared on the scene. There is no individual here.

Marx counters all of this with a hypothetical example of social production. In an important part of the chapter on fetishism, Marx says that in a society of free producers, the commodity form that creates fetishism can disappear, free producers can exercise planned control over the production process, and the mystical fog on commodities can be dispersed in a material production process in which neither qualities nor relations are abstracted. Herein lies the antithesis of the isolated individual represented by Robinson: here the individual appears for the first time as the site of actualization of socialized humanity. In the image of a hypothetical society where fetishism has been dismantled, the production activity abstracted in the commodity form is reorganized as the common activity of everyone. Even if hypothetically, the organic world is reconstructed in the form of a communal society.

The common point of the four modes of production that Marx presents here (the Robinsonian mode of production based on the production of use values, the feudal mode of production based on relations of dependency, the mode of production based on the land ownership of the patriarchal peasant family, and the collective mode of production based on the work of free producers) is that in each of them the concrete labor capacity can be preserved even under the harshest conditions of exploitation, that is, the organic can continue to remain in its own world.⁵ Under capitalist conditions, concrete labor capacities are included in the equalizing logic of abstract labor. The first division experienced by the individual within the phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism appears before us in this form; the first historical division of the individual subject. In the organic world one thinks and imagines the abstract with reference to the concrete, whereas in the world of commodity fetishism, the concrete can be understood with reference to the abstract. The two become one again, but this time by reducing the concrete to the abstract.

⁵ According to Balibar, traces of fetishism can be found as “displaced” in pre-capitalist societies (2006: 218).



3.2. Labor Time

One is divided into two, but is about to unite again with another kind of synthesis. “Disjunctive synthesis”, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, disseminates every force connected by continuous series and marks the singular social forces within their own fields of action by constituting a recording surface until it is distorted by its paralogical uses that makes it an exclusive and transcendent field (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 78). If there is a revolutionary moment, it is the one that can use division as an operator of differentiation. However, when differentiation turns into a tool of division, the exploitation processes of capitalist logic and operations become visible. It is then that the mystical shell of fetishism is broken. If the visible only appears in value forms and illusions have acquired a social and objective character, will it be possible to extract a rational essence from the shell? To what extent can this rationality preserve the rationality of the organic? Now we have the division of quantitative and qualitative; a division that will culminate in a kind of unification that subordinates the second to the first: social and objective figures of illusions will thus arise from within a system that determines labor time as the measure of value.

Marx expresses the second appearance of commodity fetishism as follows: “the measure of the expenditure of human labor power by its duration takes on the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of labor” (1976: 164). Again, the same reflective machine is at work, once again by giving a form after its own image. The duration of the expenditure of labor power, the measurable time spent during the physical and mental effort of humans to transform and shape things, becomes the magnitude of the value carried by the products of labor. The conditions of possibility of this situation, which seems normal for us living under capitalist conditions, are much more complex than expected. Within capitalism, social consciousness is increasingly shaped by fetishization, obscuring the fact that a living, dynamic temporality is materialized in an object that has lost its capacity for self-movement, and that the extent of this materialization determines the object’s value. Time materializes, for example. What does this mean? How does capital production manage to corporealize time?

First of all, we need to point out that this corporealization occurs in both the producer and the products of labor. As Marx wrote in one of his earlier texts, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, “time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the most, time’s carcass” (2010: 127). Marx shows that quantity completely dominates quality: “we should not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour” (2010: 127). Time has become homogenized, measurable and quantified. This is where the disjunctive synthesis comes into play: laborers appear as personified labor time. Pointing out that some phenomena of this personification in the temporal existence of workers are revealed by names such as “full-timers” and “part-timers” (Marx 1976: 516), Marx



develops the analysis of the struggle over capitalist social time through the connection between mechanization and time, as well as the working day struggle.

If time is corporealized, it is now possible to socialize it as a measurable, linear and homogeneous quantity. Just as abstract human labor is formed by the equalization of different concrete labor capacities as a result of the equalization of all labor products as values within exchange relations, quantitative time is formed by the different qualitative time experiences of the exchanged commodities confronting each other as values. Adorno emphasizes the role of transfer of use value into exchange value:

It has been asked what the cement is which still holds the world of commodities together. The answer is that this transfer of the use value of consumption goods to their exchange value contributes to a general order in which eventually every pleasure which emancipates itself from exchange value takes on subversive features (2002: 296).

Those who engage in exchange submit to the laws of exchange and the rules of the market. So, what is it that determines the magnitude of the value of a commodity? The secret law in this seemingly uncontrolled field is nothing other than labor time. Marx says: “The determination of the magnitude of value by labor-time is therefore a secret hidden under the apparent movements in the relative values of commodities” (1976: 168).⁶ Thus, the concept of time must be measurable, as it encompasses both the arena in which the struggle over the working day unfolds and the debate about free time as a space for human development.

Quantitative time fosters abstraction as a fundamental aspect of commodity fetishism, with the ticking of the clock mimicking nature yet reducing all moments to uniform sameness: “moments are the elements of profit,” as the factory inspectors quoted in *Capital* put it (1976: 352). Thus, the temporal and qualitative information of human productive activity is recorded in a quantitative equation of value on the surface of the products of labor. Time becomes corporealized and personified. The qualitative time of the organic world can no longer maintain its integrity against quantitative time. The commodity-form transforms laborers’ qualitative experiences of time into qualities of the products of labor: the time corporealized in the exchange value of a commodity is now possessed time: a time identified with money, the mirror of value. Time is economy, the economy that capital uses to traverse space (Marx 1993: 538). The proletariat, on the other hand, is at most an individual, a *carcase*, confined to labor time and subjected to relative surplus value exploitation.

⁶ In *Capital III*, Marx elaborates this definition and modifies it in relation to reproduction: “the value of any commodity – and thus also of the commodities which capital consists of – is determined not by the necessary labor-time that it itself contains, but by the socially necessary labor-time required for its reproduction” (1991: 238).



3.3. Reification, Money and the Completion of Fetishism

The third manifestation of commodity fetishism appears in *Capital I*: “and finally the relationships between the producers, within which the social characteristics of their labors are manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the products of labor” (1976: 164). The reification of qualities is completed by the reification of relations.⁷

One is divided into two to create a new figure from the reified relations: If we refer to the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari’s social machines, this figure is formed by conjunctive synthesis (1994: 84). The unity of the organic world is fragmented by a duality within itself and is resynthesized with reification. What is reification? It is when the subjective qualities of labor become the natural and social qualities of things, and the relations between workers become relations between things.

Distinguishing this issue in its subjective and objective aspects, Lukács’ analysis can show us that there is another way to understand reification. Objectively, reification is the construction of a world out of past things and relationships between things. This world works on its own and producers cannot control it. For example, the market is literally such a world, so is a legal order that complies with the market. The organic becomes reified within an abstraction of inorganic forces. From a subjective perspective, human activity becomes reified against itself. For example, one skill of the proletarian becomes specialized in a way that prevents the actualization of all her other capacities.⁸ By activating their capacities to work in the field in which they specialize, the proletarians are forced to freeze all their other capacities: actual and potential are completely divided.

Reification is also the suppression of the category of becoming by the categories of immutability and the dominance of abstract forms of law over the transformative activity of humans (Goldmann 1998: 106). Under capitalist conditions, capital appears as a productive mode of existence in itself, whereas at best it is past labor, the accumulation of dead labor. The only thing that is alive is the labor that the organic being produces itself: “Labour is the living, forming fire; it is the transitoriness of things,

⁷ A principle that Deleuze repeatedly emphasizes in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* can be used to understand the mechanism of internalization working in fetishism: “Whether as relations of ideas or as relations of objects, relations are always external to their terms” (1989: 66). From this point of view, fetishism can be considered as a collective representation that violates the principle of externality of relationships and reduces them to their terms. Of course, relations of production are no exception to this principle; they are also external to their terms. Capitalism is the name of the axiomatic system that reconstructs this externality as its own internal limit, a movement to internalization.

⁸ Lukács almost defines the individual when, quoting Marx, he writes: “On the other hand, there is an even more monstrous intensification of the one-sided specialization which represents such a violation of man’s humanity. Marx comment on factory work that ‘the individual, himself divided, is transformed into the automatic mechanism of a partial labor’ and is thus ‘crippled to the point of abnormality’ is relevant here too” (1971: 99).



their temporality, as their formation by living time.” (Marx 1993: 361).⁹ In capitalist production, dead labor drives all social dynamics of change and movement, subsuming them under its own logic. Despite this, it still permits the organic to reproduce itself. The subject of labor must breathe and be fed enough to reproduce itself. Even vampires have a political economy! They are still dependent on the organic, becoming wilder as the gap between their resources and their needs widens.

Abstract labor, quantitative time, dead thing. There is nothing sensual left. The element that completes fetishism, using this trio and constituting its most developed form, is none other than money. Money is the carrier of the universal equivalent that hides all labor processes within it, the social qualities of labor and the social relations between producers. Marx says:

It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private labor and the social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly. (1976: 168)

Money is a form of value; whereas, in the phantasmagoria of fetishism, money is the highest phenomenon of the capture of the productivity of labor by capital. It is now becoming clear that money has completely different functions other than paying off debt, storing value and being a universal equivalent. It has two other basic functions in the theory of fetishism.

First, money reverses the relationship with time by veiling all the labor processes that constitute it. Time is money and money is time, but this abstraction can only be made by connecting value to time in a capitalist axiomatic order. In order to establish the equation ‘100 kg of iron = 100 kg of gold,’ we need a third element common to both: *mass*. Thus, we say that these two different objects contain the same amount of matter. Likewise, we cannot abstract ‘100 kg of iron = 2 grams of gold’ without abstracting value. So, while there is an equal amount of matter in the first equation, what will replace it here? According to Marx, this is nothing other than the amount of labor or *labor time*. In order for time to be reflected in value equations, it must be exchangeable with money, but this reflection exhibits a movement that represents the relationship of labor time to money as wages. The capitalist axiomatic, which identifies money and time, automatically turns labor time into wages. The leap from money to time brings the commodity into the equation in the form of price, while the leap from labor time to money is automatically reflected as the wage relationship.

⁹ This axiomatic installation is analyzed by Deleuze and Guattari regarding the inherent boundaries of capitalism and the analysis of the machines that homogenize, abstract and bind all social forces in the capital order: “Capitalism is indeed axiomatic, because it has no laws but immanent ones” (1988: 463).



Secondly, money automatically gives a socially objective character to an illusion formed under capitalist conditions, as if it were itself a productive entity. This situation appears especially in Marx's remarks on interest in *Capital III*. In his analysis of interest-bearing capital, he shows that fetishism acquires an "automatic" and "pure" form with the process of M-M' (1991: 516). Contrary to simple circuits in which capital is converted into money and money is converted back into capital, Marx detects something interesting here: he emphasizes that we are now faced with a form "devoid of content" (1991: 516). The money-form is the completion of fetishization, because money itself, along with interest-bearing capital, appears to be the source of value, and our collective illusions confirm this. Money is turned into a fantastic form of fetishism by the ever-increasing tendency of capital. Marx even states that this form is the "irrational" form of capital (1991: 516), that production relations are represented completely wrongly and objectified in this form, and that the most visible form of capitalistic mystification is found here.¹⁰

In a new moment of division, where the image of the organic world that maintains the distance between the object and the subject collapses, we can now see the dawning of the kind of subjectivity that commodity fetishism, which reaches its purest form with money and interest-bearing capital, has led to. This is a "subject-object" (Kordela 2017: 43), that is, an indivi-dual. However, for those of us who are immersed in the money fetishism of the control society, this term should be written as divi-dual.

4. Deleuze and the Dividual

For Hegel, "work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing" (1977: 118). This means that traces of reification can be found even in the representation of the organic world at the level of intersubjective relations. So, what happens when labor, as a productive force in which desire is frozen, is frozen once again? If capital appears before us in the form of past labor, accumulated labor or dead labor, we should no longer refrain from saying that what is accumulated in it, what is past or what is dead, is also desire. By freezing living labor in motion, capital also retains the productivity of social desire in it.

Marx analyzes commodity fetishism by reversing the dualities of the organic world: he still has a Hegelian image of the organic world with which he can compare the dead, abstract and quantitative world created by fetishism. Commodity fetishism arises from the capitalist mode of production as an objective and social phenomenon that mystifies the field of objects. In Deleuze's age, money fetishism is hidden in an openness that

¹⁰ For me, this irrational form of capital shows that fetishism moves to another phase: just as primitive accumulation continues in the contemporary phenomena of capitalism, fetishization is not a completed process but an ongoing phenomenon that evolves and transforms as capital internalizes its external limits.



removes the mystery from everything. Fetishes are hidden within power relations as well as production relations and are nestled in the forms of thought. It is the society itself that has become fetishized within the world of representation created by common sense and dogmatic thought images: “common sense objectifies sociality, makes society a thing that can be seen, remembered and thought” (Read 2009: 83).

Following the genealogy initiated by Foucault, in his groundbreaking article “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze proceeds by developing a historical, logical and programmatic analysis of three forms of social power. These are societies in which power relations are based on sovereignty, discipline and control (1995: 177). In this context, the ‘divi-dual’ presents the view of the fragmented individual emerging from a control-based social formation. So, what is the connection of this framework with fetishism?

First of all, the historical dimension of Deleuze’s analysis locates the societies of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These societies belong to a period when the social contradictions necessary for the development of capitalism progressed, primitive accumulation was enacted with “bloody legislation” (Marx 1976: 896) and capital relations in the modern sense began to be established. Then, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and even the beginning of the twentieth century, are the time of disciplinary social power relations. So, based on Deleuze’s historical analysis, we can say that Marx formulated his theory of commodity fetishism within a disciplinary society: a period when capitalism revolutionized production with mechanization and the creation of worldwide markets. Well, can the commodity-form preserve the phantasmagoria of the modes of production of a society dominated by disciplinary power relations in the same way within the modes of production of a society based on control? Undoubtedly, the basic dynamics of the capitalist mode of production have continued, overcoming periodic crises, but the question of change still needs to be asked.

In the sovereignty model, only archaic traces of commodity fetishism can be found, while in the disciplinary society we encounter a completed form of commodity fetishism, as presented by Marx in his analysis of money. Or is it really completed? How does the evolution of commodity fetishism take place within the control society? When commodity fetishism reaches its purest form and completion with money, does not fetishism itself evolve towards a new social appearance? Does the commodity lose its power to reflect social relations, or has this power been transferred to money in a process of change from discipline to control? These problems are before us. We can no longer ignore that we are in a space of control where we need to rethink our perspective on abstract labor, quantitative time, money and reification.

Secondly, if the subjectification modes of the disciplinary power paradigm develop through the individual/mass couple, as Deleuze emphasizes, it must be asked what kind



of subjectification mode we encounter in control societies and what its connection with fetishism is. The divi-dual is a figure that carries the fetishistic images of the new division regimes formed within money fetishism. In this respect, it is possible to read the divi-dual as a phenomenon of contemporary money fetishism within the control society. So, who is the divi-dual? Is it the modern proletariat, the person who has become so pulverized that it can no further be disintegrated? Is it the subject that can no longer be reified because its reification is complete, or the object that can no longer be personified because its personification is complete? No, none of these. It is not enough to write it in the subject-object form; because this is the name of the individual in the world of commodities. The divi-dual is the mode of contemporary subjectivity searching for its own body in an incorporeal world, the second historical division of the individual subject.

The fragmentation of the individual takes place in a certain regime of duality: abstract and concrete, qualitative and quantitative, dead and alive. These are traces of the dualities of the organic world. Here the regimes of political economy are at work, which pave the way for a special typology: the vampire does not stop haunting the organic. Of course, capital's vampirism has not disappeared, but when it activates the principle of excess, it also uses its zombies. The vampire haunts the organic before it dies, the zombie does so after its death. If the vampire is a principle of frugality, the zombie corresponds to a principle of excess that disrupts the rational balance of the liberal political economy between resources and needs. The vampire is a monopolist, the zombie is a competitor: the dialectic of the market operates between the two. The transition from vampire to zombie has torn the individual apart: individual. However, the founding figure of the phantasmagoria of money fetishism in the control society is neither a vampire nor a zombie. These cannot represent an order existing on its own, a world completely independent of the organic: another figure is required. Autonomous robots, artificial intelligences that produce production tools and algorithms, and cyborgs complete this transition. *The vampire belonging to the organic world image in the society of sovereignty is the individual acting according to the principle of thrift; the zombie belonging to the commodity fetishism in the world of the disciplinary society is the individual acting according to the principle of excess; the robot belonging to the money fetishism of the control society is the divi-dual acting according to the soul of enterprise.* Money was seen as the blood flowing through the circulatory system of capital; however, this is only the case in the organic world image. Money is now not the complement of the commodity, which is space, it is the time of fetishization and the major signifier of the establishment of a new fetishist world. The divi-dual is the true child of the control society with its money fetishism.

In fact, the organic world externalizes the movement from witch to vampire, the world of disciplinary commodity fetishism reflects the transition from vampire to zombie, and the world of control-based money fetishism indicates an acceleration from



zombie to robot. When the transition is completed, the previous figures do not disappear; on the contrary, they inherit the characteristics of the type into which they evolved: in the transition to the zombie, the vampire behaves like a zombie, and in the transition to the robot, both vampires and zombies become robotic. Robotic dance choreographies are now widely popular, surpassing even Michael Jackson's zombies. The divi-dual is the division created by this transition within the individual subject in the contemporary world. This phenomenon of division is no longer describable in terms of a break between the simple dualities of the organic world: division is an irreversible process. This is a division that cannot be synthesized. The hand is not separated from the organism, the organism is separated from all organs. Divi-dual is a part without a whole. If we let it talk instead of commodities, it would claim that it is half of itself, just like Medardo of Terralba, and that everyone is "divided, fragmented" like itself (Calvino 2017: 76).

4.1. Society of Control

Deleuze reads the development of control societies as a twentieth-century development. He states that at the end of the twentieth century, we witnessed that the institutions of confinement on which the disciplinary society was built were in a deep crisis. Disciplinary institutions such as hospitals, barracks, factories and schools, which are organized according to the prison model, have become associated with continuous reforms with the development of control-based social power (1995: 178).

Disciplinary social power subjects the individual to a process of subjectification in which he must constantly start over, from one institution to another. An individual is born, becomes a member of a family, and when she goes to the barracks, she is no longer at home. She moves from the barracks to the factory and is no longer in the barracks. This mode of expression is interesting: "you are not at home, you know" (1995: 177). When she finally falls into prison, the black box of the entire system becomes visible to her. The individual is one pole of a huge disciplinary program. Discipline is exercised on the individual/mass pair (1995: 179). Disciplinary societies are based on the management of life, unlike societies based on sovereignty that rely on the threat of death. The Panopticon, formulated by Jeremy Bentham and analyzed in depth by Foucault, is an architectural model of a power technique suitable for keeping the individual under constant discipline. The individual internalizes the idea that watchers, who are not visible from the outside, are constantly watching him in his transparent cell, which is clearly visible from the high tower at the center (Bentham 1995: 43). Sometimes the individual is a soldier in a strict hierarchical order, as in the barracks, and sometimes the individual is a student, sitting in a row, as in school. However, each individual has a signature that distinguishes him.



Deleuze analyzes three logics of social power and three different programs. These three societies have their own machines. In societies of sovereignty, simple machines such as clocks, spinning wheels and levers; in disciplinary societies, energy-powered machines such as engines and steam-powered mechanisms; in control societies, digital machines such as computers and software shape the means of production (1995: 180). We can talk about an organic-mechanical mechanization process that is still dependent on human power in the first, an energetic-electronic process depending on human management in the second, and a digital-automatic mechanization process that operates on its own in the third. It is important for our analysis that Deleuze emphasizes that this technological evolution is related to the “mutation of capitalism” (1995: 180).

In terms of social institutions, disciplinary societies consist of “molds” (1995: 178-179). In other words, the individual enters a mold and takes shape there, and this can only happen through closure. In control societies, institutions such as family, hospital and prison are moribund in their modern forms: there is still a family, a school, a hospital, a prison, but now their functions and programs are differentiated: each new function is born with a new capacity that is differentiated within a modulation. The family gradually breaks down, while the school transforms into a place of ongoing education. Meanwhile, the patient attends regular check-ups, and the prisoner transitions to probation. Deleuze says: “we’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals become ‘dividuals,’ and masses become samples, data, market, or ‘banks’” (1995: 180). Let us continue using a hyphen: the individual has been replaced by the divi-dual. So, what does the phantasmagoria based on money fetishism in which the divi-dual grows up look like?

4.2. The Soul of Businesses and the New Movement of Money

If in the society of control, continuous education has taken over the domain of the school, if probation and electronic handcuffs modify the prison, if the constant medicalized risk of disease has replaced treatment, if private armies have been established in place of the conventional army, what could have taken the central place of the factory in the relations of production? Deleuze’s answer to this is businesses, corporations. And right away he adds:

Corruption here takes on a new power. The sales department becomes a business center or ‘soul!’ We’re told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world. Marketing is now the instrument of social control and produce: the arrogant breed who are our masters (1995: 181).



How was this soul formed and from which body was it freed?¹¹ The mutations of capitalism are of critical importance in understanding the metamorphoses in the phantasmagoria of fetishism. For Deleuze, capitalism of the nineteenth century is based on the intensification of production (1995: 179). Indeed, the capitalist starts by purchasing raw materials, as can be observed in Marx's equations regarding the cycles of value. The capitalist production process begins with the investment of money-capital into raw materials, labor tools and labor power commodities, and progresses when a commodity that comes out of the production process with surplus value turns into money again in the market and triggers a process of appreciation. As soon as money returns to itself with a surplus, the process of not only producing surplus value but also its realization is accomplished. The cycle continues and money-capital continues its endless tendency to increase, with its own internal contradictions, passing through competition-monopoly dynamics. According to Deleuze, the mutation of capitalism in the late twentieth century transformed this process: "It's a capitalism no longer directed toward production but toward products, that is, toward sales or markets" (1995: 180). What is this "toward products" and what is its connection with capitalism and money fetishism?

Consider Marx's example of the wooden table. According to Deleuze, the focus of capitalist valorization today is no longer on the material transformation the wooden table undergoes. The mystical clothes, theological ornaments, and even the "grotesque ideas" (Marx 1976: 163) that the wooden table, produced as a commodity, acquires when it appears as value against other commodities, indicate that the table is no longer in relation with any wooden table but with a certain divi-dual. The tailor who sews the mystical outfit is Money. The entire space of the commodity is surpassed by money, which is the time of capital. In commodity fetishism, the commodity reflected social relations because it dominated the social "forms" of ideas. In money fetishism, money is the mover. Everything appears to circulate through money, which exerts a seductive power by mediating and animating all social objects. This illusion becomes naturalized, taking on an objective and socially validated form. Whereas the commodity fetishizes fixed forms, money fetishizes the moment and operates directly on time itself. The subject is thus compelled to undergo continual transformation, adapting within each moment which, while appearing uniform, demands constant renewal. Yet the subject remains unable to fully apprehend the flow of capital, which traverses them at a velocity governed by a temporality unanchored from any stable spatial reference.

Money is the immanent imperative that promises to transcend the finite. It is the messenger of the bad infinite. In the transition from capitalism for production to

¹¹ Nietzsche says: "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* – this is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus, it was that man first developed what was later called his 'soul'" (1989: 83). Today, we are faced with the soul of the businesses as a fetish that occurs in a new internalization process: *internalization of capital*.



capitalism for product, a major transformation occurs in the phantasmagoria of fetishism: this is one reason why we speak of money fetishism. In commodity fetishism money had a complementary role, in money fetishism commodities are finite modes to be transcended.

In short, it is money that controls the cycles of value. The value cycles that continue their flow in the form of finance are completely out of the individual's control. The individual can only enter this world with her password, and there she now consists of a collection of imprints, divi-dual, scattered like QR codes undergoing statistical calculations. The individual has her/his own "signature" and the divi-dual has a "code" that can only be used as a "password" (Deleuze 1995: 180). Therefore, the value of the object is no longer determined by the signature on it. In the world of the divi-dual, where this new figure is defined within the monetary flow accessed with its own code, intersubjectivity gives way to interobjectivity: things become products in such a way that they themselves form an ecosystem, moving with money within a certain chained activity field. Marketing is the language of this interobjective world.

Advertisers appear wherever the divi-dual uses its passwords. The show starts again as soon as the curtain closes. The entrepreneurial spirit enters the new world by occupying the whole stage. In order to access services, obtain a criminal record, or view blood values, the divi-dual has to get used to waiting on digital platforms of which it is now convinced that they are impossible to change. For example, Daniel Blake, one of the last figures of the free citizen who still relies on a pen-and-paper based, cannot survive in this network-based world (Loach 2016). This is not an individual, this is a divi-dual that has to enter the interobjective world with its own codes. In a world out of control, that is, in the control society, the role assigned to it is to maintain a statistically calculable and measurable life. It may even be given citizenship points.

So, what happens in this world of control that turns businesses into spiritual beings? Trying to break the mystical shell of the commodities, Marx's theory of fetishism is a theory of the market and ideology, aiming at the collective phantasmagoria where collective illusions gain objective social powers. The analysis of money fetishism, on the other hand, compels us to discover the new Cartesianism before us by pointing to the logic of businesses and corporations, the "soul" they have usurped in the control space where the market has now become a control device: we should now write this strange entity as divi-dual. Its divisions are not in the form of abstract and concrete, quantitative and qualitative, dead and living: instead of this trinity, along with the divi-dual, it is now the mind-body or material-spiritual distinction that appears in this digitalized world: a world subjected to the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal, which is gradually transferring its corporeal qualities to the incorporeal entities. Corporations, advertisers, marketers are working on this new Cartesian entity.



From a historical and political perspective, the centralizing effect of the factory on production relations also created opportunities for the coexistence of productive forces, the continuity of worker unions' activities and the social impact of workers' resistance. However, according to Deleuze, businesses do not act on the individual/mass pair, they regard individuals as mere articles and masses as statistical samples. *The phantasmagoria of commodity fetishism threatened individuals to throw them into an anonymous world and to appropriate their signatures; contemporary money fetishism, on the other hand, puts into effect the promise of taking the divi-dual into an interobjective world with a unique password or code.* The divi-dual is the fragmented subject of the interobjective world. The queues it is waiting in are not post-office queues; it belongs to the horizontal hierarchy of queues of unknown length at the doors of virtual worlds.

Pure performance is the criterion of the social activity of the divi-dual in this interobjective world. Let's look at wages with Deleuze. Factories adopt traditional wage policies: wages differ according to level, activity and status. Nowadays, businesses and corporations have performance-based wages. The employees are regarded in terms of the capacity to deliver a singular performance that encompasses all dimensions of their existence. For example, poor performance is grounds for dismissal. Companies use anything that will increase performance, from the most terrifying and ridiculous happy hour parties to the most humiliating group events. Still, it wants to make its employees feel like they are a "family."¹² The corporation is a spirit that modulates and divides individuals. The divi-dual, whose sense of self is fragmented across objects and can only be reassembled through the mediation of the corporate soul, is ultimately condemned to even deeper division by holding onto this belief.

According to Deleuze, the transformation of money presents an interesting phenomenon in the transition to a control society (1995: 179). Money is no longer the old money: the coin is a material representation. It belongs to an abstraction that civilization has developed over several thousand years, a basis for representing wealth with something natural. Money bound to some material, such as gold, silver, and even paper money, cannot explain the fluctuating exchange rates in the control society. Value is located in the folds of a smooth space. Now, the money we see before us is not the pure and completed form of fetishism, but the main actor of a new fetishistic phantasmagoria. It is a new ghost wandering around the entire commodity world. It has become increasingly spiritual, increasingly digital, and has been turned into an abstraction that has lost its material basis. This is an unchained money that moves in fluctuating exchange rates, whose value can change constantly, and which has become a center as well as a store and producer of value. It is a digital machine that is

¹² The relationship of family and households with fetishism is discussed by David Graeber in relation to the concept of the "double process of fetishism" (2001: 79). According to Graeber, there are two minimal units in a capitalist society (factories that produce commodities and households that produce people), and the mediating element that connects these two units is the market.



incorporealized. What we have before us is the new phantasmagoria of money, whose dependence on gold was broken by liberal capitalism in 1971, and which gained the power to disperse souls. Deleuze compares old money to a mole and new money to the *coils of the serpent*: “If money’s old moles are the animals you get in places of confinement, then control societies have their snakes” (1995: 181). Value used to have forms, that is, temporary spaces, like a mole moving from one burrow in the ground to another, value moved in money, in commodities, and in forms in the process of production. Now, however, value moves through the moment: the moments deeply penetrated by value belong to money, just as each coil is a movement of the snake itself.

Deleuze did not live long enough to hear the new bad news. Today, companies produce concepts and even claim to reinterpret products. Corporations are represented as a mind, a spirit, with the power of conception, valuation and interpretation. The manifestation of this spirit across social life become possible through the formation of the contemporary divi-dual as a body conditioned to internalize it. This process reflects the present-day expressions of money fetishism. The selfie defeats all theories of the self: it is just one of the prices that the divi-dual pays in order to say “I am.”

4.3. Indebtedness

The role of money in commodity fetishism is to be a complement. Within the realm of commodities, money appears as a pure and irrational form. Along with its economic functions it also has a fetishistic function, and yet all this is performed by money as a commodity. In commodity fetishism, the question *how many?* could be asked of everything; however, in money fetishism, what is asked of everything is *how much?* Quantity does not define money anymore, money covers quantity. In commodity fetishism, money is still one of the value-forms that leaves its mark in the translational movements of value, or the universal equivalent, which is the major term of the translation of value. In money fetishism, money is the only ether that traverses all cycles: for capitalism, the point is now to transcend the finite image of the cycle with the bad infinity.

We now have a movement against *corporealization*, a movement which is in alliance with the *corporations*. Time and labor were corporealized in commodity fetishism; in money fetishism, they become incorporealized. Value is an incorporeal field. Thus, value takes on the appearance of a “soul.” Nowadays, a person’s search for meaning is replaced by a feeling of “worthlessness.” Isn’t this interesting? Corporealization is a form of retention, keeping time and labor in capital, stopping their movements; just as in the organic world desire is frozen in work and labor. The movement of incorporealization releases capacities and mobilizes value within moments. Everyone must organize moments according to the movement of value, that is, she must rearrange her daily life,



moment by moment, according to the infinite tendency of value to increase. In this new racing form, any piece of time in which the moment is not converted into value is recorded in the person's negative column as "worthless". In this endless race for value, the more she wins, the more she *has* to win and thus becomes someone who is doomed to lose. She turns into a strange subjectivity, a divi-dual, with the possibility of infinite devaluation in the face of capital's infinite drive towards valuation. This is a crisis: her crisis of value arises from the re-division between the infinite and the finite, and it intensifies as the negative share she has of the globe's capitalist "psychosphere" increases (Berardi 2007: 131). The divi-dual is a negative numerator or rather a negative dividend: a negative dividend whose denominator is bad infinity.

In this new Cartesianism that divides the corporeal and the incorporeal, which is also trying to subject the first to the second, and faced with the threat of being surpassed by this subjection, money is not only a means of paying debts, but also a distributor of debt on behalf of capital. And it is in this consciousness of indebtedness that the Cartesian dualism finds its pineal gland. Deleuze says: "Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded, whereas discipline was long-term, infinite, and discontinuous. A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt." (1995: 180) This man in constant debt, that is, *homo debitor* (Lazzarato 2012: 127), is a divi-dual that is opened rather than closed Where does this debt arise from? Since when has it been surrounded by an unpayable infinity?¹³

In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's genealogy of social machines in their groundbreaking work *Anti-Oedipus*, debt expresses itself in every register of social investment of desire, adhering to phenomena of power. Following a program dedicated to the analysis of the relationship between debt and morality in Nietzsche's work *On the Genealogy of Morals*, the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* reveal that the social power structure that codes from above, which they call the despotic and barbaric social machine, imposes the debt of existence on the investments of social desire. Every social being, every resource flow such as stocks, land, products, people and animals bear this debt of existence to the despot. The despot retains the power to kill at all times. In capitalism, which Deleuze and Guattari claim emerged from the encounter between deterritorialized labor force flows and capital that has lost its dependence on land-based wealth, debt exists no longer in the form of gratitude to ancestors and sacrifices to temples, as in the primitive period, nor in the form of an existential debt to the despot, as in the Middle Ages. Capital is a body that gathers all social flows within itself: it is a body

¹³ Deleuze's observations in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* regarding the birth of the debt that cannot be paid are worth mentioning here. Debt, whether directed at society and the state or at the cult of ancestors, is part of a fetishization between reactive forces: "The association of reactive forces is thus accompanied by a transformation of debt; this becomes a debt toward "divinity," toward "society," toward "the State," toward reactive instances. Everything then takes place between reactive forces. Debt loses the active character by virtue of which it took part in man's liberation: in its new form it is inexhaustible, unpayable" (1992: 141).



without organs and the debt one owes it can never be escaped by payment (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 10). The big creditor is none other than capital itself. The incorporeal presence of money, the spirit of corporations and businesses, entrepreneurial presentations of the self, and the spirit of the market doctrine are at work everywhere and in everything. It is at this point that the appearance of debt in the control society is linked to money fetishism.

Capital progresses not by closing, but by deterritorializing, by shifting and dispersing the ground on which the subject stands. If the real limit of capitalism is capital itself, then this system is obliged to change internally in order to constantly expand its borders. Money fetishism constitutes a variant of this change. In commodity fetishism, the commodity reflected the products of labor into human consciousness as beings with independent personalities, equipped with the qualities of the labor of those who produced them, and the social relations between laborers in the form of natural-social relations between things. Labor is still the only reality that is not capital. It can be said that labor is productive in the face of capital, and that there is a living structure of labor in the face of its dead nature. One can engage in analysis of the commodity to dispel the collective illusion. Exchange value suppresses use value but still needs to be carried by it. In any case, there is a relationship between exchange value and use value. However, in money fetishism, the last relationship between exchange value and use value disappears. Money eliminates the definition of use value in the form of pure exchange value. The birth of the endless debt to capital is the end of this relationship.

Imagine a world built solely on exchange value: this is the world of debt-ridden people who produce nothing but trash and waste, while things are constantly replaced by one another. Debt is defined as an amount that takes the form of a bad infinity by adding finite things together infinitely. Debt is the apparatus of the new fetishism, in which the control logic of capital is organized in the form of bad infinity. So now the reflective power of commodities turns into the power of money.

Money in the new phantasmagoria of the divi-dual is the ether that traverses stocks, flows, desires, labor – in short, all dimensions of social production. It divides social space between the finite and the infinite, the corporeal and the incorporeal, and finally, the mental and the physical. This is where the new Cartesianism of the divi-dual arises. Control is divided once again in the divided social individual. One is divided into two, and with the possibility of differentiation it simultaneously faces the risk of integration in a new decadence. According to Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, the attempt to contain the social forces that drive deterritorialization results in a dual structure within the divi-dual, caught between paranoid fascistic investments and schizoid revolutionary impulses. This internal contradiction reveals a key limitation of schizoanalysis itself. This is the handicap of schizoanalysis. When the battle between fascistic investments and revolutionary lines of flight over one and the same body is transformed into a new



Cartesianism by the division logic of capitalism, schizoid investments to escape find themselves operating at one pole of the duality.

The divi-dual is in a phantasmagoria where it thinks that it can overcome the abstractions of finite worlds and finite commodities only with the infinite movement of money. Debt and money compete in a way that feeds the infinite tendency of capital to increase. This is no longer the debt to the ancestors, nor the debt of existence to the despot. In the imagination of ancient cultures, the debt to the ancestors is met with sacrifice or other forms of substitution, while the debt to the despot ends with a death sentence. However, the debt to capital is permanent and increases all the while it is being paid. This is a strange tendency towards infinity that did not exist in any previous mode of production. Yet it belongs to bad infinity itself; it mobilizes money to overcome the finitude of the commodity – that is why capital remains the real limit of capitalism. Today, the only ground granted to the divi-dual for eternity is continually traversed by the movement of bad infinity itself.

4.4. Divi-Dual

Why do we write the individual that Deleuze claims is fragmented in the control society as “divi-dual”? The duality of the divi-dual arises from the evolution of the three world images discussed here.

While the organic world, which allows the subject to externalize his own will, is considered to be dependent on a social production system in which use value dominates exchange value, the world of commodity fetishism, which allows the object to be reflected in the subject’s consciousness as personalized, is the product of a system in which exchange value disciplines and mediates use value. However, even in commodity fetishism, there is a relationship between use value and exchange value: accordingly, use value must carry exchange value.¹⁴ While the organic world encodes a technique of power characterized by sovereignty within the social organism, the realm of commodity fetishism offers a comprehensive framework for understanding disciplinary societies. In control societies, however, money fetishism has created a new phantasmagoria, reinforced by the assumption that there is no relationship between exchange value and use value: it is this rupture that defines the divi-dual, and this rupture results in the inclusion of money as a mobilizing force in the collective phantasmagoria. *Reflection* and *externalization* have now been replaced by *mobilization*. The idea of externalization

¹⁴ In the world of commodity fetishism, use value is, as Spivak emphasizes, “both outside and inside the system of value-determination” (2006: 223). This *both/and* is the division of the individual and its structure: indivi-dual. This relationship was one of *either/or* in the organic world: *either* the living *or* the non-living. However, in the world of money fetishism, use value is *neither* inside *nor* outside the determination of value.



addresses how a world emerges from the conscious subject, while the idea of reflection explains how subjects and objects achieve social consciousness within the world of commodities. In contrast, the idea of mobilization introduces a more complex and nuanced terrain. Rather than providing a solution, it reframes the problem by questioning how the paradigm of fetishistic relations penetrates social unconscious investments. It further investigates how this paradigm drives a second historical phase, in which money becomes the prime mover shaping the logic of mobilization

Fetishism is not just an epistemological illusion, a collective mistake to be corrected, it is a reality that has gained social power as a collective illusion. Marx's aim is to gather together all the tools necessary to dispel this mysterious appearance of the fog that has settled around commodities, to historicize the issue and finally to analyze it at a moment when commodity fetishism can no longer be itself, through a materialist use of dialectics. Deleuze, on the other hand, reveals the terrible news we hear in the control society: that companies have souls. Throughout this article, in which we have tried to read Deleuze's analysis of control societies and Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism together, I have suggested that the transformation of our collective illusions is moving towards money fetishism, and that the great changes we are going through from disciplinary societies to control societies can be related to the movement and new manifestations of money. I have claimed that we are faced with a new field of subjectivity, a new Cartesian phenomenon, and that this phenomenon is full of new bad news as well as risks. I have observed that this new Cartesian phenomenon is redivided between the finite and the infinite, the corporeal and the incorporeal, and mind and body. One became two again in order to be accelerated according to the logic of mobilization: this moment can be considered as a revolutionary line of flight across all the moments that money tries to traverse, but on the condition that it is not captured by reterritorialization, that differentiation is not swallowed by division. The forces that could create this condition are hidden today in the common historical tragedy of desire and labor. Who will be the mover? An imagination is needed that will save desire from freezing in labor, labor from being corporealized in capital, and that will liberate time from being the bad infinity of moments. This imagination is now used and usurped by the phantasmagoria of fetishism. Where can traces of a counter-imagination be found? Or is it the child who still maintains use value in the game? Adorno says: "In his purposeless activity the child, by a subterfuge, sides with use value against exchange value" (2005: 228).

We have heard the bad news and pondered over it. Let's end this article with good news. The following words of Medardo of Terralba seem to have come from the mouth of the divi-dual: "Not only me, Pamela, I am a divided, fragmented being, but so are you and everyone else. I now have a brotherhood that I did not know before, when I was whole, with all the disabilities and deficiencies in the world, I am a brother" (Calvino 2017: 76).



The two conflicting halves of Medardo of Terralba come together only after a duel, during which both are wounded once more at the precise place of their initial division. The divi-dual's *duel* (*duello*) is just beginning, perhaps not to become one again, but to create a world suitable for its own image. The moment is approaching when we need to write this figure as *dividuello* rather than *dividual*, to be able to think the people to come once more.

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