

From Critical Race Theory to Critical Religion Theory:
An Adaptation for In-Country Struggles based on Race, Religion, Skin Color, and
Capitals. A Globalized Cultural, Social, Political, Educational, Historical, and
Contemporary “East versus West” Crisis.

by Diana Labisch

Claremont Graduate University
(2019)

FROM CRITICAL RACE THEORY TO CRITICAL RELIGION THEORY

APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Diana Labisch as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Joshua Goode
Claremont Graduate University
School of Arts and Humanities

Prof. Thomas Luschei
Claremont Graduate University
School of Educational Studies

Prof. William Perez
Loyola Marymount University
School of Education

FROM CRITICAL RACE THEORY TO CRITICAL RELIGION THEORY

Abstract

From Critical Race Theory to Critical Religion Theory: An Adaptation for In-Country Struggles based on Race, Religion, Skin Color, and Capitals. A Globalized Cultural, Social, Political, Educational, Historical, and Contemporary “East versus West” Crisis.

by

Diana Labisch

Claremont Graduate University (2019)

Multiculturalism and the merging of local communities with immigrants demands glocal policies in various sectors—especially in education. In order to successfully integrate immigrants, language acquisition is oftentimes the first initiative educators and politicians regard as one of the most essential attributes for successful and prompt integration. However, language acquisition cannot be separated from the need to bridge communities and their different values, tradition, ideologies, and identities based on their cultural heritages and religious affiliations. In order to properly respond to newly-emerging glocal dynamics in, for instance, classrooms, it is crucial to understand the shifts in racisms from black versus white to East versus West. Therefore, concepts need to consider different dynamics and embrace issues related to gender, sexuality, skin color, habitus, social, financial, and cultural capital, as well as educational achievement (gaps) on an interdisciplinary level. While seeking to find appropriate adaptations of school curricula, it is necessary to not try to run before one can walk—in other words—to not try to let educators teach before they have been taught cross-cultural communication. In addition, racisms cannot be limited to conflicts between immigrants and non-immigrants; racisms also occur among a homogeneous group. The complexity of reuniting and/or integrating various immigrant, non-immigrant, (Middle) Eastern and Western identities and their (intercultural) belonging is critical because of the various circumstances and settings that need to be considered for responding to linguistic, cultural, social, psychological, educational, and financial matters individually. Although there is not *one* concrete

theoretical framework or outcome that can be applied for integration; this dissertation thesis functions as a roadmap for becoming more aware of regional and international struggles. Despite the multifaceted approaches that need to be combined and implemented in terms of second language acquisition, updated teacher training, cross-cultural policies, access to social services and support systems, etc., the education sector remains the foundation for prospective integration: Integrative and multiculturally-aware education provides the glocal society with intercultural and interdisciplinary-applicable assets and capitals. Such abilities help create a politically, socially, financially, culturally, and educationally responsible future embracing transatlantic intermingling instead of oppressing Otherness. Local *and* global communities benefit from better-adjusted and well-integrated immigrant families and students. The better societies and politics educate, integrate, and value non-locals, the more societies will benefit culturally, socially, politically, and economically from the glocal population. The newly-introduced **PIC SAM** guidelines provide, in cooperation with key actors and community-centered programs for immigrants and non-immigrants, a roadmap for combining theory and practice in glocal contexts.

Keywords: Critical Race Theory, Critical Religion Theory, belonging, multiculturalism, bilingualism, bi-religionism, Middle East, *Ossi, Wessi, F-connection*, Ideological State Apparatus, Repressed State Apparatus, ill-ideologies, racisms, *glocal*, immigration, integration, German Democratic Republic, Othering, colorblind, headscarfblind, habitus, pre-activism, post-activism, identity, ideology, education, bilingual immersion programs

FROM CRITICAL RACE THEORY TO CRITICAL RELIGION THEORY

Dedicated to my Mama Petra and my Papa Peter, my wonderful grandparents, and my true friends. Without all of your support I would not have been able to pursue my (personal American) dream, my hopes, and my ambitions!

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	vi
List of Figures, Tables, and Illustrations	x
<i>Chapter One</i>	1
<i>Personal Narrative and Relevance: Education as Powerful Integration Tool</i>	1
<i>Rationale, Overview, and Global Integration and Education</i>	7
Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approaches	14
Terminology	17
Steps for Globally-Adjusted Integration and Education	29
Step 1: Understanding Legal Challenges of Turkish Immigrants	29
Step 2: Understanding that Not Every Middle Easterner is a Muslim	33
Step 3: Starting Successful Integration in Kindergarten	33
Step 4: Nurturing Integration Instead of Oppressing Immigration	36
Step 5: Adapting CRT—From Colorblind to Headscarfblind	39
Step 6: Taking the Education Exit for Integration	43
Step 7: Taking the Education Exit to Integration	44
Step 8: Sprucing Up the Headscarf Image	45
<i>Chapter Two</i>	48
<i>Literature Review</i>	48
<i>Chapter Three</i>	103

<i>“Other” Ideologies and Identities—Theoretical Approaches</i>	103
(1) How to Approach Different Ideologies	103
(2) Reasons for Othering and Biased Headscarf Images	103
(3) Disempowering the Exotic Other	104
(4) The Danger of Ill-Ideologies	106
(5) Ideologies as Utopia and Fantasy	108
(6) Capitalization and Mass Economization of Identities and Ideologies	109
(7) Institutionalization of the ISA (aka the School)	110
<i>Chapter Four</i>	113
<i>Individuals are Always-Already Subjects of Ideology</i>	113
Concepts Creating the Multifaceted Constructions of Ideology	114
(1) Ideology as A-Historical	114
(2) Is Ideology “Real” or an Illusion?	115
(3) Individuals are Always-Already Subjects (of Ideology)	116
(4) Subjects within a Mass-Produced Media (Ill)Ideology	117
(5) Shift: From Dominant via Repressed Ideology to State Apparatus	119
(6) Concluding Thoughts on Ideologies	120
<i>Chapter Five</i>	123
<i>Race as Product of Social, Political, and Educational Thought</i>	123
<i>Chapter Six</i>	128
<i>Shifts in Racisms: Whitewashed—From Black to (Middle) East</i>	128
The <i>Wende</i> within Immigration and Globalization	134

(1) History and Its Effect on Pre- and Post-Activism	134
(2) GDR Museums—(False?) Nostalgia in Times of Globalization	141
(3) Cross-Generational Racisms and Racialized White Others	145
<i>Chapter Seven</i>	149
<i>Different Social and Cultural Capitals: East vs. West (German) Habitus</i>	149
Adapting Bourdieu's Habitus to Different Contexts	151
Comparative Examples: Disadvantaged Groups in the Education Sector	154
Getting to the Nitty-Gritty: The Case of Oscar	156
Concluding the Nitty-Gritty: Political Trust and Progressive Educators	165
<i>Chapter Eight</i>	170
<i>Reverse Activisms: The Importance of Transnational Post-Activism</i>	170
Tear Down that Church!	173
Transferring Activism from the GDR to the 21 st Century	177
From "Teaching" Activism to "Doing" Activism	181
East versus West: Striving for Balanced Activisms	184
Activism, Aktivismus, and Activisme—or Negativism?	187
<i>Chapter Nine</i>	190
<i>Adapting and Diversifying CRT</i>	190
Teaching and Learning German and Intercultural Communication	195
Global and Anti-Racist Pedagogies In- and Outside of Schools	200
Roadmap for Changing (the) Dynamics in Germany's Education	203
(1) Cross-Language Policies: Bilingualism for Everyone	203

(2) Current Challenges in Germany's Education System	207
(3) Key Actors and Levels in Addressing the Integration Problem(s)	208
(4) Solution Approaches	210
<i>Chapter Ten</i>	212
<i>Glocal Frameworks: Adding "Bi-Religionism" to Bilingualism & Biculturalism</i>	212
Getting to the Nitty-Gritty: The Case of Mo	215
Educational Policy Recommendations	224
Concluding the Nitty-Gritty	230
<i>Chapter Eleven</i>	233
<i>Outlook and Conclusion: Striving for Glocal Awareness and Activist Change</i>	233
References	243
Endnotes	263

List of Figures, Tables, and Illustrations

Figure 1: Turkish Migrant Stock in Germany	30
Table 1: Translating CRT into a Middle Eastern/Religion-Based Theory	40
Illustration 1: Countries That Have Banned Veils	47
Figure 2: Household Net Income (in Euro) per Month	136
Figure 3: Concerns about Immigration in Former East versus West Germany	138
Figure 4: Percentage of Right-Wing Violence in Federal States of Former East Germany	139
Illustration 2: “we are the people” (Leipzig 1989)	147
Illustration 3: Pegida Demonstrations, “Miss Merkel, here is the people!” (Dresden 2014)	147
Illustration 4: Leipzig University (2019)	174
Illustration 5: Karl-Marx-Universität (GDR), Later Renamed to Leipzig University	174
Illustration 6: Paulinum before the Implosion (1968)	174
Illustration 7: Resistance during the Johann Sebastian Bach Competition (Leipzig 1968)	174
Illustration 8: Connection between Assembly Hall and Paulinum	178
Figure 5: As Family Income Rises, Expenditures on Items of Enrichment Rise	226
Table 2: Key Actors & Task Allocations for Community-Based Programs for Immigrant Families	228

Chapter One

Personal Narrative and Relevance: Education as Powerful Integration Tool

Due to my dissertation focus in Cultural Studies and Education and my German background, my research concentrates on interdisciplinary and intercultural approaches. I was always fascinated by the idea of how one concept or theory is understood and how the meaning and adaptation can change because of different and, perhaps even contradicting, political, religious, social, and cultural circumstances within the respective context. Since racism is a global problem, I was interested in different forms of racisms and how and why racisms shift throughout times and how racisms are affected by changing dynamics and times. This led to the idea of taking Critical Race Theory (CRT) as one of the basic concepts for my dissertation and looking at it from not only a race-focused perspective but to adjust and diversify CRT to a rather European and, particularly, German context.

Although CRT has developed new forms such as LatCrit, FemCrit, WhiteCrit, AsianCrit, TribalCrit, and QueerCrit, it lacks the religious component, which becomes increasingly relevant—in Germany and post-9/11. Therefore, I concentrate on a CRT that is less race-based and not only limited to skin color: Critical Religion Theory.

Possible adaptations of the initial CRT to a Critical Religion Theory are, for instance,

- the intersection of race, law, and power, which becomes an intersection of religion and anti-mask laws banning veils from public institutions,
- the shift from colorblindness to headscarfblindness, and
- the shift from whiteness as property and privilege to Christianity as property and privilege.

With the 9/11 attacks, suspicion and racism toward people of Middle Eastern descent and people wearing veils increased tremendously. It is a different form of racism

against white people who are Othered because of religious-related clothing that become racialized identity markers.

These rather newly-emerged forms of racisms cannot be limited to black versus white only: They are increasingly related to religious differences, ideologies, values, and identities. These new forms become even more problematic in times of globalization and the intermingling of Western and Eastern (or Middle Eastern) cultures, politics, traditions, and religious affiliations. Mark LeVine's *Heavy Metal Islam* (2008) is about the resistance and the struggle within the Middle Eastern cultures and the fact that Eastern and Western societies "had little choice but to accept the powerful impact of globalization on its culture" (260). LeVine continues to argue that today's world is "one big village" (ibid.), in which "cultures are melting and [in which] a mixed global heritage is being formed" (ibid.). He continues to describe the fear and the suspicion that derives from this intermingling—it is the fear of losing a (Western) identity and ideology. And it is exactly this fear that leads to racism and that hardens fronts across cultures in various sectors.

In order to put this into a Cultural Studies framework, I used Louis Althusser's concept of the ideological and repressed state apparatuses—a struggle of who is the most powerful and who determines identity, ideology, and, educational policies. The ongoing struggle and overruling of the East by the Western-dominated politics can also be noticed in the school sector, which I particularly focused on: The ban of the *Burka* in Germany's public schools, and other European countries such as France, is clearly an act of discrimination that discourages integration—it fosters isolation and creates a negative image of people wearing veils. Those people are then Othered and represented as if they do not belong to German society. In addition, Germany's immigrants who are predominantly from the Middle Eastern countries are taught

German in separate buildings. Hence, they are already isolated during the integration process—they are segregated from their classmates, which increasingly Others them. Another complication is that school curricula are neither multilingual, multicultural, nor multireligious—and the majority of educators is also not properly trained. This leads to the fact that integration is oftentimes confused with the idea of assimilating the Others, which does not encourage a cross-cultural mutual understanding and learning environment.

Instead of integration it is rather a Germanization, Westernization, or Americanization that demands a complete assimilation of the Others without treating their cultural heritages and different perspectives as enrichment for learning in a growingly global setting. In order to achieve a mutual intercultural learning atmosphere, bilingual and multicultural immersion programs would contribute to better integration procedures: Schools, teachers, policymakers, as well as parents need to understand that globally-adjusted learning environments will be enriching if policies provide teacher preparation and education and leave enough free space for individually tailored pedagogical and didactic learning and teaching methods and contexts. This would also encourage intercultural interactions for all inside as well as outside of the school: There is a need to bridge schools and communities in order to foster exchange between locals and immigrants. It is important to bridge school routines and immigrant family life in order to prevent a separation between an all-German environment and an (for instance) all-Turkish environment because this separation might cause identity struggles and crises for the immigrant families who often feel misplaced. Furthermore, bilingual immersion model would contribute to a more equal learning environment by not advantaging or disadvantaging particular groups: Because this model places “immigrant children in a position to help native

speakers become bilingual” (cf. Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 175). In this way, they feel appreciated. It is also an integrative and enriching model for immigrants and locals alike because it is beneficiary for learning different languages and, at the same time, both sides learn more about culture and traditions from their fellow students. Additionally, it will decrease clichés and stereotypes that might result in racism and continuous misrepresentations, underrepresentation, and segregation.

In order to achieve educational equality and cross-cultural exchange, we need certain key actors and key sectors for addressing integration problems: Those key branches include immigration offices, educational institutions, politics, and teacher training platforms. Sectors and school books and curricula need to be updated, need to be become multicultural and (at least) bilingual. Such an intercultural update needs to *embrace* diversity and not regard diversity as obstacle: Diversity needs to become the roadmap for bridging cultures and communities because the ability mediate between speakers of different languages and people from different cultures are not just skills for living and cooperating in such globalized world—those are values for creating the kind of world we actually want to live in. For this, we also need key actors; but key actors are not only educators: Key actors are also translators, psychologists, nurses and doctors, and legal counselors because

- translators help immigrant families to overcome language barriers that might hinder them to access certain social services that are crucial for setting up their new life,
- psychologists are able to professionally help traumatized immigrant families overcoming their experiences from the oftentimes violent circumstances in their home countries,
- nurses and doctors are necessary for providing health care and first aid but also, which I found shocking, to provide seemingly simple things such as glasses. Immigrant children’s vision and hearing need to be tested because many kids do not see and hear properly. Thus, they are not able to focus, learn, and understand in class. Especially in immigration countries such as Germany, this is easy to fix, and
- legal counselors are able to explain legal options related to immigration status, job opportunities, approvals of university degrees received in a different

country, and can guide through the entire application process in order to get legal citizenship or permanent residency.

Possible solutions and recommendations are *PICSAM*, a model I have developed in order to

Provide the opportunity to live in safer neighborhoods that are not isolated from mainstream society and in which immigrant families do not to face poverty and violence.

Increase the opportunity for items of enrichments (such as access to proper learning materials) and to increase supervised out-of-school activities that foster integration and that help building friendships after school.

Create better physical and mental health conditions in order to create well-integrated learning atmospheres.

These aspects will also result in

Safer living conditions and learning environments, better
Access to tutoring and after-school activities and resources, and better usage and opportunities of health care services and proper
Medical treatments including psychological counseling.

The problem, however is not only related to Westernizing immigrants, sometimes East and West struggles are also present within one country: While I was researching about the shifts in racism from black versus white to Middle East versus West, I also realized that racism does not necessarily need to be related to different cultures or heritages only. Racism can also happen within one nation—as it is the case in (former) East and West Germany. For my dissertation I conducted two interviews: One with Mo, who is a Turkish teenager who immigrated to Germany and talked about the isolated German language courses that Othered him even more and who also confirmed the lack of multiculturally-sensitive educators who would not embrace different approaches in culturally-diverse classrooms. The other interview was with Oscar who grew up in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and received his university degree in the GDR and struggled after the Wende to adjust and adapt to the new (more Westernized) unified Germany as a former *Ossi* (East German). Although

these two stories are very different, they both capture the shifts of racism caused by changing political dynamics. However, no matter what forms of racism curricula, classrooms, or societies face—it is essential to create a *glocalism* that embraces local circumstances and integrates the new global dynamics within those local settings and vice versa.

In order to decrease racism and segregation based on race, religion, gender, and other components, the most important aspect might be to update the educational systems, its policies, and curricula because education is, in my opinion, one of the most powerful tools to foster intercultural exchange and also an awareness, which is crucial for connecting politics, societies, and people. With an updated glocal education, we can create a well-functioning and cooperating society that faces less racially and religiously biased problems, violence, injustices, and unemployment. It is my hope that societies, education, and politics, strive for a global and local awareness as well as a constant interdisciplinary and multicultural exchange and activism in cooperation with key actors and community-based programs for immigrants and non-immigrants.

Rationale, Overview, and Global Integration and Education

Historically as well as contemporarily, the majority of countries face immigration dynamics that shape politics, cultures, religions, economies, and societies. Immigration is a continuous and always changing process (cf. Davis et al. 535). This process is caused by political, societal, and economical circumstances. The influences of immigration are a continuously shifting process and progress: Immigration contributes to diversities and new lifestyles to the respective target country. Theoretically, immigration is (especially in the 21st century and times of increasing globalization) described as enriching for immigrants as well as locals on a multilingual and multicultural scale. However, in reality, immigration cannot be separated from racism, oppression, segregation, and discrimination (cf. Arzubiaga et al. 314).

While in the United States discrimination was (and still is) mainly associated with people of color particularly referring to Blacks and later Latin Americans, Germany's association with immigration is not people of color but rather people from the Middle East.¹ Especially post-9/11, the United States has also experienced a shift in racism and racialized groups. This shift from skin color-based racism to religious-based racism is part of global immigration and the merging the oftentimes contradicting identities, ideologies, belief systems, and politics between (Middle) Eastern and Western cultures. Accordingly, the United States and Germany face obstacles mainly related to issues of different religions instead of skin colors. Hence, this dissertation is going to evolve around the idea that the newly emerging discrimination and segregation in the United States and Germany is religion-based

¹ Countries belonging to the Middle East are as follows: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates.

instead of ethnicity-based.

The connections between history and its redefined forms such as the reformulations of the (seemingly) abolished Jim Crow laws (cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 67), the distinction, and the different definitions and understandings of terms such as race, immigration, ethnic identity, and acculturation in various countries, languages, and cultural contexts are complex and require proper definitions adjusted to the respective cultural political, societal, and socio-historical contexts—despite or perhaps precisely because of globalization. Thus, concepts and terminologies have to be appropriately adapted when applying, for instance, CRT² in various cultural and educational contexts and *settings*.

In consideration of the complexities of immigration, the dissertation's core theme is about issues related to immigration policies in the education sector. Furthermore, it concentrates on the importance of introducing bilingual, bicultural, and multireligious learning *and* teaching methods as early as in pre-school in order to prepare immigrant and nonimmigrant students for the growingly global atmosphere throughout all sectors. This approach requires more than one official language, religion, and culture of instruction.

Taking particularly the German educational system into account, this dissertation also outlines the oftentimes underestimated enrichment of teaching German and integrating immigrant families into German culture, schools, and society through German as foreign/second language programs as well as the necessity of teaching German students *about* the new foreign traditions, religious beliefs, and

² CRT has its roots in the mid-1970s and the realization of the failures and drawbacks of the initially promising Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s (cf. Delgado et al., *Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography* 461). The groundbreaking works by, for instance, Derrick Bell mainly contributed to the further development of CRT scholarship (ibid.). Bell was the first tenured black professor at *Harvard Law School*. CRT is concerned with the “discontent with liberalism as a means of addressing the American race problem” (462).

cultural identities. The objective of the dissertation is to emphasize the increasing problem of how to properly handle and modify *settings*, curricula, and cross-cultural awareness for the growing number of immigrant (and refugee) children and parents in German classrooms while following bilingual and bicultural immersion programs. Furthermore, there is a focus on the need for innovative teacher training: Teachers should be familiar with the Other (in most cases Middle Eastern) language, culture, tradition, and religion in order to create an enriching atmosphere for German students/families and Middle Eastern immigrants/refugees alike.

The main theoretical framework will be CRT and how this rather US-American-based scaffold can be transformed into the German context, namely Critical Religion Theory that shifts from discrimination, inequality, and segregation based on race and people of color to “justifications” for discrimination and exclusion generated by the Islam religion: This also adds a different layer to the concept of institutional racism that has been, especially in the US-American context, predominantly associated with skin color and not as much with religious heritage, culture, traditions, and belief systems (even though this has changed tremendously after the terrorist attacks of 9/11).

The dissertation aims to provide roadmaps for a better handling of the immigration crisis in Germany and how perceptions of Middle Easterners in Germany as well as the United States need to be reconsidered within the educational (and other) sectors. Those approaches focus on better long-term integration of immigrants/refugees within educational institutions and recommendations and practices concentrating on “metalinguistic awareness” (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 145) concepts and “much-needed intercultural interaction for all students” (170) targeting to prevent (further) xenophobic attitudes and prejudices against

different languages, cultures, religions, and ethnic heritages. Because effective, transdisciplinary, and cross-cultural integration “is best understood as [...] the right to difference” (Chin 176).

Besides adapting CRT to a more relevant format (Critical Religion Theory) that considers the global and new circumstances focusing on religious-based racism, this dissertation also uses the initial CRT framework to argue for a particular form of pre- and post-activist³ educational politics while referring to the US-American civil rights activist Saul Alinsky. Alinsky emphasizes theoretical as well as practical approaches within activist movements and argues for an “education of an organizer” (Alinsky 64). In addition, it is crucial to transfer these kinds of social and civil rights activism into a pre-activism as well: A kind of (pre-)activism that becomes part of multicultural, multireligious, and bilingual curricula that embrace diversity and unbiased teaching, learning, and evaluation methods. Educational (pre-)activism is necessary because it happens as part of the education *before* (pre) students leave educational institutions and practice the “actual” (post-)activism. While practicing pre-activism, the schools and universities need to become a “site for fomenting radical social change; eschew substantive content; subordinate effective practice to “political correctness”” (Ross 250).

Hence, educational curricula and political agendas should be regarded as “an informed social criticism” (ibid.) for all direct and indirect participants: students, teachers, parents, and entire communities—because communities benefit from educational support and vice versa (cf. Kirst et al. 626, 628, 632). This way of teaching, learning, and acting is also crucial for developing an unbiased understanding and practicing of democracy (cf. Ross 250) avoiding discriminations and inequality

³ Post-activism refers to the forms of initiatives, movements, and activism that endure or even newly emerge after the initial activism. It is a form of activism that develops after the final goal has been achieved in order to maintain its achievements.

between the ideological state apparatuses (ISA) as well as the repressive state apparatuses (RSA). This is particularly important because segregation and false (racialized) assumptions toward specific religious and ethnic groups already start in early childhood and the respective educational institutions (kindergarten, elementary school, high school, etc.) (cf. Van Ausdale et al. 101-02) and are reproduced after graduation, which makes pre- as well as post-activism even more relevant.

The increasingly politicized and biased media have an enormous influence on activism, ISAs, RSAs, and educational policies. Thus, the media can be regarded as extended branch of the ISA that plays “significant roles at multiple levels in the functioning of a participatory democracy” (Gerstl-Pepin 3). Since educational policies cannot be separated from power relations and, hence, are “overt and covert exertions of control and domination such as individual experiences or prejudice and bias” (ibid.), the ISA controls the mainstream media and reproduces inequalities in several sectors (education, law, civil rights, etc.). While the media could function as a tool representing society’s diversity and its needs and, thus, a “form of public sphere [...] in the sense that genuine dialogue about govern-ance [sic] issues” (4), the media operate as culturally- and religiously biased tool of hidden racism redefining old forms of bigotry and inferiority. Due to the fact that media representations contribute to the perception and “coverage [...] in educational policymaking within participatory democracies” (6), the media are also part of public education because the media inform communities, learners, and teachers. In this way, the media influence how people and institutions approach certain issues in daily curricula (cf. 7). Accordingly, the media as well as educational institutions are influenced by one another and are powerful enough to shape (racialized) ideologies. Consequently, the media and their expansion into various branches are a powerful part of the ISA(’s reproduction).

Although the dissertation will not explicitly compare immigration-based racism issues in the United States and Germany, there is still a need to include major connections between these two countries (especially in terms of bilingual education programs) in order to develop a transformed theoretical framework from a rather US-American stance to a German one. An adaptation of mainly US-American-based concepts (such as CRT) into the German educational, cultural, religious, political, and societal landscape requires a reference to the United States to a certain extent because of the already existing theories and concepts that need to be redefined and reapplied to the German context.

Completing the Preparing Future Faculty module at Claremont Graduate University and being an English and Ethics/Social Studies teacher myself made me realize how racialized, outdated, and non-global school curricula are. On the one hand, I experienced students' puzzled reactions to school book contents they could not relate to and that did not capture any intercultural and diverse aspects of an increasingly globally-driven education system, economy, politics, and society. On the other hand, I experienced stubborn monocultural teachers who continued to teach according to GDR methods. These shocking, and at the same time, eye-opening experiences caused a joint responsibility of a new awareness for teaching and learning and, most importantly, for adapting the educational system to a global context because it is education that creates and shapes the political and social future of transatlantic intermingling. There is already a lot of research focusing on intercultural and multilingual approaches in various sectors, however,

[i]ronically, despite [...] passionate and groundbreaking scholarship and his [Richard Delgado's] status as one of the founding members of the critical race theory movement, Delgado entirely and inexplicably omitted the Middle Eastern category from his argument. Delgado is not alone in this shortcoming. This oversight is pervasive in the academic and in American [and German] society, and it is repeated among critical race scholars, a group one hopes

would recognize otherwise. Other leading scholars in the field have discussed the problems facing African, Asian, Latin, and Native Americans with no mention of individuals of Middle Eastern descent. (Tehrani 174)

Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approaches

According to Althusser, the ISA and its branches (schools, the media) dominate certain groups. Antonio Gramsci as well as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak claim that people of color or particular genders, cultural heritages, and religions are a subaltern group repressed by the ISA. Accordingly, the ISA determines how a specific (subaltern) group (people of color, immigrants, refugees, people of Middle Eastern descent) are supposed to handle their own and individual rituals, traditions, cultures, religious affiliations, and heritages (cf. Nelson et al. 302-03; cf. Gramsci 52-55). This, however, is questionable in terms of freedom and the seemingly unbiased, multicultural, multireligious, and multilingual educational curricula and policies. The essay “Can the Subaltern Speak” by Spivak focuses on the Other/the subaltern as the repressed Other that cannot speak out socially, culturally, politically, and religiously.

The subaltern can also be female and black (double-subaltern/twice repressed). Hence, additional components such as gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc. become key triggers of discrimination—in addition to the race (skin color) factor. Since 9/11, Muslims are subalterns too—especially the female ones who are even more Othered because of their gender-based oppression as well as their obvious religious clothing (Islamic headscarf, hijab, burka, and other forms of veiling) (cf. Şahin 39, 41). Therefore, Spivak’s subaltern can, as CRT, also be adapted to other social, religious, and political dynamics and needs to be redefined/adjusted to the contemporary zeitgeist.

Applying current debates about anti- or pro-headscarf regulations in Germany’s educational institutions⁴ to theories, concepts, and methodologies used

⁴ Since 2000 there have been ongoing debates about the right to wear Islamic headscarves in German schools. The debates are mainly concerned with teachers wearing headscarves but also students. The core of the discussion is concerned with the meaning of the Islamic headscarf itself: Is the headscarf a

within the academic field of Cultural Studies and Education, it is essential to concentrate on different aspects and understandings of ideologies. This includes the Marxist perspective on ideology, the ISA and the RSA according to Althusser, as well as Stuart Hall's notion of ideology. Moreover, Slavoj Žižek's *The Sublime Object of Ideology* and the associated understanding of ideology as a structured fantasy and Raymond Williams' definition of ideology are central contributions to the discussion of the complexity of historical, contemporary, prospective, and globalized understandings and reinterpretations of ideologies. Furthermore, the notion of cultural as well as racial identity in relation to ideology has to be properly redefined when considering the increasing number of Middle Eastern students wearing headscarves in Germany's public schools: While the headscarf can be regarded as a symbol for, according to Althusser, an ISA, the headscarf has also been replaced by the ISA of the respective German school. Accordingly, the headscarf represents a symbol for the ISA as well as the RSA, which leads to the issue of how race, culture, and religion are apprehended in such a rather new identity-based oppression that separates religion and its cultures.

Forms of veiling are often politically and culturally loaded points of institutional and individual (cf. 99) contention for the Western as well as the Middle Eastern world. Consequently, veils of any kind are mostly limited to the function of reducing "sexual desire in men" (Hawkins 1) and being strictly religious (cf. *ibid.*). However, research proves that the actual (more modern and Westernized) idea behind wearing veils for younger women is the social meaning and identity veils present to both, men as well as women (*ibid.*): because "it will be easier to find a good husband

religious symbol or rather a part of one's clothing style and personal identity? Germany's Federal Court has decided to allow students to wear headscarves. Teachers, however, are not allowed to wear headscarves in schools because they are supposed to appear (religiously) as neutral as possible (cf. *Spiegel Online* n. pag.).

if they [women] demonstrate good character [...]. The girls don't really care that much about religion [Islam]" (1). Subsequently, the main reasons for wearing veils are based on striving after an ideal related to the Islam culture and its social and religious upbringing and contexts. Moreover, it is interesting to ascertain that wearing a veil (independent from one's actual religious affiliation) stands for purity and being "good;" while wearing tight shirts stands for "bad" and too obvious representations of one's sexuality and desire (cf. *ibid.*). This equals the perception of whiteness standing for purity and privilege, while blackness represents the Other in a negative and socially unaccepted manner.

The Western world lacks a multifaceted knowledge and understanding of the "social significance of [Middle Eastern] clothing options" (3): "a loose outfit with long pants, long sleeves, a turtleneck, and a turban might satisfy religious dictates for appropriately modest clothing, but would not indicate hijab to a casual [non-Muslim/Western] observer" (4). These perceptions are problematic for Westerners and Middle Easterners alike because both struggle with Westernized, and respectively, Middle Easternized attitudes due to their own traditional thinking, constructs, and clothing styles. Since one's perspective depends on the cultural *setting* and upbringing, it is interesting to reframe the issue of religious clothing and ask: What if veiling was fashion "imported from Europe" (*ibid.*)? Would veiling then "be categorized as modern or traditional" (*ibid.*) and even Western?

Terminology

The subsequent section outlines the most relevant terminologies for this dissertation in order to provide a fundamental understanding within the fields of Cultural Studies as well as Educational Studies. The elucidations are based on the German, European, and US-American cultural, societal, and political *settings* and are meant to contribute to the respective context of this dissertation. However, how certain terms are actually perceived always depends on the personal cultural identity and heritage of the reader and might, hence, differ. Therefore, the definitions are not meant to be set in stone; instead, this terminology section can be regarded as an indicative guide.

German Turks. The term German Turks is mainly used in a rather colloquial manner and describes, firstly, German citizens who themselves or whose ancestors were born in Turkey and immigrated to Germany. Secondly, German Turks are also defined as people who live in Germany and have German, Turkish, or dual citizenship. In general, German Turks are people with Turkish ancestry who now live in Germany. Particularly in the academic field of sociology, the term is problematic and de-integrative because it implies that (despite German citizenship) German Turks are treated as inferior within German mainstream society and are still mainly regarded as Turks and not as Germans (cf. Crossland n. pag.). The political and cultural correctness of the term is especially debatable because one third of the German Turks in Germany never lived in Turkey (cf. Duthel 237; cf. Sezgin 79). Consequently, the expression German Turks is oftentimes consciously used for discrimination and exclusion purposes.

Developmental Niche Theory. This theory focuses on how culture is shaped by the environment, the *setting*, and/or the neighborhood (cf. R. Taylor et al. 334) and is, in this context, mainly connected to the field of Educational Studies. In order to

implement this theory properly, it is crucial to define culture and cultural context first: Culture and its contexts are a “system of shared symbols and meanings” (338) learned, established, and maintained by the respective cultural (immigrant) group (cf. *ibid.*). Policymakers and educators “must [...] thoroughly examine the influence of culture, especially its role of shaping parenting” (*ibid.*), and the way parental involvement is practiced at home as well as in school. Integrating *Developmental Niche Theory* in immigrant communities, which are shaped by cultural diversities that contradict “beliefs and meaning systems of the dominant group [US-American/German, non-immigrant society]” (*ibid.*), could possibly reduce the four main reasons why especially immigrant parents feel isolated and misunderstood by the dominant society and its institutions:

- (1) “inability to communicate in English [or German]”
- (2) “cultural distance between them [parents] and the school,”
- (3) “unfamiliarity with the operation of American [or German] schools,” and
- (4) “limited socioeconomic resources and status” (355)

Guan. *Guan* descends from the Chinese language and is translated with “to govern” (346). In Chinese culture, *guan* has a positive meaning and is understood as caring for someone, while, at the same time, governing someone (cf. *ibid.*). Although *guan* is specifically related to Chinese culture, it can also be applied to US-American and German school systems, policymaking procedures, and adapted educational programs that particularly support immigrant communities. *Guan* describes the symbiosis and the significance of “parental care, concern, and involvement” (*ibid.*) in combination with a structured “form [of] control and governance” (*ibid.*) of the child’s educational process and progress. Considering that the majority of Chinese immigrants struggle less than, for instance, immigrants from Latin American (and other) countries (cf. R. Wells 1685; cf. Pong et al. 1550; cf. Suárez-Orozco et al., *Children of Immigration* 110), policymakers and educators need to apply a caring and

understanding but also governing balance within the classroom as well as within the community. This approach leads to the significance of the *setting*.

Setting. *Setting* embraces the entire environment people grow up in—this includes parents, homes, schools, educators, neighborhood conditions, and political climates. *Setting* has an enormous impact on (academic) achievement because it provides (or does not provide) certain resources and accesses impacting learning and teaching environments: “Parents [and educators] choose from among the possibilities available to them to *create* [...] settings of development for their children” (R. Taylor et al. 339, italics in original). The more ideal and equal the *setting*, *guan*, and *Developmental Niche Theory* bridge conditions at home, school contexts, and cultures through community initiatives, the more learners, educators, and parents will experience stable academic developments and achievements: Research has shown that “inner tendencies [of learners] unfold” (342) and shape academic attitudes, accesses, and resources. This also determines risk factors such as school dropout rates and a lack of college preparation including lower standardized test scores destroying equal educational opportunities (cf. Coll et al., *The Immigrant Paradox* 213-14). Educational achievement gaps already exist “before children start school” (Desimone et al. 3060-61). Therefore, bilingual, bireligious, and multicultural community *settings* and services need to connect parents, children, and educators from various cultural, religious, and linguistic descents immediately after immigration (cf. Pérez 93).

Refugees, Immigrants, and Immigration. Different than immigrants, refugees escaped involuntarily from their home country—it is a forced form of (im)migration caused by push factors such as poverty-related, dangerous and life-threatening circumstances, political turmoil, and war (cf. *National Geographic* n. pag.). Independent from push or pull factors, however, both forms of migration affect

(immigrant) families' cultural, political, and social identity. Both, pull as well as push factors, have an enormous influence on children's and parents' educational background, financial resources, and social and cultural capital providing (or not providing) access to particular assets. In order to distinguish between immigrants (mainly driven by pull factors) and refugees (mainly driven by push factors), the achievement gap and educational performance differences between different immigration identities and heritages need to be considered: While, for instance, the majority of Asian immigrants *choose* to migrate to the United States, Latin Americans are oftentimes forced to escape their country's economic and social circumstances (cf. Zong et al. n. pag.).

In addition, it is essential to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary migration: Human migration is "the movement of people from one place [...] to another. People can either choose to move ("voluntary migration") or be forced to move ("involuntary migration")" (*National Geographic* n. pag.). Asian immigrants are mostly an example for "voluntary migration" (ibid.) motivated by pull factors: the decision to move "because of something good" (ibid.), namely better educational opportunities and living circumstances. While Asian immigrants benefit from better educational circumstances in their home countries, Latin Americans, come from oftentimes poor(er) regions. This already impacts their educational achievement, access, and opportunities back in their home country and continues to affect their educational chances in the target immigration country. Those disadvantageous or advantageous conditions either discourage or encourage education and job opportunities. Accordingly, the majority of Asians have better educational and, consequently, financial resources they can (re)invest in their children's education and (external) preparation for university admission processes and required standardized

tests—a phenomenon called “[s]hadow education” (Stevenson et al. 1639; cf. 1639-40, 1643, 1649, 1655).

Race. Race is one of the most complex terms and constructs oftentimes treated as fact and reason for segregation, inferiority, and discrimination. Especially in multicultural, multilingual, and multireligious contexts, the understanding of what is perceived as “a race” depends on historical as well as contemporary circumstances of a society and is mainly shaped by political, religious, and cultural identities and ideologies. Even within one nation there are several distinctions of how race is defined. The perception of race is predominantly influenced by cultural, political, and religious traditions, the environment, the *setting*, as well as the kind of education people have been (historically and recently) exposed to. Particularly in consideration of the German context, race is chiefly associated with World War II and the Nazi era. However, this perception is too narrow in times of globalization and media (mis)representations and (mis)perceptions of certain races.

The construct of the term race constantly changes because it is redefined by the current ISA and the respective political circumstances—aspects that shape how certain races are linked to particular features, statuses, threats, social wrongs, and contemporary crises. Accordingly, race can refer to skin color, cultural heritage, political ideology, religious affiliation, ethnicity, etc. Oftentimes, however, race is perceived in terms of black and white only; and so is racism—another term that cannot be separated from race. Theoretically, all humans belong to a particular race defined by religious affiliation, heritage, ideology, outer appearance (skin color), etc. Political regimes, changes in political governance and ideology, immigration waves, economic downturns, terrorist attacks (9/11), and other circumstances that affect seemingly stable and long-known societal structures are reasons for treating certain

“race groups” as scapegoats and racialized/demonized Other that constitutes a threat to the political, cultural, societal, and religious structures within a nation.

Moreover, race is a multifaceted construct and much more than black and white. Hence, theories such as CRT need to be adapted to the unique regional situations of a particular country. Consequently, the term race cannot be limited to one specific definition only. While in some countries, race is limited to skin color and the (false) assumption that “light-skinned [...] people attribute higher status and grant more power and wealth to one group, typically those designated as white” (Hochschild et al. 646), other countries do not define race in terms of skin color: Some societies divide their nation by people of different religions instead of different skin colors—as in the case of Muslims in the United States, Germany, and other European countries. Due to occurrences such as 9/11, it is the veil (instead of black skin color) that has become a trigger that racializes and alienates certain groups. Although race and racism are two different terms that merely have the same root word, race is rarely separated from racism. Accordingly, race can be considered as a politically-charged term (cf. Goode 5) reinforced through racially biased reporting, false assumptions, education, etc.

How race is perceived and treated can also not be separated from a nation’s and a country’s history as well as contemporary circumstances. Race is a political and linked with social status, various forms of capital, and markers of belonging to one particular (racial(ized)) group (ethnicity-wise or religion-wise). Since a society’s political, social, and cultural *settings* constantly change and are contextual, definitions of race need to be malleable (cf. 17, 207). However, in Europe, and particular in Germany, “the concept of race [is] too rigid and hermetic” (7) because it was (and partly still is) reduced Hitlerism (cf. 214). Assuming that race is a social construct, it

is not about defining race correctly: It is rather about what and who defined race in what manner and when. Since *settings*, the ideology of the ISA, as well as dynamics within a nation alter, race needs to be regarded as a flexible concept “through which myriad political, social, and cultural attitudes and positions were reflected” (11). Accordingly, the racialization of Others reproduces the dominant ISA norms and the “array[s] of social and political views, interests, and prejudices” (144) within various sectors.

Headscarf, Veil, Hijab, and Co. Throughout the dissertation, the terms veil, *Hijab*, and headscarf will be used interchangeably. The term *Hijab* is the rather official and formal term of—what is colloquially called—the headscarf. There are several forms of traditional Muslim clothing for women representing traditional and religious values. The *Hijab* is a veil that covers the head and parts of the chest and shoulder. The *Niqab*, to the contrary, covers oftentimes more than simply shoulders, chest, and hair; it covers the entire face (with exception of the eyes) and is similar to a garment covering the entire body until women’s ankles. The *Burka* is a complete body veil from head to ankles and is similar to the *Niqab* that covers the eye area. Besides the religious components of veils, headscarves have also become a fashion item: The “fashion industry and self-identified Muslim women’s lifestyle magazines devise strategies to turn Islamic virtue into economic value and vice versa” (Gökariksel et al. 180). Unfortunately, this part of Islamic clothing is often not covered in the Western media landscape because it does not correspond to the racialized image and representation of headscarf-wearing people as potential terrorists: “Muslims [...] become the “them” versus “us” supported by images of stroller-pushing women with headscarves that evoke fears of an explosion [...] and the fear of Islamic terrorism” (Korteweg et al. 148).

Attempts of the media and the fashion industry to “normalize the headscarf” (9) through the creation of a multicultural and happy image of women wearing headscarves and the argument that their outfits add “color to “our” drab European streets” (ibid.) fail. The media’s foci on veils as fancy fashion items fail because the representation of “minority groups in a positive light” (ibid.) does not “articulate the degree to which [...] diversity should lead to a multicultural politics” (ibid.). Instead, those kinds of initiatives get stuck in the media apparatus and do not intervene into curricula or politics. German chancellor Angela Merkel claimed in 2010 “that “multiculturalism has failed in Germany”” (146; cf. Chin 7) but is, yet, “needed to ensure that minority groups are included in decisions that affect them and are not left on the margins of society” (Tebble 472). This has been proven by the, initially, progressive new law that immigrant children (who were born after 2000) are allowed dual citizenship (German and the one from their parents) (cf. Korteweg et al. 146). However, in order to maintain German legal citizenship status, dual citizenship holders need to choose *one* citizenship “between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three” (146): Even those seemingly progressive and pro-immigration and pro-integration sanctions reveal that “the desire for homogeneity is still prevalent on the conservative side of the German political spectrum” (ibid.).

The Other: Fascination, Obsession, and Fetishization of the (Colored and Middle Eastern) Other. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED)⁵, the term Other is defined as a “person or thing that is different or distinct from one [...] already known” (*Oxford English Dictionary* n. pag.). It is also observed in the context of philosophy and sociology, in which it is referred to as a “distinct from” (ibid.) and the “opposite” (ibid.). The understanding is mainly related to groups of people—

⁵ The information related to the *Oxford English Dictionary* are all taken from the following website: <http://www.oed.com>

Other is personified as the dictionary entry demonstrates: Other is “intrinsically [...] alien from oneself” (ibid.). Accordingly, Other stands for an alien that/who mostly features negative connotations and is interlinked with the uncanny, the unknown, uncertainty, and, hence, a threat and discomfort. Considering Other as “alien from oneself” (ibid.) implies that “oneself” (ibid.) is perceived as the majoritarian norm. Therefore, the Other is often exposed to racism because the dominant norm (for example whiteness) is regarded as privilege (cf. Harris 1753).

The listings of synonyms in the *OED* also represent the rather negative understanding of Other: dissimilar, separate, contrasting, and disparate. It is noteworthy that the Germanic origin of the word Other is related to the German and Dutch word *anders*, which is translated with different. Considering the Indian-European root, Other stands for “different” (*Oxford English Dictionary* n. pag.) and not only for “dissimilar” or “separate” (ibid.). Considering the linguistic history and origin of the word Other, the term Other has been alienated throughout history and its political and societal circumstances that have almost exclusively shaped the notion of Other as colored/nonwhite.

However, the Other appears in various forms and several (academic) fields and, thus, varies in its respective definitions and contexts. In the majority of cases, Other stands for colored Other and has a negative connotation. This demonstrates the past and still ongoing conflict of society’s perception of the Other and corresponds to “covert racism” (Sniderman et al. 224-25) and the hypocritical obsession with political correctness in the age of colorblindness and, paradoxically, the persistence of whiteness as privilege. However, Other needs to also be distanced from people of color only (cf. Harris 1753). Yet, the power of whiteness is still enormously present in today’s society and its politics—as it is also reflected in an announcement from

former US-President Bush: “I believe that people whose skins aren’t necessarily—are a different color than white can self-govern” (Jensen 90). This statement indicates that the United States still perceive themselves as essentially white and, therefore, label everybody who is nonwhite as Other (cf. 89).

Due to whiteness as privilege (cf. Harris 1753) and its link to Otherness, Other has to be debated in terms of power relations and knowledge (while studying literary critic Edward Said, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault). In *Orientalism*, Said criticizes the Western thinking that is principally shaped by definitions meant to create contradictions while the Other is portrayed as potential threat (cf. Hussein 42, 156, 200, 229-30, 228; cf. Iskander et al. 25-26). The basis of Lacan’s theory of the Other is the verbal communication that is the initial form of interaction and exchange (cf. Furth 6, 57, 90, 116, 158, 161, 212). Lacan minted the term “symbolic order” that is also known as the Other (cf. Furth 135-16, 143-44, 151-52, 160-61). Said, Lacan, as well as Foucault are all concerned with the hierarchical structures between knowledge and power and how those are practiced in society and its (political) sectors (cf. Han 79-82, 112, 132-33, 140, 143), cultural ideology, and identity (cf. Rutherford 222). They describe the notion of the exotic Other on the basis of the initial concept of power relations, the so-called big Other, and the criticism on the predefined representations and ultimate definitions created by the ISA (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134-35, 137, 139, 155) that treats the Other as mythic, suspicious, and precarious (cf. Hussein 42, 156, 200, 229-30, 228; cf. Iskander et al. 25-26). The cognition of the Other as unknown, abnormal, and scary continuously turns the “Other into a barbarian” (Césaire 9) from a historical, present, and future perspective: In retrospect, Blacks have been the ones consistently Othered because of not being white and, thus, being abnormal.

Although the perception of blackness has not really changed and is regarded as an “abnormal” (Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 144) phenomenon and even fascination with the black body from the past, this perception shifted to a fascination and fetishization of the Other: Historically, this fascination was based on the different bodies of Blacks and freak shows with Hottentot women⁶. Nowadays, the Other is more than black; the Other became more diverse: It reaches from Mexican to Latina/o to Chicana/o to Middle Eastern people (cf. Rutherford 227-28) to almost every immigrant (cf. Hall, *Signification* 109; cf. Burgett et al. 169) who is considered “not fully American” (Sollors 8) (or German) and who does not belong to the “metropolitan centers” (Rutherford 228) of the Western world. Hence, the new Other is not just a colored Other anymore: The new Other wears a *Burqa*⁷.

Although Other is mainly referred to people who do not fit the white, Christian, and, what is perceived as dominant norm of Western societies, Lacan defines the Other as “inscrutable authority” (Krips 131; Milbank et al. 51; cf. McNulty 148; cf. Hofstein 168, 171-72). This contradicts the predominant understanding of the Other as an excluded and marginalized minority. Thus, the Other can be both: positive and negative/threatening. Whoever is perceived as Other, however, depends on political, social, historical, religious, and cultural circumstances and perspectives: While Whites perceive Blacks as Other, Blacks perceive Whites as

⁶ Sara Baartman was born in the late 18th century and died in 1815 in Paris, France. Because of her anatomical (black-related) Otherness, Baartman was brought to Europe in 1810 and was forced to be part of so-called freak shows. She became famous under the name of the *Vénus Hottentote*.

⁷ Especially in the beginning of the 21st century, laws increasingly prohibited wearing a *Burka* in public schools: 2004 and 2010, France officially prohibited *Burkas* in public schools because it was considered a religious symbol (cf. Korteweg et al. 11). Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of France, argued that *Burkas* contribute to women being prisoners of themselves (cf. *BBC* n. pag.), which, according to Sarkozy, France will not support. 2011, Belgium also banned the *Burka* (cf. Sanghani n. pag.). In Italy and the Netherlands, people who keep wearing the *Burka* in public institutions are fined up to 150 Euros. There are several other countries that could have been listed here and that exemplify the strict ban and the domination of the white and non-Muslim state apparatus over the Others. These anti-mask laws result in a form of “covert racism” (Sniderman et al. 224-25) that demands not only the riddance of the headscarf but also the riddance of the people’s cultural and personal identities, heritages, and styles. With those laws, the ISA forces the denial of a particular cultural Other identity that is not accepted within the mainstream ideological norm.

Other. Additionally, the Other can also be the desired and mysterious object one is obsessed and fascinated with (and that one may even fetishize). Furthermore, it is important to consider the changing dynamics of “social construction[s]” (Delgado et al., *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* 8), which assume races as “products of social thought and relations” (ibid.) because minorities (exotic Others) change throughout time: It is the “racial “others” against which the racial ideal was defined” (Goode 13). The changing angles of groups of people prove the instability of the Other and how minorities can be perceived contrarily in different times depending on political, societal, and economic circumstances: “In one age, Middle Eastern people are exotic, fetishized, wearing veils, wielding curved swords, and summoning genies from lamps. In another era, they emerge as fanatical, religiously crazed terrorists bent on destroying America and killing innocent citizens” (Delgado et al., *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* 9).

Steps for Globally-Adjusted Integration and Education

Step 1: Understanding Legal Challenges of Turkish Immigrants

In order to understand the current challenges of the steadily increasing number of Middle Eastern refugees in Germany (cf. *Norddeutscher Rundfunk* n. pag.), historical, political, and legal approaches of Germany's immigration dynamics and politics need to be considered. During the 1950s and 1960s, Germany experienced a vast immigration wave due to the economic miracle: The majority of immigrants came from Southern-European countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia as so-called *Gastarbeiter*⁸. The growing xenophobic attitude toward *Gastarbeiter* and other immigrants drastically rose in the 1990s and resulted in new political debates about integration—particularly Middle Eastern immigrants. 2015, *Der Spiegel* (German political magazine) revealed the still-existing discrimination of Middle Eastern immigrants who are often treated as scapegoats and who are portrayed as a threat to Germany and its national security (cf. Hebel et al. n. pag.):

[I]n German classrooms, the headscarf was regarded [...] as a symbol of a profound social threat: “In the most recent times, it is seen increasingly as a political symbol of Islamic fundamentalism that expresses the separation from values of Western society.” (Korteweg et al. 137)

Germany has approximately 13.5 million foreigners from 194 different countries: The majority are European immigrants (cf. Holzwarth n. pag.) and predominantly from Turkey, followed by Poland and Italy. Every fourth immigrant in Germany descends from Turkey (cf. Şahinöz 20).⁹ According to a survey from the *Essener Zentrum*¹⁰ for Turkish Studies, 80 percent of the Turkish immigrants between

⁸ *Gastarbeiter* are immigrant workers who migrated to Germany during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

⁹ Figure 1 is taken from “Historical Trends in Emigration and Immigration” (İçduygu et al. 7).

¹⁰ The *Essener Zentrum für Türkeistudien* is a center for Turkish Studies and is part of the University of Duisburg-Essen. It is located in North Rhine-Westphalia. With a population of approximately half a million, Essen is one of the 9th largest cities in Germany.

the ages of 18 and 29 consider themselves extraordinary religious (cf. Zinnkann et al. n. pag.). Although the number of Turks living in Germany slightly decreased in the mid-2000s (in comparison to the mid-1990s), Germany is still the number one choice for Turkish immigrants in contrast to other European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Scandinavia, etc. (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Turkish Migrant Stock in Germany

The main reasons for Turkish immigration to Germany are better and secure living conditions as in their home country that is—especially in rural areas—shaped by poverty and political turmoil (cf. *Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten*, *Soziale Unruhen* n. pag.; cf. *Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, *Politische Instabilität* n. pag.). Although immigrants face employment problems due to the lack of (German) citizenship and/or residence permits, the German social system still provides housing, health insurance, and medical services independent from the legal status (cf. Küchler n. pag.; cf. Alrabaa n. pag.; cf. Kaiser n. pag.). Housing opportunities and access to health care and other social services are mainly tax-funded. And since the majority of taxpayers in Germany are non-Turkish, they have become frustrated because of the constantly

rising taxes that are—to a great extent—used for Turkish, Middle Eastern, and other immigrants and refugees (cf. Alrabaa n. pag.). This has hardened fronts between immigrants and Germans even more: It enormously contributed to the problem of (intentional) discrimination and exclusion and discrimination of immigrants within German society, politics, and education.

The majority of Germany's Turkish population possesses German, Turkish, or even dual citizenship. However, Turkish immigrants who have already received their German citizenship and are legally considered German citizens are still officially defined as Turks living in Germany (cf. Altmeier n. pag.): Even if they decided to only keep the German citizenship and not the dual one. Colloquially, those Turkish-heritage Germans are regarded as “German-Turks” (Altmeier n. pag.). Although they legally have the same status as Germans, they are still politically, religiously, and culturally distinguished from “real” (German-heritage) Germans. This devalues Turkish heritage, culture, and traditions within German society and causes an anti-immigration attitude on a social, cultural, and religious level—despite their legal and official social status.

One step toward better (at least official and legal) integration from early on has been made in January 2000: Children of Turkish immigrant parents who are born in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are eligible for immediately receiving German citizenship if their parents can prove legal and unrestricted residency in Germany for at least 8 years (cf. Dempsey n. pag.). Although this step is positive and progressive for faster integration, it is still no guarantee for successful integration: Due to their immediately-received German citizenship, those children are not included in Germany's naturalization processes. This is problematic because the parents are (despite their at least 8 years of residency in Germany) still closely

connected to the Turkish lifestyle, culture, as well as its associated language and religious and traditional values. Accordingly, those children still grow up in a rather Turkish-dominated culture. This Turkish-dominated *setting* shapes (and, unfortunately, often hinders) their social integration into German mainstream culture. Because of the rather outdated educational system and the lack of multicultural approaches in the curricula, those children are outsiders in school—no matter their German citizenship. Furthermore, they are legally not allowed to maintain the dual citizenship: At the legal age of 18, they have to choose between the German and the Turkish citizenship. This decision puts immigrant youth into conflicting positions with their parents who are—independent from Turkish, German, or dual citizenship—still more affiliated to the Turkish lifestyle in all its cultural, political, and religious facets (cf. Horrocks et al. 138-40).

Consequently, even after living several years in Germany, the choice of citizenship becomes a question of belonging and identity (denial). The rather forced decision of identifying one's cultural identity (while denying one's cultural and religious heritage and belonging), citizenship, and legal status led to a reverse migration trend: 2010 and 2011, approximately 193.000 Turkish people left Germany because of the law enforced in 2000 and returned to Turkey (cf. *Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten, Weg aus Deutschland* n. pag; cf. Dempsey n. pag.). However, their return to their, by now, often idealized home country might result in a reverse culture shock and identity-related issues because the majority of the returning German Turks have already lived in Germany for more than a decade. The two main reasons for this backward migration are discrimination and unemployment (which led to financial hardships and denied and unequal access to better German language classes and, thus, the job market). It is uncertain whether the returned German Turks *really* face better

living conditions in Turkey after being gone for a more than a decade.

Step 2: Understanding that Not Every Middle Easterner is a Muslim

Middle Eastern immigrants are religiously and culturally very different from German society, culture, and traditions. This also complicates the integration and solidarity—especially in educational institutions and politics. These conflicting religious values between German and Middle Eastern culture, however, is not the only complication—the integration process and progress cannot only be reduced to culture and different religious belief systems: For the majority of Germans, Middle Easterners are almost exclusively associated with Islam. Germans tend to not make any kind of cultural, religious, and/or language-based distinction with people from Middle Eastern countries. Yet, the diversity of, for instance, Turkish culture and its variety of languages is crucial for understanding integration challenges on social and educational levels. Middle Eastern countries do not share one (Muslim) identity as it is often wrongly presented in the Western mass media. Turkish culture, for example, is highly heterogeneous and embraces several ethnicities, religious belief systems, and language groups (cf. Safty 424-25). This cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity complicates an all-inclusive development of bilingual and bicultural (German and Turkish/Middle Eastern, Arabic, etc.) curricula: It is almost impossible to establish a curriculum that meets the requirements of all present forms and variations of languages, religious beliefs, and cultural values.

Step 3: Starting Successful Integration in Kindergarten

Due to the complexities of properly and individually adjusted integration processes within society as well as public education, every fifth Turkish citizen does not speak fluent German (cf. Lauer et al. n. pag.). There are two major reasons for this: First, the

majority of Turkish immigrants never receive primary education in their home country. Second, most Turkish immigrants only graduate with a secondary modern school qualification (cf. Holzwarth n. pag.), which is worth less than a high school diploma. Because their educational background is only very basic (also German-language wise), Turkish youth faces high unemployment rates (cf. Brönstrup n. pag.): In Berlin, more than 40 percent of all Turkish people are unemployed (ibid.). This leads to high poverty rates and contributes to corruption, violence, and drug dealing in order to economically survive.

Furthermore, Middle Eastern parents tend to not send their children to kindergarten because of the high poverty rates and the inability to pay for a kindergarten spot. This affects immigrants' primary and secondary education.¹¹ Throughout the last decade, 90 percent of all German three- and five-year old children regularly go to kindergarten, while only 64 percent of immigrant children within this age group go to kindergarten (cf. Geißler et al. n. pag.). Hence, only a few Middle Eastern immigrants are able to enter and finish German secondary education: In particular "children from Turkish immigrant families are low achievers in education: [...] 27 percent drop out of school" (Korteweg et al. 139)—in contrast to only 4 percent of non-immigrant students. Since the majority is unable to attain high(er)

¹¹ Germany's education system consists of five layers: primary education, secondary education I, secondary education II, tertiary education, and quaternary education. The first three are part of the German school system. Kindergarten is not part of the German obligatory school system and, thus, voluntary. The first educational institution that is compulsory for children is first grade/elementary school. Elementary school reaches from grade 1 (ages 6 or 7) to grade 4 (usually age 10). The secondary education sector is distinguished in three branches: main school, middle school, and high school. Main school is the least and the lowest educational level one has to achieve in order to have a valid graduation diploma (one finishes after 9th grade). Middle school finishes after 10th grade and high school finishes after 12th or 13th grade (depending on the federal German state). High school is the only educational level that allows students to enter university. The quaternary sector is the education after school graduation that prepares one for a job (for example academic programs or occupational apprenticeships). Kindergartens are either public or private and (different than schools and universities) fee-based—even though public kindergartens charge lower monthly fees than private ones. The main purpose of kindergartens is early childcare and some pre-education (teaching children the alphabet and numbers). In order to get admitted to kindergarten, one has to be at least 4 years old. There is also a so-called daycare center that is part of the kindergarten. In order to qualify for this, children need to be at least 1 year.

educational levels, they also struggle to exit the vicious circle of exclusion and poverty predominantly based on their cultural and religious heritage that impacts their employability and social status and capitals.

Immigrant children who did attend kindergarten also succeed in elementary school and high school because they learned to speak, read, and write German (letters) fluently while already being exposed to the German language in kindergarten. In this early learning phase, they have also learned how to socially and culturally interact with German-speaking pre-school teachers and same-aged peers in an authentic and rather natural manner and *setting* (cf. *Verlag das Netz* n. pag.). Despite the fact that the majority of kindergartens they joined (and are able to afford) did not offer any bilingual pre-school education, immigrant children still begin to integrate themselves socially, culturally, and linguistically. This natural way of learning provides a smooth(er) transition into elementary school and the following educational institutions (secondary education) (cf. Caprez-Krompàk 39).

However, bilingual kindergartens would be (more) ideal for immigrants as well as Germans alike. Of course, there are kindergartens that offer bilingual models and pre-school education. But those kindergartens are more expensive and unaffordable for most immigrant families (cf. 40). Therefore, the target group of bilingual (or even multilingual) kindergartens is not immigrants: Instead those kindergartens offer “trendy” and “fancy” languages such as English, Chinese, Spanish, or French for the German upper/middle-class that can afford those pre-school language programs and institutions (cf. *Accadis International School Bad Homburg* n. pag.). Those financial constraints have long-term damaging impacts on immigrant children’s German language as well as social and intercultural skills they could have learned earlier in integrative educational preschool

institutions/kindergartens.

In addition, many immigrant families almost exclusively consume Arabic-language media (newspapers and television) and watch Germany's Arabic TV stations. This is another reason for the steadily growing language barrier immigrant children face when entering schools (cf. Mueller 429-30). Furthermore, immigrant families are residentially segregated and concentrated in certain areas without having much interaction with the German population, as it is, for example, the case in Berlin *Neukölln*¹².

The resulting lack of basic German reading and writing skills also contributes to a constant underrepresentation of Turkish German citizens in education, jobs, and other sectors. This underrepresentation, for instance in politics, compounds the complexity of the exclusion of Turkish people from public sectors and hinders them to actively participate politically, culturally, religiously, and socially. Although Germany's government proudly emphasizes that the German *Bundestag* counts eleven Turkish political members, the majority of the Turkish people do not qualify for German citizenship, which means that they are legally not allowed to vote (cf. *Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, 11 *Deutsch-Türken* n. pag.)—a form of hidden racism and consciously-intended exclusion. Other German citizens of immigrant backgrounds are also still underrepresented in the parliament (cf. Korteweg et al. 145).

Step 4: Nurturing Integration Instead of Oppressing Immigration

Despite the fact that *Wikipedia* is a rather “un-academic” source (see footnote 76), I have yet decided to include the definitions for immigration from the German, English,

¹² *Neukölln* has a history of immigrants beginning in the 18th century with Bohemian religious refugees. The name *Neukölln* already emerged in the 17th century and originates from the Turkish term “Nyu-Cölls;” its translation is immigration city.

as well as French *Wikipedia* entries because *Wikipedia* represents the common understanding of the so-called masses. This is, especially in the case of immigration issues and its policies, helpful for grasping the majority's attitude toward immigration. While the English definition tends to focus on the most common reasons for immigration such as "escaping conflict or natural disaster" (*Wikipedia* English "Immigration" n. pag.), the German entry rather concentrates on the consequences of immigration (emigration) (cf. *Wikipedia* German "Einwanderung" n. pag.). The French *Wikipedia* entry refers to immigration as a movement of aliens (cf. *Wikipedia* French "L'Immigration" n. pag.) and explicitly uses the French term for alien, which is linked to alienation, Othering, and the dehumanization of immigrants. Accordingly, the French *Wikipedia* entry implies a rather negative connotation often resulting in racism, exclusion, and discrimination.

Considering these different definitions of three distinctive cultural contexts portrays that, even though immigration is generally referred to as a movement of people to another country, the various comprehensions represent a certain (biased) attitude toward the current (Western) mindsets toward immigration. The challenges of covering a theme such as immigration in all its complexities from as many perspectives as possible without advantaging or disadvantaging particular cultures, politics, countries, religious belief systems, or groups of people also emphasizes the manifoldness and often blurry lines of racism and the danger of anti-Semitic movements toward people with immigrant backgrounds.

Covering immigration from practical perspectives and theoretical approaches, it is crucial to understand why Germany's educational system is, despite increasing immigration, globalization, and multiculturalism in classrooms, still predominantly and continuously ruled by mainstream (German) power structures oppressing Middle

Eastern immigrants and refugees. Althusser's concept of the ISA, the RSA, and dominant ideology can be applied here: The culturally and religiously monotonous German ISA governs society and cultural identities with the intention of maintaining and reproducing cultural ideologies according to their own-defined German norms (including school curricula). The ISA keeps oppressing Middle Eastern immigrants and refugees (part of the RSA) by not adjusting its hegemonic politics, policies, and educational curricula according to new immigration-based cultural needs and differences.

The ruling apparatus influences a variety of sectors making equal chances for educational, political, social, and cultural integration almost impossible. Integration starts with education because education covers not only fact-based knowledge in different subjects but, even more importantly, fosters daily social and linguistic interaction with the target group (German society/new home for immigrants). If immigrants are excluded because of a lack of proper integration methods and multicultural curricula and learning and teaching methods, they will also be denied equal access further education and the resulting chances for apprenticeships, study programs, and jobs. Furthermore, they will be Othered because of the lack of integration skills, which highly depend on language learning in order to use and access social services and accesses by themselves. The inability of the German school system to adapt to Middle Eastern students in the classroom can also be regarded as a form of covert racism that intentionally does not provide immigrant students with the necessary assets to integrate successfully in school and after school.

Instead, the educational system (as representative of the ISA) continues to dominate the learning contents excluding teaching and learning methods for non-German students (cf. Pines 120-24; cf. Žižek, *Jacques Lacan* 3). Hence, German

students already perceive Middle Eastern fellow students as Other. This alienation is often reproduced and continued after school because German students have never learned to integrate Middle Eastern fellow residents. Their teachers did also not act as role models for an open, equal, and intercultural society welcoming and supporting different ethnicities and religious beliefs. Instead, they are treated as unwanted Others. From the ISA's perspective, the only acceptable way to integrate successfully is to adapt to the (by them) predefined German norms and ideologies (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 137, 139). Otherwise, immigrants can never belong and will remain alienated Others. This alienation is not only a matter of social, educational, political, and cultural exclusion; it is also a matter of dehumanizing the Other while representing the Other as threat and ill-ideology¹³ (cf. *Das Islamische Portal* n. pag.).

Step 5: Adapting CRT—From Colorblind to Headscarfblind

The adaptation of CRT is a key component for successfully changing the exclusively German (or, at least, non-Middle Eastern) dominant ideology within the educational system and the school curricula. An adaptation of CRT needs to be implemented on several levels because it also affects several sectors (culture, politics, civil rights, religion-based values, traditions, languages, etc.). CRT also has to be separated from race-based theories and struggles because they are often limited to defining race in terms of skin color: In order to adjust changing dynamics in immigration and, accordingly, the racialization and alienation of immigrants, CRT cannot be skin-color-based only anymore. In Germany, many other European countries, as well as the

¹³ Geert Wilders is a Dutch right-wing populist politician of the *Party of Freedom*. He is known for radical and insulting opinions toward the Islam and its ideology: He described the Koran as a “fascist book,” compares it to Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, and compared the Islam ideology to Hitler’s fascist ideology. 2007, Wilders called for a legal prohibition of the Koran in the Netherlands because of the “ill ideology of Mohammed and Allah,” as he claimed during a political public meeting that was concerned with the increasing attacks on former Islam members who decided to resign the Islam belief. The article citing Wilders was published on August 9, 2007 on the website “Islam Portal” (cf. *Das Islamische Portal* n. pag.).

United States, racism is increasingly directed toward people of Middle Eastern descent and, hence, not (exclusively) against people of color. Hence, CRT needs to be expanded from skin color-based issues to religion-based issues as well (see Table 1).

CRT “original”	CRT adapted: Critical Religion Theory
intersection of race, law, and power	intersection of religion, anti-mask laws, and educational policies and school curricula
equality issues related to race	equality issues related to religious freedom
white supremacy over people of color	Christian or atheist supremacy over Muslims
racial emancipation	religious emancipation
colorblindness	headscarfblindness
intentional discrimination, racial profiling	intentional discrimination and racial profiling by prohibiting veiling in German schools/official institutions
racial (skin-color-based) oppression	religious oppression
whiteness as property	Christian (and/or atheist) belief systems as property

Table 1: Translating CRT into a Middle Eastern/Religion-Based Theory

While the initial form of CRT is mainly based on markers related to (nonwhite) skin color, Critical Religion Theory focuses on veils as markers for racism and discrimination. Accordingly, the concept of colorblindness is transformed into a headscarfblindness. Similar to the often racialized and negative connotations with

darker skin color, the headscarf also becomes a symbol of alienation and Othering because it does not fit the ISA's mainstream cultural, religious, and political ideologies and norms. In the Western ideology, the headscarf is interpreted as indication of oppression and hiding one's identity. Additionally, the headscarf "makes women into others, into second-class humans" (Korteweg et al. 163), and suspect individuals. Therefore, the ruling class associates the headscarf with suspicion, mystification, and terrorism—especially after the attacks of 9/11 and the increasing influence of sensationalistic media headlines representing Middle Easterners as terrorists and lunatics (cf. *Pew Research Center* n. pag.). Veils deny the ruling class' access to an unknown Other. This causes discomfort, uncertainty, and a feeling of threat. The headscarf signifies an exotic Other who does not belong to mainstream society (cf. Korteweg et al. 138). Furthermore, the general associations with veils are primarily negative and headscarf-wearing people are often wrongly labeled as *sans-papiers*¹⁴ and potentially threatening intruders endangering the power of the ISA.

Lacan argues, "the unity of identity is constructed on the surface" (Gökariksel et al. 177) through, for example, markers such as veils. Taking this into consideration, veils, firstly, function as oppressor of the religious and male-dominated Islamic regime toward women. Secondly, veils are part of a woman's identity for expressing her religious-based ideology and values through this piece of clothing. Therefore, veils are not identity deniers and fearmongering as it is often perceived by Westerners. Instead, veils are specific clothing that "contribute to the making of a self-conscious individual image [...], an image linked to [...] idealized visualizations

¹⁴ The term "sans-papiers" originates in French and can be translated with "without legal papers." It originates in the French-speaking Switzerland and is related to the illegal residents living in the French parts of Switzerland. The term itself is rather general and not necessarily related to headscarf-wearing immigrant women. It increasingly became an expression for the Other (not wanted) immigrants and refugees and the prejudiced and racialized social wrongs of the ISA that justifies hierarchical structures on the basis of different ethnical, religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.

of the human body” (177-78). Consequently, the Western world needs to rethink their idea of oppression in the case of veils because “[v]eiling has inspired much political, social, and psychoanalytic critique, but the perspectives of women who veil are rarely the impetus for these theories” (178).

Does oppression originate in wearing veils only or at all then? Or is oppression rather based on the fact that women need to wear veils only (and men do not)? Is this a gender-based, religion-based, or ideology-based form of oppression? The reasons for veiling¹⁵ are often based on stereotypical and biased representations of the Western media that link veils with terrorist attacks and extremism. However, whether veiling is oppressive or not depends on the Western and/or Middle Eastern perspective: Especially the Westernized (Germanized or Americanized) ideology of the ISA marks veils as oppressor. Yet, it is rather the often-unquestioned Westernized perspective and attitude that oppresses and threatens religion-related clothing styles that do not fit Western norms (cf. 179-80).

Considering that veils are not oppressors but rather signifiers of one’s religious, cultural, social, political, and historical identity and heritage, it is important to avoid Westernized perspectives that discriminate people due to their religion-based clothing styles. This is also crucial for school curricula that need to include the new immigration dynamics by providing multireligious, multicultural, and multilingual approaches (cf. Chin 9). Those adjusted approaches also need to be detached from hierarchical orders justifying certain rights and norms that regard whiteness (and headscarf-free clothing styles) as ideal, privileged, and property (cf. Harris 1753). The Marxist approach also emphasizes the power of whiteness and not wearing a veil: The ISA does not allow the Other to be part of the ISA (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and*

¹⁵ The term veiling “may range from [...] covering the hair with a headscarf to fully covering the body” (Gökarıksel et al.178).

Philosophy 134, 137). Consequently, the ISA's domination and oppression of the Other increasingly strengthen the domination of the already (too) powerful ruling class not providing a chance for the Other to escape their oppressed status quo. The Other is stuck in the dominating power structures of mainstream ideology. This results in a continuous vicious cycle of steadily growing oppression of the already overpowered state apparatus (RSA).

Step 6: Taking the Education Exit for Integration

One of the few realistic possibilities to exit this vicious circle of oppression is education. The education sector can function as a key component for preventing xenophobia and racialization of certain groups from early on (preschool/kindergarten age): Education and knowledge are “for social justice and social change” (Abraham et al. 128; cf. Solórzano et al. 60). As observed in *The First R: How Children Learn Race and Racism*, teachers, parents, and entire communities (cf. Van Ausdale et al. 31; cf. Rigney 117) need to teach children as early as possible “about hatred, bigotry, and prejudice” (Van Ausdale et al. 199) because “[i]nfants mostly learn to speak by being spoken to, from the time they are born” (ibid.). Currently, this kind of (pre-)awareness is not present in German kindergartens and schools. Curricula and teaching methods need to include Middle Eastern cultural, linguistic, religious, political, and social angles in order to avoid racism, segregation, and exclusion already starting before first grade (cf. Reimann, *Umgang mit Pegida* n. pag.; cf. Wagener n. pag.).

The German school system is rather recently challenged by an enormous refugee and immigration wave. A successful integration does not start with separating non-German students from their German classmates. Neither does integration and adjustment work if learning contents and curricula are separated as well. Hence,

school curricula need to be updated in order to meet contemporary and new classroom dynamics embracing students from different cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. Additionally, schools need smaller student-teacher ratios for better learning outcomes and more individualized teaching methods and strategies because every classroom dynamic is different and requires adapted methodology and didactics. Teachers as well as students need to have the freedom of learning within their own pace. In this way, one also avoids frustrations and failure due to not individually adjusted learning and teaching styles. However, according to Germany's government, budget constraints and shortages within the (public school) education system impede a revision of the current (outdated) curricula (cf. Vogt n. pag.).

The outdated monocultural curricula do not respond to the changing immigration-based dynamics within German society and, hence, also the classrooms. Adjusting the learning contexts means to not Germanize immigrants and to not Middle Easternize Germans (as it is oftentimes perceived due to misrepresentations within the media). Instead, it is essential to create a mutual and intercultural learning atmosphere in which Germans and immigrants learn from one another across cultures and religions in order to prevent racism, segregation, and exclusion on a long-term basis (cf. Chin 16). Since the recent refugee wave is a fairly new phenomenon for Germany, there is not much research related to a successful and multicultural integration of refugees and immigrants into classrooms and society. Therefore, this dissertation will (re)apply already-existing theoretical approaches such as CRT and bilingual immersion programs to current circumstances.

Step 7: Taking the Education Exit to Integration

The law is racially constructed. The liberal jurisprudence and how it “tends to target only the most obvious, outward manifestations of discrimination [and] thereby

suggesting by omission that other kinds of discriminatory behavior [...] either do not exist, or do not justify concern or suspicion among right-thinking people” (Fan 1209-10) is problematic: It does not include racism’s multifaceted layers connected to skin color, cultural and ethnic heritage, as well as religious affiliations. If the law approaches racism only from narrowminded liberal jurisprudence standpoints, the law keeps reproducing racism and practices covert racism instead of providing equal solution approaches. Another complication in readjusting and redefining CRT *and* legal studies is that laws cannot be “written from a neutral perspective” (1212)—in particular when politics are still predominantly white and non-Muslim. The law also needs to recognize the “complexity of the interplay of race and alienage in immigration law” (1240) that, if treated politically, culturally, and socially correct, can enhance the “systematic nature of discrimination” (ibid.) and “provide a voice for members of oppressed groups” (ibid.).

Step 8: Sprucing Up the Headscarf Image

Shaped by globalization, international trade, political and economic transnational interdependence, multiethnicity, and cultural and religious diversity, 21st-century societies become increasingly global. These diverse dynamics are supposed to be economically, politically, and culturally enriching within a variety of sectors on a glocal¹⁶ level. One of the most influenced and influential sectors is politics and its overarching dominating ISA. The ISA still predominantly controls cultural identities and intends to maintain cultural ideologies according to the ISA’s concepts of an ideal mainstream ideology and identity. Consequently, the ISA continues to oppress Others

¹⁶ The term glocal has been profoundly defined and conceptualized by Roland Robertson, sociologist and theorist of globalization. He explains glocal as a term “‘formed by telescoping *global* and *local* to make a blend’” (Ritzer et al. 335, italics in original; cf. Featherstone et al. 28). The “terms ‘glocal’ and ‘glocalization’ became also aspects of the business jargon during the 1980s” (Ritzer et al. 335).

(immigrants, people of color, and veiled women¹⁷) by (re)establishing anti-mask laws in the United States¹⁸, Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, etc.

Considering the political and cultural scope of anti-mask laws (see Illustration 1), resistance, as well as the implementation of the dominant ideology, the headscarf can be referred to as cultural identity denier from two different perspectives. Firstly, the headscarf represents an obvious form of denying the dominant identity and ideology because the people who wear a headscarf deny or refuse to adjust to the respective mainstream cultural identity of the (Western) country. This denial expresses the unwillingness, or cultural and religious impossibility, to refrain from the headscarf. In this case, the headscarf becomes a symbol of denying the society's Western cultural and religious identity. Secondly, the ISA might regard the headscarf as a symbol of hiding one's (nonconforming) identity of the country's dominant majority. Accordingly, from the Western perspective, headscarves contribute to suspicion, mystification, and (especially after 9/11) an enormous increase in xenophobic media headlines (cf. Khan et al. 2-3). Assuming that headscarves cause discomfort and embody an outsider and exotic Other not belonging to mainstream society, the remaining question is whether headscarves are identity-deniers or an identity-advocates. This question is relevant because the headscarf is a cultural and religious identity marker that is predominantly linked to women because men do not

¹⁷ Although wearing veils often has political, cultural, religious, *and* fashion-related reasons, it is mainly associated with the Muslim religious tradition. Therefore, veils are almost exclusively associated with the clichéd image that all veiled people are not capable of coping with a Western society. Additionally, veiled people are represented as potential threat and terrorists. The negative image that particularly emerged in the late 20th and early 21st century is due to the media's manipulative portrayal of headscarf-wearing women as well as the general suspicion of the Other (in particular Middle Eastern cultures) who became the main target for any terrorist act and social wrongs after 9/11. As a consequence, several countries enacted anti-masks laws. Especially in Germany, France, and the Netherlands the headscarf became a symbol for being an illegal immigrant—being “sans-papiers.”

¹⁸ In the United States, anti-mask laws emerged in the mid-20th century mainly because of the *Ku Klux Klan* and its hoods out of white linen in order to hide their identities (cf. Turpin-Petrosino 62, 64). Current anti-mask laws are reinforced because of political protest movements such as the *Occupy Movement* and *Anonymous*.

wear such obvious (Muslim) religion-related clothes. The racist attitude toward masked people is, thus, even stronger for women than men. However, men still face racism. This image needs to be rethought and spruced up: Particularly schools, but also other public institutions, can be empowered to start positivizing such a damaged and biased image.




Illustration 1: Countries That Have Banned Veils

Chapter Two

Literature Review

The subsequent literature review covers various theoretical approaches related to CRT, identity, ideology, ISAs and RSAs, and shifting dynamics of racism in several and increasingly globalized sectors such as politics, education, the media, etc. Furthermore, this literature review emphasizes some gaps and possible adaptations of CRT that need to become part of future research in order to meet the global zeitgeist. While the majority of scholarly articles and books refer to the United States context, their approaches can also be translated into the German and European context. Although this dissertation is not a comparative study between the USA and Germany, there are certain similarities that serve as illustration for relatively similar globalized societal, cultural, religious, and political shifting dynamics in Western societies shaped by racism, panicmongering, and scapegoating of (Middle) Eastern versus Western and White versus Black power struggles. Due to those similarities, most of the publications' skin color-related contexts can be translated into religious-related contexts (especially regarding Islam).

Due to globalization it is crucial to adjust CRT to the respective cultural, religious, societal, and political contexts: Although politics and economies growingly merge together, cultural and religious ideologies and identities are yet unique. Hence, trans-societal conflicts that emerge because of different cultural, political, historical, and religious ideologies and identities need to be solved with diverse forms of CRT. CRT research should include historical as well as contemporary aspects and developments in order to connect racist occurrences from the past with contemporary (redefined) racist attitudes against people of color *and* Middle Easterners. Since,

initially, CRT mainly concentrates on “the effects of race and racism, while simultaneously addressing the hegemonic system of White supremacy” (DeCuir et al. 27), adapted forms of CRT need to also focus on religion and need to be redefined and (re)adapted to a Critical Religion Theory.

Considering the historical roots of racism in the United States, CRT mainly centers on racial prejudices based on skin color. In Germany, however, it is not necessarily black versus white; instead, it is (Middle) East versus West and a form of racism that is based on religious differences. Although globalization causes shifts in societal dynamics, racism in the United States is chiefly associated with slavery and the inferiority of Blacks toward Whites. Racism in Germany, conversely, is chiefly associated with fascism and racializes certain religions (Jews, Muslims) instead of skin colors. Although racism is based on several factors, the majority of racist acts is still based on skin color in the United States and on religious differences in Germany. This has been particularly obvious during Germany’s recent refugee crisis that caused a (new) wave of right-wing demonstrations that can be interlinked with the Third Reich and its fascism. Similar to the redefined Jim Crow laws in the United States, this kind of racism can be regarded as a redefined (neo) Nazism. However, independent from the form of racism, racism is always based on an “us versus them” or “superior versus inferior” attitude.

Cengiz Barskanmaz’ German-context based article “Rassismus, Postkolonialismus und Recht—Zu Einer Deutschen “Critical Race Theory””¹⁹ also outlines this “us” (ISA) versus “them” (RSA) issue in society (cf. Barskanmaz 298) and emphasizes that the Other is differently defined—depending on the country: In Germany, skin color is not the main signifier—it is the headscarf indicating the Other,

¹⁹ Article’s title in English: Racism, Postcolonialism, and Law—A German Critical Race Theory.

namely the non-Christian affiliation (cf. 299, 301). This article is one of the few that establishes a connection between a US-American understanding of CRT and an adapted German version of CRT but also lacks a more interdisciplinary CRT approach: CRT has to be adjusted to the European (and especially German) context in order to include CRT *and* Critical Religion Theory in several sectors (politics, society, education, etc.) in order to prevent racism based on different religious affiliations and ideologies and identities (cf. 302).

Although other key writings on CRT also contribute to a more transdisciplinary approach and represent a great contribution to CRT as a multifaceted research field considering various angles, the majority does not include the religious component. Another important angle is that law and CRT cannot be separated because the law is part of politics and, hence, also part of communities and institutions (kindergartens, schools, universities). Politics and its ISA-dominated laws and policies shape particular attitudes toward, for instance, people of color (cf. Crenshaw et al. 85). Similar to CRT studies and many other academic fields, legal studies are also dominated by white scholars. This creates a hierarchical power structure and struggle between members of the ISA and the RSA (cf. 85, 87, 94). In addition, civil rights and laws are often politicized and almost exclusively determined by the ISA. This causes a reproduction of segregation (cf. 104, 109, 302, 445) that is primarily based on race and that is historically rooted (cf. 237). Accordingly, contemporary kinds of racism have been redefined and are, more or less indirectly, linked to the hierarchical relations originating from times of slavery or Hitlerism (cf. 267).

Moreover, racism categorizes people into superior and inferior. The stigma theory is concerned with such racial categorizations (cf. 244) and is described as the “process by which the dominant group [...] differentiates itself from others by setting

them apart, treating them as less than fully human, [...] and excluding them from participating in that community as equals” (244). Consequently, race (or religious affiliation) is used as a justification for Othering and an unquestioned inferiority from a historical perspective as well as contemporary perspective (cf. 259, 262). Particularly post-9/11, religious affiliation is also increasingly used for a justified and racialized/religionized Othering. Furthermore, media representations are manipulative and racially (and religiously) biased: The media embodies “blacks as the primary potential source of violence and crime” (252). Due to those images, children already grow up with the assumption that Blacks are inferior to Whites because they already observe and learn “the behavior of others [parents, teachers, etc.]” (238). Therefore, laws and ISAs need to be challenged, changed (cf. 127, 274), and adjusted to new forms of scholarly fields. CRT studies need to be extended to, for example, Critical Religion Theory embracing new (Middle Eastern) immigration movements (cf. 134).

Extended forms of CRT also need to consider the complications of double-racisms and double-minorities: While people of color and Middle Easterners are already a common target for White and non-Middle Eastern (Western) political apparatuses, women suffer racism based on their religion, skin color *and* gender (cf. 357-59). Accordingly, women are a double/triple-minority because of their skin color, their Middle Eastern heritage, and their gender. Although double-racism and, hence, double-oppression are mainly linked to skin color, religion, and gender, another frequent reason for double-oppression is language (learning). “[M]any immigrant women are wholly dependent on their husbands as their link to the world outside their homes” (359). Accordingly, language barriers cause (in addition to skin color, religion, gender, immigrant status) “another structural problem that limits opportunities of non-English [or non-German]–speaking women to take advantage of

existing support services” (ibid.): social and educational services contribute to better and faster integration in the community and in the workforce.

Integration is also often linked to residential (in)equality that is divided into ethnicities, skin colors, and religious affiliations. Any kind of segregation is a form of racism that denies access to social services, education, better school forms and districts, and language courses to certain groups of people. Therefore, long-term opportunities to achieve valid educational degrees and well-paid jobs are almost impossible (cf. 449). Housing also has enormous political and social significance because housing “is much more than shelter: it provides social status” (449) and affects integration. Yet, as long as people of different skin colors, religions, and ethnicities are residentially segregated, Western societies are neither colorblind nor headscarfblind (cf. 449, 452, 455, 457).

Any form of blindness, however, might not necessarily decrease racialized segregation or discrimination. Instead, current scholarly research lacks to properly adapt CRT to the respective cultural and religious contexts by acknowledging its complexities and intersections. As a multifaceted and transdisciplinary theory, CRT merges in several sectors, academic fields, as well as society, politics, religion, education, law, cultural studies, comparative literature, history, and anthropology (cf. Delgado et al., *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* xviii). There are already adjusted forms of CRT such as LatCrit and QueerCrit (cf. ibid.). However, especially in times of increasing Middle Eastern immigration in Europe but also in the United States, it is crucial to include the religion component into CRT studies as another (sub)category.

The majority of Western nations expect that “getting rid of racism means simply getting rid of ignorance, or encouraging to “get along”” (xviii). However, this

is precisely what is criticized: Colorblindness, headscarfblindness, and “ignorance” (ibid.) do not reduce racism; to the contrary, they harden fronts between society, politics, and people of the RSA and ISA. Due to globalization and the overarching political and economic cooperation between different nations and their divergent religious, societal, and political (belief) systems, certain groups of people are treated as inferior and even as danger for the ISA. Economic downturns and terrorist attacks are responsible for dehumanizing and devaluing certain people (cf. xxi) such as “undocumented Latinos and Middle Eastern people” (xxi). Although “minorities of color exceed the white population in size” (ibid.) in, for instance, California, those minorities do not exceed the white population “in influence” (ibid.). Consequently, the ISA’s dominant structures and interference into various sectors need to be deconstructed through, for instance, an extension of CRT not only to LatCrit and people of color: It is crucial to amplify CRT and to not limit it to race only—religious components need to be considered as well.

The “relationship among race, racism, and power” (3) cannot be separated from religion. Political, religious, racial, and economic influences enforced by power dynamics usually also contain “an activist dimension” (7)—and so does CRT and its extensions (Critical Religion Theory, LatCrit, FemCrit, QueerCrit, etc.): Academic activism and the power of academic theories and concepts depend on the extension of CRT to “other fields [...] as well as to other countries” (xxii) in order to use its influence in education, society, economy, and politics. Due to the “social construction” (8), races are treated as “products of social thought and relations” (ibid.).

Social and political constructs and who is regarded as Other also change throughout time. Those changing attitudes and concepts prove how unstable racism is

and how certain Others are perceived differently depending on time and current political, societal, and economic circumstances: Middle Easterners., for instance, were once romanticized and adored because of the fairytale image of flying carpets and “summoning genies from lamps” (9). Today, Middle Easterners pose a threat as “crazed terrorists” (ibid.).

As targets of racism change, people’s kinds of activisms also shift. Accordingly, CRT’s extensions cannot be separated from outer influences and fluctuating global dynamics. Yet, several US-American publications lack to consider enough multicultural and transatlantic aspects regarding CRT’s newly emerging facets: The majority of publications focuses on “white privilege” (13) and “other racial groups such as LatCrits and critical Asian writers” (ibid.). However, this does not cover the racisms based on religion.

Critics alleged CRT scholars (and CRT’s limited exposure to different racisms) to teach “unmitigated manipulation of emotions and playing the race card” (51-52). Instead, CRT scholarship should reduce racism against minorities, people of color, and Middle Easterners. Critics, hence, perceive CRT as a rather pessimistic form of scholarship that does not provide solutions or progresses for politics and societies. The reason for this pessimistic attitude toward CRT’s scholarship is the emotional and humanly biased component that is difficult to measure neutrally: “[W]hat would be more effective, an array of statistics or a good story or movie?” (53). As outlined in several publications, storytelling research methods are often criticized because storytelling features immeasurable emotional components, which is referred to unacademic and unprofessional research. However, CRT studies should not necessarily aim at quantitative research results in forms of statistics. Instead, CRT

research should raise awareness how politics, society, and media (negatively) influence what is assumed to be the “right” and “wrong” (Othered) norm.

Therefore, this dissertation presents interviews with open questions. Nevertheless, researchers need to realize that stories and open questions can never be assessed in a completely unbiased manner: Particularly because people have different and individual ways of seeing and processing images and stories depending on their heritage, education, social status, and cultural *setting*. Accordingly, CRT scholarship should be regarded as an open research field that needs to be constantly updated and questioned because of the changing political, economic, and societal dynamics. CRT studies cannot present fixed results. Generally, research should not always be driven by definite results and outcomes. Instead, research needs to raise awareness and should leave enough opportunities and freedom for individual critical approaches and adaptations.

The research method of storytelling also leaves enough space for intersectionality and flexibility. It allows a consideration of “race, sex, class, national origin, and sexual orientation, and how their combination plays out in various settings” (57). In addition, intersectionality is important because people (independent from their ethnical, societal, political, educational, economic, and religious backgrounds) do not fit into one category only: What happens to CRT if oppression and discrimination are not based on race only but are also based on, for example, being homosexual (cf. *ibid.*)? Due to the diverse factors, it is essential to consider the politics of distinction as well as the politics of identification (cf. 61). Since racial oppression might not be based on race only, the intersectionality and “double minorities [...] such as black women, gay black men, or Muslim women wearing head scarves” (64.) needs to be recognized.

Several publications critically claim that “American society prefers to place its citizens into boxes based on physical attributes and culture” (78) and the “history of minorities [...] shows that while one group is gaining ground, another is often losing it” (79). In how far does racism and discrimination against once black people shift with changing presidential leaders and different political and economic circumstances? How does the “recent wave of anti-Muslim suspicion [...] in the years following 9/11” (76-77) replace racism against people of color? Does the changing focus on different minority target groups reform political structures? One shift was from anti-black attitudes toward anti-Latino/a/Mexican discrimination²⁰, when “Mexican immigrants [were depicted] as newcomers who took black jobs” (80).

Despite the shifting target groups of racism, Whites seem to be the one group that maintains its dominant position within the ISA: “[W]hiteness became established” (83) and the “phenomenon of white power and white supremacy, and the [...] privileges that come with membership in the dominant race” (ibid.) are still considered the norm. Although whiteness is increasingly questioned and criticized, the meanings and privileges of white(r) skin color are still represented as “right” norms: Especially in popular culture, the media, and several movies, the leading characters are still overly white. Whiteness is “normative; it sets the standard in dozens of situations” (84): politically, socially, historically, economically. It treats non-Whites as “exotic other” (ibid.). What if Othered people are not colored but Middle Eastern (cf. 76-77)? Whiteness and who is part of the alienated minority groups is “malleable” (87). Since whiteness is perceived as race-less (cf. 89) and positively connotated, the white ISA is in the dilemma of justifying racism toward

²⁰ Despite shifts in racism and who is referred to as the targeted and oppressed minority, I do not want to state that there is no more racism against Blacks. To the contrary, there is still a lot of racism against Blacks and other people of color. However, racist movements and politics became much more diverse and now also include Latinos/as/Mexicans and Middle Easterners.

Middle Easterners (because it cannot be done via the skin color component). Therefore, the white ISA uses 9/11 as justification for turning Whites (but Middle Easterners) into a racialized minority (cf. Tebble 466).

Considering that the majority of scholars is still white, the analysis of storytelling research methods might not be authentic because researcher and interviewee might misunderstand each other based on their different cultural identities (cf. 103-04). Since identity is unique and diverse, it is crucial to redefine and extend CRT while not limiting it to race in terms of black skin color only. CRT should even be renamed into Critical Multi-Racial Theory. In addition, it needs to include genders, sexual orientations, religions, and factors related to *setting*, *guan*, and *Developmental Niche Theory*. In addition to various cultural heritages, identities, gender issues, and religious belief systems, CRT cannot be separated from “immigration or national security [...], the threat of terrorism, [...] capitalism, wealth accumulation, and distributive justice and domestic issues of power” (114). Particularly in relation to poverty, class, social, financial, and cultural capital, racism embraces even more complex facets such as neighborhood segregation, standardized tests, and educational opportunities, which depend on zip codes (cf. 122-23) because “positive neighborhood characteristics are related to gains in educational attainment” (Horvat et al. 163).

Although Whites will uphold their privileged position and “will continue to be in the numerical majority until about 2050” (Delgado et al. 143), the—for now—minorities of color and Middle Eastern descent steadily grow and began, “for the first time, to pose political and economic competition for whites” (ibid.). Accordingly, globalization challenges political and educational structures and the way Whites perceive people of color, immigrants, and people with different religious affiliations:

The globalized economies and businesses need “people who [...] speak other languages and interact easily with their foreign counterparts” (144). Hence, (former) minorities “find new niches in the world economy” (ibid.). This poses a threat and unknown discomfort to the white and unquestioned norm. The growing number of Other minorities also changes how CRT will develop in the future: In general, CRT can be understood as a concept intending to draw attention to (racial and religious) discrimination against people of color and other minorities who do not fit the white norm (cf. West 148). However, minorities will outnumber Whites in the next few decades demographically (cf. 143). This could also alter CRT to a concept that needs to be adapted to the white minority. In this way, whiteness would not be regarded as “race-less” (89) anymore: The conflict of interests between the white norm and people of color will be reversed.

In order to acknowledge this reversal and shift in norms, the terms of race and racism and how to properly integrate them into the legal system, society, cultural identity and ideology, and the educational system, need to be redefined as well. Such redefinitions will also provide an interesting base for developing new versions of CRTs for other cultural, societal, political, and post-historical contexts. In so doing, the main focus should be on solution approaches for creating equal chances in various sectors (society, education, politics) for people of all ethnic, religious, and cultural heritages. However, current research and publications fail to provide specific cross-culturally applicable solutions. Some practical solution approaches, which still need extension for the respective local circumstances, are provided in Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas’ “Critical Race Theory in Education: Theory, Praxis, and Recommendations:” First, “diversify the classroom” (Lazos Vargas 13) by offering equal access to everyone in order to achieve higher levels of education for well-paid jobs after

graduation. Second, “educators must overcome their own racial identities and develop the ability to be open-minded and sensitive toward other life experiences” (ibid.) in order to create and teach an unbiased curriculum neither advantaging nor disadvantaging particular groups of people. Third, society, politicians, and educators have to face the “struggle to find and become comfortable with racial identity” (ibid.). In order to neutralize oneself (as an educator), it is crucial to integrate multiculturalism and multi-religionalism into the educational system from the very beginning. In this way, one avoids prejudiced teaching and learning methods (cf. Tebble 478).

In order to avoid racialized teaching, it is essential to regard CRT as a lens that “explains how ‘race’ and racism works in American society” (Lightfoot 32). However, CRT seems to be rather a research method, or a lens, scholars use for deconstructing social and political concepts of race. Since racism is diverse and has various origins and complications, CRT (or adapted forms) should be regarded as a method to research “rules, policies, practices, awards of prestige and power, and [...] interest convergence” (ibid.). This is necessary for avoiding a reproduction of racism and the ISA’s supremacy. In Western nations, “there is a socioeconomic political system that uses ‘race’ as a primary mechanism for awarding privileges and benefits [...] based on phenotype (looks) and ancestry” (ibid.).

Accordingly, people need to be prepared for “meaningfully and effectively use an anti-bias approach” (33) in politics, economy, education, and communities in order to keep the “‘race’ talk in the academy” (ibid.). Furthermore, race has to be recognized as a multilayered construct that is inseparable from politics, culture, class, gender, education, sexual orientation, religion, and financial capital. All those layers contribute to the social status and determine how particular races are perceived

socially. Hence, racism cannot be limited to skin color only because factors such as gender, class, and religion categorize people racially and are also common triggers for racism. Jonathan Lightfoot's "Race, Class, Gender, Intelligence, and Religion Perspectives" is one of the few scholarly works that considers religion as part of CRT studies and outlines the multilayered ways of how different societies, politics, and cultures define religion (cf. 36). In this way, Lightfoot adds to the complication of terms such as race and emphasizes the intersectional challenges of religion, "'race', gender, class, and intelligence" (37).

Those intersectional challenges also make racism a complex phenomenon that involves people from diverse ethnic, cultural, economic, societal, historical, religious, economic, and political backgrounds. Racism also interferes with a variety of sectors affecting social status and financial capital, which are both interlinked with the ISA's political norms and regulations (cf. L. Parker 185). Therefore, CRTs need to become tools for empowering disadvantaged communities (ibid.). Additionally, CRTs should be used "with respect to naming racism and its connection to the larger social context and ideological forces of domination" (185). However, for successfully using CRTs as tools for equal empowerment, different colors as well as religious and cultural identities and ideologies need to be *seen* in all its facets (and not disregarded while being colorblind and headscarfblind).

Additionally, scholars and academic and non-academic fields (education, politics, the law) need to allow CRT to expand to a variety of intersections with, among others, "feminist theory, postmodern theory, social class-based criticism, queer theory" (186), LatCrit (cf. 187), and Critical Religion Theory. In so doing, it is crucial to consider "how race [...] intersects and connects with gender, social class, culture, and other areas of difference" (187); CRT's main focus can also not be disconnected

from those components because of the enormous influence those components have on society and social status.

“[R]ace is central in the making of our world” (ibid.)—and so is gender and religion. Does this mean that race, as a social construct and “system of human classification” (ibid.), is necessary for making societal and political meaning? If so, what does this mean for racism and its redefined forms? Assuming that this kind of meaning influences governmental systems and societal structures, the arising question is what was there first—race as meaning creator impacting politics or politics defining the meaning of the (social) construct of race? According to Laurence Parker’s “Critical Race Theory in Education: Possibilities and Problems,” “racism evolved ideologically and philosophically in Europe and North America as a system of human classification based on physical characteristics that were considered fixed” (ibid.). However, those fixed norms were also constantly redefined and changed political meanings and social constructs according to the respective zeitgeist.

Due to the constantly changing circumstances, “the concept of race” (191) needs to be reexamined and regarded as “fluid” (ibid.) and “continually shaped by political pressures” (ibid.). This ever-changing dynamic has to be considered in different cultural, political, and societal contexts with particular attention to the growing impacts of globalization and the power of state apparatuses and (white, non-Muslim) mainstream societies (cf. 189, 191), which increasingly merge into almost every sector (politics, culture, economy, religion, etc.) (cf. 195). Therefore, CRT and the social construct of race need to “uncover patterns of disempowerment on gender and racial lines in the areas of law as well as popular discourse” (192) and seek “intersections and conjunctions with other areas of difference” (193). The diverse facets of theories such as CRT should also not be limited to the “debate between

critical race theorists and the colorblind advocates of the law” (186) because race cannot be limited to color only and vice versa. The current situation in Europe, particularly in Germany, demands headscarf awareness besides (or even instead of) the color-based awareness/blindness.

Prejudices based on false assumptions related to (false) headscarf- and colorblindness require a rethinking, reconstruction, and redefinition of existing political, cultural, religious, and social constructs linked to race. Although academia should not be the only lens through which gridlocked constructs and laws are redefined, it can function as key component for creating a new intellectual community (and teacher and student cohort) with diverse backgrounds and social statuses in order to achieve a non/less biased CRT scholarship providing multifaceted approaches (cf. 193). 21st-century education needs more practice-related research and guidelines how to transform CRTs into practical matters. In this way, it will also be easier to approach all members of society and the political systems, sectors, and state apparatuses practically and equally (cf. 194): Scholarship must become “dialogical praxis-oriented” (194) and has to demand “constant questioning of power and authority in research” (195).

Furthermore, research is supposed to not generalize “human relations” (196) and constructs because “experiences [...] are unique” (ibid.) and adjust to contemporary situations within societies. Since “practice always informs theory” (ibid.), CRT scholars also need to “engage in activist work with the communities and their complexities” (ibid.) instead of overgeneralizing theories hypothetically. Accordingly, Parker’s suggestion of the following three steps for a “hands-on” research can be reapplied for a rather religion-based context:

- (1) consider the contemporary race relations,
- (2) observe the relationship between the researched race and the community, and
- (3) consider the (minority) groups' constant struggles for equal power (ibid.).

Yet, independent from the context, the long-term goal is to question the mainstream approach and the all-dominating norm of the ISA. Those three steps' research also have to be beyond "black-white paradigm[s]" (ibid.) in order to develop a "more "layered" research discussion about life in racially [and religiously] diverse" (ibid.) sectors. Forms of CRTs have to be intersectional and in combination with other critical theories. Moreover, CRTs need to acknowledge different components that allow adaptations (cf. 196-97). Consequently, CRT is not one particular theoretical approach. Instead, CRT is "part of a larger ongoing power struggle pertaining to the dominant ideological racial context [...] that will engage concerned researchers, teachers, and activists within the academy, the schools, and the larger community" (197). An equal and globally-considerate future of a properly adapted and multilayered CRT lies in questioning the authority dynamics between the (white, non-Muslim) ISA and the RSA and its interrelated political, social, religious, educational, and economic sectors.

Consequently, CRT should be regarded as a "form of oppositional scholarship" (Tate IV 196) because it cannot be limited to gender, race, sexuality, religion, or class only (cf. ibid.) Instead, CRT is part of the political system and keeps modifying its own dynamic through changes related to past as well as contemporary legal, economic, social, political, and cultural matters (cf. 197). Those dynamics have different meanings for different eras and (ethnic) groups. Thus, they are also oppositional depending on time and political, economic, social, and religious perspectives of the cultural identity and heritage. Accordingly, CRT should not be considered as an oppositional form of scholarship (cf. 196) but rather as a manifold

form of scholarship that continuously redefines itself through the ever-changing social dynamics.

Despite this constant alteration of CRT scholarship throughout the last decades, there is one stable CRT component that remains unmodified: the inferiority of the Other—referred to as the “inferiority paradigm” (199). This paradigm is “built on the belief that people of color are biologically and genetically inferior to Whites” (ibid.). Although this hegemony of Whites has mainly historical roots (slavery, colonization) (cf. 199-200), it changed its format of racism. Yet, hegemony and hierarchical orders still keep reproducing itself through, for instance, redefined Jim Crow laws of the 21st century. An equal and diverse representation of all ethnic communities, ideologies, heritages, and ethnicities is crucial for anti-hierarchical hegemonic power apparatuses. Although the law, legal studies, and political science have enormous impacts on those power dynamics, issues related to racism and race need to be considered with multilayered academic and educational approaches: CRT is more than a theoretical concept (cf. 202).

Accordingly, various forms of CRTs need to become part of the educational system and focus on its intercultural complexities as well as legal and historical backgrounds related to segregation, racism, and discrimination. Educational institutions and curricula need to question past and current “role[s] of racism and social class in learning” (199). In this way, the educational sector is able to promote a positive image of cultural diversities because education is regarded as key element for fighting racism since it is “low intelligence [that] is at the root of society’s social ills” (200). Learning with and from diverse student and teacher cohorts is crucial for a racism-free education and future jobs because “many African American lawyers were not prepared to litigate and resolve issues of race and American law” (204). It is

essential to deconstruct the social construct of race created and maintained by the hegemonic state apparatus (SA) through unfolding CRT and its complexities impacting politics, law, economy, science, cultural ideology, identity, and social structures.

In order to successfully adapt and redefine traditional norms of social constructs, it is crucial to “promote political activism to achieve racial justice” (211). One possibility to foster political, societal, religious, and cultural activism is to use narrative and “its communicative power” (ibid.) as a tool for the disempowerment of hierarchical (and racist) structures (cf. ibid.). Activism is only successful if all ethnicities are equally represented in “school boards and other policy-making bodies to reflect the proportion” (213) in various sectors. Otherwise, activism is counterproductive and reproduces hegemonic power. Another complication of reproduced inequality and hierarchical power structures is the perception of whiteness as ultimate truth: “[M]ost of us [Whites] are unaware of our racism” (219; cf. 223) because Whites do not realize how and that “most minorities [...] live in a world dominated by race” (219).

Finally, it is important to create intersectionality among societies, community building, religions, education, ideologies, cultural identities, politics, and the media. Through various adapted forms of CRTs, whiteness will not be regarded as the only accepted norm. Therefore, CRTs should be regarded as interdisciplinary theories that question and redefine past and contemporary laws and their limitations still based on white supremacy (cf. 234). Those intersectional and interdisciplinary forms of CRT are complex and need to be considered beyond structures of racial inferiority and superiority (cf. 236). Consequently, CRT and all its facets become a tool for turning

theoretical frameworks and scholarship into action and activism in order to reduce racial hierarchies.

Such an activism is represented in the current scholarship's approaches to develop more zeitgeisty and diverse forms of CRT: FemCrit, LatCrit, TribalCrit, AsianCrit, WhiteCrit, etc. (cf. Yosso et al. 3). Those recommended new forms of CRT are mainly related to ethnicity, heritage, and gender, which cannot be disconnected from one another because those aspects interfere. Moreover, the lines between ethnicity, race, religion, culture, and politics become increasingly blurry in a globalized society, economy, and education. "[R]acism intersects with other forms of subordination in the U.S. education system" (3) and, thus, has an enormous influence on societal and political structures, outcomes, policies, and decisions: Race has "a more influential role in the promotion of social reforms and public policy than is usually presumed" (Goode 16)—either for better (inclusion) or for worse (exclusion). Those aspects and intersections are also indispensable for Critical Religion Theory. Especially in consideration of the Islam, it is crucial to also integrate the gender component since Muslim women tend to be more racialized and stigmatized because of their obvious (female) clothing signifiers (headscarf).

The complexity of racisms requires "critical race pedagogy" (Yosso et al. 6) in order to "empower marginalized students and teachers [...] and help prepare future teachers to engage in education as a liberatory project" (ibid.). Accordingly, CRT scholars need to ask themselves how "racism, sexism, [and] classism" (ibid.) shape institutional racism and how education can become a "tool to help end racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of subordination" (ibid.). However, it is unrealistic to end racisms. Hence, it is crucial to teach people to recognize differences and to avoid colorblindness and headscarfblindness. Consequently, instead of making it the

ultimate goal to “provide access and equal opportunities for students of color” (14), society and policymakers should rather focus on providing “access to diverse groups so that White students can learn in a diverse context” (ibid.).

Those diverse (educational) contexts need to be free from canonized norms, as it is criticized in Aijaz Ahmad’s “The Politics of Culture:” In consideration of the social construction of race and identity, it is crucial to redefine terminologies in order to avoid xenophobia and oppression caused by terminology defined by the ISA. Ahmad is concerned with the dominant (mass) media confusing “‘culture’ with ‘civilization’ and civilization with ‘religion’” (Ahmad 65). The Canon, for example, already distinguishes between high and low culture, devalues popular culture, and causes oppression and segregation with the definition of the term culture: There is only one accepted culture—culture that is white, non-Middle Eastern, and that represents the dominant “civilization” (ibid.). Although Ahmad’s scholarly work dates back to 1999, it is still relevant nowadays because it emphasizes how Christianity is confused with high culture and an accepted form of civilization (cf. ibid.). This is relevant for the current situation in German schools that “integrate” Middle Eastern students into either atheist or Christianity-based curricula. Those curricula do not incorporate Others and their belief systems.

Definitions and meanings of terms such as culture, religion, and the Canon often have biased and predefined connotations distributed and hyped by the ISA. Because members of the ISA represent the mainstream ideal norm and do not reflect (enough) diversity, those ideologies and identities are not multifaceted. Instead, they are biased and cause a reproduction of segregation, discrimination, devaluation, and racism based on being Other. Additionally, definitions cannot be regarded as fixed because structures and constructs are part of an ever-changing dynamic process and

progress—particularly in times of globalization and immigration movements. Conflicts, “along lines of class, caste, gender, ethnicity, etc. actually leave very little room for all the people” (65). Hence, (multi)culture needs to be redefined to create a “unity in diversity” (66) in order to recognize that culture “is not an arena for harmonious unfolding of the National Spirit” (ibid.). Instead, culture is a “field [...] of contention and conflict, among classes and among other social forces that struggle for dominance” (ibid).

Accordingly, culture becomes even more politicized in times of globalization and the resulting challenges such as immigration and the social, political, and educational integration of immigrants: “The struggle over culture is now a central element in political struggle as a whole” (68). Moreover, most sectors are politicized and predefined. This “political dominance [causes] cultural hegemony” (69) and separates society into “mainstream” versus “Other” state apparatuses. In this way, culture becomes a field of “contention and conflict, among classes and among other social forces that struggle for dominance” (66). This dominance creates biased cultural images and influences the culture industry, education, social matters, and politics (cf. 69).

This biased domination cannot be separated from discrimination, segregation, racism, and an Other(ed) political identity that does not fit the ISA’s norm. Therefore, identity is a multifaceted signifier that determines whether one belongs to the ISA or the RSA. According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, however, identity “may not be the best word for bringing together the roles gender, class, race, nationality, and so on play in our lives” (Appiah 15) because “each of us has many identities” (ibid.). In multicultural societies, identities also cross boundaries that politics often disapprove because allowing identities to cross and to become equally part of the ISA disrupts the

dominant political order the ISA haunts. Accordingly, identities are used to “[de]construct our human lives” (19).

Treating cultural, political, historical, religious, educational, and social identities as constructs in order to uphold the dominant norm alienates various heritages. Additionally, in consideration of the Hegelian language, the “responses of other people obviously play a crucial role in shaping one’s sense of who one is” (ibid.). Hence, institutions, such as schools, influence one’s political and cultural identity (cf. ibid.) and how certain cultural and religious identities are perceived. Shaping one’s identity does not necessarily mean to influence one’s identity or to affect who one is or becomes. Instead, the impact of politics and educational institutions influences how one’s identity and social standing is perceived and accepted. Consequently, identity is, as race, a social construct that rules over one’s social, financial, educational, and cultural capital. Therefore, the complexity of social constructs and identities is composed of various signifiers labelling a person according to gender, religious affiliation, ethnic heritage, skin color, sexual orientation, etc.

Unless whiteness as privilege and covert forms of racisms are disestablished, racism based on the ISA’s dominant norms will continue. Derrick Bell’s article on “Affirmative Action: Another Instance of Racial Workings in the United States” is concerned with whiteness being the constant privileged norm in society and the hidden racism and “overt discrimination” (Bell, *Affirmative Action* 145): Whites pretend to sacrifice their own rights for black people but, in reality, they only “protect [their own] important economic or political interests” (146). Accordingly, the principle of “separate but equal” (cf. ibid.) emphasizes the selfishness and hypocrisy as one of the main problems of covert racism and the fear of losing white-dominated

advantages and superiority. Although this covert racism is mainly on political and economic levels, the separate but equal practices also affect other sectors such as education because institutions are increasingly politicized and economized.

Similar to covert racism, education and its curricula also separate Others by pretending to integrate them: In Germany, the emergence of German as second language classes for immigrants and refugees pretends to integrate while, actually, separating them even more from German society because those courses often take place in other buildings (cf. Allington 602-03). Hence, learners are not integrated in Germany's school routines and everyday interactions: German language learners become increasingly marginalized and alienated. Oftentimes, integration and new teaching and learning methods are only reinforced and supported if the ISA's interests are (still) protected or even enhanced (cf. Bell, *Affirmative Action* 146).

Bell's *Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism* provides additional interesting research on how racism affects various life sectors while reflecting on stories people of color shared. At first glance, this might be a "less academic" approach. However, this approach gives people of color an authentic and heard (political and legal) voice in CRT and other academic fields—fields that are still predominantly covered by Whites (cf. Chin 111). This way of providing people of color with an appreciated voice makes research more authentic and direct. Furthermore, such research methods reach readers more than hard facts because of the emotional and personal components (storytelling method) (cf. Bell, *Faces at the Bottom* 144). Additionally, this research style might also be more accepted by Whites and people of color alike: First, because the mainstream scholarly community is still mainly white. Second, because people of color are given an active voice through the often more heard and respected (white) voices.

This is important because skin color impacts how contents are conceived by whom: “No matter their experience or expertise, blacks’ statements [...] are not entitled to serious consideration” (111). Hence, this kind of storytelling research method provides a chance for people of color to be taken into “serious consideration” (ibid.). Although this seems to be a progressive move in terms of being heard, the reasons why colored voices are often not seriously considered seem to depend on Whites: The ISA becomes the megaphone and distributor. This can also be regarded as a form of hidden racism that oppresses people of color over and over again. In other words, “it takes whiteness to give [...] Blackness validity” (113). Consequently, the ISA keeps reproducing whiteness as property and privilege and produces “cultural criticism in the context of white supremacy” (114).

Therefore, the storytelling method (conducted by Whites) also poses a danger when used as a tool to advance one’s own research and academic standing through using black people’s voices as expedient: White “Americans achieve a measure of social stability through their unspoken pact to keep blacks at the bottom—an aspect of social functioning that [...] has retained its [...] value to general stability from the very beginning of the American experience” (152; cf. 153). This is especially the case in education, in which social, cultural, and financial capitals are crucial in order to get admitted to (elite and) socially approved schools, colleges, and universities. However, due to the fact that those kinds of capitals are mainly based on skin color, one has to wonder how black people’s life is predetermined because they are “born into a system in which they have never had a chance, they are reduced” (23) to their skin color and suffer continuous and reproduced oppression.

“And the white ones really think racism is over, despite anything we tell them”

(30). One reason why the majority of Whites believe “racism is over” (ibid.) is the false assumption about symbols:

[M]ost whites and lots of black folks rely on (racial) symbols to support their belief that black people have come a long way since slavery and segregation to the present time. In their [white people’s] view, we [Blacks] not only have laws protecting our rights, but a holiday recognizing one of our greatest leaders [Martin Luther King, Jr.]. (20)

This is similar to the election of former President Obama: When Obama became the first black President, especially white people automatically assumed that there is no more racism against people of color and that everybody is created equal, independent from heritage and skin color. However, electing or (as stated in the quote above) celebrating a black leader does not vanish racism. Especially post-9/11, racialized symbols were extended to religious symbols (headscarves) and Middle Easterners were constantly regarded as terrorists (cf. Tebble 464, 466). The handling of the refugee crisis and the predominantly Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Germany and other European countries is also a form of covert racism and false assumptions: Due to Germany’s Nazi history, Germany and its chancellor Merkel did not have a choice for limiting or controlling immigration figures because this would have automatically been connected to being racist and fascist. Hence, the German government did not limit immigration numbers. Instead of regulating immigration and integrating refugees and immigrants responsibly, Germany built mosques. Although building mosques might be well-intended, it is exactly the same mistake the United States’ white population did: It is based on the (pretended and false) assumption that electing a black President and honoring black leaders (Martin Luther King) prove that there is no more racism. However, simply not limiting immigration figures and building mosques does not automatically welcome and integrate refugees and immigrants. It also does not protect them from racist attacks; to the contrary: Building mosques

resulted in even more xenophobia. Finally, it is also crucial to not just be aware of racism and its consequences but “to be *with it*” (Bell, *Faces at the Bottom* 22, italics in original).

Consequently, skin color and religious affiliation “formed [and still form] an easy and reliable gauge for determining to what extent one was or was not American [or German]” (West 3). However, it is not only skin color that is used as gauge deciding whether one belongs to mainstream society or not; it is family background, immigration history, religious affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, and factors related to social, cultural, and financial capital. All those aspects are—directly or indirectly—linked to skin color, heritage, and religion because, for example, dark(er) skin or wearing a headscarf are still obstacles and “visible catalyst[s], not the underlying cause[s]” (4). This hardens fronts between ISA and RSA and cannot be separated from institutional racist structures and values (cf. 18). Consequently, it is (educational) institutions that reduce or reproduce racism. This also emphasizes the significance of diversity within institutions through multicultural teams and curricula.

The lack of diversity, multiracial respect, equal chances and educational advancement in curricula and institutional structures has led to nihilism among people of color (cf. 22-23). In *Race Matters* Cornel West argues, “nihilistic threat contributes to criminal behavior. It is a threat that feeds on poverty and shattered cultural institutions and grows more powerful” (25; cf. 66). This “black existential *angst* derives from the lived experience of [...] emotional scars inflicted by white supremacist beliefs and images permeating U.S. society and culture” (27, italics in original). Nihilism is a “disease of the soul” (29) that “can never be completely cured” (ibid.), even though there is “hope for the future and a meaning to struggle” (ibid.) against racial prejudices and discrimination. CRT is one way of alleviating nihilism

and “black existential *angst*” (27, italics in original) while drawing attention to discrimination based on skin color, cultural heritage, religion, ideology, and identity while attempting to deconstruct the stereotyped understanding of “black authenticity” (39; cf. 43). CRT also challenges the ISA’s “white supremacist abuse” (39) and “racial reasoning” (ibid.). Most importantly, however, the issue of racism is multifaceted and needs to consider religion and multicultural heritages as well— independent from skin colors.

CRT scholarship can only be successfully applied if racialized constructs and structures are not redefined by white supremacy and Westernized norms. Even though several scholarly works such as Michelle Alexander’s *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* focus on how redefined Jim Crow laws are reapplied to current racism issues, discrimination, and segregation toward Blacks within the United States’ white-dominated ISA, one needs to recognize that racism has shifted to Middle Easterners. Racism is not only against people of color anymore: It increasingly targets Middle Easterners. As Alexander’s publication also covers hidden racism and how it, seemingly indirectly (yet planned) denies people of color (and Middle Easterners) equal access to the law, politics, education, housing, and public services (cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 1-2), it is relevant for this dissertation that seeks new approaches for the outdated and racially-biased curricula.

Alexander’s and other research on redefined racialized structures is particularly important because it emphasizes that it is not the immediate racism that leads to long-term discrimination and segregation: It is the resulting enduring exclusion based on racial prejudices that continuously rejects people of certain skin colors, ethnical backgrounds, and religious affiliations. Hence, Othered people cannot equally participate in the ISA. Consequently, it is the ISA’s hidden racism that keeps

redefining and defending its discrimination and segregation in order to legally recreate and justify the, for instance, long-abolished Jim Crow laws. In Europe's contemporary situation this means that Middle Eastern immigrants and refugees are denied free access to German as second language courses, which are indispensable for successful long-term integration. Moreover, the Middle Eastern and black Jim Crows face religiously- and racially-biased misrepresentations throughout the media: Besides racial profiling (cf. 125), the media also dehumanize and sensationalize crime reports (cf. 41-42, 105-06) and make the Others scapegoats: People of color and Middle Easterners are frequently represented as threat, criminals, lunatics, and terrorists (cf. Tebble 464, 466; cf. Schipperges n. pag.).

Although there are (were) rays of hope, such as Obama's election, racism is still very much present; the election of Obama is merely a drop in the bucket (cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 253-55). A comparable "drop-in-the-bucket" situation exists in Germany: The fact that the right-wing party is still outnumbered by other political parties in the parliament leads to the assumption that racism is not as present anymore—especially not in times of pretended equality, freedom, and political correctness. However, "[w]e have not ended racial caste in America [and in Europe]; we have merely redesigned it" (2): In Germany, for example, the media and politics refer to "it" as conspiracy theories, deliberate provocation, and power games (cf. Schmidt n. pag.)—but it has been retransformed and "redesigned" (Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 2). It is named differently and belittled. Hence, people tend to not realize it as much as before, when it was still called fascism and Jim Crow laws. Since the last election in Germany, the concerning rise of the *AfD*²¹ (right-wing German

²¹ The *AfD* (German abbreviation, *Alternative for Germany*) is a German political party founded in 2013. 2014, the *AfD* won nationwide mandates for the first time. At the parliamentary elections for the German Bundestag in 2017, the *AfD* was elected by almost 13 percent and become the third strongest

political party), and the election of Donald Trump, the United States and Germany face hidden racism in various forms of redefined Jim Crow laws within the ISA.

Another issue to consider is how violent histories of discrimination, segregation, fascism, and racism will repeat itself in redefined ways and how much Western countries already face the danger of another era of fascism, right-wing movements, and anti-Islamic sentiment. Germany's contemporary *Pegida* ²² movement proves that the worst-case scenario is not only panicmongering—it has already become reality in a (pretended) colorblind, headscarfblind, and “raceless” (cf. Lynn et al. 276) society that has ever since been fighting the dramatic scales of the Third Reich and the extinction of a wretched race. Politics' key problems are the denial of being racist and pretending to be not racist anymore (or even post-racist). However, the setback is not, as also often wrongly assumed, to not see colors or headscarves; the problem is *pretending* to not see it at all: To fake to not see the different colors, cultures, ethnicities, and religions of people has nothing to do with tolerance. It is a denial and defiance of the respective cultural and religious heritages and the repressive enforcement of the white and Westernized ISA's norms.

Although societal and political dynamics constantly shift, the biased social construct of race and the hierarchical Westernized and white structures of the ISA have never really been redefined. Hence, people of color, of (Islam) religion, and of different ethnic backgrounds are still alienated, labeled as threat, and treated as minority that does not possess legal equality. Due to the exclusion, they cannot

party. It is a right-wing populist and extremist party that supports racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Islamic movements.

²² The *Pegida* movement emerged in October 2014. *Pegida* is an abbreviation for “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West.” *Pegida* did weekly demonstrations against the (according to their supporters) endangering Islamization of the Western world. The organization and its members aggressively and violently criticize Germany's and Europe's “misguided” immigration as well as asylum policies. Although politicians and various religious associations admonish of the danger of racism, extreme right-wing tendencies, and xenophobia, *Pegida* became officially incorporated as a league. In many cities, counter demonstrations emerged against the *Pegida* movements (for instance in Dresden and Leipzig).

participate in policymaking or in redesigning school curricula: However, “people who have been historically and are currently excluded from the educational conversation [...] [should] have a voice and take part in the negotiation of educational opportunities” (Moses 10). However, despite the increasing numbers of Middle Easterners in Europe and in the United States (cf. Reimann, *Globale Studie* n. pag.), the media and the ISA continue their panicmongering: Amaney Jamal, “associate professor of politics at Princeton and a consultant for *Pew* on global Islam” (Goodstein n. pag.) criticizes the post-9/11 obsession and fear along with the media’s alienation, misrepresentation, and dehumanization of people of color and Middle Easterners:

There’s this assumption that Muslims are populating the earth, and not only are they growing at this exponential rate in the Muslim world, they’re going to be dominating Europe and, soon after, the United States. [...] But the figures don’t even come close. I’m looking at all this and wondering, where is all the hysteria coming from? (ibid.)

Considering this hysteria, it is important to restructure school curricula that do not strengthen the terrorist image of Middle Easterners. School curricula need to not teach racism but diversity and, hence, need to question stereotypes based on false assumptions and racial profiling. Additionally, curricula have to embrace all religions and skin colors in a neutral way without privileging or disadvantaging any particular group. Furthermore, the redefined curricula need to involve new teaching and learning methods including new media tools in order to evaluate and deconstruct medial (mis)representations of specific groups of people. This is particularly important in early educational stages because the “understanding of major social abstractions such as race, ethnicity, gender, or class does not develop in children until they are at least grown to elementary school age” (Van Ausdale et al. 5). The fact that “young children are unable to recognize even their own racial group” (ibid.) proves that children,

teenagers, adults, and the media have an enormous influence on teaching them racism (or not): “I realized I had been taught about racism as something that puts others at a disadvantage” (Baldwin 2). Hence, teachers and obsolete school curricula contribute to racist attitudes and teach and initiate the unquestioned continuation of racism. Therefore, school curricula need an extended form of CRT(s) and updated learning and teaching methods in order to embrace issues related to gender, religion, sexuality, social class, and ethnic heritage. Those new teaching and learning systems need to be individually tailored for the respective societal, political, cultural, financial, and religious circumstances within the community and their institutions.

In so doing, it is crucial to consider *Creativity and Academic Activism: Instituting Cultural Studies*, which is particularly concerned with the academic field of Cultural Studies and its (Westernized) institutionalization. It focuses on the impacts of globalization and the Westernization of contemporary cultural (immigrant) identities (cf. Morris et al. 27). The dominating Westernization tends to exclude particular non-canonized academic fields and is too “matched up” (28) with the Western canon. Hence, it is a growing challenge to combine cultural traditions and modernity while intersecting Other and Western properly (cf. 38). Therefore, it is necessary to create an “interface with the market, society, and public policy” (39) in order to guarantee a balanced intermingling between “old” and “new” without segregating (non-Western, Middle Eastern) cultural identities from mainstream expectations. Equal integration is difficult because of the capitalization of educational institutions: Academia is part of an institutionalized, Westernized, and politicized SA and economy. Hence, academic fields and its institutions are often a moneymaking business that is more concerned with costs and benefits than with

curricula contents. This shift in priorities has serious consequences for the academic development of niche fields such as Cultural Studies.

Another complication of treating academic institutions as marketplaces is that they “must now compete globally” (69). The influences of a globalized economy within academia demand an “engaged university” (85) that concentrates on imparting knowledge from within the university and, even more importantly, that integrates the “non-university world” (ibid.). In this way, educational institutions create a dialogue with and for the community inside and outside of academia. This could also become part of a practically applied academic activism. However, this kind of outside-university activism has to include *all* communities and neighborhoods—also the ones that are likely to be excluded from “community engagement” (ibid.): the poor, the immigrants, the Middle Easterners, the Blacks, the Latin Americans, the Others.

For successful and innovative (educational, political, cultural, legal, and economic) community integration, academic activism and curricula have to be transformed “from a teacher-centered to a student-centered mode, thus allowing the student to engage proactively with learning, and to own the learning process” (123) by applying the often abstract and theoretical approaches and concepts tangibly. Cultural Studies offer an appropriate and multilayered platform for combining cultural, political, educational, legal, and political intersections across communities and from theory into action. For successful implementation, it is essential to look “largely outside Cultural Studies to other intellectual traditions for productive ways of rethinking its nature as an intellectual practice” (226) with pre- as well as post-activism.

It is crucial to rethink the mindset toward the Other and the dominant ideology within as well as outside of academia. Especially in the United States, Other is

predominantly associated with minorities such as Blacks and Latin Americans. However, in European countries (and increasingly also in the United States) the new colored Other is Middle Eastern. Who is regarded as Other shifts: Historically, Blacks have also not always been treated as (exotic) Others either:

‘black’ has never just been there either. It has always been an unstable identity, psychically, culturally, and politically. It [...] is a narrative, a story, a history. Something constructed, told, spoken, not simply found...black is an identity which had to be learned and could only be learned in a certain moment. (Alexander, *Stuart Hall and ‘Race’* 467)

In other words, defining a particular group as Other is created through political, societal, and cultural (superior) power relations and ideologies formulated by the ISA. Such a superstructure (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134) is more concerned with perpetuating its hierarchical system (cf. Pines 182) instead of preserving unique cultural identities contributing to a multiethnic multiplicity. The isolation and disempowerment of the Other is, hence, a vicious circle of cultural clashes and an endless fight of sustaining hierarchical power structures (ibid.; cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134, 155; cf. Feagin et al. 934) between the white/Western domination and the colored/Middle Eastern Other.

Otherness is, therefore, socially, culturally, religiously, and politically constructed by the mainstream ideology oppressing Others who do not fit into the norm. From a historical perspective, Otherness was rather easy to create because the Others were mainly the minority, which facilitated the oppression. However, social constructs of, for example, race are constantly changing throughout decades and centuries because political ideologies and dynamics shift. Especially within growingly globalized societies and the interlinked economies, the ISA has to eventually redefine Otherness—also because the Other is not the minority anymore. And how do society

and its politics modify their norms when the (historically) oppressed Other becomes the majority?

Due to changing political and economic influences, the notion of the Other has shifted within the late 20th century and the early 21st century: From a US-American perspective, the Other is mainly portrayed as Mexican and Middle Eastern (especially because of the United States/Mexican border issues and 9/11). The dynamic within the concept of Otherness depends on current conditions and might, thus, be contradictory when comparing different historical periods. Thus, there were times, when black was considered beautiful²³, but still Othered: In the Harlem Renaissance²⁴, the black Other was entertaining and welcomed by Whites who experienced the “exotic as valuable” (Burgett et al. 106) and celebrated the “exoticism” (ibid.). This contributed to a “commercialization of ethnic difference” (ibid.), which was both, a progression toward the appreciation of the Other but also a new form of capitalism and consumerism: a market selling the (colored) Other. This is just another form of reverse racism, dehumanization, and a negative representation and merchandizing of the Other. A commercialization of Others can also be positive, as in the case of Middle Eastern people who were, in the past, mainly associated with “wielding curved swords, and [...] genies from lamps” (Delgado et al., *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* 9). Although the genie association might be better in contrast to the current representation of Middle Easterners as dangerous Other and “religiously crazed terrorists” (ibid.), it is still debatable in terms of political correctness.

In history, today, and prospectively in the following decades, “black” is the term which connotes the most despised, the dispossessed, the unenlightened, the

²³ *Black is Beautiful* was a cultural movement that began in the 1960s in the United States. The purpose of this movement was meant to stop racial discrimination based on the fact that dark skin color was less attractive than the one of Whites.

²⁴ The Harlem Renaissance, also called the *New Negro Movement*, was an artist movement of African American writers, performers, dancers, and musicians during the 1920s and 1930s.

uncivilized, the uncultivated, the scheming, the incompetent” (Hall, *Signification* 112). The “natural attitude of all cultures toward alien ones” (220) contributed to an “ethnocentrism” (ibid.) mainly associated with other skin colors and religions—factors that alienate particular ethnic groups. However, considering prospective demographics, this will shift: By 2050, Whites will be the Other minority group and people of color will be the new Whites. This shift will also occur on a religious level in Germany: By 2030, Islam and Christianity will be the main religions (cf. Reimann, *Globale Studie* n. pag.).²⁵ Considering current issues of racism, mass incarceration, persistent forms of social Darwinism, and the emergence of redefined Jim Crow laws (cf. Gilmore 13; cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 61), Othering, dehumanization, and categorization of human beings into privileged and inferior need to stop; and the only solution is “disalienation” (Fanon 206).

Black Skin, White Masks by Frantz Fanon and similar publications can be read as sociological studies of the psychology of racism. Fanon applies psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory in order to explain the dependency most Blacks experience in a white-dominated world. *Black Skin, White Masks* is also concerned with Blacks being forced to assimilate to the ideology of the white society and culture and to fit those white ideals and norms. Additionally, Fanon covers the alienation of black people and the negative association of blackness with wrongness and the representation as “bad guys.” However, Fanon’s and other publications do not enough provide multilayered approaches for different forms and shifts of alienations and Otherness.

Who decided that black is the Other? How did black ethnicity become a signifier for Otherness (cf. Sollors 219)? The “natural attitude of all cultures toward

²⁵ “[I]f current immigration and birth rates continue, by 2050 about 37% of the U.S. population will be either immigrants or the children of immigrants” (Pearson n. pag.). According to the German political magazine *Der Spiegel*, Germany will face a similar challenge: 2030, the two dominating religions in Germany and other, particularly East and North European, countries will be Islam and Christianity (cf. Reimann, *Globale Studie* n. pag.).

alien ones” (220) contributes to an “ethnocentrism” (ibid.) that alienates a particular racial group: “[m]odern theories of race, have often placed a central emphasis on physical appearances in defining the “Other”” (Lentricchia et al. 274). Why is the Other mainly colored and not white and why were (and are) Whites “superior to others” (280)? Contemplating the current issues of racism, new forms of social Darwinism, mass incarceration of predominantly people of color, and redefined Jim Crow laws (cf. Gilmore 13; cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 61), the vicious cycle of Othering and the categorization of human beings into superior versus inferior needs to be repealed. Othering dehumanizes and devalues diversity and the racialized struggle of a

lack of affective self-esteem always leads the abandonment neurotic to an extremely painful and obsessional feeling of exclusion, to never fitting in, and to feeling out of place, [...] Being “the Other.” To be “the Other” is to always feel in an uncomfortable position [...]. (Fanon 57)

One scholar who offers an interesting approach of looking at the Other from a reverse perspective is Diana Fuss and her article “Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification.” Most scholarly writings are concerned with people of color as the Other. Fuss reverses this and establishes an Other for people of color—Whites (cf. Fuss 20). This different angle is important because people of color are about to outnumber Whites. Whites have not only been the (reversed) Other for people of color but also the “master[s]” (23), which dates back to slavery (cf. Rorty 162). Othering based on skin color is also not the only form of Othering anymore: One can also be Othered because of religion. In this case it is not the dark(er) skin color that alienates people, it is the veil that “functions as an exotic signifier” (Fuss 26).

Another way of Othering is through language that functions as a “cultural tool” (38) and that is part of belonging to a particular community and SA. Although

language is connected to one's individual identity and heritage, language is also a tool for integration and connection between immigrants, locals, and their cultures. Accordingly, language cannot be separated from cultural heritage and the respective identity. Hence, it is crucial to develop English (or German) as second language courses for immigrants and refugees that, first, guarantee possible verbal interaction between Others and locals in order to function as integration tool. Second, those language courses need to include social and cultural competencies for supporting verbal and non-verbal interactions based on linguistic *and* cultural skills: because traditions, certain kinds of greetings and social behaviors, religious beliefs, and values cannot be separated from language. Third, the linguistic as well as cultural parts of the courses need to teach immigrants across generations (children, parents) alike in order to create a bridging process between different generations and new values. Fourth, locals and immigrants should have common spaces for connecting interculturally in order to avoid Othering on both sides (cf. Zúñiga et al. 121).

Consequently, education and politics need to allow an adjustment of school curricula: Globalized communities, societies, and politics need to extend the “linguistic repertoire [while] expanding the curriculum” (Rorty 162). In so doing, it is crucial to “promote serious cross-cultural studies in the public school because ignorance is politically dangerous and being monolingual is only one step away from being mute” (ibid.). Language is referred to as a “practical consciousness” (Marx n. pag.) because people express their inner consciousness through language. This expression turns from an interior consciousness into an exterior one. In this way, consciousness becomes a real and outspoken form of the inner consciousness. Since ideology is part of the unconscious because it is “constituted through the entry of the

subject into language” (Hall, *Critical Dialogues* 87), ideology and consciousness are interdependent, connected, and both communicated through language(s).

Considering the significance of language acquisition as a tool of integration and form of intercultural expression and communication, George C. Bunch’ “Pedagogical Language Knowledge: Preparing Mainstream Teachers for English Learners in the New Standards Era” discusses the pedagogical language knowledge required to meet the needs of English (or German) language learners. Although pedagogical language knowledge is crucial, it is still difficult to provide proper and constantly updated teacher training corresponding to the most recent reforms, policies, and expectations (cf. Bunch 298): Teachers are frequently confronted with new standards that leave them uncertain about what is “right” and what is “wrong” when applying pedagogical language knowledge versus pedagogical content knowledge (cf. *ibid.*; cf. 299). In contrast to pedagogical content knowledge, pedagogical language knowledge is concerned with “sense-making” (300) of language within specific academic fields.

Pedagogical content knowledge allows practical approaches for making language a powerful tool of interaction and communication outside the grammar lessons (outside the classroom). Hence, language learning needs to be restructured in terms of the “relationship between linguistic form and social context in school settings” (309). Based on personal research and teaching experiences at the *Schule am Adler* and the *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule*, I have concluded that the most convincing argument for motivation is to show students *why* the other language matters: Teachers need to constantly connect, for instance, past tense learning sessions with retelling a story the students are interested in and have experienced themselves. Also, regional and cultural studies, traditions, songs, holidays, songs, etc. need to become part of

teaching. In this way, students learn about different cultures on a linguistic and political level.

In accordance with this personal example and the conducted interview with Mo, the article emphasizes the importance of creating an organic and authentic co-learning atmosphere while encouraging a language interaction on a conversational and academic (content-related) level (cf. 305). In implementing those authentic language acquisition methods, teachers need to focus on the students individually: Ideally, teachers consider former (bilingual) education, which may vary from the classmates' former education experiences (cf. 303). Furthermore, intercultural awareness and distinctions are crucial. Therefore, pedagogical language knowledge is preferable to pedagogical content knowledge because it allows more critical language awareness (cf. 307) through the implementation of "cross disciplinary boundaries" (308).

"Language is a dynamic system" (314) and the "goal of academic language instruction is not to replace home [...] ways of using language" (ibid.). Instead, language learning is a process: Firstly, this process should be interlinked with the student's cultural and linguistic heritage. Secondly, this process should be regarded as enrichment and opportunity to make connections and work interdisciplinary in a multicultural classroom in which "multiple linguistic identities" (321) meet and provide a respectful platform for exchanging knowledge. Thus, policies and schools need to follow the concept of "human learning" (316) embracing a "social activity that is situated in physical and social contexts [...] across persons, tools, and activities" (ibid.).

In implementing co-language learning, one of the most important aspects are understanding the students' native language and engage acculturation (not to confuse with giving up one's heritage, language, and culture identity!). Bilingualism should be

integrated linguistically as well as culturally into (language-learning) curricula. For proper language assessment, it is crucial to monitor language progresses flexibly and to allow differences in language achievement in order to embrace intercultural competencies. Hence, teachers are not only responsible for teaching grammar, they are also “cultural facilitators” (de Jong et al. 117).

In order to be “cultural facilitators” (ibid.), teachers need to be properly educated and need to have access to specific (bicultural and bilingual) learning and teaching materials. Ideally, those materials are bilingual. However, this is only possible if student-teacher ratios are not too high and if current standardized tests are restructured and adjusted to the individual classroom circumstances. Such a restructuring requires an innovative teacher training, financial support, new assessment methods, and altered school curricula. Additionally, those approaches and methods require the teaching of “specific kinds of language” (DiCerbo et al. 450; cf. 451), the distinction of conversational English and academic English (or German), and how to interlink those kinds of languages successfully. Teachers need to realize that “proficiency is more than linguistic competence” (452) because language proficiency also includes cultural knowledge.

Intercultural (language) competencies are also linked to cultural codes and norms outside of the school—namely within the family and the community (cf. Lindquist 226). Cultural codes are related to language, heritage, and religion. Due to the cultural values and identities of immigrant families, children grow up differently because their upbringing is shaped by heritage-related norms of their parents and grandparents. Hence, immigrant children face different values at home and are confronted with different norms and values at school. Also, immigrant students learn that their different values might not be acknowledged or even appreciated in the

classroom. The majority of school curricula also do not allow multifaceted and diverse learning and teaching contents: Curricula do not provide platforms for intercultural exchange among students and teachers. Therefore, the classroom could be conceived as a “marketplace [...] that constitutes a complex scene of rhetorical performances, performances that take on value as cultural capital and are symbolically meaningful as currency” (227).

Curricula need to treat various heritages and values in a classroom as a marketplace that is customer friendly (students) and service oriented. This marketplace treats customers respectfully and as equal consumers as long as they are eligible for being an accepted part of society and all its sectors (education, the law, politics). This is an interesting angle for making cultural, financial, and social capital accessible and applicable for everyone (independent from cultural and religious heritage). Furthermore, perceiving all people of different heritages as valid customers will create a protection and prevention mechanism against racist and segregating cultural reproductions in politics, society, and education on the long-run (cf. 228).

In order to create a classroom atmosphere with fair and equal opportunities, curricula cannot be monocultural and monolingual. Curricula should be a tool for teaching, learning, and equally acknowledging multiculturalism in order to create a respectful awareness for cultural and religious differences from as early on as possible: How people of different ethnicities are treated and perceived in a classroom is, in most cases, also how students understand multiethnicity in society.

The book *Leadership for Culturally and Linguistically Responsive Schools* highlights a framework for responsive teaching practices. The most significant aspects of this framework are: Firstly, the interconnection between culture, language, heritage, and identity (cf. Scanlan et al. 33, 57, 120). Secondly, the importance of the

native language that fosters intercultural understandings and linkages between the two languages and that makes the new language more accessible for students (cf. 88-89). This framework is culturally sensitive and considers language as part of culture and identity in all its multifaceted layers. Thirdly, this framework acknowledges differences between academic and conversational levels of language acquisition. This distinction is particularly indispensable in the early stages of language acquisition. Especially when teaching immigrants, it is recommended to begin with rather informal and conversational vocabularies and phrases. Once learners feel more comfortable in using this colloquial language, teachers can start to introduce more formal/academic language. However, in both, academic and conversational language teaching, it is crucial to always reflect the cultural backgrounds of the learners. Without the opportunity to, for example, talk about their culturally specific holidays, learners often feel less accepted and forced to give up their own cultural identity and heritage because of the new language acquisition.

The oppression of one's unique cultural identity is also oftentimes linked to hierarchical and privileged forms of second language learning and different perspectives of multicultural identities: Although "middle-class, native English-speaking parents are quick to promote foreign language for their high schoolers, confident that this will serve them well [...] in a globalized economy" (18), there is still a negative representation of second language acquisition related to immigrants. This negative image is mainly shaped by the media's "fear mongering about alleged threats to national identity that immigration trends pose" (17). Those issues might also impact how parents and politicians react and (financially) support schools (or not).

In addition to financial support, well-trained teachers, and updated curricular, psychological factors can also not be separated from a successful performance in

class. The article “Toward a Concept of a Migrant Personality” concentrates on an often-underrepresented aspect in immigration-related research: “[T]hose who emigrate are not necessarily among the poorest in their country of origin” (Boneva et al. 478). This is important because the majority of research mainly covers poor and (socially, economically, and educationally) disadvantaged immigrants only. This one-sided coverage contributes to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants and refugees because it strengthens the assumption that immigrants cannot and do not contribute to society. Instead, the media represent them as benefit scroungers who only strive for financial and social resources provided by the host society. Hence, it is crucial to psychologically support both, poor immigrants *and* the ones described in “Toward a Concept of a Migrant Personality.” Additionally, locals (especially educators) need support as well—in order to unlearn their racist attitudes and false assumptions.

Yet, independent from economic circumstances, the majority of refugees and immigrants (in the case of Germany: Syrian refugees) have often experienced violent circumstances in their home country and need psychological support: Firstly, for processing what they have seen and gone through in their (corrupt and violent) home country (cf. Portes et al. 148). Secondly, they need to process the new circumstances affecting the (self-) perception of their culture, ethnic identity, religious values, and sense of belonging in their (chosen) new home. Psychological and cross-cultural processing requires new integration methods that need to involve “culturally competent clinical formulations and interventions” (Chiu et al. 444).

The underestimation of the immigration-related struggles derives from false assumptions, stereotypes, and prejudices responsible for discrimination, exclusion in various sectors, and racism. In order to achieve successful integration, psychologists but also school staff need to be trained biculturally and bilingually. Additionally, it is

necessary to adjust integration procedures as well as learning and teaching methods individually for the respective unique *setting*. Otherwise, integration will remain a “blind application [...] that clash[es] with cultural values” (448). Supporting mental health needs is enriching for immigrants, their families, *and* the destination society: How a family “solves [intergenerational] problems, communicates, assigns roles, self-regulates, and responds to each other emotionally” (Nguyen et al. 1549) contributes to successful acculturation processes and progresses. Hence, assistance is needed for immigrant youth *and* their parents because parents are often in a steady conflict between their traditional values and new cultural values. Those new values are important for adjusting to the new home and environment successfully. Accordingly, integration initiatives should involve public (schools) and private (family) matters of contradiction for immigrant *and* non-immigrant parents, students, communities, and teachers alike.

Another (psychological) aspect is the separation of immigrant families. It is often the case that at least one parent has been separated from his/her child(ren) for several years because they cannot afford the immigration expenses for the entire family. Due to the challenges of “long-distance emotional intimacy” (Suárez-Orozco et al., *I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind* 225) and “extended physical absence” (ibid.), children often feel misplaced after family reunification: “I don’t know how to live with my parent” (239). After reunification, growing up, and developing personas in two different worlds, immigrant parents and children need to reestablish the former family relationship and belonging. The struggle of belonging and additional hardships of immigration (financial issues, language issues, etc.) require psychological support in order to recreate a harmonic family atmosphere, which is also important for the children’s educational success and the development of their psychological wellbeing.

Especially immigrant children and youth need to attain a sense of common cultural identity with their parents *and* their new cultural environment and peers.

Finally, the local population also benefits from well-adjusted and integrated immigrant families and students because they are a steadily growing sector: The better societies and politics educate, integrate, and value immigrants, the more societies will benefit culturally, socially, politically, and economically from the immigrant population. It is crucial to enable immigrants “a meaningful stake in civil society in order to forestall a turn to religious [or other forms of] extremism” (Chin 189). In this way, locals and immigrants develop and celebrate a diverse “cross-cultural universality” (Belizaire et al. 91) and bi-religious and “bicultural competency” (Nguyen et al. 1556; cf. Potochnik et al. 476).

Moreover, integration cannot succeed if people are residentially segregated because of their heritage, skin color, or religious affiliations. Residential segregation is racist and causes a reproduction of hierarchical structures and (ISA’s) supremacy on social, cultural, racial, political, educational, and financial levels (cf. Horvat et al. 171). “[D]ecades of quantitative sociological research have demonstrated that the social class into which one is born has a massive influence on where one will end up” (MacLeod 4; cf. 242). Inequality caused by belonging (or not belonging) to a certain social class is a vicious circle that is “reproduced from one generation to the next” (5): Social status cannot be separated from financial capital through the opportunity to access better schools and, hence, chances for better secondary education and well-paid jobs. Therefore, housing determines whether one belongs to the ISA or to the RSA because “residence in public housing is often an emblem of failure, shame, and humiliation” (6; cf. 145; cf. Horvat et al. 202); and Blacks, Middle Easterners, and

immigrants often “live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods” (Horvat et al. 165; cf. 166, 170).

Considering the importance of (residential) integration, social reproduction theory should become part of CRT studies (including CRT extensions). Social reproduction theory is a “process that contribute[s] to the intergenerational transmission of social inequality” (MacLeod 7). A key component of the reinforcement of social, cultural, educational, political, and financial reproduction based on skin color, ethnicity, cultural heritage, identity, and religious affiliation is education because it provides the basis for equal accesses to higher education, better neighborhoods, and employment (cf. 11). One of the most crucial contributions to the social reproduction theory is Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital. Bourdieu regards cultural capital “as the general cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that are passed from one generation to the next” (13). Reproduction is already reflected by the students belonging to the ISA and their habitus (cf. 14-15). The habitus “functions as a regulator between individuals and their external world, between human agency and social structure” (15). Another layer of cultural capital is language. Language is an essential part for equality because “linguistic codes [...] derive from [...] social relations and roles” (17) and are linked to ethnicities, neighborhoods, financial capital of the family, cultural heritage, and education. Thus, it is critical that immigrants are able to learn the target language as quickly as possible in order to actively and equally access and engage within society, politics, the law, education, and the job market. Besides becoming linguistically fluent, language acquisition needs to be linked to culture, social skills, and interaction competencies.

In addition to the language complication, immigrant youth and families also need to cope with contrasting gender role expectations that result from immigration

and their acculturation process. The majority of immigrant families have to “renegotiate family roles and duties” (Mehrotra et al. 779). This will help them to reorganize their new family and social life post-immigration. Additionally, the new gender-role dynamics make all family members contribute to the new financial and social challenges. Thus, immigrant families need to cope with rather atypical role allocations caused by the acculturation process that demands adjustments on the cultural and societal scale—outside *and* inside the nuclear family. Part of this bicultural acculturation process is the realization that there is a new interdependence within the family in order to “make it” in the new country educationally, socially, and economically (cf. Qin, “Gendered Processes” 478).

Particularly men struggle after immigration (cf. 467): Their struggle is related to the new responsibilities and the changing role allocations of their wives and daughters who gain more independence and personal freedom (cf. Mehrotra et al. 790) that are often less strict and conservative (in contrast to their home countries). However, the opposite is true for those women who are on their husband’s visa, which does not allow them to legally work. In such cases, the cultural and societal adjustment process disrupts the changing dynamics in gender-related expectations for the immigrant family. This kind of dependence leads to problems such as isolation and a lack of social interaction and contact to the outside world caused by unemployment, legal constraints, and language barriers.

Immigration does not only affect gender roles; it also causes conflicts between the “old” traditional values and the “new” culture. Hence, immigration also impacts (cultural) identity development. The emergence and alteration of an identity is especially complex and complicated for the immigrant youth who is often not as set in their ways as their parents. This complexity is reflected in being permanently torn

between “old” and “new” world (cf. Qin, “Being “Good”” 40): For parents, the conflict is a fine line of how American, German, or Western they allow their child to be in order to adjust properly to the new environment but without forgetting or even denying the initial cultural heritage. For immigrant families, it is living and coping in-between cultures, which requires sacrifices on each side (“new” versus home culture and traditional family values and gender roles). It is an integration that “entails both maintenance of their own cultural orientation and participation in the host culture” (Raghavan et al. 628). The majority of immigrants is “trapped” between competing values, such as between the need for personal development and the need to maintain family traditions” (Dion et al. 518). One probably compromising way to cope with the changing dynamics caused by immigration involves a balanced lifestyle between “continuity and change” (ibid.). Furthermore, it is difficult to define one particular way of coping because of the variations between different immigration cultures. All cultures cope differently because of their distinct understandings of traditions, values, and adaptations.

In order to overcome the feeling of being trapped between two cultural identities, politics and educational institutions should offer services for students *and* parents in order to encourage integration and to initiate a neutral contact zone for getting to know (local) residents (cf. Zúñiga et al. 108). In this way, community hierarchies (that are mainly based on class, gender, religious affiliations, and ethnicity) can be decreased by striving against the “culture of suspicion” (111). One way to do so is to bridge communities in order to minimize “the differences associated with race, class, age, and ethnicity” (120). Bridging becomes part of successful integration and connection between residents and immigrants. It is crucial that the bridging process is not too political; an emergence of dominant and oppressed

groups needs to be avoided (cf. 121). It is also essential to not put integration on the same level with, for instance Americanization or Germanization (cf. 228). In the long-run, integration only succeeds when residents as well as immigrants mutually respect each other's culture and heritage. Moreover, it is necessary to accept that integration processes "occur differently in different contexts despite the fact that the same national origin group is involved" (238). Educational institutions have the power and the responsibility to bridge communities and to set an example for tolerance across cultures and communities without treating one group as inferior to the other (cf. Horvat et al. 86).

Ricardo D. Stanton-Salazar's *Manufacturing Hope and Despair: The School and Kin Support Networks of U.S.-Mexican Youth* and Roberta Espinoza's *Pivotal Moments: How Educators Can Put All Students on the Path to College* are one of the few publications that provide a concrete plan and vision of how to discontinue the reproduction of inequality in education. One of the key questions of these two publications are whether pivotal moments and student-educator relations can interrupt the reproduction of inequality in schools and other educational institutions. Espinoza and Stanton-Salazar focus less on proper teacher training and the issue of a smaller teacher-student ratio (even though those two aspects are important); they are more concerned with interpersonal interactions that depend on the students' situations and private circumstances that affect students' educational success and access. Therefore, teachers are also part-time psychologists because they are personal and professional contact partners who listen to the students' needs and who observe the students (cf. Espinoza ix; cf. Stanton-Salazar 207). Teachers can only create pivotal moments when closely interacting with the students and understanding where students come

from and what their daily (past and prospective) struggles are (culturally, personally, educationally, linguistically, identity-wise, religiously, etc.).

Creating pivotal moments between teachers and students is complex because racism and the notion of the American Dream complicate the conception of individually tailored guidance: “Americans continue to affirm the American Dream: if you work hard and play by the rules, you will go as far as your given ability and initiative will take you” (Espinoza 3). However, it is not that simple because students who are in desperate need for pivotal moments are mostly minority students, people of color, immigrants, or Muslims. People of color often live in less privileged neighborhoods and, hence, have less access to financial and counseling resources at home *and* in their schools (cf. Stanton-Salazar 164, 198). This results in unequal chances for proper preparation for standardized admission tests. Consequently, an interruption of the reproduction of inequality in test preparation, guidance, counseling, and access also depends on the psychological ability of teachers: First, teachers have to realize that particular students struggle. Second, teachers have to be trained to properly respond to the (cultural) diversity struggles. Third, teachers need to possess intercultural sensitivity and competences in order to understand students’ struggles deriving from their home *setting* affecting their school performances. This can be established through an emotional (yet professional), respectful, and trustworthy relationship between students, teachers, *and* parents (cf. Espinoza 4-5). Initiating pivotal moments that change students’ educational achievements and successes are often difficult to implement during the regular class schedule. Hence, educators have to understand that personal support mainly happens outside the actual process of schooling (cf. 17-18): It happens within the “social networks of low-income and minority students” (18). Bridging the social (private) networks and the school

curricula is challenging for teachers because there is a fine line between remaining an authority figure, maintaining one's professionalism, and supporting students on a personal level. Nevertheless, teachers need to develop a personal connection to students and sometimes even their families and local community in order to function as "gatekeepers" (17; cf. 35; cf. Stanton-Salazar 170). In this way, teachers help students "choosing a life path" (Espinoza 18) in accordance with their private life, community, and extended family.

In order to obtain equality, the process of creating pivotal moments for students needs to include different parties. Although educators play a crucial role in pivotal moments during schooling, parents also need to be encouraged and involved in this process of learning and achieving (cf. 60): After school programs and activities need to become part of the students' personal pivotal moment encouraging students to enjoy schooling *despite* the oftentimes disadvantaged circumstances (cf. 57; cf. Stanton-Salazar 175). Consequently, it is critical to realize that pivotal moments are not just one moment. Long-term pivotal moments are a process over several years including teachers, parents, classmates, and communities. The earlier schools, families, and communities are able to start this pivotal moment process, the better are students' chances for (educational) success (cf. Espinoza 78; cf. Stanton-Salazar 270).

Stanton-Salazar argues that those overlapping relations only work efficiently if counselors and educators are able to "manage the tension between their role as agents of social reproduction and their role as co-parents and informal mentors" (Stanton-Salazar 162). However, there is a risk, teachers feel more connected to the already (more) privileged families because those families and teachers come from rather similar backgrounds. Similar financial and educational capitals and backgrounds might be preferred by teachers and parents alike and, in this way, cause a reproduction

of inequality for the marginalized. Moreover, the majority of counselors/teachers is not bilingual, which leads to a level of discomfort, miscommunication, and gap between minority students, their families, and school staff: Especially when considering the fact that “Spanish-dominant and bilingual students preferred seeking assistance from the counseling staff in their native language” (165; cf. 206, 210). This is also true for all other “foreign” languages and immigration countries.

Besides the language barriers, struggling minority students also reported a feeling of discomfort because the majority of their teachers “had it easy and doesn’t know where you’re really coming from. They don’t really know how you’re struggling” (173). Accordingly, the disruption of inequality requires psychological and empathic abilities, assessment skills, and bilingualism. Additionally, school staff needs to become more culturally and socially diverse in order to represent their diverse student body as well. Furthermore, schools and its staff need to provide a secure social network for disadvantaged students; in this way, they can (re)establish social and cultural capital to exit inequality based on their personal socioeconomic circumstances. This is essential because less privileged students can often not benefit from their parents’ social and cultural capital. Hence, they need to find new networks, opportunities, key figures, and pivotal moments to rely on: It is the schools’ and the counselors’ responsibility to become that resource and network provider for all students, but particularly for the disadvantaged students.

The *setting* and place are also important for successful integration: In “Illusion, Reality, and the Politics of Place,” Kevin R. Cox provides an interesting approach of the definition of place and how places are shaped by “insiders vs. outsiders” (Cox 12). This “versus” attitude is represented in various sectors and is often associated with the struggles between the ISA (the norm) and the RSA (the

Other) (cf. *ibid.*). Politics of place are a process of “including and excluding, establishing and defending boundaries” (12); politics of place also influence social and cultural capital and belonging. Identity and ethnicity often preset the place one belongs (cf. 14). Hence, places (communities or educational institutions) need to provide equal integration and access for immigrants (and residents alike) without disadvantaging or segregating places from one another. Accordingly, the process of bridging communities (cf. Zúñiga et al. 121) and of providing equal access is denied to certain groups because of race, class, gender, and religious affiliations, which makes them belong to particular (underprivileged) places only.

The concept of belonging cannot be separated from cultural, religious, political, historical, and social identities. Belonging is created by a community that creates certain meanings and *settings*. People, independent from their cultural and religious heritage, need this meaning in order to develop their own *setting*, community structures, identities, and ideologies (cf. Hooks 1). However, globalization and immigration effects pose a “too muchness [that] creates a wilderness of spirit” (1) within communities. This causes a confusion and insecurity of where one should belong politically, socially, privately, religiously, and culturally in order to “belong” to the ISA.

The idea of belonging can also be referred to as “a culture of place” (2) that cannot be disconnected from the past (cf. 5)—especially in terms of racism: The past is “a resource that can serve as a foundation for us to revision and renew our commitment to the present, to making a world where [...] everyone can belong” (5). Correspondingly, the social wrongs of the past, for instance slavery and fascism, serve as a chance for redefining the structures, “the culture of white supremacy” (42), and the ISA’s hierarchies ruling communities and *settings*.

Racist constructions throughout communities are mainly based on prejudices: “blacks were lazy and unwilling to work independently without white supervision” (43). Racism erased (Blacks’) identities and pride of having a (black) identity. In this way, “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (ibid.) erased black people’s equal rights and sense of belonging. The erasure of the right to belong is still present today; but it is redefined and has changed its target group: Although it is still people of color who suffer racism, there is a shift to Middle Easterners. Racism and the erasure of the right to feel belonged dehumanizes, devalues, alienates, and Others certain cultures and religions. The exclusion of nonwhite or Middle Eastern identities have an enormously negative influence on health and psyche (cf. 51) and result in educational disadvantages. Accordingly, the victims who do not belong cannot establish cultural and financial capital through their community/district, education, or (well-paid) jobs. Those social, educational, financial, and cultural capital consequences of not belonging also cause “psychological traumas” (69) and identity struggles.

Justice requires more than the redistribution of economic goods and opportunities” (Tobias 101). “[I]dentity is shaped by the recognition or misrecognition of others” (105). Hence, identity depends on societal and political recognition that shapes the way one is recognized and accepted by society, communities, politics, and educational institutions (cf. 115). Therefore, recognition is always present—independent from positive or negative outcomes for the Other or members of the ISA (cf. 105). Recognition can only be “realized in a social-political environment in which such needs can be openly discussed and negotiated” (105), for instance, proper multicultural and bilingual teaching and learning methods. The Others needs to be able to (equally) develop their own autonomy via self-education

that strengthens their predefined, racialized, and oppressed identity (cf. 113). Education is oftentimes the only chance to exit the cycle of inequality.

Especially within a global classroom, the understanding of the term culture becomes increasingly important and, simultaneously, much more multifaceted: Culture can be translated (into German) with “*Bildung*” (119, italics in original), which means education. This derives from Hegel who understands culture as *Bildung* proving that different ethnicities have different forms of education and, hence, different understandings of identity (cf. *ibid.*). *Bildung* is “a community’s intellectual and spiritual achievements, as these might include its language as well as its literature and art” (Rorty 156). Consequently, one needs to focus on “critical identity politics” (Tobias 123) in order to create a balance between one’s self-identity and the oppressive hierarchical order of “us versus them” that keeps recreating and redefining racialized politics, educational systems, and societies.

Chapter Three

“Other” Ideologies and Identities—Theoretical Approaches

(1) How to Approach Different Ideologies

The oftentimes contradicting perceptions of cultural, religious, political, and racial identities of the ISA’s dominating ideology have to be properly redefined in consideration of the increasing number of Middle Eastern students wearing headscarves in Germany’s public schools. Williams suggests different approaches of possible definitions of ideology, such as ideology as “an upside-down version of reality” (Williams 155), the notion of ideology as an “abstract and false thought” (ibid.), or ideology “as illusion” (ibid.). In contrast to the concept of ideology as a fantasy (cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 140) or an “illusion” (Williams 155; cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 159-60), the Marxist view of ideology is more concerned with hierarchical power structures of ideology and its dominant ideology practiced through the ISA (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 155): It is the ruling class that dominates the societal, political, and cultural ideology and oppresses alienated groups (cf. Pines 120-24; cf. Žižek, *Jacques Lacan* 3). Those alienated Others are forced to adjust to the predefined ideology of the ISA and its institutions (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 137, 139).

(2) Reasons for Othering and Biased Headscarf Images

In the case of the United States, so-called atypical immigration states are, for example, Iowa, Idaho, and Georgia. Those states are not used to the differently-looking population (mainly Latin Americans in those states) and the respective culture, tradition, and values (cf. Zúñiga et al. xiii-xiv). The fear and suspicion toward the unknown Other are often caused by prejudices and false assumptions based on

ignorance and the lack of knowledge about the other culture. Although prejudices also exist in states that are used to immigration and multicultural population dynamics (such as California), xenophobic attitudes are more pronounced in states that are unfamiliar with cultural and religious differences. Furthermore, political structures and norms of the ISA also regulate public institutions and how school curricula and educational systems are set up and conducted. This domination and repression of Other systems and Other persons is ruled by Western norms that do not allow structural changes and adjustments that might endanger their powerful status quo.

(3) Disempowering the Exotic Other

Foucault establishes the idea that regimes of truth and politics (cf. Han 9, 132-41) are the result of scientific discourses and institutions. Those regimes of truth are reinforced through the media and the mutability of political and economic ideologies (ibid.). Foucault, Lacan, and Said also contribute to the notion of headscarf-wearing students as exotic and alienated Others with initial concepts of power relations, the big Other, and the criticism on fixed representations of ultimate definitions, which present the Other as mythic and suspicious (Hussein 42, 156, 200, 229-30, 288; cf. Iskander et al. 25-26).

Consequently, the ruling class and its powerful political institutions and apparatuses (including schools) control and suppress the Other and do not provide options for individual and free ideological development. Thus, the freedom of developing an individual and tolerated cultural, political, and religious identity is denied. However, Hall's notion of identity in relation to significance and representation provides a more detailed and multifaceted view on this issue: Hall particularly focuses on the importance of language in terms of identity. Language is an essential component for feeling affiliated to certain cultural identities because

language creates the common basis for “belonging to the same social phenomenon” (Hall, *Signification* 92).

Applying Hall’s notion and the recent debates about banning (or not banning) the headscarf in Germany’s schools, the idea of “belonging to the same social phenomenon” (ibid.) becomes contradictory: If Hall is “right,” there is no reason for oppressing Middle Eastern children in class as long as they become (more) fluent in German: Because if the majority of them speaks German fluently, they (automatically) belong to the same “social phenomenon” (ibid.). However, despite sharing the “same social phenomenon” (ibid.) (language), some people will always be the Other, the less powerful, and the suppressed minority group because their clothing styles (headscarf), cultural, political, and religious ideology do not fit the ISA’s norm.

Although the majority of headscarf-wearing students belong, at least language-wise, to the same “social phenomenon” (ibid.), the headscarf is the one obvious distinction that isolates and disempowers them. Specific clothes (headscarves) naysay one as threatening Other and, hence, function as symbols and signifiers that bear specific and oftentimes biased cultural, religious, and political meanings. The headscarf is often exclusively regarded as religious symbol and evokes associations with terrorism. Historically, the Other was mainly represented as black, which is due to the fact that most societies regard(ed) whiteness as privilege (cf. Harris 1753).

However, within the last decades, the Other became more multiethnic, multireligious, and multicultural: The Other is not only black anymore, the Other is increasingly Middle Eastern. Although the understanding of who is perceived as Other has changed, the ISA has not changed and remains white and non-Middle Eastern throughout several centuries. However, what has remained the same throughout the centuries is the ISA’s racialized definition of the “correct” norm and

who counts as Other. The ISA decides who belongs to the Other and constantly adds new Others due to changing international politics- and immigration-related dynamics; especially in the last two centuries, when worldwide immigration and globalization influenced structures and dynamics of multicultural societies and politics rapidly.

Considering the changing dynamics, Marx' terminology of the proletarians as the Other (cf. Avineri 271, 274) has to be redefined as well: Even though Marx' understanding of Others as the oppressed and less powerful ones is still the case nowadays, the Others are not necessarily the proletarians anymore. The Others are, mainly, people of color and Middle Easterners who are often denied to apply for certain job positions because of inferior chances to achieve higher academic degrees. This significantly lowers their prospective hiring options. Because of these circumstances, Others are doomed to be part of the proletariat (ibid.), which keeps isolating and alienating them because they are not part of the ISA. Accordingly, Marx' theory is still valid but needs to be adapted to the growingly colored and Middle Eastern "proletariat" in order to prevent ill-ideologies and xenophobia.

(4) The Danger of Ill-Ideologies

According to Hall, "[i]deologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world" (Hall, *Signification* 99). Correspondingly, the current ISA in charge dominates the main ideas and structures of ideology and determines the way society is supposed to function according to their norm. This is concerning if the ISA is ruled by people such as Geert Wilders (see footnote 13). Besides the language aspect, Hall also includes the representation of language within the media and how this affects ideologies and contributes to what Althusser calls the ISA—which is necessary in order to perform the media's power (ruled by the ISA). The sensationalistic, racialized, and manipulative news coverage of the German media, and the way it represents the

issue of wearing headscarves in German schools, shapes the comprehension of the public ideology toward or because of this particular matter.

“[I]deologies are structures” and “not ‘images’ nor ‘concepts’” [...] but set of rules which determine an organization [such as schools]” (Gurevitch 71). The rules defining an ideology are, accordingly, constantly recreated and determined by the ISA. In case of Wilders, those predetermined ideologies can potentially become oppressing ill-ideologies shaped by bias, racism, and xenophobic attitudes. Considering this in the context of educational systems, such an ill-ideology has the power to enormously influence and manipulate current debates about banning or not banning headscarves in German classrooms.

Especially in Germany’s densely populated cities such as Berlin, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, and Leipzig, the number of Middle Eastern immigrants and refugees steadily grows and leads to more Middle Eastern students in elementary schools, high schools, and secondary schools. A reformulation into Cultural Studies terms, theories, and concepts leads to the subsequent argument: Due to the hierarchical superstructure (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134) of the Westernized ISA’s identity and ideology, the RSA (Middle Easterners) is forced to adjust and surrender its personal, religious, and cultural identity. The problem of the oppressive dominance of the ruling class and the forced restructuring of their respective cultural identities requires, as Hall suggests, a rethinking of cultural identity:

Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. This view problematizes the very authority and authenticity to which the term, ‘cultural identity’, lays claim. (Rutherford 222)

(5) Ideologies as Utopia and Fantasy

The hegemony of the ISA results in a manipulated and produced ideology (cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 140). Ideology then remains a structured fantasy and, therefore, distances itself from reality (ibid.) because of its control over the RSA. According to Žižek, “‘going through’ the social fantasy is likewise correlative to identification” (143), which makes it impossible to achieve a social and cultural identification because fantasy is not real and rather an imagined, illusionary, and ideal, almost utopian, scenario. For Žižek, social fantasy equates with identification, which has to be scrutinized because it implies that a specific identification with certain societal, political, cultural, and religious factors is unreal and does not *really* exist, or at least cannot be fully achieved.

Another consequential aspect is whether identification equals identity for Žižek or whether there is a distinction: Are (cultural) identity and ethnic heritage social fantasies as well? Does identity even exist or is its existence merely an illusion (cf. Williams 155) controlled by the ISA and other external factors? Contemplating the power of the ISA and how its politics leverage the media to create a dominant cultural identity and ideology, it is questionable how authentic and realistic this produced identity is: Who (if anybody) should be in charge of defining this particular identity? Taking this critically into account, it seems as if identity and ideology are confused with the (ISA’s understanding of) term norm, which is regarded as ultimate truth and ideal mainstream ideology and cultural identity. This segregating assumption also impacts school curricula and how teachers fail to successfully integrate Others due to the lack of intercultural competences and the lack of understanding diverse identities and ideologies.

The media produce biased images build on stereotypes that focus on rare instances that are sensationalized (cf. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow* 41-42, 105-06) and overemphasized. Additionally, the media became the megaphone of the ISA's misrepresentation of the Others. To cap it all, the media are dependent on politics and its capitalism and vice versa: The ISA, the media, and the economy are highly interdependent industries. This interdependence uses Others as capital in order to make profit out of the threatening and racialized stories newspapers sell because of the sensational headlines. Consequently, ideologies and identities are divided into "right" (ISA, white, non-Middle Eastern) and "wrong" (RSA, Others, people of color, Middle Eastern): They are an intentionally manipulated, politically-produced, and capitalistically-driven utopian fantasy. Especially in times of globalization, the business of ideology and identity is not only shaped by the ISA deciding what cultural identity and ideology is supposed to be the mainstream one—it is an entire machinery of the mass economy that creates a cultural ideal and utopian identity in movies, newspapers, school curricula, etc.

(6) Capitalization and Mass Economization of Identities and Ideologies

The current political, cultural, religious, and social tensions and debates about banning or allowing headscarves in German schools illustrate the ongoing and complex conflict between subjective identity and the economic class: Identity increasingly becomes a business and a form of (re)making politics while producing an authenticity of a particular (dominant) culture. If there is a particular cultural identity that does not fit the ISA's idea(l) of cooperation between identity and economy, the "anti-norm" of wearing headscarves is labeled as "wrong" and Other. In addition, this "anti-norm" can also be an economic loss: If the number of Middle Eastern students increases in classrooms, the school will eventually suffer financially because of higher

dropout rates of German students. As a consequence, the school will get less financial support for school supplies and might be closed in the long-run. The Frankfurt School covers the struggle between the capitalist organization (cf. Babe 103), in which society is forced to adjust to the given and precast ideologies and identities of the ISA's cultural capitalism controlling the mass economy. Accordingly, the headscarf debates reflect the continuing battle between capitalist thought, mainstream economy, as well as the subjective identity within a society's cultural identity and ideology.

Due to the capitalist thought, German schools refuse to support and integrate students with headscarves because this will lead to an increasing dropout rate caused by the discomfort and negative clichés associated with headscarves: a suspicion of the unknown and threatening Other. The headscarf is mystified and demonized through the media and people with headscarves are represented as terroristic objects. Through a capitalist lens, students with headscarves are not affordable—they are unprofitable for business. In order to fulfill the capitalist requirement of the ISA's ideology and identity ideals, Middle Eastern students might be less unprofitable for business if they remove their headscarves. In this way, however, they would also partly remove their cultural, religious, and personal identity (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134-35, 137, 139, 155). But what is going to happen to the ISA's capitalist thought and definition of ideology and identity if the oppressed Others become the majority?

(7) Institutionalization of the ISA (aka the School)

The headscarf debates in German classrooms and the institutionalization of the Western cultural and religious identity can be linked with Althusser's notion about the church as an ISA and how it controls identity, ideology, social structures within societies, politics, and even religious affiliations: "*there was one dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Church, which concentrated within its not only*

religious functions, but also educational ones, and a large proportion of the functions of communications and ‘culture’” (Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 151, italics in original). Furthermore, Althusser claims the “Church has been replaced today *in its role as the dominant Ideological State Apparatus* by the School” (157, italics in original). This interfaces with the power of schools because it is up to the school principle and the ISA’s politics to decide whether students are allowed to wear headscarves and obviously show their identity. Hence, the school becomes an extended branch of the ISA. Consequently, although different ideologies are “*realized* in institutions, in their rituals and their practices” (184, italics in original), they are not yet accepted and handled properly within school curricula, politics, societies, and the media.

Politics and media keep emphasizing the enrichment of multicultural societies and global economies and try to be as politically correct as possible. However, debates about prohibiting headscarves in public institutions make their (pretended) headscarf blindness appear inauthentic, paradoxical, and misplaced: The USA, Germany, and several other European countries experience a new (post-9/11) form of covert racism. This form of racism and xenophobia targets people of color and increasingly Middle Easterners. As long as the ISA’s power over the “right” norm and ideology persists, it is impossible for the Middle Eastern Others to overcome their identity- and religion-based exclusion. Moreover, as long as economic factors are key elements of school curricula and institutions’ biased ideologies, organically integrated and accepted multicultural identities and ideologies will remain an illusion (cf. Williams 155; Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 159-60) and a utopian fantasy (cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 140). The ISA’s hierarchical power structure (cf. Pines 182) does not embrace unique cultural identities. Instead, the ISA strives for

cultural acculturation that often provokes ill-ideologies and racialized policies (as in the case of Geert Wilders). Although ill-ideologies seem to protect the power of the ISA, it also makes the ISA a potential target: The anti-attitude of the RSA causes rebellion and revolt toward the ISA and might result in rejection and denial of the dominant cultural identity and ideology leading to culture wars²⁶. And again, this prompts the questions: What happens to the ISA's produced ideology and identity if the Middle Eastern minority becomes the majority?

Also, banning the headscarf does not automatically imply a surrender of the Middle Eastern identity. Instead, it leads to a "contingent struggle" (Laclau 115) and a new form of social force toward the ISA and its politics (cf. *ibid.*). Furthermore, the "genuine" (Francese 179) struggle is then rather about the "struggle against power to achieve" (Pickett 453) than about the "struggles to take power" (*ibid.*). Accordingly, there is a risk of a transgression of the normative order if the Other (over-)conforms to the ISA's ideology. This conformity is not a victory of the ISA but rather a constant power battle that "struggles to take power" (*ibid.*). The constant power struggle hinders the ISA to reckon the problems and dangers caused by the revolt of the RSA. This is a vicious circle of cultural clashes and a continuous fight of maintaining hierarchical power structures (cf. Pines 182) between the ISA and the Other.

²⁶ In this context, culture wars stand for a diverse attitude toward cultural identities, traditions, and values, which depend on religious, political, societal, historical, etc. distinctions. Culture war(s) is a concept that was introduced in *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* by James Davison Hunter, an American sociologist. The subsequent quote represents Hunter's main understanding of the term and its origin: "It would be frivolous to imagine that this conflict [of culture wars] emerged spontaneously out of a social and historical change. Yet most discussions of the tensions in American society fail to consider the historical context. The truth of it is that the contemporary culture war evolved out of century-old religious tensions—through the expansion and the realignment of American religious pluralism" (Hunter 67). "[T]he culture war [...] has become institutionalized chiefly through special-purpose organizations, denominations, political parties, and branches of government" (290, italics in original).

Chapter Four

Individuals are Always-Already Subjects of Ideology

The multifaceted understandings of ideology and its intersections within diverse fields through different philosophers and theorists (Marx, Althusser, Lacan, Bourdieu) are outlined as follows:

- (a) the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life;
- (b) a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class;
- (c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant power;
- (d) false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power;
- (e) systematically distorted communication;
- (f) that which offers a position for a subject;
- (g) forms of thought motivated by social interests (cf. Eagleton 1)

For Althusser, ideology is neither right nor wrong because what ideology represents is the “way I ‘live’ my relations to society” (18) and this way of living is rather connected to a specific “organization of signifying practices which goes to constitute human beings as social subjects” (ibid). Accordingly, (human) subjects “function in the practical rituals of the most elementary everyday life [...], which means that you [subject] are recognized as a unique subject [...]—this recognition only gives us ‘consciousness’ of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition” (Sharma et al. 105). Hence, in contrast to an object, a subject is an observer but is not observed (cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 33). The subject is a social and ideological construction (cf. Leyton 170-71) shaped by the ISA. It is ideology that inaugurates one into being a subject and “into sociality by a variety of diffuse and powerful interpellations” (Mar-Molinero et al. 113).

Concepts Creating the Multifaceted Constructions of Ideology

Considering the diverse constructions and approaches of ideology, Althusser's fundamental grasp of ideology is also multilayered:

(1) Ideology as A-Historical

There is no ideology but *through* a subject and *for* subjects. Independent from these diverse approaches toward ideology, there is one particular aspect that keeps reoccurring for Althusser: Ideology is an essential element of “every social formation [that] must reproduce the conditions of its productions [...] in order to be able to produce. It must therefore reproduce [...] productive forces [...] [and] existing relations of production” (Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 128; cf. 159) throughout history. Hence, ideology has particular social, political, and cultural functions and structures, which are constant and valid across time. Thus, ideology is “omni-historical” (Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism* 175 & *Lenin and Philosophy* 161). Accordingly, ideology is impacted by history but also constantly redefines and transforms itself through the shifts within the political, cultural, social, and economic structures of a society (divided into ISA and RSA). Arguably, it is the adjustment of a (human) subject according to the respective living circumstances and outside influences (politics, economy) that changes the dominant ideology. In this way, ideology corresponds and readjusts to the respective contemporary needs and contexts. Those contemporary circumstances are pre- or redefined and reinforced by the ISA because the ISA has the power to formulate an “ideal” (new) mainstream ideology.

(2) Is Ideology “Real” or an Illusion?

Ideology “expresses a will, a hope or a nostalgia rather than describing a reality” (Eagleton 19). These personal “feelings” and perceptions of a subject (human being) toward an ideology are neither right nor wrong; instead, they get “coded into a discourse which looks as though it is describing the way things actually are” (ibid.). Therefore, ideology “cannot be a matter of false consciousness because it [ideology] is indubitably *real*” (22, italics in original). Thus, ideology is not imagined, unreal, or even an illusion; ideology is rather varying in the impacts of its effects (cf. ibid.). Due to the fact that ideology is closely connected to power relations “between human subjects” (Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 31) and within a society and the power struggles between the ISA and the RSA, ideology has always—in a direct or indirect manner—an impact on people: The effects are multifaceted but depend on one’s ideological stand from one’s own perspective as well as from the other apparatus’ perspective.

Althusser argues, ideology is not a distorted image of reality. Instead, ideology is an imaginary distortion of the subject’s relation to reality (cf. Sharma et al. 103). This distortion depends on the subject’s perspective, which is highly individual and, hence, complex and difficult to grasp: Yet, one could argue that social, financial, cultural, religious, and political stand influences which kind of (dominant or repressed) ideology one is personally connected to. This, however, is complicated by, first, the perception of oneself and one’s own-defined/imaginary ideology and, second, by the perception of oneself through the Others/the dominant ideology oppressing one’s ideology-belonging. This complication leads to Althusser’s third understanding of ideology: ideology as hailing and interpolating concrete individuals

as subjects and the assumption that subjects/individuals are always already-subjects (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 172-73).

(3) Individuals are Always-Already Subjects (of Ideology)

In addition to the fact that dominant as well as repressive ideologies have always some kind of effect on the subject, there are also always practices in accordance with the respective ideology (within society, politics, and institutions): “Ideology exists in institutions and the practices specific to them. [...] more precisely: ideology exists in apparatuses and the practices specific to them” (Simons 65). Although ideology appears to have an overarching and omnipresent domination or repression of its subjects, ideology does not function without its subjects (no matter whether the subjects are in accordance with this ideology or not). Hence, there is a strong interdependence between ideology and its subjects and vice versa. If ideology does not “possess” any subjects or corresponds to subjects in a certain way, it would not have an effect. Yet, the impact of the effects is not predictable and depends on the social, cultural, religious, and political belonging of the subject that processes the effect/influence of ideology in a unique and individual manner.

Accordingly, ideology keeps transforming itself through the individuality of its subjects. Nevertheless, individuals are “always-already subjects” (Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 176) because every individual subject has a pre-ideological self (cf. Sharma et al. 106; cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 48). This pre-ideological self is interpolated by the dominant ideology and other forms of ideology practicing its effects on the individual subject. Those influences enhance the certitudes introduced by ideology and the relation between the subject and its “idealized self-image” (Žižek, *Jacques Lacan* 145) projected to the subject by ideology and the object because only “*the object can give certainty*, as it is only the object that provides

one's being" (79, italics in original). The pre-ideological self could be referred to as the subconsciousness because it does not realize how one is subconsciously caught up in a pre-defined ideology through one's social, cultural, financial, political, educational, economic, educational, and religious, circumstances and *settings* one is born into. Moreover, some aspects of the pre-ideological self are already pre-defined/pre-set for the subject before it is even born because "individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects" (Sharma et al. 106):

Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived. [...] this familial ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly structured, and that it is in this implacable and more or less 'pathological' [...] structure that the former subject-to-be will have to 'find' 'its' place, i.e. 'become' the sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance. [...] and their respective roles, are reflected in the very structure of all ideology. (ibid.)

Consequently, one cannot escape ideology; one is always trapped within ideology (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 157). Hence, one is constantly oppressed by ideology. The only individual power one possesses when coping with ideology is to individually define how this particular ideology affects oneself.

(4) Subjects within a Mass-Produced Media (III) Ideology

As a result of globalization and the rapid development of the new media and its social networks such as *Facebook*, *Twitter*, *Instagram*, blogging, as well as the opportunities to constantly follow the news on a global scale, ideologies now spread across borders within seconds. Due to the technical progress, ideologies are also represented in the fictional and nonfictional mass media and culture industry. The mass media tend to misrepresent ideology in radical and prejudiced ways reinforcing the dominant ideology of the ISA intending to manipulate the mass audience. A rather recent example is the representation of Middle Easterners who are predominantly embodied

as potential terrorists belonging to a radical Islamic ideology indicating a potential thread to the rest of the world (cf. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* 48; cf. *Das Islamische Portal* n. pag.).

Since ideology determines how subjects attribute meaning and since ideology is regarded “as a *dominant* formation” (Eagleton 18, italics in original) of certain events and/or productions, the distortion of Other ideologies is dangerous because it reproduces racial prejudices and hierarchies. Communicating and strengthening the dominant ideology of the ISA by representing the Other ideology as radical or even ill-ideology to the mass audience/subjects leads to a superstructure: Superstructure can be referred to as an upward extension of an already existing structure above its baseline. In a metaphorical sense, this baseline signifies the already dominant ideology of the ISA that reduplicates its dominance by manipulating the subjects/the mass audience of the ISA in order to double-repress the RSA by creating a superstructure through an extension of the ideology and positioning an ill-ideology on top of the ISA’s governing ideology. This increases the already clashing power gap between ISA and RSA and, according to Marx, results in a superstructure, which is the peak of dominant ideology and which derives from “the *infrastructure*, or economic base (the ‘unity’ of the productive forces and the [power] relations of production)” (Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 134, italics in original). This arising infrastructure—transforming itself into a superstructure—reflects the interests as well as the power of the ISA and justifies its overarching and powerful stand because it is not initially “produced” to be instantly a superstructure. Consequently, the subjects are double-trapped in the predefined and prejudiced ideology of the ISA.

Considering that ideology forms a “closed system” (Eagleton 126) and maintains itself through (or even despite) contradictory or inconsistent experience, the

(mis)representation of ill-ideologies through the ISA is dangerous. The creation and manipulation of ideology through the media is connected, to, what Marx referred to as, an economic “mode of production” (Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism* xxiv) that cannot be separated from capitalism and (mass-produced and manipulative culture) industries influencing the masses through ideology in order to establish a profitmaking business ideology that guarantees economic success. In addition, the logic (or justification) of the ISA’s dominant ideology can also be linked to the notion of the American Dream: This logic and the American Dream are both related to the reproduction of a dominant and privileged ideology achieving its goals through economic advancement and, hence, capitalism. This “sugarcoating” of an oppressive dominant ideology reproduces the inequality between ISA and RSA and reinforces an “us versus them” and an “inferior versus superior” (social) order within societies providing the already privileged people with even more financial, social, cultural, political capital and advantages.

(5) Shift: From Dominant via Repressed Ideology to State Apparatus

Initially, Althusser mainly concentrates on ideology and how ideologies are not only predefined already before birth (cf. Sharma et al. 106) but also how (human) subjects “function in the practical rituals of the most elementary everyday life” (105) and how “this recognition only gives us ‘consciousness’ of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition” (ibid.). Although Althusser’s prime concern is the power struggles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 137) and the “clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms” (149), he still distinguishes between the two separate forms of ideology and power dynamics between ISA and RSA.

However, Althusser's distinction shifts, when he does not separate ISA and RSA (very clearly) anymore: The "State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. The State is a 'machine' of oppression, which enables the ruling classes" (ibid.). This turn indicates that there is actually just one ideology left, namely the dominating one. And this ideology interferes in the SA. The SA consists of a variety of branches (religion, education, media, church, politics, economy, culture, etc.) and spreads, teaches, and mediates its ideology to members of the SA as well as the ISA. This is problematic because it only circulates the ideology of the ISA (cf. 143, 150). The distribution of only one dominant form of ideology is not distinguished anymore because it is also not questioned anymore. This is concerning because it displays the hopelessness of the economic base (cf. 135) to interfere into the ISA and its superstructure. In addition, it is a continuing vicious circle that develops upwardly while establishing more and more sub-superstructures on top of the already privileged and dominant ISA. Hence, the disparity increases steadily resulting in only one ruling SA.

(6) Concluding Thoughts on Ideologies

It is crucial to realize this shift and the constant progress of the ISA as well as its endless process of reproducing the already advanced, dominant, and more powerful ideology of the ISA and how this results in a superstructure and oppression that cannot be reversed or even reduced by the oppressed members of the RSA. Finally, there is an irreversible shift from "only" a repressed (less powerful) ideology of the RSA to only one remaining dominant ideology of the ISA: It is a "repressive force in the last instance" (137). Since "ideology *has no outside*" (175, italics in original), repressed members of the (former) RSA remain trapped within the overarching superstructure of the ISA (cf. 171). This irreversible shift represses the members of

the RSA even more, and does not even allow a power struggle, power dynamic, or questioning of the power holders anymore because there is no ideology left that could challenge the prejudiced ideology oppressing the Others. Due to the constant reproduction and reinforcement of the dominant ideology of the ISA, society and its RSA reached (through its peak with the superstructure) a condition of impossible revolutionary critique and passive movement (cf. 153; cf. Witkin 6, 17) because of its silenced and repressed power reproducing its already weak(er) and repressed ideology (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 156).

The key for equality within a society and between ISA and RSA is the chance to reproduce one's ideology with the opportunity to move above the economic base (cf. 135). In this way, ISA and RSA would have the prospect to participate in formulating a common superstructure that might still possess more elements of the ISA's ideology but would feature some ideology elements from the RSA as well. It is essential, for a society claiming that everybody is created equal, that various ideologies have the chance to become part of the superstructure and to reproduce themselves. In this way, the structure of the superstructure would be more balanced and each ideology would control the other, which contributes to more equal power distribution.

Another obstacle for equality, however, is the division of the superstructure in in private and public sectors. This division also disturbs an equal distribution among the ideology of the ISA and the RSA: The

(Repressive) State Apparatus belongs entirely to the *public* domain, much the larger part of the Ideological State Apparatus (in their apparent dispersion) are part, on the contrary, of the *private* domain. Churches, Parties, Trade Unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, culture ventures, etc., etc., are private. (144, italics in original)

Accordingly, the main issue is not to change (oppressed and/or dominant) ideology. Instead, the key for equal distribution is to de-privatize all sectors of the SA. This, however, is impossible because of capitalism that needs privatized domains in order to financially and economically function and survive: especially sectors such as politics, the media, and education. While this dependency on capitalism and private domains steadily strengthens the already powerful superstructure, it, additionally, reproduces ideology through the members of the privatized domains of the ISA who attend schools, colleges, and universities that are part of the ISA league propagating an elite through financial, social, cultural, political, and, ideological capital: “the school (but also other state institutions like the Church, or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches ‘know-how,’ but in forms which ensure *subjection to the ruling ideology* or the mastery of its ‘practice’” (133, italics in original; cf. 157).

Chapter Five

Race as Product of Social, Political, and Educational Thought

In the context of CRT, social construction refers to the notion that race is a product of social thought and relations. It suggests that race is a product of neither biology nor genetics but rather a social invention; therefore, it is not “real” (cf. Haney-López 9). Nevertheless, “races are like witches: however, unreal witches are, *belief* in witches, like belief in races has had—and in many communities continues to have—profound consequences for human social life” (Heider 5, italics in original). It is necessary to deconstruct race and to reconsider the tensions between race as a social construction, illusion, and its, “very real,” material consequences. Although education can highly contribute to deconstructing racial thoughts based on false assumptions and prejudices, education cannot be the only sector deconstructing race. It is also not exclusively education’s responsibility to create equal opportunities for all. Instead, race needs to be deconstructed as a social concept created and maintained by the ISA through unfolding CRT and its complexities impacting politics, law, economy, science, ideology, identity, and social structures. Racial constructions are often justified “by the [...] oppressive social policy and law that reflect” (Tate IV 200) racial categories. Accordingly, racially biased policies and laws were and still are legally practiced against people of color (cf. 201). It is difficult to break the vicious cycle of racism, the inferiority of people of color or Middle Easterners, and to deconstruct race because of the constant reproduction of the hegemonic structures of the ISA.

As targets of racism change, people’s kinds of racial constructions, ideologies, and identities shift. These shifts demonstrate that race is a social invention that has

been and still is redefined throughout time because there was and is a need to adjust race as construct in order to maintain the power and domination of the ISA. The ISA can only “succeed,” however, if it maintains its power and reconstructs its falsely justified reasons for treating certain Others/certain races as inferior. In order to “succeed,” the ISA has to branch out into a variety of sectors: education, politics, culture, and society. The most powerful and overarching branches of the ISA are the media and the culture industry. In order to achieve a reproduction of racially prejudiced and predefined stereotypes, socially constructed and racialized institutions and apparatuses (for instance schools) follow the ISA’s constructs and, hence, teach and continuously spread racism.

Race, as a social construct, is neither merely socially constructed, nor an illusion: Race is real-made. It is also an invention of capitalism and politics, mediated through the media and racially biased school curricula. Accordingly, race is “very real”—not scientifically but as a trigger for racism based on historical conceptions of certain races (for example Blacks and the history of slavery) who are regarded as inferior, less educated, and worth less. What makes race “real” and not an illusion is the daily practicing of racism—the consumption (through the media) and the recognition of race within the media: Blacks are often represented as gangsters while presenting them with particular outfits in particular *settings* (cf. du Gay et al. 2). This (mis)representation makes race real in terms of its material consequences related to less (or worse) access to, for instance, safer neighborhoods and, hence, denied access to proper education. This leads to a constant denial of access to social, financial, and cultural capital for people of particular (colored or Middle Eastern) “races.”

Consequently, the reality of inequality and the realness of race result in a reproduction of exclusion: Certain races remain repressed and racism remains real and

is, by the ISA and its branches, de-illusionized. Therefore, it is real for the masses: The media and the culture industry misrepresent certain races through the covert usage of (apparently) real predefined effects impacting the ideology and the “as real perceived” identity by manipulating the audiences. Since the audience can *really* see it, the (mis)representation is not questioned or even regarded as unreal illusion.

The already gridlocked white supremacy is regarded as truth because “Whites don’t see their viewpoints as a matter of perspective” (E. Taylor 122; cf. Tate IV 219, 223). Thus, the problem is two folded: First, white hegemony is defined as the ultimate “truth” (E. Taylor 122). Second, the oppression that is caused by white hegemony “no longer seems like oppression to the perpetrators” (123). Especially the second aspect is the result of a constantly recreated social construct of race as real. Consequently, these two aspects contribute to the constant repetition and reproduction of whiteness as *the* norm, which makes it almost impossible for people of color and Middle Easterners to exit the vicious cycle of oppression, discrimination, (political and societal) exclusion, and (residential) segregation—they are trapped in their social construct and the RSA’s inferiority.

Another complication of a real-made particular races and racism is the danger of being colorblind/headscarfblind: “it allows us to ignore the racial construction of whiteness and reinforces its privileged and oppressive position” (ibid.). In this way, colorblindness (or headscarfblindness) reinforces the notion of “us versus them” and makes the real-made ISA’s norm a privilege while “blackness [or a headscarf] remains different, other, and marginal” (ibid.). In the past as well as today, the ISA is only willing to “sacrifice the well-being of people of color for their economic self-interests” (ibid.). Consequently, racism remains a “normal activity in [...] society” (124), politics, education, etc.

Yet, considering that race is a product of social thought mainly controlled by the ISA and its power branches, the main concern is not racism; it is rather the ISA's racially biased, predefined, and prejudiced ideologies and constructs resulting in continuous racisms. The biased representation and reconstruction of race as inferior Other makes race and racisms increasingly real and unquestioned through oftentimes silent and (un)consciously unrecognized forms of "covert racism" (Sniderman et al. 224-25). "[T]here are simply too many people [Others] who do not fit into any such [dominant] category" (Lentricchia et al. 277). Kwame Appiah refers to categories in terms of "*Negro, Caucasian*" (ibid., italics in original). However, it is not only the categorization into white and black or Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern that complicates the issue of race as social construct. Nevertheless, those categorizations do not (by themselves) lead to racism, race as social invention, or race as "the real." The omnipresence of those categorizations and racist relations is caused by the ISA's invention of methods that make race "real" in various sectors and keep certain races trapped in the RSA. Those methods include manipulation and misrepresentation of certain identities, ideologies, and race categorizations aiming to maintain the ISA's superstructure.

Racial categories are outdated because they reduce diversity (of heritages, religions, cultural identities and ideologies, etc.) to skin colors and other obvious racial signifiers such as veils. Moreover, race has often a rather negative connotation and is, in the general understanding, often limited to racism (even through this expanded to Middle Easterners). Consequently, the usage of the term race needs to be reconsidered: "Even those scientists who still have a use for the term "race" agree that a good deal of what is popularly believed about races is false—often wildly false" (ibid.). The societal and cultural structures of the 21st century have become

enormously diverse and globalization and new immigrations multiply the blurry lines between different cultures, ethnicities, heritages, identities, ideologies, religions, and races. Therefore, one could, perhaps, consider “heritage” instead of “race” because race often evokes connotations with black and white racism. Accordingly, race also predefines where one/the Other belongs. This is shaped by dominant ideologies of the ISA. Furthermore, defining oneself (or somebody else) as a particular race creates additional (equal integration) barriers because

- (1) race is an invented social construct that is (pre)defined by the ISA that determines for Others where they belong politically, socially, and culturally.
- (2) race is, in certain studies, regarded as an illusion. And since illusion can be referred to as an “instance of wrong misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience” (*Oxford English Dictionary* n. pag.), the person who belongs to this race is not real as a subject.
- (3) race is only “real” in terms of racial discrimination, exclusion, and segregation resulting in inequalities based on one’s race. This is problematic because it is not oneself who gets to define one’s race—it is the ISA that defines it. Hence, it is not oneself but the ISA that decides on one’s racial, cultural, social, educational, and political identity and where one belongs.

Concludingly, the predominantly negative perception of race, even though race is a socially-constructed invention, is real because “races are like witches: however unreal witches are, [...] belief in races has had—and in many communities continues to have—profound consequences for [...] social life” (Heider 5). This proves that race cannot be vanished from politics, society, education, and other sectors the ISA intervenes in. It is real, because race has been made real by the ISA, its superstructure, the culture industry, and capitalism: These sectors intend to maintain and even duplicate their privileges. Therefore, race is also a cultural, political, ideological, and economic construction and invention that is historically rooted and has, ever since, a long “tradition” that is, even though outdated, constantly redefined in order to reform and maintain the ISA’s superstructure.

Chapter Six

Shifts in Racisms: Whitewashed—From Black to (Middle) East

Race has become a “fact rather than a construct” (Tehrani 8) and is far more than racism based on skin color only: It is a form of rather recently-emerged (post-9/11) racism that is based on clothing (veils), religious affiliation, and Middle Eastern identity. Defining racism in terms of being white but still Othered is the case for the contemporary forms of racism that are not anymore solely based on black versus white. New racisms are increasingly political and religious. These new forms of racism are mainly caused by globalization and became even more present because of the intermingling of Western and Eastern cultures, politics, and traditions: Eastern and Western worlds “had little choice but to accept the powerful impact of globalization on its culture. [...] The world today is one big village. Cultures are melting and a mixed global heritage is being formed. [...] we might lose some identity, but that is the price we must pay” (LeVine 260). That loss of identity is exactly what causes racism—a fear of Others who might overrun and overrule the—until then—stable and well-known traditions of one’s own cultural and political identity. Through the Westernized mainstream media, globalization-related problems are oftentimes assessed from one perspective only: It is the Middle East that represents a threat to “us” and “our” “social and cultural homogeneity” (Korteweg et al. 167). However, the Middle East also regards globalization and the forced Westernization of their culture, politics, and identity “with much suspicion across the Muslim world” (Tehrani 8).

From either perspective, it is a whitewashed racism that is not simply minority versus majority, oppressed versus mainstream, or black versus white. The Others who face racism are not the minority—they are also not necessarily differently looking in

terms of skin color. Therefore, racism has gotten much more complex and cannot be separated from religion and politics anymore. Due to globalization, politics and religion merged—intersections that cause conflicts based on identity, belonging, traditions, rights, and individual socialization that do not correspond with one another. Instead, it is a constant political clash because of (too) dissimilar cultural heritages, ideologies, and identities. Both, Eastern and Western societies, are not yet ready for diplomatically and compromisingly merging into a globalized shared living space. Racism that is not based on skin color anymore, is much more complex and undefinable because officially, “Middle-Eastern Americans are not even considered a minority in official government data [...] [and] do not enjoy the benefits of white privilege. Yet, as white under the law, they are denied the fruits of remedial action” (3).

Historically and contemporarily, racism and discrimination have, in addition to the skin color issue, been caused by immigration policies denying access for Others who are considered potential terrorists because they look Middle Eastern, wear veils, and caused the 9/11 attacks, which is ever since hyped and overemphasized in the Western media and film industry (cf. 101). This misrepresentation is continued at airport security checks: “When examining the treatment of Middle-Easterners at airports, we [Middle Easterners] are provided a poignant reminder of the way stereotypical media portraits can perpetuate racism and wreak a particularly devastating toll on the regular lives of targeted groups” (106). This is contradictory for three major reasons: Firstly, because Middle Easterners are perceived as Whites but are yet Othered, alienated, racialized, and even demonized (cf. 92). Secondly, Middle Easterners and/or Americans of Middle Eastern descent are not a minority but are yet treated as an inferior Other. Thirdly, US-American educational institutions

“consider faculty applicants as Caucasian if they come from Middle Eastern or North African descent. According to Uncle Sam, a Middle Easterner is as white as a blond-haired, blue-eyed Scandinavian” (37).

This proves that racism is complex, unpredictable, and illogical. Considering, for instance, the “racism” (although that might need to be renamed since it is a rather unique form of racism) between *Ossis* and *Wessis*²⁷, is even more illogical because they are both white and possess German citizenship. However, *Ossis* and *Wessis* have been socialized in different political regimes that do not fit together and embrace different norms and social, political, historical, and cultural ideals, which cause clashes. Former West Germany has been shaped by Capitalism and is, hence, more connected to the United States (also due to the US-American Military bases) and the Western alliance toward *Ossis*. *Ossis*, to the contrast, have been more exposed to communist regimes opposed to Westernization. The merge of the two politically-different German nations (East and West) caused a form of racism based on prejudices and stereotypes caused by politically biased media representations of the respective Other. Consequently, this form of racism was mainly caused by the merge of two different political and cultural identities, political ideologies, and regimes that needed to cooperate in a—for East and West—unknown sphere that required adjustments from both sides. This is, independent from the form of racism, a phenomenon most societies struggle with: It represents a threat to one’s own long-known identity and requires adjustment the majority has not been prepared for. This threat is also present in times of globalization and immigration and refugee waves. Such an immigration-based racism is currently happening in Germany (and other countries as well) with people from mainly Syria and other surrounding countries.

²⁷ The terms *Ossi* (plural: *Ossis*) and *Wessi* (plural: *Wessis*) are informal labels that are oftentimes used in a provocative manner to describe stereotypical (and biased) *Ossi* and *Wessi* behaviors. *Ossis* are people who grew up in the former GDR and *Wessis* are people who grew up in former West Germany.

Considering East Germany, however, it has also been a form of racism based on the political ideologies of Communism versus Capitalism. This is still present today and has shaped an entire generation and, more or less, their children who grew up with false assumptions and prejudices toward *Wessi* versus *Ossi*: The media and politicians, regard *Ossis* as “an inferior ethnic group: “passive, pacifist, pessimistic, and paranoid’” (Korteweg et al. 144).

Accordingly, new forms of racism are whitewashed and “our racial categories have surprisingly little to do with actual skin color” (Tehrani 45). Race is rather defined by educational, social, and cultural capital and behavior, social belonging/class, gender, religious affiliations, language, and clothes (cf. 46-47). In this way, culture (as umbrella term for interaction, outer appearance, and behavior related to cultural heritage) provides and defines “proof of performative whiteness” (47) and determines where one belongs socially: either to the oppressed minority and Other or the mainstream, accepted, and superior majority. The Others “act white” (or Western)—despite the fact that acting white can be regarded as just another form of forced identity denial, oppression, hidden racism, and “false” belonging because one does not belong to the “real white” (Western) norm. What was once a skin color-based form of racism has now become a religion-based form of racism in many Western countries:

Christianity, instead of skin color, becomes a proxy for racial belonging. [...] it reveals race as a construct of human institutions and imaginations—a construction and reconstruction that continues to this very day with enormous consequences, especially as the religious affiliation of the Middle-Eastern population in the United States has dramatically shifted from Christianity to Islam. (53)

Consequently, acting white is related to social class, education, heritage, and, now also mainly religious affiliations: Racism and its triggers have shifted from skin color to multifaceted constructs and facts defined by the white, Western, and Christian

populations through the biased media, film industry, and news reporting. The definition of who is regarded as white (superior) depends on religion and not (only) on skin color anymore. Therefore, some “qualify as white in some situations and nonwhite in others” (60).

The shift of racisms is based on globalization-related matters and has become even more intense because of 9/11 (cf. 63). The resulting discrimination and segregation of Middle Easterners has “risen dramatically” (64) ever since. The perception of Middle Easterners has been transformed from a rather positive association of the “mysterious Orient” (105), “magnificent rugs” (83), and fairy tales such as *Aladdin* “to a veritable enemy race” (65; cf. 75). Facts such as “only 23 percent of present-day Arab Americans are Muslim” (69) and “only 12 percent of the world’s Muslims are Arabs” (176) are ignored by the mainstream media and are constantly misrepresented in the post-9/11 news representation. In the aftermath of 9/11, immigrants became a synonym for terrorists in the United States as well as in Germany (cf. 70, 121), which has caused a shift in racism from black to Middle Eastern. Hence, the erstwhile war on terrorism has become a war on one particular “race” and religion (cf. 134, 172). Although the definition of racism is instable and constantly changing due to current political situations, racism has always been justified by what is not considered the ISA’s Western ideals and norms. Despite the constantly changing and adapting definitions of who is racialized and Othered, there are certain aspects that improve one’s status. Although the “options may be limited when it comes to skin color, [...] it is possible to improve one’s status in other ways. [...]: the right clothes, the right car, the right neighborhood can help compensate for that fundamental imperfections: nonwhiteness” (79).

The problem of racializing a particular “race” or group of people based on

their religious affiliations and the prejudiced associations of Middle Easterners as terrorists, can be fixed or decreased with, “reform[ing] media portrayals [...]; encourage[ing] greater political action in the Middle Eastern community [...]; tackling the airline industry’s problematic treatment of individual of Middle Eastern descent; [...] [and] consider[ing] outlawing the practice of racial profiling” (165). Although these suggestions seem to be reasonable, they exclude the educational sector. But the educational system needs to readjust promptly to the current shifts in increasingly multicultural, multilingual, and multireligious societies, classrooms, and politics. These shifts are caused by the challenges and consequences of globalization and, thus, demand different learning and teaching environments—from kindergartens to universities. Most forms of racism are based on false assumptions created by the oppressor in order to maintain superiority. However, it is all a construct not based on hard facts but on racialized assumptions aiming at Othering and excluding a certain group. Hence, race and racisms are “all about [false] perceptions” (180) and something that can be (re)taught, strengthened, and continued throughout several generations through biased teaching and learning methods and *settings*. Therefore, constructs need to be updated and constantly readjusted in order to learn from history’s mistakes and to successfully integrate and practice pre- as well as post-activism on the political, social, and educational level.

The *Wende* within Immigration and Globalization

(1) History and Its Effect on Pre- and Post-Activism

Although the *Wende* is almost 30 years ago, there are still cultural, economic, religious, social, educational, and political clashes between former East and West Germany. While statistics prove that the younger generation (born shortly before or after the *Wende* in 1988, 1989, or 1990) does not distinguish and identify as much as their parents' generation with either being *Ossi* or *Wessi*, there is still an enormous salary difference that affects the younger generation as well (see Figure 2). The salary difference is also represented and reinforced in the parent's lower salaries for the same job (for examples teachers) (cf. *Der Westen* n. pag.). This results in an overall higher frustration rate in East Germany than in West Germany. Additionally, the immigration wave contributes to East Germans feeling threatened to lose their jobs because immigrants will do their job for even less money. This leads to higher unemployment rates increasing the *Ossis'* frustration rate even more.

Financial capital cannot be separated from culture, social circumstances, and education because it prospectively influences the educational path, chances on the job market, and, finally, also the salary. Accordingly, although Germany is (re)unified since 1989, there is still an invisible wall of injustices between former East and West Germany. Those frustrations and injustices often escalate topics that are not necessarily closely linked to the actual problem: In East Germany, this topic refers to Middle Eastern immigrants who already suffer from negative images and racialized media representations after 9/11.

Even 30 years after unification, statistics still indicate differences between East and West Germany. Thus, the FRG needs another reunification and adjustment in salaries in order to create an equal Germany and to overcome the *Wende* trauma,

which is still not properly handled in politics and education: Educational as well as political sectors delimitate former East Germany to a historical subject (the *Wende*) only. Both sectors represent the GDR as historical turning point only. Instead, curricula need to consider the historical scope for former *Ossis*. Especially the “older” generation (approximately 30 years old at the *Wende*) is still traumatized (or at least frustrated) due to injustices based on their East German upbringing, education, heritage, lack of chances to go abroad etc. because it now affects their unified German identity and financial situation: Many former East Germans learned jobs, finished apprenticeships, and studied academic fields that disappeared after the *Wende* and were defuncted. Consequently, the majority of *Ossis* faced unemployment and very limited and frustrating training opportunities.

Although the “wall in people’s heads” has been overcome after almost 30 years of German reunification, the (mainly economical and financial) trauma of the *Wende* and the remaining inequalities between East and West are still very much present. An interesting aspect is how much influence parents still have on their children born post-*Wende* or in the midst of the *Wende*: Due to the inequalities of former East Germans’ lives, their children are still often negatively (and unconsciously) influenced by their parents when talking derogatively about *Wessis* (cf. Bierbrauer et al. n. pag). This experience is completely different for the majority of West Germans from the young(er) generation who claim “I have stopped to think about the differences. [...] They are less rooted and they do not identify themselves as much as West or East Germans anymore”²⁸ (Bierbrauer et al. n. pag.). Although the interviewee from a small town in Saxony-Anhalt (former East Germany) who studies

²⁸ This quote is from an interview with Moritz Kran (*Wendekind*). He grew up in Frankfurt am Main (former West Germany) but now studies political science in Jena and Dresden (both cities are in former East Germany). The quote is originally in German: “Ich habe schon aufgehört, mir Gedanken über die Unterschiede zu machen. [...] Sie sind weniger verwurzelt und fühlen sich nicht mehr so sehr als West- oder Ostdeutsche.”

politics in Mainz (former West Germany) argues that there are no major differences between this generation's *Ossis* and *Wessis*; the interviewee critically adds: "In our generation, I actually don't perceive any differences between West and East. Perhaps it is because I am in a student bubble"²⁹ (ibid.). Generally, *Wendekinder*³⁰ are more in ease with their East/West German generation fellows; although there are still slight differences in free time, living conditions, health, and jobs between the *Wendekinder* generation: West Germans are slightly happier/more in ease with their living circumstances (cf. ibid.). All these sectors are mainly related to the economy and salaries. Therefore, "[t]he dramatic differences reveal themselves because of the household income and the linked level of satisfaction"³¹ (ibid.). Since the net income is still significantly lower in East Germany (the difference is more than 800 Euro per month (cf. ibid.), they are (independent from age) generally more discontent (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Household Net Income (in Euro) per Month

²⁹ This quote is from an interview with Tobias Wötzel (*Wendekind*). The quote is originally in German: "Ich nehme in unserer Generation eigentlich keine Unterschiede zwischen West und Ost wahr. Vielleicht liegt das aber auch daran, dass ich mich in einer studentischen Filterblase bewege."

³⁰ The term *Wendekinder* refers to the young generation born at the time of the *Wende* or shortly before/after the *Wende*.

³¹ The quote is originally in German: "Die dramatischen Unterschiede zeigen sich dementsprechend beim Haushaltseinkommen und bei der Zufriedenheit damit."

The net income differences between former East and West Germany already started in the early 1990s shortly after the *Wende*: Due to the unfortunate exchange rate between *Ostmark* (currency of the GDR) and *Deutsche Mark* (currency of the FRG before the *Euro*), which was par for par, the East German economy was not competitive anymore and collapsed. In addition, the escrow as well as the privatization of former state companies led to mass unemployment rates in former East Germany. Although the *Wendekinder* generation was not affected themselves by this unemployment, they still remember the consequences of these shortcomings for their parents and, hence, the entire family including the *Wendekinder* (cf. *ibid.*). 2019, former East Germany's economy is still behind: One reason for this is that the majority of former East Germans earns less than former West Germans. Another reason is that East Germany has higher unemployment rates³² and, accordingly, a worse monthly net income resulting in frustration and economic downturns. In times of frustration or even economic and social traumata, which have not yet been solved for many “older” former East Germans, the fear of Others and the Unknown (immigrants) also increases and results in right-wing xenophobic attitudes.

The *Wende* is usually perceived (and should be perceived) as a positive turning point and was (and still is) hyped as peaceful and almost ideal revolution leading to freedom, unification of Germany, and reunification of families separated by the Wall. However, there are also not immediately realized negative aspects of the *Wende*: First, several apprenticeships and fields of study were mainly related to the East German political and economic regime.³³ Hence, people were unable to find an adequate job after the *Wende*—they are unemployed or in low-paid jobs. Second, whenever a society is socially, politically, and economically frustrated, many seek to

³² The unemployment rate in East Germany is 7.4 percent and only 5.2 percent in West Germany.

³³ Such academic programs focused on the former communist political regime and the communist-based business economy.

find scapegoats and this has clearly been on its epitome with the refugee and immigration wave in 2014. Not only parents but also *Wendekinder* from former East Germany are concerned about the constant open-door immigration (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Concerns about Immigration in Former East versus West Germany

One major reason for such (racist-like) concerns is that West Germany features more people (also in the polls) with immigrant backgrounds: Almost 10 percent of the West German *Wendekinder* were born outside of Germany, while in East Germany, only 4 percent of the *Wendekinder* were born abroad (ibid.). This statistical evidence is often used for the argument why East Germans might be more racist toward immigrants: They were and still are less exposed to people with immigrant backgrounds. However, it is crucial to not misrepresent *Ossis* in the media (which is often the case) because it increases the already dominant clash between *Ossis* and *Wessis* even more. In contrary to the current statistical representations, *Ossis* were also exposed to immigrant workers (*Gastarbeiter* from Vietnam) during GDR times. Therefore, the following argument needs to be brought into question: “For a long time, there was only a very few contacts in East Germany with migrants,

which might have encouraged the development of prejudices and resentment”³⁴ (Bierbrauer et al. n. pag.).

According to the annual report of the Federal Government, former East Germany features much higher racism rates and violent acts against immigrants within the last several years than former West Germany: Right-wing violence has occurred more within some former East German federal states (see Figure 4):




Figure 4: Percentage of Right-Wing Violence in Federal States of Former East Germany

The average percentage of the former West German federal states is only 10.5 percent. Demonstrations (mainly based in former East German federal states) such as *Pegida* contribute to a negative image of the *Ossi*—not only Germany-wide but also internationally, as one of the interviewees also claims: “What made me particularly angry was to see how so many people can join a movement that is so obviously antidemocratic and xenophobic”³⁵ (ibid.). Right-wing movements contribute “enormously to the negative image of East Germany”³⁶ (ibid.).

³⁴ The quote is originally in German: “In Ostdeutschland gab es über einen langen Zeitraum sehr wenige Kontakte mit Migranten, was die Entstehung von Vorurteilen und Ressentiments begünstigt haben dürfte.”

³⁵ The quote is originally in German: “Mich hat es vor allem wütend gemacht zu sehen, wie sich derart viele Menschen einer Bewegung anschließen, die so offen antidemokratisch und fremdenfeindlich argumentiert.”

³⁶ The quote is originally in German: “zum Negativimage des Ostens massiv.”

The origin of the recently-emerging right-wing movements and the rise of the *AfD* derives from trauma: The first reaction after a traumatizing, new, and even abrupt turning point is silence. This is mainly because many *Ossis* have lost everything without pre-notice and had to cope with an unfamiliar (even though more democratic and freer) political system that did not cooperate with apprenticeships, skills, and jobs acquired in the GDR. There was a long silence because *Ossis* needed to restructure their entire lives and skills socially, economically, educationally, politically, and even culturally. Unless traumatized people have fair opportunities to create stability in an open society through a supporting political regime and ISA, their traumata cannot be overcome by openly addressing it in the current society and its politics (cf. Richter n. pag.). Furthermore, traumata can only be overcome if society and politics treat the “victims” (or vulnerable group) properly and take them seriously. However, this is still not the case with *Ossis*: They are often ridiculed and regarded as exotic Others not fitting the now predominantly Western (*Wessi*) German norms: “Especially after the first ten years of the reunification, East Germans were marginalized, exoticized, and even ridiculed”³⁷ (ibid.), which is one of the major reasons for the rise of the *AfD*.

Additionally, it is an issue of shame because of the alleged failure after the *Wende* for many *Ossis* who have lost their jobs and whose university degree become suddenly worthless. This might lead to the often-misunderstood statement of former East Germans who still fancy the GDR and who even mourn after the “good old times.” There is a nostalgic mourning, which is represented in GDR museums, as for example in Leipzig: Those museums do not resemble museums and exhibition meant to represent a specific part of Germany’s political GDR history. Instead, those museum types exhibit GDR products (kitchen supplies, food cans, children’s toys,

³⁷ The quote is originally in German: “Die Ostdeutschen wurden gerade in den ersten zehn Jahren nach der Wiedervereinigung marginalisiert, exotisiert, ja auch lächerlich gemacht.”

*NVA*³⁸ uniforms, etc.). But do those nostalgic museums function as a glorification of the oppressive GDR regime and the continuous oppression of *Ossis* because of the ISA's power? Do those exhibitions and representations of the past function as a way of overcoming and processing the trauma of the *Wende* that took familiar economic, cultural, educational, social, and political structures for the majority of former GDR citizens?

(2) GDR Museums—(False?) Nostalgia in Times of Globalization

Although the *Wende* had—first and foremost—enormous inner-German influences, the *Wende* also contributed to changes on a global scale—especially in regard to German-American political, cultural, and economic relations (cf. Rocard n. pag.). However, the long-term magnitude of such a historical turning point is oftentimes underestimated and reduced to the very moment itself. Nevertheless, it is the constantly progressing ramifications that cause the “real” challenges after the actual *Wende*: In the case of the GDR, it is exactly the dimension of two separate “Germanies” that demands a restructuring and reuniting of political ideologies, national identities, and issues related to educational degrees, laws, salaries, etc. that caused inner-German complications on political, societal, economic, and cultural levels (cf. Weber n. pag.; cf. Neubacher et al. n. pag.).

To raise awareness, it is crucial to manage and preserve the past for the public. This means integrating the generation who experienced the *Wende* but also including the generation who was born after Germany was already reunited. In so doing, institutions such as the *Wende Museum* in Culver City (founded 2002) contribute to an ongoing dialogue about how the past is, firstly, preserved, and, secondly, managed today. Therefore, the *Wende Museum* does not only display collections of former East

³⁸ *NVA* is a German abbreviation and stands for *Nationale Volksarmee* (National People's Army), the armed forces of the GDR.

Germany embracing “vanishing” objects from the GDR era while exploring historical moments for the GDR during the Cold War era. Its purpose is also to not (only) display GDR’s everyday life through typical products such as radios, televisions, food products, (communist) art pieces, books, magazines, political badges, flags, and uniforms. In addition to such collections, the *Wende Museum* also exhibits films and documentaries produced in the GDR as well as interviews from people witnessing, for instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, it is also necessary that the museum incorporates more multilayered and transatlantic components.

In consideration of heritage and culture, those components should cover German-American immigration history and focus on heritage and preservation of particular German(-American) cultural traditions and their role in the past and in contemporary culture, society, and (inter)national identities. Contemplating such elements also provides insights of still-existing prejudices and misunderstandings—even almost 30 years after historic moments such as the *Wende* (cf. Wiarda n. pag.; cf. *Thüringer Allgemeine* n. pag.). Therefore, institutions such as the *Wende Museum* have to engage accountability through educational and political initiatives beyond the historic representation of the GDR era only. Currently, the *Wende Museum* offers several educational programs and initiatives: A provision of multilayered collections meant to inspire individual (re)interpretations of the past contemplating on how to manage the past today. Furthermore, the museum concentrates on the realization of the global impact of the Eastern Bloc and the Cold War period and the long-term effects on a global scale (cf. Goodrich et al. n. pag.).

Yet, the *Wende Museum* lacks to explore the—at first glance—farfetched parallels between the GDR regime and other (bygone and current) regimes. The connection between historic and contemporary matters such as surveillance, the

correlation of the *Staatssicherheit (Stasi)*³⁹ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the (political) ideology and ISA, and censorship issues. Those connections contribute to a better cross-national contemporary understanding and are relevant for realizing recent impacts from history. The (re)interpretation and reviewing of seemingly already passed moments is indispensable for education, politics, and the respective curricula.

In addition to curricula, language acquisition is also part of past phenomena such as the *Wende*. However, due to political circumstances, many international German Studies/language teachers and professors did not have the chance to elaborate their educational trainings/studies in former East Germany. They oftentimes only spent their semesters abroad in former West Germany. Consequently, museums such as the *Wende Museum* function as an additional educational component helping German educators to equally include former East and West German challenges after the reunification. Besides, the *Wende Museum* helps visitors to understand the significance as well as the parallels: the adversarial situations and injustices between former East and West Germany but also the conflicts between the North and the South in the United States. Despite the fact that the historic roots of, for instance, inner-German conflicts do not exist in the same form today, the conflicts are still present—they appear in a transformed manner. Those connecting aspects are missing in the concept of the *Wende Museum* and other GDR museums. Hence, those museums should develop educational and political outreach initiatives that highlight the transatlantic and transdisciplinary discourse and interlinkage of history and current zeitgeist.

Such initiatives need to cover shifting forms of discrimination, segregation

³⁹ *Stasi* is an abbreviation for the state security service of the GDR.

and different racisms. In the US context, it is mostly Blacks and (recently) Middle Easterners versus Whites. It is also still predominantly Blacks and Middle Easterners who are the disadvantaged ones in several sectors (politics, social services, education etc.) (cf. *The Telegraph* n. pag.): “political reforms had proven so ineffective that millions of African Americans [or Middle Easterners] were trapped in “permanent second class status” because of discrimination” (Pears n. pag.). Considering the German context, it is not Blacks versus Whites. Instead, it is East Germans versus West Germans—but the sectors of discrimination remain similar: West Germans treat East Germans as second-class citizens (cf. *Thüringer Allgemeine* n. pag.)⁴⁰: East German teachers, for example, still earn significantly less money than West German teachers (cf. Weber n. pag.; cf. Burchardi et al. 1, 15; cf. *Der Westen* n. pag.). In regard of the education as well as the job sector, Blacks and East Germans tend to be the minority group, which exemplifies the multilayered forms of racisms and the magnitudes of historic oppression denying its citizens free access to White/Western capitals and opportunities.

Since forms of racisms shift, the term minority also needs to be reconsidered because in the case of East Germans, it is not a minority that was racialized. Instead, East Germans were racialized because of their “heritage” and former *Ossi* national identity. Accordingly, both, the United States and Germany, have experienced (and still experience) racisms that are not only based on skin color but also on different ethnic heritages in terms of political and national identity (Communism versus Capitalism) and religion (Christianity versus Islam). Thus, nations struggle with their own forms of racisms that also mingle because of an increasingly globalized landscape within societies, politics, education, and economies. Although immigration

⁴⁰ The newspaper article is originally in German; I translated/summarized the content.

and globalization are movements and alterations that steadily grow and may be unnoticed (or less noticed) in its beginnings, one of the most influential turning points for how racisms were and still are affected was caused by 9/11.

(3) Cross-Generational Racisms and Racialized White Others

In the German context, it is not only Middle Eastern students being Othered in classrooms from teachers, parents, and fellow students; it is also former East Germans (including the *Wendekinder*), which also affects future educational paths: Some study programs require semesters abroad or other forms of educational exchanges in order to be admitted to, for example, universities. Even today, former East Germans are still underrepresented in semester abroad programs—especially in the United States (cf. Köhler n. pag.). Since this underrepresentation of (disadvantaged) East Germans was not, as oftentimes represented in GDR museums, only the case in the GDR era but is still a key issue of the early 1990s and the 21st century (ibid.), GDR museums should be concerned with the GDR era, the reunification, *and* how the reunification poses a challenge for both reunited parts of Germany (cf. Weber n. pag.). It is important to consider the intercultural and inner-German complications and to ask to what extent those differentiations (within one unified nation) still shape German life today and how the generation born after 1989 perceives former East and West German “borders” in the 21st century.

Historic roots of discrimination, desire, racisms, and minorities keep shifting and can be contradictory throughout decades. During the GDR and its economy of scarcity and the prohibition of Western goods, East Germans had a very strong desire for Westernized and Americanized products and lifestyles (cf. Jackson 5, 10, 17; cf. Wallace 4, 33): “For a new generation, upward social mobility provided rewards which compensated for any political frustrations or desire for the luxuries of the richer

West” (10). After the *Wende*, there was still a hype of Western/American products and ways of living. However, in the late 1990s, this hype faded and was replaced by criticism and skepticism. The former hype was accompanied with a growing fear of the Western/American power on a cultural, societal, economical, as well as political scale: Especially people who grew up during the GDR refused to join the increasingly Americanized business strategies, economy, politics, and lifestyles (cf. Hatlapa et al. 72-74):

“Americanization” of German society [...] in this context pertains to an alleged loss of values, standards, and decorum in Germany, and a process of alienation within German society. “The rampage in Winnenden shows once more that the Americanization of our society is advancing to a catastrophe.” Clearly, America, and “things American” were solidly considered to be a negative force in the world and direct culprits for tragedies like the shooting in Winnenden. (81-82)⁴¹

Cases of political, cultural, and identity-based conflicts and racisms, such as Winnenden and many others, illustrate the shifts between black and white as well as between (Middle) East and West. Moreover, they also represent how historic roots of discrimination and racism cross-generationally, cross-culturally, and cross-nationally mingle: *Pegida*, the German right-wing movement against Middle Easterners, has redefined the historic tradition of the peaceful Monday revolutions in Leipzig. The counter movement also reemerged out of the redefined Monday revolutions. The Monday demonstrations were part of the peaceful revolution in fall 1989. As in the peaceful Monday demonstrations of 1989 in Leipzig and Dresden, *Pegida* protested (in contrast to the original Monday demonstrations) disrespectfully with one of the most well-known and influential slogans of the revolutions against the *SED*⁴² regime

⁴¹ In March 2009, a 17-year old student ran amok and shot several fellow students and teachers at his school. Winnenden is near Stuttgart in Baden-Wuerttemberg (southwestern Germany).

⁴² *SED* stands for *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* and was the GDR’s Socialist Unity Party. During the Monday demonstrations, the people of the GDR protested against the oppressing regime and demonstrated for a democratic government system.

in 1989: “Wir sind das Volk.”⁴³



Illustration 2: “we are the people” (Leipzig 1989)



Illustration 3: Pegida Demonstrations, “Miss Merkel, here is the people!” (Dresden 2014)

In the GDR context, the slogan “we are the people” was clearly asking for a democratic system in which the people were allowed to be part of the government. However, in the context of the *Pegida* movement as well as its counter movement, the slogan appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, “we are the people” means that the counter movement activists are the people of Germany demanding what they were protesting for: a liberal society in which no ethnic or religious group is discriminated. On the other hand, “we are the people” was (mis)used by the *Pegida* adherents expressing the exact opposite: The slogan was misapplied and represented the racist approach of *Pegida* saying that “we are the people” does not include people from other ethnic or religious groups than “pure German” ones. The two illustrations portray this paradox (see Illustration 2⁴⁴ and Illustration 3⁴⁵). They also portray the

⁴³ The English translation for the famous slogan “Wir sind das Volk” is “we are the people.”

⁴⁴ Illustration 2 shows the Monday demonstrations of 1989 in Leipzig. They are protesting for a democratic government, against the oppressing GDR regime ruled by the *SED*. The slogan on the poster says “we are the people” The image is taken from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: [http://de.wikimannia.org/images/thumb/Wir_sind_das_Volk_\(Plakat\).gif/180px-Wir_sind_das_Volk_\(Plakat\).gif](http://de.wikimannia.org/images/thumb/Wir_sind_das_Volk_(Plakat).gif/180px-Wir_sind_das_Volk_(Plakat).gif)

⁴⁵ Illustration 3 shows *Pegida* supporters during a protest against the “Islamization” of Germany. The poster represents German chancellor Merkel wearing a *Hijab*. Instead of “we are the people,” the upheld poster states “Miss Merkel, here is the people.” It criticizes the outrage of the *Pegida* followers that do not agree with “non-Germans” receiving the same political and economic rights and benefits as the “real” German people. They also criticize Merkel. The image is taken from the following website,

cultural, political, and societal challenges (former) East and West Germany still face after the *Wende*. For proper (re)adaptation, educational as well as political initiatives and systems need to consider the constantly shifting dynamics while preserving various heritages, identities, ideologies, and cultures. Thereby, it is crucial to focus on the historic roots and how those transform (counter) movements and (pre- and post-) activisms.

Chapter Seven

Different Social and Cultural Capitals: East vs. West (German) Habitus

Disadvantaged, poor(er) (immigrant) families are increasingly marginalized because of “societal and institutional processes that exclude certain groups from full participation in the social, economic, cultural and political life of societies” (Mowafi et al. 262). This kind of social exclusion results in a reproduction and deterioration of the already marginalized social stand and reduces the already limited “social networks that provide opportunities” (ibid.). Those (lacking) resources usually provide (or do not provide) access to educational opportunities such as tutoring and extracurricular activities that contribute to establishing beneficial capitals and networks for farther education. Considering the current, mainly Latin-American immigrant, issues in the United States, the inequality of the educational system is chiefly interlinked with socioeconomic background and “race-based” (Browne 185) issues, while particularly referring to people of color (cf. 37, 41, 54, 57, 142, 174, 185, 200).

However, taking different countries into account, main reasons for a lack of access to (higher) education and resources (tutoring, counseling, extracurricular preparation courses, etc.) are not necessarily related to racial markers or socioeconomic circumstances. In Germany, inequality in education is based on prejudices and false assumptions against Middle Easterners as well as the still dominant social and political segregation between former East and West Germans. In order to obtain as much reliable first-hand information as possible, I interviewed a former East German (Oscar⁴⁶). Oscar’s case and Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of the concept of cultural, social, and human forms of capital demonstrate the political as well as social struggles after Germany’s “supposed” unification: A unification which

⁴⁶ In order to protect the identity of the interviewee, I have changed the name.

had (and still has) major impacts on how parents were allowed to be engaged in the school and how this shaped an entire generation's educational access and experiences in the early 1990s.

Furthermore, this case illustrates how educational inequality does not necessarily depend on race, socioeconomic status, or social class. The key issue in regard to former East versus West Germany is not race, it is rather the tensions between two opposing political regimes: Communism and Capitalism. The interview conversation primarily centers on the Communist political regime of the GDR, how it manipulated educational achievement and access, and to what extent it limited parental involvement and students' achievement before and after the *Wende*. Taking the significance of various capitals into account, the case also ascertains particular similarities and conflicts between East and West Germans as well as people of color and Whites. Similar to first-generation college students in the United States, East Germans faced challenges of having resources and networks but being unable to use those in the reunified FRG.

Adapting Bourdieu's Habitus to Different Contexts

While using Bourdieu's concept of social and cultural capital, this chapter also focuses on the inner-German cultural adaptation and adjustment considering the concept of the habitus. The concept of the habitus, however, needs to be more specified while rather referring to an East and West German habitus than a working-class versus a upper/middle-class habitus (as Bourdieu initially refers to). According to Bourdieu, habitus can be referred to as "mental structures "through which we apprehend the world"" (Light et al. 90). Those "mental structures" (ibid.) are not only interlinked with forms of capital; they are also connected with political ideologies state apparatuses.

Bourdieu's idea of cultural heritage as "being the undivided property of the whole society" (R. Brown 73) and his claim that "the inheritance of cultural wealth [...] has been accumulated and bequeathed by previous generations only belongs [...] to those endowed with the means of appropriating it for themselves" (ibid.) is complicated when considering the German context: Although Oscar has benefited from his parents' "cultural wealth" (ibid.), this form of affluence became a resource and a form of capital that did not matter in the reunited Germany anymore. Hence, Oscar had to develop new forms of capital and needed to learn how to transform the inherited capital in order to adjust to the new (political, educational, societal, and cultural) ideologies and values in order to meet the educational system's demands of specific "cultural competence[s] and [...] familiarity with culture which can only be produced by family upbringing when it transmits the dominant [West German] culture" (80).

Ideologies intervene and are closely connected to the respective political regime that intends to create as much sameness and unity as possible. The purpose of

such unity is usually a double-edged sword because it is a fine line between unity, oppression, and maintaining and allowing personal freedom. Terms such as unity, equity, and equality are, hence, oftentimes confused and not properly expounded. Their definitions are constantly changing and depend on the interpretation of the current ISA. This is also problematic for the adaptation of the terms adequacy and equity: Adequacy and equity are often confused.

Especially in the education sector, the fine line between adequacy and equity can even change intentions of policies. If the educational system and its policies strive for equality, it means that everyone, independent from cultural heritage, native language, social status, socioeconomic background, etc., has the same chances to achieve primary, secondary, and higher education. This also means that the school system and the government are responsible for providing equal resources, opportunities, and support for all. Adequacy, to the contrary, does not imply that everyone has access to the *same* educational institutions, opportunities, resources, networks, and social, human, financial, and cultural capitals. Instead, adequacy guarantees that resources and other factors that influence someone's educational career and access need to be properly adjusted to the respective (personal) life circumstances. This includes, for instance, curricula that need to be individually tailored because the mingling of different cultures and its transition from one cultural mentality and ideology to the other (East to West Germany) is often underestimated. Therefore, politics, norms, and the intermingling of different value systems need to be represented in the learning contents as well.

Accordingly, the culturally sensitive distinction between adequacy and equity is increasingly important in a globalized classroom. The question whether students should receive the *same* education or rather several educational opportunities

demonstrates the glocal complexities that also raise ethical issues. If everyone gets the *same* education, societies, politics, educational institutions, economies, businesses, and communities will soon lack individuality and diversity. It will also result in a conformity everyone (independent from cultural and socioeconomic background) gets stuck in. Therefore, the ultimate goal is not to provide the *same* educational opportunities because opportunity *A* might not be an enriching experience for person *X*, while it might be for person *Y* and vice versa. However, ensuring enough educational opportunities is an idea that is linked to the understanding of adequacy. Additionally, “enough” opportunities is vague since it is difficult to define when enough is enough and who gets to define “enough.”

The question of who gets to define certain terms leads back to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as well as the reproduction of social and cultural capital and the opportunities associated with the habitus one has (or has not) been exposed to. Consequently, “enough” could be defined as exhausting all possibilities for every individual case in order to guarantee equality for *all*. Achieving such an ideal scenario for an entire society is still limited to the already more privileged members of the ISA who possess the “right” capitals and networks: because it is not necessarily (only) about possessing social and cultural capital. Instead, effective implementation of capitals and possible reproduction and multiplication can only succeed if society regards these very forms as “desirable” and acceptable. Otherwise, the possession of/or the access to less desirable capitals cannot be transformed into an advantage, better social status, and access to (higher) educational institutions.

Comparative Examples: Disadvantaged Groups in the Education Sector

In the United States, Germany, and other countries, there are certain standards determining whether one's brought-along capitals and habitus are useful or not. Those decisive norms are linked to the ISA as well as the political, cultural, and societal ideologies that are dominated by the majority possessing the "right" capitals. "[B]lack lack the capital to start up their own businesses, and they cannot borrow it either" (Light 85). Adapting this to the German context, it is (repressed) East Germans who have comparable difficulties (as people of color) when competing with West Germans. In order to unpack the complication of differences in privilege, hierarchy, social status, and capitals within one nation that does not differ (as the United States) in terms of race or language, the notion of how an *actor* is socialized and how an *action* is governed by social norms, that depend on the respective social context (cf. Coleman S95), offers a thought-provoking concept that can be applied to the East/West German issue. Did the oftentimes beneficiary *F-connection* (families, friends, and forms) (cf. S96) still matter after the *Wende*? And if so, how did Oscar successfully transform his personal GDR-related *F-connection* into the Westernized (educational) sector?

"[H]istorical change in schooling and its function in modern society" (Schaub et al. 125) challenges different forms of capitals and how those could be incorporated with "aspects of new educational innovations and their impact on educational stratification" (130). To what extent did Germany borrow educational values and contents from the GDR and what consequences did such an intermingling of two different (Capitalist and Communist) school systems had on former East Germans in the FRG? The case of Oscar is one step toward more awareness of the often "hushed up" injustices and societal struggles. Although the case represents the struggles from

an East German perspective, it can also be applied to the current struggles within other countries, in which injustices, prejudices, and discrimination are based on one's descent and related capitals. Moreover, the case provides a practical perspective on theoretical concepts such as Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital, habitus, and reproduction as well as Althusser's understanding of ISAs and RSAs.

Similar to the struggles of people of color for better access to education, social and cultural capital, and resources within society, the case of Oscar also illustrates why there was and still is a (cultural) clash between former East and West Germany: It is the combination of divided understandings of ideologies, resources, and capitals that—especially in the early 1990s—had enormous impacts on equal access and opportunities to educational institutions. Consequently, two GDR generations (and in the United States several Latin American and people of color generations) are still struggling with the Westernized/Americanized educational system. The education system did (and does) not yet offer proper (re)adjustments and transfers for East Germans (and Latin Americans and Middle Easterners) who began their higher education in their home country and who had to finish their degree after the *Wende* or after immigration.

Getting to the Nitty-Gritty: The Case of Oscar

Oscar is in his early 60s and grew up as a single child in a small town in Thuringia—former part of the GDR (now Central Germany). He is a first-generation university graduate and graduated after the *Wende* in organic chemistry in Magdeburg (also GDR) after he finished his apprenticeship as chemistry skilled worker. His father was a bookbinder and his mother started to study pedagogy for children with special educational needs in Dresden (GDR, now Central Germany). She never finished her studies because of the World War II circumstances. Currently, Oscar is a successful businessman.

The case⁴⁷ illustrates the variety and the constantly changing dynamics of social, cultural, and human capital and how certain forms of capitals depend on political and societal regimes and circumstances. Accordingly, everyone, independent from socioeconomic background and useful societal connections and networks, possesses forms of capital—they might just be worthless in a particular period of time: The determining difference is in which contexts those capitals are going to be activated. East Germans, Latin Americans, Middle Easterner, and Blacks have not necessarily less social and human capital; it is just a less white and less Westernized or Americanized kind of capital, which does not fit the ISA's current norms and expectations. Hence, ISAs decide which forms of capitals are valuable, which results in Bourdieu's notion of reproduction of the already powerful majorities and their capital-related standards.

In order to understand the struggles after starting one's chemistry degree at a GDR university before the *Wende* and then continuing and finishing one's degree in

⁴⁷ The interview was conducted in German and I translated all the quotes into English. The German answers can be found in the respective footnotes.

the FRG in the early 1990s, it is important to consider the major differences of university's teaching methods and learning contents. The GDR's curricula were very politically-oriented and included 95 percent⁴⁸ Socialist and Communist works in fields such as the humanities but also sciences. In addition, every student needed to regularly attend and pass a course called *Civics*⁴⁹. This course was mandatory and had the purpose of familiarizing (and, as Oscar called it, "brainwashing"⁵⁰) the students with the political ideology of the GDR and its ruling party (*SED*). Students who failed *Civics* and did not glorify the *SED* ideology, had enormous difficulties to finish the degree successfully, to find a proper job, and to enter educational institutions. *Civics* was part of all school and university curricula, independent from the actual subject (it often did not relate to at all):

I hated *Civics* with a passion! And we called *Civics* teachers "people who had a red rotating light on their head" because they were so *SED* regime-faithful that it was scary and ludicrous at the same time. And they were usually frustrated people who were weak, alone, and miserable and, hence, it was easy for the *Stasi* to convince them to do this kind of subject. They also provided them with things that one usually did not get easily and quickly: cars and apartments. Because the GDR was an economy of scarcity it was tough to, for example, build a house—not because of the money but because of the lack of supplies such as cement and other things. If you were a *Civics* teacher, you had access to those things. Thus, everyone kind of knew that you were part of the regime if you had all things together for building your house in a relatively short period of time.⁵¹

In contrast to today's (rather westernized) understanding of useful forms of capitals and extracurricular support opportunities (such as preparation courses for

⁴⁸ Oscar used the expression of 95 percent during the interview.

⁴⁹ The German term is *Staatsbürgerkunde*.

⁵⁰ Es war wie Gehirnwäsche.

⁵¹ Ich habe *Staatsbürgerkunde* total gehasst! Und wir haben *Staatsbürgerkundelehrer* „Leute mit roter Rundumleuchte“ genannt, weil sie so sehr *SED*-regimegetreu waren, dass es gruselig und lächerlich zugleich war. Und sie waren in der Regel frustrierte Leute, die schwach, allein und unglücklich waren und deswegen war es einfach für die *Stasi*, sie zu überzeugen, so ein Fach zu machen. Sie haben ihnen auch Dinge zur Verfügung gestellt, die in der Regel nicht einfach und schnell zu bekommen waren: Autos und Wohnungen. Weil die DDR eine Mangelwirtschaft war, was es zum Beispiel schwierig, ein Haus zu bauen—nicht wegen des Geldes, aber wegen des Mangels an Materialien wie beispielsweise Zement und andere Dinge. Deswegen wusste jeder irgendwie, dass du Teil des Regimes warst, wenn du all diese Dinge zusammen hattest, um dein Haus in einer eher ziemlich kurzen Zeit zu bauen.

standardized tests), which increase admission chances to higher education, the GDR's admissions requirements were based on "skills" that were difficult to practice or influence: Nowadays, students from upper/middle-class backgrounds, whose parents have achieved higher educational degrees (Bachelor or higher) are more likely to be admitted to (prestigious) universities (cf. Stanton-Salazar 86). The GDR rejected applicants from the so-called "intelligence rank" because the *SED* wanted to encourage and support its workers' and peasants' state, applicants from lower social classes, and families that did not earn higher educational degrees. Those applicants did not need to fulfill as many admission requirements as applicants from the "intelligence rank."

Similar to today's quotas that need to be fulfilled in admission rates (number of so-called minority students, disabled students, people of color, international students, female students), the GDR's university admission quotas required that 50 percent of the admitted students needed to be from the workers' and peasants' rank. 25 percent needed to be active members of the *Stasi* and the remaining 25 percent included—back then—minorities such as applicants from the "intelligence rank" and active members of the church. These contradicting quota distributions⁵² demonstrate that habitus and social, cultural, and financial capital are unstable. Accordingly, privilege and power structures of the ISA are also not enduring because they depend on the contemporary state ideology: While applicants from upper/middle-classes are oftentimes more privileged in today's admission processes, the GDR preferred the opposite and rejected a high percentage of applicants from families who already achieved higher educational degrees and who owned private businesses because they did not fit into the ideology of the workers' and peasants' state.

⁵² Oscar used the expression of these percentages during the interview.

Consequently, people who were considered privileged in the GDR do not belong to today's favored groups. The power of the privileged members of the workers' and peasants' SA was also decisive for the admittance to the *SED*. Therefore, it is a reverse form of reproduction: Bourdieu's notion of reproduction "implies high correlations among parental social class, parental cultural capital, and children's cultural capital" (Aschaffenburg et al. 575) and, accordingly, the "parents' social [...] and cultural capital [that] are reproduced and [...] reflected in those of their children" (ibid.). The GDR's reproduction, to the contrary, supported the (in today's understanding) disadvantaged groups with less social, financial, educational, and cultural capital.

This reverse reproduction also affected parental involvement and resources offered from the school. The politically biased admission procedures did not require extracurricular activities (such as voluntary work, internships, standardized tests, etc.). The GDR's admission processes did not even require supplementary and honorary activities. The factors that made one a "desired" candidate were rather uncontrollable—such as the commitment of the parents in the *SED*. Therefore, there was no need for the kind of capitals that are significant today. Instead, parents' political activism supporting the *SED* ideology was considered an ideal habitus and capital:

I had classmates who were lazy, got relatively bad grades all the time, and did not behave properly in school. Yet, they always got away with it because their parents had active and powerful positions in the *SED*. Hence, their entire family was regarded as infallible. Whenever something happened, they should have been punished for, it was dismissed as a "gaffe" only.⁵³

⁵³ Ich hatte Klassenkameraden, die faul waren, immer relativ schlechte Zensuren bekamen und die sich nicht anständig in der Schule verhalten haben. Trotzdem sind sie immer davongekommen, weil ihre Eltern aktive und mächtige Positionen in der *SED* hatten. Deswegen wurde ihre ganze Familie als unfehlbar angesehen. Wann auch immer etwas passierte, weswegen hätten bestraft werden sollen, wurde es als „Ausrutscher“ abgetan.

Oscar described the fine line between political involvement and personal career path as tough and conflicting. The political values were oppressive and forced upon the people. Since Oscar's parents had no university degrees, his chances of being admitted to organic chemistry were relatively high. However, his parents were neither *IMs*⁵⁴ nor active members of the *SED*, which made them "enemies" of the political regime; although Oscar and his parents never revolted against the GDR regime because of the well-known negative consequences:

It did not really matter whether your parents or you were good people or not. It was much more about being politically active and conform. Furthermore, people who went occasionally to the church were also regarded as suspicious. My parents and I never really said something obvious against the regime but facts like us being in church, not being part of the *SED*, and having said "no" to becoming an *IM* and the *Stasi* made us opponents. It made our lives difficult sometimes, like getting admitted to university or finding a job in your desired field later on. But at least we could, especially after the *Wende*, still have a clean conscience that we never spied on our friends. We never gave up our moral values.⁵⁵

The only reason why Oscar was yet able to follow his dream and study organic chemistry was because men had an additional option to be admitted to university—although they were not *IMs* or active members of the *SED*: They had to join the GDR's *NVA* for three years. Despite the fact that this was—at least to some extent—political, it was a rather silent commitment and a silent form of political activism many young men agreed on in order to be admitted to their desired university program. After the completion of his obligatory 3-year military service, Oscar did not even need to apply to the university program. He only had to fill out an application card

⁵⁴ *IM* is an abbreviation for *inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* (unofficial collaborator). *IMs* were affiliated to the *SED* and the *Stasi* spying on people who did not follow the rules, expectations, and *SED* ideology.

⁵⁵ Es war nicht wirklich entscheidend, ob deine Eltern oder du gute Leute waren oder nicht. Es ging viel mehr um politisch aktiv sein und im Einklang sein. Außerdem Leute, die ab und zu zur Kirche gingen wurden auch als verdächtig angesehen. Meine Eltern und ich haben nie wirklich etwas Offensichtliches über das Regime gesagt, aber Tatsachen wie unsere Kirchenbesuche, nicht Teil der *SED* zu sein und „nein“ zum *IM*-Dasein und zur *Stasi* gesagt zu haben, hat uns zu Gegnern gemacht. Es machte manchmal unsere Leben schwer, wie zur Universität zugelassen zu werden oder einen Job in deinem gewünschten Bereich zu finden. Aber zumindest konnten wir, besonders nach der *Wende*, immer ein reines Gewissen haben, da wir niemals unsere Freunde ausspionierten. Wir haben nie unsere moralischen Werte und abgegeben.

with his contact information. Accordingly, extracurricular forms of capitals and activities did not count in the GDR's admission process. The fact that Oscar founded an after-school club for chemistry in his high school was irrelevant for his admission.

I didn't like to be in the *NVA* and it felt wrong because I hated everything that was related to war and weapons and it was not me at all. But I knew I had to. At least I got into my desired study program. However, I regarded it as a waste of time. But I also need to say that I was lucky because I drove a Russian officer, I was his chauffeur, and this was rather peaceful. And he was kind—so I didn't, luckily, need to experience too much of this military nonsense.⁵⁶

Despite the dissimilarity between today's and the GDR's forms of capitals, one aspect has not changed: parental involvement. Although today's parental involvement is mainly linked to financial resources providing access to resources in order to attend preparation courses for standardized tests, there is still one major similarity in comparison to the GDR: Depending on the social stand and political commitment of the parents, children have better or worse prerequisites facilitating or complicating the admission chances. Consequently, Bourdieu's concept of reproduction can still be applied—even if it is a reverse reproduction because its focus lies on the workers' and peasants' instead of the *WASPs*⁵⁷.

In contempt of the oppressing regime and the constant inner conflict and balance between being politically inactive but also not revolting against the regime, Oscar did not perceive his childhood as repressed or limited. The only abiding memory Oscar connects with an oppressive regime is that he was not allowed to see his extended family who has moved to West Germany before the country's separation:

⁵⁶ Ich mochte es nicht, in der *NVA* zu sein und es fühlte sich falsch an, weil ich alles, was mit Krieg und Waffen zu tun hatte keinesfalls meiner Moral entsprach. Aber ich wusste, ich musste. Zumindest bin ich in mein gewolltes Studium reingekommen. Dennoch habe ich es alles als Zeitverschwendung angesehen. Aber ich muss auch sagen, dass ich Glück hatte, weil ich einen Russengeneral gefahren habe, ich war sein Chauffeur und das war eher friedlich. Und er war nett—also musste ich glücklicherweise nicht zu viel militärischen Unsinn erfahren.

⁵⁷ *WASP* stands for *White Anglo-Saxon Protestant* and is a rather informal term for a high-society status consisting of influential predominantly white Americans of English Protestant ancestry (The definition was found via the following website, accessed on November 29, 2015: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wasp>).

I was not allowed to visit my aunt who lived in West Germany. My aunt was also not allowed to visit us very often in East Germany, except for special occasions such as the youth initiation ceremony. This ceremony was really popular in the GDR. It was so special for us because teenagers are given adult social status during this ceremony.⁵⁸

The first key moment, when Oscar realized the oppression and the “stupidity”⁵⁹ of the GDR regime was after he completed the 3-year military service, when he was already enrolled into the chemistry program: In order to be admitted to taking chemistry exams for the completion of his study, Oscar needed to pass “Marxism and Leninism” courses first. Passing meant glorifying the GDR’s ideology throughout the entire paper.

Furthermore, the regime’s ideology also shaped sciences and research studies related to organic chemistry: Chemistry students were not allowed to include studies and/or research materials and tools from non-Socialist countries. Research studies conducted by Western scientists were prohibited and if used, they were modified so they would suit the GDR’s ideals. This limited and decelerated Oscar’s research progresses and was an enormous disadvantage—in particular after the *Wende*, when Oscar had to finish his degree with Western research methods and literature:

It was not my fault that I never worked with research studies and methods outside the GDR. If I would have done so, they could have expelled me from the entire program. But after the *Wende*, this was, of course, a huge problem since all the *Wessis* didn’t take you seriously.⁶⁰

Although the Czech Republic was also a Socialist country, it was known to be a more Western one. Thus, students smuggled articles, magazines, and books to the GDR in

⁵⁸ Ich durfte nicht meine Tante besuchen, die in Westdeutschland wohnte. Meiner Tante war es auch nicht erlaubt, uns sehr oft in Ostdeutschland zu besuchen, außer für besondere Anlässe wie die Jugendweihe. Die Jugendweihe war sehr bedeutend in der DDR. Es war so besonders für uns, weil Jugendliche somit einen Erwachsenenstatus während der Zeremonie bekommen haben.

⁵⁹ Beschränktheit.

⁶⁰ Es war nicht mein Fehler, dass ich nie mit anderen Studien und Methoden außerhalb der DDR gearbeitet habe. Wenn ich das getan hätte, hätten sie mich vom ganzen Programm rauswerfen können. Aber nach der *Wende* was das natürlich ein großes Problem, weil alle *Wessis* dich nicht ernst genommen haben.

order to impel their research. It was a “legal limbo,”⁶¹ as Oscar described it, because the literature came from a Socialist country with the same ideological ideals but also a country that was “critically observed and was almost suspicious because of its Western progressiveness.”⁶² Thus, this research could only be used in small doses because otherwise “students would not have passed their studies because of the too Westernized research approaches.”⁶³

The biggest challenges in pursuing one’s research and the associated experiments were not (as oftentimes today) dominated by money issues. Instead, it was the provision of reading materials and supplies. There was a constant lack of proper equipment because of the GDR’s economy of scarcity and a lack of the latest and innovative (Western) research literature. Even though the university’s library provided access to some Western research findings, the university did not allow students to take those with them or to make copies. In addition, the time for reading those non-Socialist research findings was limited and controlled by a librarian: “You really felt watched like in a prison and it was not a comfortable, free, or inspiring working, studying, researching, and learning atmosphere at all.”⁶⁴

Coming from such a repressive political background, in which studying was chiefly about balancing the lack of resources and supplies, resulted in a culture shock for the majority of East Germans when continuing/finishing their studies after the *Wende*. Besides the content-related differences, study mentalities between East and West were incomparable. Especially in the field of chemistry and its experiments Oscar emphasized the different approaches and attitudes between former East and

⁶¹ Rechtliche Grauzone.

⁶² Kritisch betrachtet und war fast verdächtig wegen seiner westlichen Fortschrittlichkeit.

⁶³ Studenten würden ihren Abschluss nicht bestanden haben wegen der zu westlichen Rechercheansätze.

⁶⁴ Du hast dich wirklich wie im Gefängnis beobachtet gefühlt und es war kein angenehmes, freies, oder inspirierendes Arbeiten, Studieren, Recherchieren und keine angenehme Lernatmosphäre.

West German students. Those strong distinctions were mainly based on the available (or not available) materials and supplies: East Germans were used to improvise and repurpose, which their West German fellow students ridiculed as unprofessional work ethic. Due to these inner-German conflicts in the chemistry laboratory (as well as other sectors) many of Oscar's East German friends and fellow students frustratingly quitted their studies without having received their degrees. Oscar, however, decided to not quit and to not let himself be oppressed by the new political regime and the new habitus: After graduating with an organic chemistry degree, Oscar started his own business—a rather unusual career path for a former East German.

The shift from studying organic chemistry to becoming a business owner seems farfetched. However, the *Wende* changed the power of Oscar's GDR-related social and cultural capitals: Most of the networks and resources Oscar has established throughout his life as a GDR citizen lost its power because of the political, cultural, and societal shift after Germany's reunification. Hence, Oscar needed to recreate new forms of habitus and capitals because of the dissonance between East and West German ways of life and habitus (especially in the early 1990s) (cf. Arnhold 33). This dissonance was shaped by the West German dominant ideology oppressing the East German habitus. Accordingly, the new freedom was still repressive for many East Germans who had to prove themselves in a Capitalist society dominated by Western values. The decision of having an own business provided a kind of newly-gained freedom Oscar and several other former GDR citizens craved after the *Wende*.

Concluding the Nitty-Gritty: Political Trust and Progressive Educators

The long-awaited desire for freedom and a political regime not oppressing one's personal development or determining one's educational path, however, was an illusion (cf. Arnhold 28-29; cf. Williams 155; cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 159-60). The Capitalist West of Germany was imagined as an ideal habitus shaped by nonconformity. After the *Wende*, this ideal habitus turned out to be another form of repression because East Germans' habitus was not compatible with the West German habitus. Therefore, one can argue that habitus is more significant than social or cultural capital (even though capital and habitus are oftentimes linked to one another). Habitus is more dominant because it, firstly, shapes one's identity and, secondly, it impacts the way one activates particular forms capitals: Habitus

refers to those levels of our personality makeup which are not inherent or innate but are very deeply habituated in us by learning through social experience from birth onward—so deeply habituated [...] that they feel “natural” or inherent even to ourselves. It seems that our individual habitus guides our behavior; but, then, habitus itself is formed and continues to be molded in social situations, marked by specific power differentials, and those situations [...] are embedded in larger social structures which change over time. (Elias 15)

This notion of habitus and Oscar's experience after the *Wende* represent the dissonance between East and West German habitus that made the transition especially difficult for former East Germans. As Oscar emphasized, citizens of the GDR were prohibited to be outspoken and to think critically. In West Germany, by contrast, these characteristics contributed to more social power, respect, and even better access to different forms of capitals: “In particular shortly after the *Wende*, you could easily spot West Germans because of their bluntness that we [East Germans] often regarded

as rude and annoying.”⁶⁵ In order to survive economically, socially, politically, and culturally, East Germans had to adopt the new Westernized habitus, had to activate new resources of cultural and social capital, and had to (re)learn and adapt a different habitus.

According to Oscar, the major transitions were related to the educational sector because the “right” degree was the key to economic success and appreciation in the FRG dominated by Western ideologies and norms. Thus, Oscar’s research also shifted tremendously after the *Wende* because he suddenly had the opportunity to freely express the findings of his research without being oppressed by the GDR’s ISA. The differences in education, however, had not only an enormous impact on Oscar’s generation (born in the 1950s) but also on this generation’s children: Former East German parents had to “teach” a new habitus to their children; a habitus completely different from their socialization—a Western one.

The power of “progressive educators” (Isserles et al. 160) and their “responsibility to encourage the development of critical-thinking skills that enable students to understand, challenge, and resist current power relations” (ibid.), is essential for a successful educational path and career. Especially in the 21st-century context, those “progressive educators” (ibid.) are key figures in a child’s educational achievement because they are resources and forms of social and cultural capital outside the home (cf. Gestwicki 158). Theoretically, today’s educators, counselors, and mentors have the power to assist children in university admission preparations and procedures. Before the *Wende*, this was not the case for two major reasons: First, because of the admission committees and selection procedures that were based on parents’ degrees and the active membership in the *SED*. Second, even if teachers were

⁶⁵ Ganz besonders kurz nach der *Wende* konntest du Westdeutsche ganz einfach an ihrer Unverblümtheit erkennen, was wir [Ostdeutsche] oft als unhöflich und nervend ansahen.

willing to recommend one to the respective study program, they were politically prohibited to do so because admission was a state affair.

These two circumstances are the main reasons why pivotal moments or key figures in former East Germans' citizens' career are very different than today's: Oscar kept mentioning his chemistry teacher from high school who soon recognized Oscar's talent and interest for chemistry:

It was my chemistry teacher who secretly, against the GDR laws, used literature and chemistry-related laboratory supplies from the West. In this way, he provided equipment that was crucial for conducting certain experiments successfully.⁶⁶

Although trust is still an important aspect oftentimes leading to, or at least encouraging, fruitful pivotal moments between teachers and students, it was a different (political) level of trust that, if betrayed, had serious political and social consequences during the GDR regime. Currently, a similar notion of this kind of trust relationship in educational pivotal moments emerges in Europe: Europe's refugee crisis. The majority of refugees are illegally in the country—even though their refugee status has legally a special stand. Therefore, they are not allowed to apply to university programs. Some professors, however, (secretly) allow them to attend lectures in the subjects they studied in their home country before they became refugees (cf. Wecker n. pag.). Comparable to Oscar's chemistry teacher, who illegally provided essential (Western) chemistry laboratory equipment, this current form of "political trust" between students and teachers illustrates the always-shifting, yet, steadily reoccurring dynamics of oppression as well as pivotal moments in different sectors during different times.

⁶⁶ Es war mein Chemielehrer, der heimlich, gegen die Gesetze der DDR, Literatur und Chemie-bezogene Laborutensilien vom Westen verwendet. Somit hat er eine Ausstattung zur Verfügung gestellt, die essentiell war, um bestimmte Experimente erfolgreich durchführen zu können.

Updated educational practices and policies need more engaging “progressive educators” (Isserles et al. 160) in order to, firstly, support students in need and, secondly, to interrupt the cycle of unequal reproduction of different capitals and the imbalanced spread of resources. However, the complexity and multifaceted nature of pivotal moments through the positive influence and encouragement of “progressive educators” (ibid.) depend on the political and societal circumstances: If social and cultural capital are not according to the ISA’s norm, the activation of those forms of capital will remain worthless.

If “progressive educators” (ibid.) and students in need (Middle Eastern refugees/immigrants in the case of Europe’s current situation) are unable to build a relationship of (political) trust, progressive and pivotal moments will remain unproductive because there is no (inter)cultural common thread. In Germany, the majority of teachers is non-Middle Eastern and has no cultural or religious training for helping or understanding the immigrants’/refugees’ heritage (cf. Röhl 8-9). Therefore, educational policies need to train teachers on an intercultural level and, even more importantly, need to expand the diversity within the teacher cohort in order to interrupt the cycle of predominantly white “progressive educators” (Isserles et al. 160). As long as teachers, mentors, and counselors remain white, discriminatory consequences of reproduction cannot be overcome (cf. Nash 436) and will reinforce the already too dominant ISA (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 155).

Although Bourdieu’s notion of reproduction of social and cultural capital are still relevant in the 21st century, it is critical to distinguish not only between obviously contrasting groups such as people of color and Whites or immigrants and non-immigrants: It is also crucial to make, for instance, inner-German distinctions of capitals that are not necessarily based on skin color, race, or legal status but rather on

the respective region (East/West Germany). In the case of Oscar, privileged forms of capital are not based on racial issues related to being Black or White. Instead, they are based on inner-country conflicts due to different political regimes and habitus. Thus, educational policies, efficient practices, teacher trainings, and future studies should be based on political, educational, religious, and societal differences and its variations in value systems based on heritage and habitus. In order to interrupt the biased cycle of reproduction, “progressive educators” (Isserles et al. 160) need to consider the individuality and uniqueness of cultural, political, societal, and religious complexities and heritages in addition to race-related problems:

Progressive education is designed around the idea of the school as a theoretical cross-sectional model of society in which everyone is able to succeed in his or her own way, by some particular definition of success. As such, the work of the schools is not about creating uniformity among the masses, but instead about developing individuality within the masses. Therefore, the school is essentially the primary tool for social change. (Norris 14)

Chapter Eight

Reverse Activisms: The Importance of Transnational Post-Activism

Leipzig is unique in terms of the liberal movement within the GDR regime because of its peaceful Monday revolutions in 1989. After the *Wende*, Leipzig is still one of the most liberal former East German cities (in contrast to Dresden). It is unique because of its history of pre- as well as post-activism that still exists on political, social, and educational levels.

Especially when looking at the daily usage of the term activism in the print media, the new media, and television news, activism became an umbrella term for positive or negative kinds of movements, protest marches, and social and political engagements. Although those media representations are part of activisms, the term activism is mainly reduced to physical and visible forms of actions. However, activisms are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to a protesting crowd holding up posters. Yet, activisms are still predominantly perceived from precisely this rather “traditional” perspective. But the impacts of globalization, its multinational political and societal influences, and the dynamics of activisms have changed and are more than merely a “policy or action of using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change” (*Oxford English Dictionary* n. pag.). It is a “transnational activism” (Tarrow 2, 5, 8, 36, 44, 195, 199) that can also take place within one country and is not restricted to happen beyond country borders only: In the case of Germany, activism took place between East and West Germany: West Germany functioned as a

role of an example, nominally more or less helping the East to converge with the West. [...] The West German intention was to build Western-type states with all the economic, political and social implications—a tendency not only limited to East Germany, but also present as a larger-ranging problem in the transformation processes in East Europe in general. (Dörfler n. pag.)

This example of “transnational activism” (Tarrow 2, 5, 8, 36, 44, 195, 199) is also not limited to the GDR. Instead, it is a continuous type of activism that was even more intensified after Germany’s reunification, when East and West had to equally contribute to the FRG, its democracy, and the resulting political and economic cooperation between Eastern and Western partners. This kind of activism across borders was not the “typical” kind of activism in forms of protest marches. It was much more a *silent* kind of activism that mainly took place behind closed doors on a political as well as educational level.

Silent activism refers to a form of activism that is not mainly based on marches and demonstrations in the streets. It is a form of activism that deals with the preparation of activist movements. It is concerned with the theoretical (and intellectual) starting point of movements and formulates a vision, an idea, and an organized and well-wrought concept, which is based on methods and theories providing the keynote for the subsequent actions. In this theoretical thought process—out of which successful and well-organized activisms emerge—historic roots and traditions of the respective country play a crucial role in, for instance, conceptualizing claims and goals. In the case of the GDR, it is the history of the peaceful Monday demonstrations that had an enormous impact on how pre- and post-activism developed and enhanced.

Due to the tradition of peaceful activism (Monday demonstrations), Leipzig’s unique tradition of silent and non-violent activism became a pattern that was also reflected in activisms after the *Wende*. This is the case in the peaceful *Pegida* counter-movements. Furthermore, this movement entailed two kinds of activisms: pre and post-activism: Pre-activism is the preparation of movements and social change based on theoretical aspects guaranteeing an efficient way of protests, demonstrations, and

initiatives on an educational level. Post-activism emerges out of the initial pre-activism and its associated claims and promises. Post-activism has a control function that guarantees the compliances with the requirements and legislations originally enacted in the stage of pre-activism. The example of the GDR illustrates that it is mainly the (re)assurance of maintaining a democratic system free from oppression aiming at a successful, free, and unbiased intersection of intellectuals and clergy in Germany's political and educational apparatuses.

Tear Down that Church!⁶⁷

The *Paulinum* (or Church of St. Pauli) is the university church of Leipzig University (see Illustration 6⁶⁸). Leipzig University was established in 1409 and is located in the city center of Leipzig. In celebration of the university's 600th anniversary, the *Paulinum* was rebuilt after its implosion in 1968 (see Illustration 4⁶⁹). Currently, the *Paulinum* unites academic institutions, an auditorium, as well as a prayer room. It is used for lectures and events. Initially, the church (now called *Paulinum*) was a Dominican monastery built in 1231. Since the foundation of Leipzig University, the *Paulinum* cannot be separated from the university: The abbey church was a popular burial place for people affiliated to the university. In 1543, the abbey was secularized, became university property, was transformed into an evangelical house of God, and was officially considered sacred by Martin Luther as university church in 1545. During World War II, all university buildings were destroyed, except for the *Paulinum*. However, due to the GDR's political regime and ideology, the *Paulinum* was destroyed in May 1968 and was replaced by a socialist main building of the renamed *Karl-Marx-Universität* Leipzig (today Leipzig University) (see Illustration 5⁷⁰). During the GDR regime, the *Augustusplatz* (where the *Paulinum* is located) was also renamed into *Karl-Marx-Platz*. The renaming as well as the reconstruction of the university buildings was adjusted to the communist regime aiming to represent its political ideology.

⁶⁷ "Tear down that church!" is referring to the quote "Tear down this wall!" by former US President Ronald Reagan who challenged Mikhail Gorbachev (general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) to tear down the Berlin Wall in order to achieve freedom in the Eastern Bloc. Reagan held a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin in June 1987.

⁶⁸ The picture is from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: <http://www.dominikaner-leipzig.de/kloster/geschichte/>

⁶⁹ The picture is from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: <https://www.db-bauzeitung.de/aktuell/news/lyonel-feininger-architekt/>

⁷⁰ The picture is from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: <https://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=120215833>



Illustration 4: Leipzig University (2019)



Illustration 5: Karl-Marx-Universität (GDR), Later Renamed to Leipzig University




Illustration 6: Paulinum before the Implosion (1968)




Illustration 7: Resistance during the Johann Sebastian Bach Competition (Leipzig 1968)

Several students were incarcerated by the *Stasi* before they could stop the implosion through protests. After the implosion, several post-protest movements emerged: During the third international Johann Sebastian Bach competition in June 1968, protesters held up a poster with the contours of the church, the year of the implosion (1968), a cross, and the inscription “we demand rebuilding” (see Illustration 7⁷¹). This poster was one of the few activist actions that were internationally recognized. It illustrates the growing frustration of the people living in

⁷¹ The picture is taken from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: <http://www.pi-news.net/2009/12/die-sprengung-der-leipziger-universitaetskirche/>

the oppressive political regime (and the *Stasi*), which increasingly interfered academic sectors⁷²:

1968 has been seen as a particularly significant year. The Western world—from Berkeley to Berlin, [...] was rocked by student movements advocating enhanced democracy, non-violence (the generation of slogans such as ‘flower-power’ and ‘make love not war’) and the radical critique of structures of repression. (Fulbrook 271)

The phenomenon of silencing, oppressing, and incarcerating people who could not be silenced and did not act according to GDR ideology results in the risk of transgression of the normative order of the Other. The GDR featured more silent revolts—a form of invisible activism—adjusted to the methods of the *Stasi*. Instead of obviously protesting on the streets, several undercover groups performed social and political activism behind closed doors. This hidden activism led, finally, to the peaceful Monday demonstrations and the peaceful revolution of 1989:

People wanted to talk about free elections, their longing to travel freely, and his [Pastor Führer] church became the safe haven for their discussion. “The people had been silenced, by fear and the secret police, we provided a space for them to discuss taboo topics,” says Pastor Führer. In 1988, he watched attendance at his Monday prayer meetings grow—eight, 80, 100. (Scally n. pag.)

Accordingly, one could argue that the ISA (*SED*, *Stasi*, GDR) only focused on the “struggles to take power” (Pickett 453) and, thus, underestimated the hidden revolts of the RSA that silently fought for a democratic and open society and political regime.

A significant piece of circumstantial evidence for the underestimated silent activism within the GDR is the Berlin press conference with Günter Schabowski (former official of the *SED*). The press conference was broadcasted in several East and West German radio and television stations on November 9, 1989. This conference

⁷² During the GDR, subjects such as Leninism and Marxism were mandatory fields of study for all students—independent from their initial study program. If the students’ essays, exams, or presentations were not representing Leninist ideas and the GDR’s political ideologies, students faced failure and even penalties often resulting in withdrawal, preventing them from graduating, and/or unemployment. (See also the case of Oscar.)

was the final trigger for the fall of the Berlin Wall: A correspondent asked about the new travel law; Schabowski claimed there would be no more restrictions for traveling abroad including West Germany. Of course, this could be considered a misunderstanding. But it was the silent and hidden revolts and activist protests that, in this moment of surprise, hope, and inconceivability, finally encouraged the masses from East and West Germany to remember what they have been silently fighting for: freedom and (re)unification. It was also in this very moment, when hundreds of thousands went on the streets and to the border checkpoints in East and West Germany, climbed up the Wall, and told border guards to turn on the radio and listen to Schabowski announcing the Wall is now considered *open*. They peacefully insisted on opening the borders.

Transferring Activism from the GDR to the 21st Century

Considering the rather silent and invisible activism during the GDR, today's activism is much more noticeable. There are two main reasons for this increasing visibility and transparency in terms of activist movements and protests: Firstly, the FRG is now a democracy with freedom of the press that allows freedom of expression. Secondly, the Internet and all its facets including blogging, news spreading, and social platforms enable people to propagate (activist) news within seconds on a global scale. Hence, the, for example, pro- and anti-movements of the rebuilding of the *Paulinum* in celebration of the 600th anniversary of Leipzig University uttered much more visible activism beginning in the early 2000s as it did in times of the GDR.

In celebration of its 600th anniversary, Leipzig University decided to redesign the *Augustusplatz* and planned on building an assembly hall instead of reconstructing the church. This led to public campaigns and the foundation of the *Paulinum* association: The activism of the *Paulinum* association was not as publicly present as other activist movements that feature protest marches or other forms of “doing activism.” Instead, this association became part of the Saxon federal state government and, thus, was able to present its reasons for the reconstruction of the *Paulinum* and its historic value for the city and its academia. The pro-*Paulinum* initiative started as silent and almost invisible activism with collecting signatures from university members and citizens of Leipzig (cf. Albrecht n. pag.).

Once the *Paulinum* association was allowed to officially represent their ideas within the SA, the activism became professional and included experts (architects, historians, economists, politicians, etc.) who were key actors within academia, and the city of Leipzig (ibid.). It was, again, a rather unusual kind of activism that did not follow “traditional” physical actions such as protest marches: It was an educational

and highly political kind of activism that leveled up the “typical” and obvious forms of activism. In order to comprehend and interlink the reason for this rather “atypical” activism, the history and the tradition of the Monday demonstrations need to be considered: They only succeeded because of the motto to avoid escalation and brutality at all costs. This nonviolent method resulted in a compromise: The church cannot use up the whole space of the *Augustusplatz*. Instead, the church has to be connected with a modern building providing enough rooms for lectures, exhibitions, offices, and computer labs (see Illustration 8⁷³). After the decision and the official submission, former principal Volker Bigl⁷⁴ stood down from his office because of quarrels with the Saxon provincial government and its final decision to reconstruct the *Paulinum* (cf. Harmsen n. pag.).



Illustration 8: Connection between Assembly Hall and Paulinum

⁷³ The picture is taken from the following website, accessed on January 3, 2019: [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paulinum_\(Universit%C3%A4t_Leipzig\)#/media/File:Universit%C3%A4t_Leipzig_-_Paulinum_-_Aula_und_Universit%C3%A4tskirche_St._Pauli_\(R%C3%BCckseite\)_%28Juli_2012%29.jpg](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paulinum_(Universit%C3%A4t_Leipzig)#/media/File:Universit%C3%A4t_Leipzig_-_Paulinum_-_Aula_und_Universit%C3%A4tskirche_St._Pauli_(R%C3%BCckseite)_%28Juli_2012%29.jpg)

⁷⁴ Volker Bigl was born in 1942 and died in 2005. He was an internationally well-known brain researcher and principle of Leipzig University from 1997 until his resignation in 2003.

The compromise of connecting the church and an academic building architecturally became another controversial subject that was particularly criticized by various churches throughout Germany: Since the partition between these two buildings is out of glass, church members were afraid that this separation contributes to the general notion of the inability to unite church and academia. This was problematic because the new main campus on the *Augustusplatz* was supposed to portray a cosmopolitan, secular, and self-governing university free from political and religious oppressions (in reference to the GDR regime). 2008, Leipzig's citizens established an initiative supervising the secular and tolerant character of the *Paulinum* and its affiliated buildings in order to prevent partial domination of either the intellectual or the ecclesiastical side. As a result of this initiative, the official name of the *Paulinum* combines both: *Paulinum-Aula und Universitätskirche St. Pauli* (*Paulinum-Assembly Hall and University Church St. Pauli*).

The citizens' initiative's post-activism after the actual pre-activism for reconstructing the *Paulinum* is another form of political and social engagement that is interlinked with the idea of cultural citizenship and cultural rights that "provide recognition through reallocation" and "construct identities and lifestyles that question hegemonic norms" (Morris et al. 2007). Cultural citizenship is a "deliberate oxymoron, a pair of words that do not go together comfortably" (Rosaldo 402) and, thus, seem to be contradictory. Yet, the pre- and post-*Paulinum* activism⁷⁵ prove that the initial concept of cultural citizenship that "refers to the right to be different and to belong in a participatory democratic sense" (ibid.) has been successfully and peacefully combined with activism. Those activism allowed representatives of the citizens'

⁷⁵ In the case of the *Paulinum*, post-activism ensures that the university remains an open-minded, secular, and democratic institution that welcomes diversity in all fields without repressing cultural identities, ideologies, and without oppressing or privileging the secular or ecclesiastical part of the *Paulinum*.

initiative to become part of the ISA (Saxon federal state government) and made the seemingly impossible possible: a church as part of a university campus connecting two (traditionally often) strictly separated people—intellectuals and clergy.

The pre- and post-activisms of the reconstruction of the *Paulinum* and the intersection of secular (intellectuals) and ecclesiastical (clergy) function as “deliberate oxymoron” (ibid.) precisely because of its intentional paradox of uniting two conflicting forms of governance. However, in the end, both parts benefit from one another because the ideas of two contradictory parts with disparate interests ally because of ongoing and adapting pre- and post-activist initiatives.

From “Teaching” Activism to “Doing” Activism

Despite growing international interdependences and protests movements across country borders, the academic sector is oftentimes underestimated. Yet, the education apparatus has enormous power; it can teach and encourage learners, educators, and reach out to entire communities to practice productive, progressive, powerful, and nonviolent activism. Several scholars have been focusing on the influence of so-called academic activism. Yet, I chose to use educational activism instead because academic activism seems to be restricted to the university apparatus only. In the case of the *Paulinum*, it is much more than just academic activism: It is the composition of politicians,’ citizens,’ and educators’ initiatives, concepts, visions, and ideas leading to pre-activism and lasting effects of post-activist movements.

Although the university apparatus also plays an important role in activist movements and social change, it is foremost primary and secondary education that already introduces the notion of “doing” and “teaching” activism. Activism requires critically thinking and is orientated toward problem-solving strategies on theoretical and practical levels. Therefore, educators need to start early enough to familiarize learners and their families and communities with past as well as contemporary roots of activist movements. Such an early exposure to critical thinking and activism also diminishes ill-activisms (representing ill-ideologies, following right-wing movements). Hence, educators need to red-flag historic roots of ill-ideologies and movements and the danger of reoccurrences nowadays. Considering the complexities and fine lines of the various forms and tasks of activism, activism is more than merely activist behavior and progressiveness. Activism cannot be reduced to physical and visible actions such as protest marches because activism starts with critical thinking, an idea, a vision for improvement, social change, a roadmap, and raising awareness.

Criteria to successfully “do” activism presuppose education. Therefore, activism is deeply rooted in an intellectual process deriving from transdisciplinary, comparative, critical, and theoretical approaches within various academic fields including historic and contemporary aspects. It is an inclusive education that ensures the solid grassroots for long-term promising social changes.

“[E]ducation of an organizer” (Alinsky 64) is crucial for effectively transforming theory into action. This requires “frequent [...] conferences on organizational problems, analysis of power patterns, communication, conflict tactics, the [...] development of community leaders and the methods of introduction of new issues” (ibid.). Teaching activism has to be constantly reconsidered and controlled from various perspectives and cannot remain within academia only: Teaching activism needs to be challenged and needs to unpack the complexities of different activisms. Otherwise, it risks a biased and monodirectional way of how to properly impart activism. The strategies of teaching activism should be based on examples from the past as well as the present while using historic cases in order to impart an ample variety of forms and practices of activism and their positive and negative outcomes, consequences, progresses, and ever-shifting processes:

Process and purpose are so welded to each other that it is impossible to mark where one leaves off and the other begins, or which is which. The very process of democratic participation is for the purpose of organization rather than to rid the alleys of dirt. Process is really purpose. (122)

Consequently, it is crucial that “our critical and pedagogic work is mediated through and for the community [...], covering areas ranging from citizenship initiatives, novel concepts of global peace, and school curriculum reform to cultural policy strategy” (Morris et al. 121-22). Yet, it remains challenging to teach activism because it is rather an ongoing and steadily changing process and progress than a fixed teaching method. Moreover, activism implicates different political, religious,

cultural, and social attitudes, persuasions, and individual views. Hence, it is debatable if and how to convince learners of certain viewpoints which involve “right” versus “wrong” constraints. In addition, educators need to be advocates of tolerant, interdisciplinary, and multinational approaches encouraging learners to consider various factors. Education is, thus, not preformulating concrete roadmaps for doing activism. Instead, educational activism is supposed to lead students to the how to “do” activism. “Teaching” and “doing” educational activism properly requires an “approach [...] towards culture and society, or a broad vision that must be free of rigid disciplinary boundaries” (94). In order to develop “an intellectual horizon or a comprehension ability capable of combining” (101) local and global aspects, past and contemporary aspects need to be combined as well.

Finally, it is the balance between pre- and post-activism and “teaching” and “doing” activism that, as in the case of the *Paulinum*, combines various and sometimes even contradicting aspects, fields, and people from the church, politics, and education. The integration of a variety of fields and people results in an equalized and versatile controlled activism. It also functions as a mutual control while securing democratic and nonbiased implementations and continuations (post-activism).

East versus West: Striving for Balanced Activisms

The cultural, economic, religious, social, financial, and political clashes between the West and the Other (East, Middle East, East Germany) are shaped by hegemonic power struggles (even within one nation). This also affects how social changes and different forms of pre- and post-activisms are done, taught, and perceived. The continuous struggles related to, for instance, unequal salaries for teachers between East and West Germany (cf. *Der Westen* n. pag.) requires activism after the initial pre-activism: Post-activism fosters a successful continuation of reuniting a once separated country and adjusting all sectors equally. However, former West Germany still dominates and Westernizes former East Germany because it dominates the FRG's ISA. Hence, Germany's "people remain divided. Instead of being divided by a physical borderline, the East and West Germans are divided across economical and social lines within a unified Germany" (Ragab n. pag.). The activism that succeeded and finally led to a united Germany bore another challenge: the complications and inner-country inequalities, which could not be solved by the pre-activism. Consequently, it is crucial to generate another follow-up activism—a post-activism that ensures equal salaries and equal economic and political participation between former East and West. A similar dynamic and obligation for post-activism is also needed in the case of the *Paulinum* in order to safeguard the democratic and balanced interaction between intellectuals and clergy.

Pre- and post-activisms connect people and do not have a beginning or an ending. All kinds of activisms are cycles and fluent passages overarching past, current, and future generations within the educational apparatuses, its economy, and its politics. Even though these activisms are constantly redefining themselves through new forms of "doing" activism (usage of social and new media), the ambition is often

analogous: achieving social change and raising awareness. During this ongoing circular process of educational activism, past and presence cannot be separated from one another because of the nation's history and cultural and ideological roots that are (consciously or unconsciously) extended, and reformulated, and maybe even repeated. The activism's reformulations are connected to political and cultural habits: In the case of the *Paulinum*, it is the peaceful and silent protest movements against the GDR regime and the social and educational activism peacefully striving for a rebuilding of the *Paulinum* after the *Wende*. It is particularly the educational scale of activism that functions as a significant intersection between people, intellectuals, politicians, institutions, and (state) apparatuses' ideologies. Educational activism represents another intersection that operates as an umbrella term for external as well as internal forms of pre- and post-activisms within educational institutions such as schools and universities. It is educational activism's initial step that sets up a theoretical framework and basis for the resulting (effective) action and protest marches.

Education functions as a megaphone reaching the people and vice versa: People can also access education through, for example, protest movements that will result in new fields of studies, discussions, publications, research projects, etc. Moreover, the inclusion of people in the educational sector and vice versa will contribute to a growing mutual awareness, understanding, and tolerance. Accordingly, education and politics are interdependent and have enormous impacts on (ill-)ideologies and the power of hierarchical hegemonies that endanger oppressed minorities (members of the RSA). This mutual interdependence can prevent or strengthen hardened fronts between RSA and ISA. Therefore, education, politics, and the external as well as internal pre- and post-activisms operate as a reciprocal control function while maintaining or destroying the balance between two contradicting

powers. Oppressive political regimes and their educational systems are often built on hegemonic (ill-)ideologies (as it was the case in the Third Reich in which the so-called study of race became a mandatory and brainwashing subject in school curricula). In order to counteract those ill-ideologies, legitimate activist initiatives serve as paragons for post-activism because post-activism controls the adherence of the initial pre-activist ambitions.

Activism, Aktivismus, and Activisme—or Negativism?

According to the English *Wikipedia*⁷⁶ entry, *activism* “consists of efforts to promote, impede, or direct social, political, economic, or environmental change” (*Wikipedia* English “Activism” n. pag.). Furthermore, activism is described as an “engaged citizenry” (ibid.) and “cooperative movement” (ibid.). The German entry of *Aktivismus* defines activism as a pacifistic movement (cf. *Wikipedia* Deutsch “Aktivismus” n. pag.). It is mainly based on Kurt Hiller’s⁷⁷ understanding of political activism as activation of the intellectual and as a form of expressionism with diverse pacifistic-socialistic tendencies (ibid.). In the French context, *activisme* is almost exclusively related to politics: It refers to a political engagement in form of a direct, and sometimes violent, action (cf. *Wikipedia* Français “Activisme” n. pag.). Is violent activism still activism or rather negativism?

Due to the hierarchical (political) power structures and its dynamics, the origin of activism most likely derives from the disagreement between the ISA and the RSA (cf. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 155). Assuming this, activism’s purpose is to reform or change the ruling class’ dominant system and regulations governing the suppressed Other. This effort of activism is, in the majority of cases, well-intended since it asks for equal rights and rights of co-determination. Because of its right-wing character, *Pegida* is a negative kind of activism. *Pegida*’s misguided activism becomes a negative and racist form of offensive and violent protests. Is negative, violent, and racist activism still a form of activism? It is rather the politicking of the

⁷⁶ Even though *Wikipedia* is not an academic source, I have chosen to use it because it represents a general understanding of certain complex terms and concepts. It is interesting to compare how the notion of activism is described and defined in different languages because it provides an idea of how the majority of the public might predominantly comprehend activism.

⁷⁷ Kurt Hiller (1885-1972) was a German author and pacifistic journalist who dedicated his life to a Schopenhauerian and anti-Hegelian socialism for peace and freedom for (sexual) minorities (cf. Wurgaft 62; cf. White 27).

counter movements against the right-wing negativism of *Pegida* that can be defined as activism. Yet, it is the political, cultural, and social dynamic between the negative activism of *Pegida* against the Turkish communities of Germany as well as the counter movements that create a communicating platform of (inter)activism.

Pegida's initial negativism and right-wing approach that won over a bigger audience than initially expected by politicians and media experts in 2014, has decreased: In comparison to its early anti-Islamic protests with 17.000 right-wing attendees in October 2014, recent demonstrations counted only approximately 500 participants (cf. Reinbold, “Kommentar zu Protesten” n. pag.). Hence, German news stations, political magazines, and newspapers proudly and confidently announced the final end of *Pegida*. The oftentimes left-wing counter movements against *Pegida* produced a peaceful form of anti-right-wing activism that seemed to have ended the dangerous potential of *Pegida*.

Even if Germany's government, its national security agency, and several counter demonstrators seemed to have successfully stifled the revolts, *Pegida* has not yet ended. *Pegida's* negativism is not forgotten and cannot be undone—not culturally, not socially, and not politically. Firstly, *Pegida* brought to the streets what has long been hushed up in German society: growing conflicts and xenophobia against people of Middle Eastern background (cf. Reinbold, “Streit um “Lampedusa-Gruppe”” n. pag.). These tensions became particularly worse when the German government decided to allow the construction of mosques as long as they are not higher than cathedrals (cf. Stoldt n. pag.). Secondly, according to surveys of political German magazines such as *Der Spiegel*, people started to continue discussions related to integration, racism, and democracy. Despite its right-wing attitude, *Pegida* made Germany rethink the current and often anti-Islamic developments endangering the

freedom and democracy (ibid.). *Der Spiegel* concluded that because of *Pegida*, discussions regarding Germany's democracy were reactivated. Thirdly, Merkel and other politicians had to officially respond to the *Pegida* movement and the long-time taboo topic such as the increasing number of Middle Eastern refugees and immigrants. Finally, the “out of sight, out of mind” philosophy does not apply to *Pegida*: It has left (German) society with complex questions that require proper and immediate answers and demand more political awareness—particularly regarding the hardened fronts between multicultural and multi-religious groups within German society and its political as well as educational sectors.

Chapter Nine

Adapting and Diversifying CRT

Based on the assumption that CRT's purpose is to "critique pedagogy and practice and to counter stereotypes" (Dryden-Peterson 2326), CRT provides a substantial theoretical framework for questioning and restructuring Germany's current immigration, educational policies, and its politics because CRTs have "an activist aspect [...] to bring change that will implement social justice" (DeCuir et al. 27). Yet, it is not exclusively politics and educational institutions that are responsible for change and the successful integration and cultural acculturation: It is also indispensable to integrate local communities, and immigrant and refugee families of the respective school district for an overarching integration and cross-cultural communication. Hence, CRT functions as a "tool for exposing, analyzing, and challenging the majoritarian stories of racial privilege" (Dryden-Peterson 2326), which are predominantly Protestant, Catholic, or atheist in Germany's school system. Since CRT's framework is theoretically *as well as* practically applicable, CRT (and its adaptations) can also be regarded as a newly-emerging form of political and cultural activism aiming at "managing new challenges of diversity" (2327). An up-to-date adaptation of school curricula and community work "seeks to inform and inspire and join the endeavors of documentation, interpretation, and intervention" (2330). Such an approach contributes to an on-going dialogue between educators, learners, and immigrant families and their communities. Especially in terms of an active and practical integration of communities, adjusted forms of CRTs also provide a platform for pre- and post-activism through equal access to dual language education and social services.

Managing those challenges begins with critically discussing racism issues toward Middle Eastern (and other) school children in Germany; it should start as early as in kindergarten. However, this culturally, linguistically, and religiously aware teaching needs to continue in high school when covering the history and magnitudes of racism in several times and countries. In so doing, educators can prevent racist and prejudice-based attitudes toward Others while raising awareness and foster intercultural competencies for the present and the future. Therefore,

[w]e need to know more about how children “do racism,” why they do it, when they do it, and with whom they do it. And we need to know about these things as early as possible in children’s lives. [...] Racial-ethnic concepts inform much of children’s social activity—from how children perceive themselves, to how they select friends, to how they explain social life, to the ways they develop understandings of social hierarchies and power. (Van Ausdale et al. 214)

Accordingly, CRT is a promising effort for less biased research methods, teaching styles, adapted curricula, and learning outcomes. Currently, however, CRT is not yet adapted to the German school system: It still does not properly respond to the changing and international dynamics in classrooms in primary and secondary education. Due to the enormously growing immigration rates of Middle Eastern immigrants, elementary and secondary schools are no longer the first instance in which children are first confronted with Other fellow classmates—it starts in kindergartens.

One possibility to approach the issue of racism and the intolerance that has (or has not) been taught throughout the preschool ages is to change the predominantly German (Christian)⁷⁸ power structures of schools. Those power structures and

⁷⁸ German schools have religion lessons and *Ethik*, which does not really translate into English. It is based on social studies and philosophy; the translation into *Ethics* would only be partially accurate. Religion only covers evangelic and catholic religion theory and does not include other religions. *Ethik*, to the contrary, covers all religions. Especially in regard to the growing Middle Eastern dynamic in classrooms, religion as subject is borderline. Some federal German states allow to choose between the

outdated curricula do not embrace cultural, linguistic, social, and religious integration and appreciation of Middle Easterners. Consequently, it is necessary to reform racially biased teaching and research methods that determine the contents of new school curricula that are still exclusive and discriminating:

The idea of research as situated cultural practice requires that the analytic spotlight be widened from an exclusive focus *on* certain groups to shed light on two additional aspects. These are the sociocultural location of the researcher as an individual and a member of a scientific field, and the cultural presuppositions in the habitual practices of a field (e.g., theoretical categories, data collection and analysis tools [...]). (Arzubiaga et al. 310, italics in original)

Considering Germany's (and Europe's) history of immigration and its contemporary developments in education, the impacts of globalization, and the increasing number of Middle Eastern school children, one possibility to reconstruct the monolingual, monocultural, and monoreligious school curricula and hierarchical power structures is to adapt (racial) formation theory: It challenges a "pluralistic understanding of 'race' [...]" and a pluralistic understanding of racial relations [...] democratically pursuing [...] political agendas" (Feagin et al. 947) and will contribute to the crucial shift from "dictatorship to [...] democracy" (949) providing equal opportunities: Especially in education, politics, and the job market, proper and paid access to German as second language courses is crucial for future educational degrees and development. The combination of democracy and equal and proper (second language) education will avoid language barriers. Language barriers are often the main reason why immigrants are denied access to education, politics, and other fields.

Equal access and proper integration are not achieved through schools exclusively built for immigrant children because this is a "segregated integration" (955). Even though those schools at least provide the opportunity for access to

two subjects. However, in Bavaria, schools often do not offer *Ethik* and, hence, no alternative for Middle Eastern or other immigrants.

education, they do not contribute to a successful inclusion of immigrants into the German society and its education system. Instead, such a “segregated integration” (ibid.) continues the isolation immigrant families face. This isolation has also negative consequences for future integration in higher education as well as the job market. Hence, the gap between rich and poor and between Germans and several generations of immigrants leads to intercity separations as in the cases of, for instance, Berlin and Cologne: Certain districts, such as Berlin *Neukölln*, are strongholds of Middle Eastern immigrants and are regarded as an island shaped by political, cultural, societal, and religious separation. Besides, those districts are struggling with poverty, violence, corruption, and drug dealing (cf. Schneider n. pag.) because of the inequality and forlornness caused by inequality in education, language barriers, and resulting unemployment due to the lack of educational opportunities within the German educational system.

Adapted CRTs are useful for eluding institutional racism (cf. Scheurich et al. 5) that “hurt[s] members of one or more races [or religions] in relation to members of the dominant” (5) ISA. Moreover, implemented CRTs would urge school curricula to adjust to the current (Middle Eastern) classroom dynamics. German politics confuse the terms and implications of equality and sameness, which complicates the process and progress of applying CRT successfully: Even though “sameness of resources and opportunities” (Brayboy et al. 159) is mandatory in order to achieve educational equality within a classroom, it does not entail sameness in terms of rejecting one particular culture or religion while trying to “de-diverse” the classroom and force German ideology on Middle Easterners.

The melting-pot-like classroom environment is challenged by power struggles between the ISA and the oppressed Others who do not fit the norm and who have not

(yet) adapted to the mainstream (German educational) culture. Due to the mainly religious and political Otherness and Western hegemony, school curricula aim at Westernization (or Germanization) of Middle Eastern culture: The “hegemonic position of Western—or [...] American [or German]—culture” (Morris et al. 129) and the “[g]lobalized capital and the mobilization of the elite class combine to create the imagined identity of “world citizen” and a culture of consumption that works everywhere in the world” (ibid.). But education, politics, and state apparatuses should not aim to create universal “everyday lifestyles” (130) or “value system[s]” (ibid.).

Therefore, CRT plays a vital role in guaranteeing critical and transdisciplinary approaches from various angles enforcing curricula that respond to multiculturalism without privileging or excluding certain (religious) groups. Creating new curricula according to the critical approaches of CRT will also change and challenge the “dominant, white, upper-class, male voicings as the “standard” knowledge” (Ladson-Billings 23). Updated curricula need to question the demands of multiple perspectives on, what Germany’s education system considers, “classical” learning contents. Those learning contents are especially illiberal in literature and social studies: They are old-fashioned, not *zeitgeisty* and, thus, have to be redefined for a 21st century multicultural, multilingual, and multireligious classroom (cf. Detjen 347).

Teaching and Learning German and Intercultural Communication

Since Germany's Residence Act of 2005, Germany has replaced its so-called Aliens Act with integration on linguistic as well as cultural levels in forms of German as second language courses. Besides teaching German vocabularies and grammar to immigrants, those courses also aim to culturally integrate immigrants into German society and its political, religious, and social system. Although the courses are well-intended, there is a risk of oppression within those German integration courses because the curriculum is predominantly concerned with teaching immigrants how to *become German* instead of combining and allowing their Middle Eastern cultural traditions, values, and belief systems within the German values and vice versa. The challenge immigrants (German as second language learners) and educators (German as second language teachers) need to overcome is not mainly German language acquisition. Instead, it is how to equally handle different cultural and religious values without privileging and without oppressing either side. Hence, German politics need to recruit and train more bilingual (Arabic- and German-speaking) teachers who create a mutual intercultural and bilingual teaching and learning atmosphere reflected in the curricula.

The always-fluid dynamics of immigration and diversity within a country call for action and the reconstruction and redefinition of traditional racially and religiously biased (German) logics and methods that have never fully adjusted to current global developments: “[N]ew methods and optics are needed to capture the effects of racial stratification in society” as well as “resistance to White [or German] domination in society and in academe [...] for a new generation” (Zuberi et al. 23). The German government and its education system need to foster intercultural awareness by reconstructing and transforming traditional German mindsets into multicultural and

interdisciplinary approaches and financial and educational support for immigrants. In this way, immigrants would have the opportunity to establish financial and cultural capitals that facilitate equal and free access to, for example, kindergarten for Middle Eastern children. In this way, German *and* Middle Eastern children are exposed to various languages, religions, and cultures from early on. This will encourage open-minded attitudes toward Others. Accordingly, multiculturalism will be an enriching experience and education for both sides from early on and Germany's educational and political sectors will benefit from this equal integration: Because equal access to social services and education creates equal integration and familiarization with the Other and will decrease xenophobic attitudes toward each Other. Therefore, it is essential that (teaching and learning) methods, CRTs, policies, and curricula are not "read as definite" (Rigney 110). Instead, they all have to be regarded as "research in progress and a transmission of ideas to promote further debate[s]" (ibid.).

There is a need for an adapted model for the increasingly global immigration dynamics in the German school context. It is necessary to comprise "local, national, and global" (Abraham et al. 124) intersections as well as "action-oriented research methodologies" (ibid.; cf. 126, 128) that function on a glocal scale (cf. Ritzer et al. 335; cf. Featherstone et al. 28; cf. Abraham et al. 124, 132). Learning and teaching glocally encourages an intercultural awareness and equality, which engage in "intercultural communication" (Davis et al. 531; cf. 537) through redefining "co-created meanings and knowledge of the [O]ther" (531) and dual language education.

While implementing dual language education, CRT should also be applied to the "multilingual and multicultural environment" (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 165). The combination of dual language education and adapted CRTs and school curricula will encourage pedagogical control regarding discrimination based

on class, gender, race, and cultural and religious heritages. In order to succeed, however, teachers have to be able to adjust CRTs (Critical Religion Theory) individually. Moreover, educators cannot be restricted by inflexible educational state policies that undermine customized practices, learning contents, teaching styles, and pedagogical methods: Because flexibility and individual adaptability prevent hegemonic power struggles between the majority (German students) and the (perceived) minority (Middle Eastern students) (cf. 167, 179).

Dual language education is supposed to “provide students from two language backgrounds with opportunities to become bilingual and biliterate [...] and develop improved cultural understanding and intergroup relations” (Freeman 203). In addition, however, it is necessary to transform the language-based focus to a (multi)cultural and (multi)religious focus. This is particularly important because language cannot be reduced to communication purposes only: Instead, language is also a multi-level form of expression of one’s religious and cultural norms, heritages, ideology, and identity. Hence, dual language programs and policies need to create a safe space for second- *as well as* native language learners because both groups need to learn how to communicate across different cultural and religious values. Those values are (subconsciously) communicated through language and influence the conversation meanings and perceptions within bi- or multi-cultural/lingual/religious groups.

Nonbiased bilingual immersion programs will, on a long-term basis, contribute to more equal access to primary, secondary, and higher education and will result in a decreasing “achievement gap between students of low and high socioeconomic status” (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 171). Furthermore, the globally-adjusted classroom and learning environments will function as enrichment for each group of students on a linguistic but also on a social and cross-cultural level

(cf. Chin 255): However, this enrichment can only be reached if policies leave enough flexible space for individual pedagogical methods and curricula. Additionally, politicians, teachers, students, as well as parents and the communities'/school districts' current political and social climates need to be included in the policymaking debates (cf. Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 168). The “much-needed intercultural interaction for all students” (170) is necessary for preventing racist attitudes and prejudices against different languages, cultures, and religions within *and* outside of schools.

However, the approach for “much-needed intercultural interaction” (ibid.) also features obstacles such as resistance from non-immigrant parents and the lack of financial resources for providing biculturally and bilingually trained teachers with proper credentials for teaching in public schools such as the *Schule am Adler* and the *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule*. In order to overcome (or at least raise more awareness to) those hindrances, it is crucial to adjust theoretical CRT concepts and dual language and immersion programs to the actual school. In so doing, it is firstly, crucial to find out why there is a lack of flexibility to restructure the outdated curricula according to the intercultural classroom dynamics. Secondly, it is important to find a balanced learning and teaching style that allows non-immigrants as well as immigrants to maintain their cultural and religious heritages and identities.

For a successful implementation and integration, it is essential that policies, curricula, and bilingual instructions embrace the “cultural and linguistic assets that children bring with them to school” (172). Accordingly, the two-way bilingual immersion model would contribute to an equal learning environment not advantaging or disadvantaging particular groups. This model places “immigrant children in a position to help native speakers become bilingual, while the English [or German]

learners also become biliterate” (175). Such an integrative and enriching model for minority and majority students is beneficiary for learning two languages properly *and* decreases racism based on heritage, religious beliefs, and language differentiations.

Global and Anti-Racist Pedagogies In- and Outside of Schools

Through “sustain[ing] white supremacy designed to exclude other human beings by virtue of their race, language, culture, and ethnicity” (Macedo et al. 3), racism is still present in various sectors in the United States and the majority of European countries (cf. 7-8, 22, 129, 131). Globalized racisms and ISA-dominated hierarchies are against people of color and, increasingly, Middle Easterners (cf. 3, 5, 7, 129, 136-39). Hence, CRTs need to be adapted to other local and international means of discrimination: Factors of globalization and the intermingling of various religions, cultures, ideologies, identities, politics, ethnicities, and languages contributed to different racisms. Therefore, it is crucial “to recognize that racism is always historically specific and that it manifests itself differently in terms of geographical, cultural, ideological and material location” (3). In order to overcome the “ugliness of our dehumanized world” (24) and racisms, activisms, political movements, and revolutions must also be pedagogical (cf. 24, 26) because multiculturally competent awareness needs to be raised in educational curricula: By teaching bilingually and on multicultural levels, religious and cultural diversities will be embraced and positively promoted through an interdisciplinary “form of cultural action [for freedom]” (33, square brackets in original).

In addition to the global struggles of discrimination throughout education and politics, economic aspects need to be considered as well: The United States and Germany depend on immigrants for “cheap labor and other forms of servitude” (28; cf. 214-16; cf. Chin 129, 133), which is a form of (economic) racism and “economic oppression” (Macedo et al. 29) treating cheap labor (immigrant) workers as “second class citizens” (28). Economic (and other) racisms reinforce the ISA’s ideology that “always portray[s] the oppressed in a negative light” (ibid.) and “ostracize[s] and

exploit[s] a subordinate group endowed with negative symbolic capital” (100-01).

Besides the political, cultural, and economic aspect of global racisms, the growing internationalization also needs to be considered in terms of global media outreach: Globalization has an enormous impact on “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (165). This requires learning spaces and curricula to “opening up within these developments” (ibid.) in order to teach diversity awareness, *how* to react and interact within global social media platforms and racist comments, (fake) news, blog entries, posts, etc. Learning the *how to* with social media is important because the media “transcend national boundaries to reach a global audience” (Korteweg et al. 7). In short, globalization demands “a pedagogical project that is antiracist [...] because without this pedagogical space globalization will crush the very possibility of pedagogy and with it the possibility of founding and maintaining human societies” (Macedo et al. 168).

Antiracist pedagogy can be reached through an “intercultural educational approach” (175), by providing “courses in the mother tongue” (ibid.), and by involving psychological aspects of immigrants (and refugees). In this way, successful integration and a smooth transition and “experience of crossing a border” (ibid.) can be eased. Besides providing support in the native language of the immigrants in order to provide quick access to social services and educational institutions, it is equally important to start teaching the “language of the host country” (176) as soon as possible: Because differences in language cause (racist) problems that become “institutionalized” (ibid.) and “dehumanize immigrants” (ibid.). Moreover, educational projects should include parents (cf. 176-77) in order to bridge the “boundaries between “newcomers” and “indigenous” groups of people” (177) across

communities. In so doing, it is also necessary to consider psychological aspects in order to understand the struggles and experiences families underwent during the immigration process (cf. *ibid.*). This culturally sensitive inclusion and empathy create a sense of belonging (cf. 179) and results in better intercultural understanding, respect, and dialogue (cf. 223)—possibly avoiding prejudices among immigrants and non-immigrants.

Roadmap for Changing (the) Dynamics in Germany's Education

Historically, Germany has shifted from being a *Gastarbeiter* country to being an immigration country in the “heart of Europe” (cf. Geißler et al. n. pag.). Despite the increasing globalization, Germany and several other European countries are still not yet prepared for properly integrating immigrants in German classrooms (ibid.). Accordingly, Germany faces the challenge of responding to the enormously growing multiethnic segment of its population and has to find a solution for integration and for bringing together Germans and Middle Easterners (ibid.). A long-term solution for this challenge begins in the educational sector because it is equal access to educational institutions that impacts future education and career paths (especially secondary and higher education as well as the job market) (ibid.).

(1) Cross-Language Policies: Bilingualism for Everyone

The reason why the majority of immigrant children are not attending German kindergartens is because of the lack of money to pay for the kindergarten. This has negative impacts on their continuing educational development and achievement. In order to solve this marginalization, Germany's government and its educational ministry need to develop new bilingual policies for the preschool level as well as primary, secondary, and higher education. Germany's language policies also feature similar issues as those in, for instance, California, Arizona, and Massachusetts: Germany and the USA devalue languages such as Spanish (US context) and Arabic (German context): The “minority language [Spanish or Arabic] never ceases to be used for instructional purposes” (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 163); which leads to an imbalance and an inequality that negatively affects “the learning environment” (ibid.), learning outcomes, integration, and the goal to “achieve competence in both”

(ibid.) languages—the country’s official/first language and the second/native language of immigrants.

The main goal of immigration countries such as the USA and Germany is to “assimilate students as quickly as possible into English [or German]” (160). Thereby, the native language of immigrants is underestimated. Yet, their native language is a “useful support in helping students acquire literacy and academic skills” (152) in the target language. Research has found that bilingualism is beneficiary for bridging “two cultures” (148) and that it contributes to “higher self-esteem” (ibid.), and motivation. Finally, it also leads to higher achievements in the language learning process (cf. 142-43, 148; cf. Caprez-Krompæk 39).

Considering that bilingually instructed programs have long-term “positive outcomes for students” (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 144), language policies need to fulfill the criteria of the so-called transfer concept: The transfer concept represents the motto “what a student learns about one thing or in one context contributes to learning about other things and in other contexts” (ibid.) *about* and *within* a language. In terms of bilingual instruction, this means “if students learn something in one language, they can more easily learn it in another language” (ibid.). This “cross-language” (ibid.) approach contributes to better learning progresses and more self-esteem due to the (teachers’/schools’/fellow students’) appreciation of the immigrants’ native language and culture.

According to the idea of a “metalinguistic awareness” (145), “bilingualism [...] should be regarded in the larger society” (ibid.) and within the larger community context while “moving along a continuum rather than representing an either/or state” (ibid.). Metalinguistic consciousness is linked to the oftentimes blurry lines of identity and requires a reflection upon external components such as family structures and

parents' education (cf. 146). The majority of language policies lacks to focus on cultural elements and the connected values, traditions, and identities, which cannot be separated from the linguistic aspect itself: Language and identity are also interwoven with "age, social status, and gender" (147)—factors that need to be part of the (bilingual) policymaking process as well because they contribute to equal access and support services across various sectors inside and outside of school. This is crucial for developing a trusting bilingual environment immigrant families and locals can rely on—cross cultural and interdependent support systems that are beyond formal language lessons: "a picture emerges of a [bilingual] school agent as a confident and informal mentor, providing the type of support she [the student] could never imagine receiving from [...] the circumstances at home" (Stanton-Salazar 170). Moreover, research has shown that "bilingual students preferred seeking assistance from the counseling staff in their native language" (165).

In order to successfully improve and adjust bilingual policies, curricula need to be developed in cooperation with practicing teachers who understand how "primary language can be used purposefully and strategically to support English [and German] language development" (Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 129). Furthermore, policies have to be constantly redefined because of the changing dynamics in classrooms. Additionally, learning and teaching contents need to provide enough flexibility for classroom specific adjustments in order to avoid tensions between what educators "knew to be pedagogically sound and what they were required to do" (133).

One possible second language acquisition model is the "pull-out" method and the two-way bilingual immersion concept. The "pull-out" model's idea is to literally pull particular students (immigrants) out of the mixed classroom and provide additional/special second language instruction. Even though there is evidence that this

method improves the proficiency in the target language (cf. Schirmer et al. 412-13), it does not support (inter)cultural inclusion (cf. Fisher 205): It helps gaining fluency in the second language, which contributes to better cultural integration because of the ability to communicate in the official language with fellow classmates. However, with this method, second language learners are pulled out of the classroom in order to achieve a better level of language proficiency. This might have negative impacts because they are isolated from their peers, which already leads to a barrier between immigrant and non-immigrant classmates (cf. Allington 602-03). Both learning groups notice this separation, which (unconsciously) strengthens the idea that immigrant peers are Othered, different, and that they have to go to a different classroom in order to become more like the locals. This enforces an “us versus them” attitude and, despite the fact that immigrant students gain more language proficiency, results in exclusion from the main classroom.

The risks of such “pull-out” programs can be reduced through the two-way bilingual immersion program. Unlike the “pull-out” program, this method already starts integration in the process of teaching the second language. The model’s priority is to create an equally accessible learning environment while not pulling certain students out of the classroom. Therefore, this kind of program is more ideal in regard to combining bilingual *and* bicultural awareness and integration for immigrant and non-immigrant students: It is based on the concept of mutual and coequal learning and, thus, eliminates hierarchical power structures that might result in discrimination, segregation, and exclusion. Instead, it embraces the cultural and linguistic diversity immigrants and non-immigrants present in the classroom (cf. Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 172). Moreover, it puts immigrants into the position of helping “native speakers become bilingual, while the learners also become biliterate” (175).

The two-way bilingual immersion model can only be effectively implemented if teachers are bilingual and interculturally sensitive. Accordingly, this model only works if teachers are properly trained and aware of the cultural, religious, and linguistic differences and challenges. Another complication of the implementation of bilingual programs is that, for instance in Germany, bilingual education is predominantly defined in terms of “trendy” languages such as Chinese or French. Those bilingual programs are targeted at the upper/middle class that can afford those bilingual programs and institutions (cf. *Accadis International School Bad Homburg* n. pag.); but it is not helping the integration of immigrants at all.

(2) Current Challenges in Germany’s Education System

The improper integration of immigrants within the school system leads to two major concerns: Immigrant children are not supported enough throughout various sectors. They not only need support in language acquisition; they also need to be prepared for (German) cultural, traditional, and social habits. Such an overall education (not only linguistically) would help immigrants to culturally, linguistically, socially, and politically integrate. However, there is a fine line of integration and forcing integration on immigrants: If immigrants are “too much” integrated, this might turn into a form of oppression and even “covert racism” (Sniderman et al. 224-25) because the education system does not leave free space to combine Middle Eastern and German cultural habits—it is an either or and an “us versus them.” Instead, it should become an acculturation that—despite adapting to the “new” culture—ensures that the immigrant remains attached to his/her own culture and is accepted and supported as a bicultural individual (cf. Salkind et al. 8-9).

The struggle between acculturation and assimilation often results in assimilation only. Assimilation then is confused with Germanization (cf. Zúñiga et al. 228), which

is often one of the few options for Middle Easterners to be included and accepted in the German school system and society. From a historical perspective, Germany has already been an immigration country (*Gastarbeiter*). However, since the economy has changed, new xenophobic developments (*Pegida*) caused by high(er) unemployment rates (see footnote 32) have emerged in the 2000s.

(3) Key Actors and Levels in Addressing the Integration Problem(s)

In order to address issues of unemployment, not sufficient professional training and education, and racism, key actors from various branches need to contribute to equal access chances for successful long-term integration of immigrant students, immigrant families, and communities. Those key branches include politics, immigration offices, educational institutions, professional teacher training, etc. (see Table 2). Although roots of xenophobia, oppression, and exclusion are multilayered and affect almost every sector within a society, education remains one of the most influential sectors due to its overarching long-term scope.

Educational institutions cannot only prevent racism while teaching the benefits of multicultural and bilingual enrichment of immigrants in modern societies, they can also contribute to successful integration. This requires specific teacher training and preparation, which focus on intercultural understanding and a prevention of “forcing” or “convincing” Middle Eastern immigrants of the German culture. Proper teacher training needs to encourage a mutual comprehension and appreciation of different cultural and religious dynamics in one classroom. Therefore, teacher training needs to be oriented toward bilingual teaching methods that create mutual learning contexts across different languages, cultural identities, and religions.

In order to successfully implement and interlink multicultural and bilingual course contents, teacher training has to be modernized and adjusted to the *zeitgeist*:

Today's German classrooms are not monolingual anymore. Therefore, teachers should be bilingual (English and/or Arabic, German) and familiar with possible cultural and religious clashes when educating Germans and Middle Easterners in one classroom. Additionally, teachers need to be taught how to raise intercultural awareness and communication without privileging or discriminating against a particular group. These multicultural and bilingual approaches also demand psychological skills helping teachers to recognize and appropriately address difficulties specifically students with immigrant backgrounds face on several emotional, psychological, educational, cultural, religious, social, and political levels. Moreover, respective learning materials and textbooks have to be adjusted in order to guarantee meaningful learning outcomes for Germans and Middle Easterners alike. This demands the inclusion of teachers, politicians, and immigrant communities in order to realize what learning contexts make sense in practice.

Globalization's enormous impacts on immigration politics and other sectors such as education urge school systems to, firstly, adjust their curricula according to the multiculturalism in classrooms including different languages, cultural traditions, and religions. Secondly, German as second language courses predominantly focus on language acquisition and often disregard the significance of cultural traditions and identities connected to the learned language. In order to adapt the curricula properly to the changing classrooms dynamics, educational institutions have to combine various political, linguistic, and religious aspects to raise awareness and prevent inequity in education. This did—so far—not happen in the German school system (cf. Reimann, *Umgang mit Pegida* n. pag.).

Instead of remodeling school curricula, German schools tend to commit to, at first glance, seemingly diplomatic actions such as building prayer rooms in schools

for Muslim students (cf. *Die Welt* n. pag.). Although this seems to be well-intended, it is not helpful because of two reasons (cf. Lau n. pag.): First, it hardens fronts between Germans and immigrants because the Islam is the only religion that has a prayer room—no other religion does. This makes Christians feel unjustly treated and elicits racist reactions. Second, building Islamic prayer rooms does not contribute to integration. Instead, it Others and alienates Muslims even more. Such an approach of integration or tolerance toward Muslims completely backfires—in- and outside of school.

(4) Solution Approaches

CRT and other concepts such as Althusser's state apparatuses mainly focus on biased research methods and Euro-American notions that result in imbalanced hierarchical systems and struggles between ISA and RSA: A "repression, which enables the ruling classes [...] to ensure their domination [...], thus enabling [...] the process of surplus-value extortion" (Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* 137). Although those concepts provide critical frameworks for possible solution approaches, they lack the power of properly expanding CRTs to not only people of color but also people of different religions. While expanding CRTs and applying those to school curricula, it is crucial to reform the dominating structures and to realize that "all education is political and thus schools are never neutral institutions" (Solórzano 52; cf. Siegel 7). Hence, modifying school curricula is not enough—one also has to change the ISA's domination on the political level to achieve long-term equity, improvements, and tolerance within the education sector.

Politicians, parents, learners, and educators need to understand that different languages, religions, and cultures in one classroom should not compete with one another. Diversity is an enrichment for all—it is not an obstacle, if handled correctly,

as UCLA professor of education Marjorie Faulstich Orellana emphasizes: It is *the* roadmap for integrating immigrants and non-immigrants into a glocal society:

Many English Learners use their skills in the English they are learning, and in their home language, to speak, read, write and do things for others. They serve as “language brokers” for their families—as well as for their teachers and many monolingual English speakers. Arguably, these kids possess skills that are of great value in an increasingly globalized and intercultural world: the ability to talk to and mediate between speakers of different languages and people from different cultures. Moreover, these skills are not just of value for living in such a world, but for creating the kind of world that I, for one, hope to see. (Orellana, “Bilingual Youth” n. pag.)

Chapter Ten

Glocal Frameworks: Adding “Bi-Religionism” to Bilingualism & Biculturalism

Intercultural inclusion occurs on various levels—it demands bilingualism, biculturalism, and bi-religionism. All three “bi-isms” contribute to better cultural integration because of the ability to communicate in a language that everyone understands—linguistically and culturally across different religions, ideologies, and values. Therefore, the pull-out method is not ideal for proper integration because it creates a spatial separation in the crunch time of adjusting to each other and getting used to each other in, for example, the classroom: This segregation makes it even more challenging to develop friendships across the cultural lines in classroom as well as outside of it (cf. Kiang et al. 754). The social environment at home, in the community, as well as the social learning atmosphere at school have an enormous impact on how students integrate themselves outside of the classroom. Therefore, educational policies need avoid “linguistic segregation” (Carhill et al. 1160) and its associated “triple segregation” (ibid.).

The bilingual and bicultural complexity of integrating Middle Eastern immigrants without “Germanizing” them but also without “Middle Easternizing” their German peers is further challenged by the religious component. The added complexity of the Islam has a strong impact on the (Middle Eastern) students’ personal gender identity, which is shaped by the Islam and its traditional values, norms, and gender role allocations. The growing number of new immigrants in rather atypical countries or states⁷⁹, urges school systems to, firstly, adjust their curricula

⁷⁹ In the United States, atypical immigration states (Iowa, Idaho, Georgia) are not used to the different population (cf. Zúñiga et al. xiii-xiv). This fear is often caused by false assumptions based on ignorance and a lack of knowledge about the Others. Although racial prejudices also exist in states that are used to a multicultural population, it is more pronounced in states that are unfamiliar with ethnicity-related

according to the diverse languages, cultural traditions, heritages, *and* religions. Secondly, German as second language courses, which predominantly focus on teaching German language only, have to include more diverse religious and cultural matters as well. In order to adapt the curricula properly to the changing classrooms dynamics, educational institutions have to combine German and Middle Eastern political, linguistic, and religious aspects to raise awareness and prevent inequity and racism in the education sector.

Due to globalization, alterations need to be made in order to fit into the global context. However, when adapting certain theories, models, and frameworks, one cannot take, for instance, CRT out of one local context (for example the United States) and use it for another context (for example Germany) because of the still differing local circumstances. Therefore, CRT can, in the current multicultural circumstances, not be limited to Critical *Race* Theory only: Frameworks and concepts need to be glocal instead. Accordingly, CRT needs to be adapted to a rather religious-based integration issue instead of a race-based issue. Yet, due to increasing Middle Eastern immigrants, CRT also needs to be altered in the United States and other countries. Yet, another complication is the complexity of the term race, which has become even more multilayered due to globalized societies, cultures, identities, and politics. Hence, its distinctions and understandings depend on the cultural heritage and identity shaped by individual religious affiliations, traditions, values, the social environment, education, *settings*.

In consideration of different historical and contemporary contexts of race, the term cannot be disconnected from racism and country specific racisms toward certain races. Yet, race broadly refers to a human categorization in various contexts (for

differences. In order to apply some this, I chose the *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule*, a public middle school in Altenburg—a rather atypical city for immigrant students (see later in this chapter).

instance in the German and in the United States context). However, due to the historical baggage that is attached to race (or *Rasse* in German), the immediate associations of who is “a race” differs: While in the United States, race is mainly linked to people of color, race in Germany has predominantly been linked to people of different religions such as Judaism and Islam. The understanding also alters because of new political and economic circumstances. Although there is no specific definition for race because of its multifaceted understandings depending on cultural heritage, politics, education, religion, language, and personal identity, the term race can be understood as follows:

[M]ost people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries believed that all humans can be sorted into three or more races based upon shared inherited characteristics [...]. Informally, races are demarcated by appeal to observable properties (e.g., skin color, hair type, and eye shape). Yet, many people also assume that these properties are good predictors of more significant inherited differences (e.g., behavioral, intellectual, or physiological differences). (Bird et al. 166)

Generally, however, race is (pre)defined by the ISA and, hence, people who fit the dominant norm are often regarded as raceless. Racial markers also change and are not only related to skin color and religion. Markers that racialize certain groups can also be certain clothing such as veils. The skin color- and veil-based perception of race is rooted in the country’s history and how people with darker/black skin color were perceived and represented (in United States context) and how people with non-Christian religious affiliations who wear veils or kippahs were perceived and represented (in the German context).

Getting to the Nitty-Gritty: The Case of Mo⁸⁰

Although some men wear kippahs, veils are even more obvious cultural and religious identity markers. Therefore, the racist attitude toward “masked” women is even stronger. However, this does not mean that men do not face racism and oppositional attitudes: The case⁸¹ of Mo from the *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule* demonstrates that issues related to the Islam in Germany’s daily school life are independent from gender—despite the headscarf complication. One of his teachers confirmed that even though female students face *additional* discrimination because of the debates about wearing a headscarf during physical education lessons, issues of religious values and traditions also interfere with the daily school routine (for female *and* male students). While girls are excluded and ridiculed by their German peers because of the obvious identity marker of the headscarf, girls are—on a long-term scale—better acculturated into the German school system than boys. Even though boys cannot be as easily noticed as Other in comparison to female Middle Eastern students, boys’ attitude toward females in general is problematic because of the hierarchical structures of immigrant families and the linked inferiority of females.

Accordingly, the headscarf is not necessarily the primary problem of exclusion. Instead, it is the religious and cultural meaning, identity and ideology beyond the obvious clothing marker: It is the religious values, norms, and traditions that cannot be disconnected from one’s identity. The alteration of CRT to Critical Religion Theory also represents this complication of cultural identity and is, thus, more suitable for the German context. It is a new approach that incorporates cultural, traditional, political, social, and personal values and lifestyles shaped by the

⁸⁰ In order to protect the identity of the interviewee, I have changed the name.

⁸¹ The interview was conducted in German and I translated all the quotes into English. The original German answers can be found in the respective footnotes.

respective religious belief system. Current forms of CRT have already expanded recently but often still predominantly focus on society, culture, and the intersection of race and law. Hence, CRTs lack to add the religious component, which can also not be separated from cultural heritage, identity, and ideology.

In reference to the previously demonstrated problem of proper integration and education in rather atypical immigration cities and schools, I chose to interview Mo, an immigrant from Turkey. Mo's school and new home need (rather recently) to properly cope with increasingly diverse dynamics due to different religions, languages, and cultures; a diversity that causes discomfort in their rather isolated Christian mainstream social *setting*. Mo's school is located in a city that is not used to immigration: The *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule* is a public middle school in Altenburg, a German city with approximately 36.000 inhabitants. Altenburg is located in Central Germany in the state of Thuringia. The school has 23 teachers and 195 students ranging from classes 5 to 10 (ages 11 to 16/17). There are 10 percent Middle Eastern immigrants in the school. The school is located in a poor neighborhood characterized by drug dealing and unsafe living conditions.

Mo is 17 years old and came to Germany at the age of 9. He and his family (mother, father, 4 younger siblings, and one older brother) escaped Turkey because of the poor and increasingly dangerous living conditions. Although Mo is now a textbook example for successful immigration, integration, and (academic) success, the case illustrates the oftentimes overlooked struggles and challenges immigrant youth face throughout the immigration process. The case also demonstrates his experiences related to racism and segregation but also pivotal moments that contributed to Mo's positive development. Additionally, the case covers themes related to religion-based exclusion and social isolation through housing as well as German as second language

courses. Mo also emphasized the difficulties of merging Turkish and German culture, identity, and religious traditions without distancing oneself from one's own family but also from German mainstream society and classmates.

One of the policy recommendations for integrating immigrant students and families successfully is to bridge schools and communities (cf. Gándara et al., *Forbidden Language* 177) and to provide social services and access to key actors (see Table 2)—especially psychological counselors. Those counselors are needed for post- but also pre-immigration experiences and possible traumata hindering a smooth integration and, hence, the preparedness to learn. Accordingly, the case did not only focus on language acquisition but also on family relations, pre-immigration experiences, and identity that is shaped by the home country and the nuclear family. Despite the fact that Mo immigrated in a relatively young age (9), he has already established a strong cultural and, specifically, Islamic identity that influences his lifestyle and personality after immigrating to Germany. Interestingly though, Mo stressed that he had neither positive nor negative feelings when his parents, “in a rather unemotional way,”⁸² told him that they need to leave Turkey due to unemployment, corruption, and political turmoil: Neither Mo, nor his siblings, nor his parents seemed to be worried about educational matters, language barriers, and cultural (mis)assimilation.

In retrospect, however, Mo would have protested against leaving Turkey if he would have known that language, culture, and religion are not just different in Germany but also major discrimination reasons. He declared language, religion, and cultural traditions as the three main components that shape one's identity. Independent from cultural and religious heritage and identity, research on immigrants

⁸² Eher unemotional.

throughout several countries has shown that particularly immigrant children juggle between two cultural identities: the one at home and within the nuclear family and the one outside of the home (the public sphere, the school). Asking Mo about possible identity struggles and conflicts between German and Turkish identity he, surprisingly, neither negated nor affirmed:

I didn't feel Turkish because nothing looked Turkish. We also only prayed at home. There was no Turkish food, you couldn't even buy it in one of the bigger supermarkets and the school wouldn't serve anything else but German food. I wouldn't say that I didn't adjust. But I also didn't really give up my identity. Now, that you ask me that, I don't know where I belonged. Now I know, kind of, because I have been here [Germany] for so long, I also have the German passport now and gave up the Turkish one. So, I guess that makes me German. Right?!⁸³

Mo's sister responded in a similar way but added, "the only thing that made me feel a little bit more Turkish was on my way home—when I put on the headscarf again. I am not sure if I had to but I just wanted to avoid any kind of conflict with my family."⁸⁴ Although the headscarf made her feel "a little bit more Turkish," it was not decisive for her personal identity at home or in school. This proves that the media's obsession with headscarf-wearing people is a panicmongering hype. Moreover, it demonstrates that personal identity is not necessarily strengthened or weakened by traditional (Muslim) items of clothing. Instead, it affirms the importance of adapting CRT to Critical Religion Theory as well as the need for updated curricula and integrated bilingual, bicultural, and bireligious teaching methods: Assuming that Mo and his sister had a rather neutral attitude toward their bicultural identities and neither felt

⁸³ Ich fühlte mich nicht türkisch, weil nichts türkisch aussah. Wir beteten auch nur zu Hause. Es gab kein türkisches Essen, du konntest es noch nicht mal in einer der größeren Supermärkte kaufen und die Schule würde nichts außer deutsches Essen servieren. Ich würde nicht sagen, dass ich mich nicht angepasst habe. Aber ich habe auch nicht wirklich meine Identität aufgegeben. Jetzt, wenn du mich das fragst, wusste ich nicht, wo ich hingehörte. Mittlerweile weiß ich es irgendwie, weil ich hier [Deutschland] schon so lange bin; ich habe auch einen deutschen Pass und habe meinen türkischen abgegeben. Das macht mich, glaube ich, zum Deutschen. Richtig?!

⁸⁴ Die einzige Sache, die mich etwas mehr türkisch fühlen ließ, war auf meinem Heimweg—als ich mein Kopftuch wieder aufsetzte. Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob ich es aufsetzen musste, aber ich wollte es einfach machen, um jeglichen Konflikt mit meiner Familie zu vermeiden.

Turkish nor German, I was wondering if they still felt excluded in school and, if so, what isolated them?

Mo's subsequent response represents the urgency of reforming German as second language courses. Those courses isolate immigrants because of the "pull-out" structure that excludes immigrants from the mainstream classroom and, in this way, alienates them even more:

I will always remember that awkward moment when the *DaF*⁸⁵ teacher walked into the classroom and pointed at me and my siblings. All the Turkish students in that school were basically part of my family because we [Turkish families] have so many kids—totally different than the Germans who only have 1 or 2 kids. Everybody looked at me and started whispering to one another and I knew it is nothing good. But it was even worse when I returned to the classroom because I missed the breaks between lessons and what was going on there. So, they [German peers] would talk about what they called "insider" jokes and I couldn't be part of it. I was so isolated everywhere: in the neighborhood, in the classroom, and somehow also in the *DaF* course.⁸⁶

Mo criticizes the approaches of the German as second language classes and the fact that teachers did not speak any other languages than German, did not know "anything about the country I [Mo] came from,"⁸⁷ and were culturally incapable:

It was strange because back home [Turkey] my parents told me it is the teacher who is the person you must respect and who knows everything. I thought it is the same everywhere because I didn't really think that things would be so different just because you are in a different country. How should I know?! We never traveled. The teacher asked me weird things about meat we don't eat because we believe in Allah. Well, I don't know if I am expecting too much but I think that teachers who teach *DaF* should know that. Don't you think so?!⁸⁸

⁸⁵ *DaF* stands for *Deutsch als Fremdsprache*, which means German as foreign language.

⁸⁶ Ich werde mich immer an diesen seltsamen Moment erinnern, also die *DaF*-Lehrerin in den Klassenraum kam und mit dem Finger auf mich und meine Geschwister zeigte. Alle türkischen Schüler dieser Schule waren quasi Teil meiner Familie, denn wir [türkische Familien] haben so viele Kinder—total anderes als die Deutschen, die nur 1 oder 2 Kinder haben. Alle guckten mich an und begannen miteinander zu flüstern und ich wusste, dass es nichts Gutes ist. Aber es war noch viel schlimmer, als ich in das Klassenzimmer zurückkam, denn ich habe die Pausen zwischen den Unterrichtsstunden verpasst und was da passierte. Also, würden sie [deutsche Mitschüler] darüber reden, was sie „Insider-Witze“ nannten und ich konnte nicht Teil davon sein. Ich war so isoliert überall: in der Nachbarschaft, im Klassenzimmer und irgendwie auch im *DaF*-Kurs.

⁸⁷ Alles über das Land, wo ich [Mo] herkam.

⁸⁸ Es war eigenartig, denn in meiner Heimat [Türkei] haben mir meine Eltern gesagt, dass es der Lehrer ist, der die Person ist, die man respektieren muss und der alles weiß. Ich dachte, es sei überall das Gleiche, denn ich dachte nicht wirklich daran, dass die Dinge so anderes sein könnten, nur weil du in einem anderen Land bist. Wie sollte ich das auch wissen?! Wir sind nie gereist. Der Lehrer fragte mich

To answer Mo's question: Yes, *DaF* teachers should be familiar with the variety of cultures, religions, and identities within their classroom. However, teacher training embracing immigrant students' complex heritages is doomed to failure because of the lack of financial resources and time to attend those advanced and specialized trainings. Due to teacher shortages, regular public schools cannot release teachers for trainings during teaching periods. Furthermore, teacher trainings need to include more than language acquisition methods; other components such as culture, politics, *setting*, family circumstances, and psychological aspects also need to be incorporated because they are part of language (acquisition). Throughout the interview, Mo kept emphasizing the importance of language and how language opens doors and provides access to resources, knowledge, and

things that make life easier and better because you actually understand what it is all about. Shortly after my arrival, I couldn't even translate for my parents because I didn't know anything and because I was confused because of the entire immigration experience and escape from my home. It is not only words I didn't know or didn't understand, it is also the social manners and the way you have to talk to someone in certain situations. If you don't know that, knowing German vocabularies also doesn't help.⁸⁹

This statement hints at the variety of facets that come with language acquisition—especially in terms of proper daily interaction in different situations as well as psychological and educational pre-immigration experiences and traditional norms that cannot be separated from one's identity, way of learning and understanding, and assimilation process and progress. Another complication described by the interviewee is the constant conflict and disunity between personal, public (school), and private

seltsame Dinge über Fleisch, was wir nicht essen, weil wir an Allah glauben. Also ich weiß nicht, ob ich zu viel erwarte, aber ich denke, dass Lehrer, die *DaF* unterrichten, das wissen sollten. Denkst du nicht auch?!

⁸⁹ Dinge, die das Leben einfacher und besser machen, weil du tatsächlich verstehst, worum es wirklich geht. Kurz nach meiner Ankunft konnte ich nicht mal für meine Eltern übersetzen, weil ich nichts wusste und weil ich verwirrt war wegen der ganzen Immigrationerfahrung und Flucht von meiner Heimat. Es geht dabei nicht nur um Wörter, die ich nicht wusste oder nicht verstanden habe; es sind auch die sozialen Manieren und die Art und Weise, wie du mit jemandem in bestimmten Situationen redest. Wenn du das nicht weißt, dann helfen auch deutsche Vokabeln nicht.

(family) identity. For Mo, it is the separation between public and private sectors that causes overwhelming and disturbing integration problems. Although the *DaF* courses' main purpose is to teach German grammar and vocabularies, the current *DaF* curricula are in need for bridging school routine and family life in order to prevent separation and identity conflicts between all-German school climate and all-Turkish home environment.

The unrest of switching between cultural and personal identity and between school and home affects language acquisition and its associated cultural values that cannot immediately be transferred from one world into the other. Moreover, it hinders successful integration because it only provides one option to immigrant students: “You’re either Germanized or you remain Turkish. But no matter what side you decide to be on: Eventually, you will have to pick one [side]. But you are better off picking the mainstream [German] one if you don’t want to be a total outsider and looser.”⁹⁰ Considering the psychological burden immigrant families, and particularly children who attend school without (in most cases) knowing the German language at all, face prior and after their immigration, it is crucial to provide counseling and supervision beyond language acquisition. This requires key actors such as psychological and legal advisors as well as multiculturally trained school personnel (see Table 2). Moreover, there is a need for providing (community) services bridging, understanding, and appreciating Middle Eastern family traditions. In this way, (German) parents, teachers, and classmates understand particular social behaviors and reactions, which are not necessarily connected to language acquisition but rather psychological matters linked to pre- and post-immigration experiences and religious and cultural upbringing influencing social behavior.

⁹⁰ Du bist entweder eingedeutscht oder du bleibst türkisch. Aber egal für welche Seite du dich entscheidest: Höchstwahrscheinlich musst du eine [Seite] wählen. Aber du bist besser dran, wenn du die Mainstream-Seite [deutsch] wählst, wenn du nicht ein totaler Außenseiter oder Loser sein willst.

One of the major challenges of allocating such key actors and trained teachers within the schools and the respective communities remains its funding. However, less expensive steps that contribute to a better and more integrative learning atmosphere are, for example, the inclusion of immigrant and non-immigrant parents while making them part of the mutual learning process. One of Mo's suggestions was to open *DaF* classrooms for parents as well: "In this way, my mom would have learned some German words and she would have actually had an idea of what school is like here [Germany], what it looks like, and why things are not comparable to what she knew from back home [Turkey]."⁹¹ This suggestion does not exceed school budgets and would also establish a welcoming feeling of comfort and availability of shared support on the German as well as the Turkish side. Such a bilingual educational approach for entire immigrant families would decrease the separation between home and school and prevent identity conflicts. Furthermore, this would have a positive and motivating effect on immigrant students once they regularly attend "normal" (non-*DaF*) classrooms because it reduces the risk of feeling unwelcomed and misunderstood: According to Mo, his German peers enjoyed listening to

Turkish stories and things we don't do or we do and how we live and what holidays we celebrate. They also liked to try Turkish sweets because they are very different from the German ones. But I didn't get this interest in my home and culture from the very beginning. I had to fight for it and survive stupid comments about Muslims. I am sure that would not have happened if teachers would have had a different way of teaching. Because if teachers are already not interested in things about your culture, why would their [German] students be interested?!

⁹¹ Auf diesem Wege hätte meine Mutti einige deutsche Wörter gelernt und sie würde eine Vorstellung gehabt haben, wie die Schule hier [Deutschland] ist, wie es aussieht und warum Dinge nicht mit dem zu vergleichen sind, was sie von zu Hause [Türkei] kennt.

⁹² türkische Geschichten und Dinge, die wir nicht tun oder die wir tun und wie wir leben und welche Feiertage wir feiern. Sie mochten es auch, die türkischen Süßigkeiten zu probieren, weil sie sehr anders als die deutschen sind. Aber ich habe dieses Interesse an meiner Heimat und Kultur nicht von Anfang an bekommen. Ich musste dafür kämpfen und musste dumme Kommentare über Muslime überleben. Ich bin mir sicher, dass das nicht passiert wäre, wenn die Lehrer eine andere Unterrichtsmethode hätten. Denn wenn schon die Lehrer nicht interessiert sind, was die Dinge über deine Kultur betrifft, warum sollen ihre [deutschen] Schüler interessiert sein?!

Translating Mo's comment into educational policies and foreign language acquisition, schools should avoid *DaF* classes that isolate immigrant students physically and culturally and, hence, separate them from their peers. Instead, new teaching models need to embrace different cultures and religions of immigrant and nonimmigrant students (and even parents) and should be based on mutual learning experiences. Additionally, *DaF* lessons should focus on imparting non-grammar/language knowledge as well:

DaF needs to inform you about the German school system and what options you have after graduation and where you can see a doctor. There needs to be that practical part that helps you to survive. This is important and I don't think teachers realize that because they think I just talk to my parents about problems. But I can't because my parents know less than I do.⁹³

Although bicultural and bilingual immersion models would contribute to a mutual learning experience for immigrants as well as non-immigrants, it is difficult to implement in the case of Turkish and German: Turkish is not a desirable language for the majority of Germans. In contrast to languages such as French, English, and Spanish, the majority of Germans regards Turkish as less "chic" and less desirable to learn because of its post-9/11 associations linked to people of Middle Eastern descent.

⁹³ *DaF* muss dich über das deutsche Schulsystem informieren und welche Optionen du nach dem Abschluss hast und wo du einen Doktor finden kannst. Da muss es diesen praktischen Part geben, der dir hilft, zu überleben. Das ist wichtig und ich denke nicht, dass die Lehrer das realisieren, weil sie denken, dass ich einfach mit meinen Eltern über Probleme reden kann. Aber das kann ich nicht, denn meine Eltern wissen weniger als ich.

Educational Policy Recommendations

Policymakers need to focus on *Developmental Niche Theory*, *guan*, and *setting* when updating school curricula and teacher trainings. In addition to schools, parents and communities also need to be provided with special social services beyond schooling in order to achieve equal educational development. Furthermore, immigrant communities need to have enough financial capital to gain access to out-of-school resources. Accordingly, family income becomes a crucial factor for educating the future population for better social, political, cultural, and economic benefits for immigrants and, on a long-term basis, also non-immigrants (cf. Petronicolos et al. 381; cf. Suárez-Orozco et al., *Children of Immigration* 156; cf. Cummins 18). Income increase will

- (1) **provide** the opportunity to live in safer neighborhoods in which children are not exposed to violence, drug dealing, extreme poverty, etc. (cf. Pérez 11; cf. Sánchez et al. 7; cf. Feliciano 871),
- (2) **increase** the opportunity for items of enrichment and supervised out-of-school activities (cf. Lareau 757), and
- (3) **create** better physical and mental health conditions establishing well-integrated learning environments (cf. Berliner, “Our Impoverished View” 971-73; cf. Belizaire et al. 90; cf. Coll et al., *The Immigrant Paradox* 182).

Equal access to resources presupposes a certain financial status. Besides, money also facilitates social and cultural capital because it allows parents and children to acquire social, cultural, and political competences in the new home country (cf. Kao 173). Those capitals are linked to skill sets that are necessary for overcoming language barriers, assisting children with homework, and becoming part of the “mainstream” (German) society (cf. Bang 408-09; cf. Orellana, *Translating Childhoods* 57); especially when considering that homework often “crosses the divide between home

and school” (Orellana, *Translating Childhoods* 51) and “brings school into homes” (ibid.).

Providing access to school related information, German as second language courses, and other social, legal, and medical services in the native language of the immigrant families will result in faster integration progresses and insights about (Germany-related) regulations smoothing the integration process (cf. Suárez-Orozco et al., “Unraveling the Immigrant Paradox” 156; cf. Collier et al. 1, 11; cf. Nguyen et al. 1556). Moreover, community services help immigrant families to establish networks and forms of capitals providing better opportunities for prospective employment and, consequently, more family income (cf. Casanova 397; cf. Hagelskamp et al. 735). Especially shortly after immigration, it is indispensable to offer those services to guarantee access to well-paid jobs for immigrant parents as soon as possible: An increase of \$1,000 for families of the lowest education group will result in \$51 spent on items of enrichment for their children (cf. Duncan et al. 196) (see Figure 5). The sooner immigrant families’ income rises, the sooner they will be financially independent and the more well-prepared are their children for high(er) educational achievement because of

- (1) safer and affordable** neighborhoods (cf. Yoshikawa et al. 293),
- (2) access** to (often expensive) resources and exposure not provided by the schools (such as tutoring) (cf. Berliner, “Effects of Inequality” 7), and
- (3) medical treatment** (physical and mental health) providing stable learning and living conditions through affordable health insurance (cf. Berliner, “Our Impoverished View” 971).

PIC SAM guidelines and community-based services, combined with medical and social services, ease the way of integration for parents and children in schools, society, and the job market (cf. K. Brown et al. 86). Additionally, those community-

based services can be individually tailored and directly targeted to the unique cultural, political, social, linguistic, and religious circumstances of immigrant families and their pre- and post-immigration experiences (cf. Belizaire et al. 95; cf. Velasco 258). This also corresponds to the idea of acting glocally by “connecting bridges between home and school” (Velasco 258; cf. Sánchez et al. 11-12) in order to fight immigration-based poverty, inequality, and racism. Easier accessible community-support services through bilingual documents and contact persons will provide immigrant families with access to resources in forms of medical and psychological services (cf. Stanton-Salazar 207), regular meals, proper clothing, textbooks, and learning materials (cf. Oakes et al. 1971). It is essential, however, that those support systems are initiated for the long-run because immigrant families need to use those benefits in the long-run and need to develop language and other skills in order to know how and where to draw from what kind of resources in the future. Therefore, schools and neighborhoods need to be connected in order to establish a trustworthy and comforting connection between community and school personnel in order to access services immigrant parents, students, *and* educators can use for mutual interaction and support (cf. Coll et al., *The Immigrant Paradox* 192; cf. Stanton-Salazar 166-67).




Figure 5: As Family Income Rises, Expenditures on Items of Enrichment Rise

Expanding (already existing) community outreach programs and prospective after school initiatives requires long-term financial resources and better income to, first, create facilities in which school personnel and counselors can interact and, second, to provide proper bilingual and psychological training for educators and counselors. Educators, counselors, and other key actors need to communicate (in other languages) with immigrant families to understand their cultural backgrounds and possible immigration traumata affecting (social) interaction and acculturation processes and progresses (cf. Pong et al. 1552-53; cf. Suárez-Orozco et al., “Contributions to Variations” 508) (see Table 2). Correspondingly, the priority of community programs for recently arrived, traumatized, and insecure immigrants is to develop a trusting relationship between schools, support services, and immigrant families (cf. Coll et al., *The Immigrant Paradox* 196) in order to develop a comforting feeling of being appreciated and understood (linguistically, culturally, religiously, politically, and personally). As soon as this *F-connection* and networking has been established, immigrant parents will be more likely to attend school meetings, become involved, and will be comfortable enough to get involved (cf. Halpern 84). Accordingly, the (initial) contact between school, community services, (after school) outreach programs, and immigrant families should not necessarily be based on school curricula only. Instead, immigrant families need welcoming, multicultural, and bilingual community services including educators, psychologists, counselors, and translators. Those community-based programs need to include key actors with specific task allocations (see Table 2) that are individually tailored according to the respective (and often poor) (g)local community circumstances and needs (cf. Pérez 149-50):

key actors	responsibilities	short-term effects	long-term effects
translators	translating, overcoming language and culture barriers	immigrant families do not feel lost because of communication problems/lack of German language	realizing the importance of learning German in order to integrate into the new home/society and social and educational environment and <i>setting</i>
psychologists	analyzing, understanding, and properly treating pre- and post-immigration traumata	preventing never treated traumata leading to long-term psychological issues hindering learning abilities and integration	reducing risks of joining violent gangs due to untreated traumata, better cultural, political, and social integration
nurses/ doctors	providing first aid after immigration, checking children for vision and hearing (factors hindering learning ability and readiness)	immediately treating (minor) injuries turning into severe health problems hindering immigrants to properly learn, work, and integrate	less financial support from outside resources (government) needed because of healthier and well-integrated (immigrant) communities and families for a globally cooperative society and future generation
legal counselors	explaining rights and legal options for undocumented immigrants, job opportunities, application processes for legal papers	providing better chances for sooner employment, reducing the financial burden for governmental support of health services for low income families, faster integration through better resources/access to housing, social services, education, etc.	safer communities due to legal immigrants being able to work, earn money, and escaping poverty, need for supporting children in their educational attainment through items of enrichment and tutoring
educators	explaining the German school system, offering tutoring options, <i>DaF</i> classes, parent-teacher meetings and expectations, structure of standardized tests (for access to higher educational levels)	establishing a trusting relationship with immigrant families before school starts, contributing to schools not being regarded as enemy but resource for better (socioeconomic) life and future	reducing early dropout rates, preventing children from being delinquent, securing higher education, reducing the risk of being unemployed, better chance of exiting vicious circle of living in poor and unsafe (immigrant) neighborhoods

Table 2: Key Actors & Task Allocations for Community-Based Programs for Immigrant Families

Theoretically, these key actors and their respective responsibilities would highly contribute to an easier integration for immigrant families and a smoother transition into a new cultural and social (learning) environment. The combination would also provide a proper treatment of possible post-immigration experiences and (culture) shocks as well as pre-immigration experiences causing certain social behaviors, burdens, and misunderstandings. On a long-term basis, those integrative community initiatives would positively transform (German) society's challenges caused by growing cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity into a glocal society benefitting from multicultural dynamics, economy, politics, and education.

The practical implementation, however, is complicated. It is challenging to socially and culturally realize those community programs with such a variety of (expertise) key actors such as legal advisors, psychologists, and translators because of the lack of financial resources for institutions offering such services, proper salary for the key actors, and advanced trainings. Even though the funding of such programs constitutes an enormous financial burden for the government on a local as well as national level, it is necessary to provide more financial support for such community-based programs *now*. In this way, extensive funding in the future can be avoided: because well-educated and well-integrated communities require less financial aid on a long-term basis because they will have enough own (financial) resources and capitals for self-help. Consequently, it will be a long-term investment benefitting the local society as well as its new locals (immigrants).

Concluding the Nitty-Gritty

The case and theoretical frameworks such as *setting*, *guan*, adapted forms of CRT, and *Developmental Niche Theory* emphasize the necessity to restructure second language courses and to regard language as part of one's respective cultural and religious identity. Considering language as a personal and cultural form of expression, *DaF* courses need to contain multicultural approaches that do not separate immigrant and nonimmigrant students. Instead, *DaF* courses' curricula and intentions should be based on mutual co-learning experiences within and outside the school context. Co-learning should also happen between students and educators as well as between immigrant and nonimmigrant parents since this might avoid intercultural and prejudiced pre-assumptions due to a lack of knowledge about the respective religious and cultural ideology and mentality. Hence, key actors and communities need to be (made) aware of oppositional attitudes related to, for instance, the threat of the headscarf and "Islamization."

Despite the need for an update of CRT and school and *DaF* curricula, there is no need to develop a completely new second language acquisition program for immigrant students. Rather, there is an urgent demand for expanding the already existing *DaF* programs and (re)adjust those for the (g)localized circumstances. Accordingly, second language courses have to cover linguistic (grammar) *and* social components while also offering time and space for additional services such as legal and psychological support, as Mo also mentioned:

Language is one thing. But being fluent in German doesn't mean that you know how to properly act and communicate in a doctor's office or in a bank. They just don't teach you what you really need outside the classroom. And there is nobody you can ask because the [*DaF*] teachers are only responsible for [German] grammar, vocabularies, and sentence structures. And if you ask

them for help outside of the school, they usually don't find the time to do so because, I guess, it's not part of their job.⁹⁴

Finally, the case demonstrates that immigrant students' main problems are not only related to language acquisition: The problems are more complex and include the daily usage of language as a form of social and intercultural expression and (proper) interaction outside the *DaF* classroom. Those language factors depend on cultural and religious codes and norms and cannot be learned through grammar instructions only. If *DaF* courses integrate this cultural component, students, teachers, and parents will understand where immigrant and nonimmigrant dissimilarities originate from. On a long-term scale, this mutual learning will decrease prejudices and racist attitudes based on false assumptions and ignorance within the classroom and, hence, also within communities. During the interview, Mo commented on racism and isolation he faced within school *and* outside of school. The racism he experienced was mainly based on "a lack of knowledge and the assumption that all the people from our [Muslim] religion are terrorists."⁹⁵ According to Mo, the only way to exit exclusion and racism was to learn German as quickly as possible because

then you can just be part of the normal [non-*DaF*] classroom and you don't have to be afraid of being Othered because you are segregated and stuck in the *DaF* classroom. Although my class [*DaF*] was in the same school building; it was like being on a weird different planet far away from the normal guys.⁹⁶

Therefore, *DaF* curricula need to initiate a mutual learning atmosphere providing a safe space for diverse cultural, political, religious, and linguistic expressions

⁹⁴ Sprache ist eine Sache. Aber fließend in Deutsch sein, heißt nicht, dass du weißt, wie man beim Arzt oder in der Bank richtig handelt und kommuniziert. Sie unterrichten dich einfach nicht in dem, was du wirklich außerhalb des Klassenzimmers brauchst. Und da gibt es niemanden, den du fragen kannst, denn die [*DaF*] Lehrer sind nur für die [deutsche] Grammatik, Vokabeln und Satzstrukturen verantwortlich. Und wenn du sie um Hilfe fragst für außerhalb der Schule, finden sie in der Regel keine Zeit, weil, so denke ich, es nicht Teil ihres Jobs ist.

⁹⁵ Ein Mangel von Wissen und die Annahme, dass alle Leute von unserer (muslimischen) Religion Terroristen sind.

⁹⁶ Dann kannst du einfach Teil des normalen [nicht-*DaF*] Klassenzimmers sein und du musst keine Angst haben, dass du anders angeguckt wirst, weil du ausgeschlossen und festgetackert im *DaF*-Klassenzimmer bist. Auch wenn meine Klasse [*DaF*] im gleichen Schulgebäude war; es war als ob man auf einem anderen seltsamen Planeten weit weg von den normalen Leuten ist.

contributing to an intercultural identity formation and learning environment neither Othering locals nor immigrants.

Furthermore, other subjects (than *DaF*) also need to contribute to a mutual learning environment through diverse learning contents. However, progressive approaches such as connecting religions instead of separating them in the subject of religious studies in German schools often remain an experiment in only very few schools and grades (cf. Schipperges n. pag.): A high school in Hamburg and in Offenbach (close to Frankfurt am Main) had an evangelic Pastor, a Muslim theologist, a catholic religion teacher, as well as an *Ethics* teacher teach an eleventh and twelfth grade all together according to the motto “appreciating diversity—strengthening community”⁹⁷ (Schipperges n. pag.) and “talking with each other instead of talking about each other”⁹⁸ (ibid.). Although this approach is based on mutual exchange and dialogues and, hence, one step in the well-updated (multicultural and multireligious) learning and teaching environment, this experiment only lasted for one school year because of the impossible implementation with the centralized school leaving examination for German high schools (cf. ibid.). Even though initially well-intended, those experiments showcase hidden racism and a reproduction of the dominant ISA’s norms and ideologies because of three paradoxes:

- (1) The paradox of the (pretended) willingness to adjust to new multireligious classroom dynamics, while, simultaneously, not adjusting centralized examinations.
- (2) The paradox that there are yet ongoing debates about allowing or banning veils and crucifixes in classrooms.⁹⁹
- (3) The paradox of still separating state and church in German school curricula, except if religious education contents are catholic or evangelic.

⁹⁷ “Verschiedenheit achten—Gemeinschaft stärken.“

⁹⁸ “sprechen miteinander statt übereinander“

⁹⁹ There is a blurry line between culture and religion. Therefore, crucifixes and other symbols related to Christianity are part of the German belonging. However, Muslim traditions and symbol are “considered to be outside traditional German cultures” (Korteweg et al. 159). Hence, German school-related political sanctions argue that the freedom of religious affiliation is “jeopardized when Muslim teachers are allowed to wear the headscarf, but not when Christian [...] symbols are present” (ibid.).

Chapter Eleven

Outlook and Conclusion: Striving for Glocal Awareness and Activist Change

Although creating glocal curricula that embrace multiple cultures, languages, and religions equally seems to be a bottomless pit, it is innovative and properly adapted education that will make a major difference on a long-term scale: Independent from ever shifting dynamics in economy, politics, and society, education can never be taken by any political regime or economic downturn. Education is a local investment that can be applied globally. Education is a powerful tool to combine locality and globality within societies if cross-generational and cross-cultural (including various religions and identities) are heeded and bridge immigrant and non-immigrant communities. Several studies indicate that the earlier cross-cultural integration and awareness is taught and experienced, the less prejudices and segregation occur in higher grade levels and after school (cf. Short et al. 495; cf. Turney et al. 257; cf. Padilla et al. 122). An early acclimatization is also essential for the development of a well-integrated social climate beyond school: The better the cultural integration, the better the academic outcomes and socially- and financially-valid capitals. Consequently, the future for immigrants and Germans will be more promising because a well-functioning multicultural society with qualified personnel (cf. Suárez-Orozco et al., *Children of Immigration* 117) faces less problems related to crime, violence, and social injustices linked to unemployment and a lack of proper acculturation on both sides (cf. Portes et al. 206-07).

Germany will face even more immigrants and refugees who will eventually become “an increasing proportion of the workforce” (Alba et al. 397). Yet statistically, immigrants’ chances of earning a degree above the secondary educational

level is much lower when compared to non-immigrants (cf. 399). This diminishes the chances for apprenticeships, employment, and economic, political, and cultural integration. Therefore, it is necessary to educate immigrant families properly for a glocal and mutual cooperation of a rather newly emerging immigration nation. Narrowing the achievement gap in school and after graduation requires integration of children *and* parents. Since the majority of immigrant parents lack education from their home country (cf. 400-01) as well as information about the German school system, they cannot assist their children (cf. 401; cf. Gándara et al., “Immigration” 760; cf. Coll, *Immigrant Stories* 99). Furthermore, immigrant parents are not familiar with the German language, which complicates any kind of social support based on communication and interaction with, for example, school personnel (cf. Alba et al. 401). Although *DaF* programs seem to be a suitable opportunity for children and parents to acquire German, they often remain inaccessible for the majority of immigrant families because of the following reasons: First, they are too expensive (cf. Vitzthum n. pag.). Second, they have only limited spots (cf. Kreller n. pag.). Third, they often clash with the children’s class schedule (cf. Menkens n. pag.). Consequently, *DaF* programs need to become part of the daily public school curricula.

In addition, *DaF* courses and other learning subjects need to overcome segregation caused by non-bilingual, non-bicultural, and/or non-bireligious programs. It is one of the most prevalent challenges to integrate immigrants and non-immigrants within one classroom and to guarantee equally beneficial educational outcomes. Teaching *DaF*, factual knowledge, and cultural aspects successfully bridges multicultural heritages and identities. This can only be implemented if classroom and schoolyard segregation are avoided through integrative curricula that forge cross-

cultural networks (cf. Dryden-Peterson 2324). In this way, Germans learn more about their Middle Eastern classmates' heritage and language and vice versa. This approach fosters an open-minded atmosphere and better learning outcomes, which benefits teachers, students, parents, and society (cf. Medvedeva 942; cf. Kiang et al. 760; cf. Carhill et al. 1158; cf. Collier et al. 1; cf. Calderón et al. 115-16).

Several studies and the case of Mo also prove that spatial isolation or “schools within schools” (A. Wells et al. 2151) through being taught *DaF* in a different building apart from German students results in exclusion, discrimination, and prejudices instead of uniting “newcomers” and Germans (cf. Dryden-Peterson 2346; cf. D. Parker 16; cf. Moll 452). Implementing socially, educationally, and culturally inclusive approaches demands bilingual educators from early on because students struggle the most with acquiring German in kindergarten and elementary school (cf. Kramer n. pag.). In addition, it also requires to not separate *DaF* learners but, instead, to integrate them from early on because, otherwise, it marginalizes immigrant students, which affects their educational achievement and integration progress.

The cases of Oscar and Mo and the adaptations of CRT to Critical Religion Theory based on frameworks from Cultural Studies and Educational Studies and concepts such as *Developmental Niche Theory*, *setting*, *F-connections*, and others, are particularly relevant in schools such as the *Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Schule* and the *Schule am Adler*: Those schools' *setting* is in an area that can be compared with, for instance, Idaho's rather “nontraditional destination” (Zúñiga et al. xiv) for immigrants. In those areas/schools, teachers, non-immigrant parents, and students feel highly uncomfortable with obvious identity markers such as the headscarf as well as its affiliated traditional, cultural, political, and religious values.

The headscarf continues to be the trigger for integration debates because the headscarf represents much more than simply a piece of clothing—it is a political item, a “threat to nationhood” (Korteweg et al. 1), and identity belonging. Are people with headscarves “Muslims, Islamists, immigrants, [...] or Germans” (ibid.)? The ongoing debates about where and when people should be allowed to wear headscarves have turned into a symbol of “rupture” (3) that challenges who belongs where in what way: In the context of integration, multiculturalism, and multireligionism, belonging “means being able to articulate complaint without renouncing the claim to belonging, or the freedom to complain about aspects of living somewhere without being told that you should leave” (ibid.). Since belonging is a political as well as a personal matter (cf. ibid.) on a regional level, it often excludes the (immigrant) “newcomers.” Instead, however, belonging should be “constituted through the very process of figuring out what [and who] can [...] be accommodated” (4).

Accordingly, it is not necessarily the headscarf itself that causes exclusion and racism—it is only the trigger for debates related to religious extremism, political ideology, and (not) belonging. Hence, the (Germany-/Europe-focused) redefinitions and updated versions of CRT, *setting*, and other frameworks consider the issue of segregation and racism in education and other sectors according to the cultural, traditional, political, social, and personal values, norm, morals, and lifestyles shaped by religion and not skin color. Although CRT also considers the intersections of race, law, and gender, it lacks the religious component, which cannot be ignored anymore. Before policies and curricula are altered accordingly, society and the ISA needs to become both: color-aware as well as headscarf-aware. Although it is pivotal to see the difference in order to treat it and embrace it correctly without ignoring it and its cultural values through not seeing it, seeing it too much often results in exclusion and

racially biased assumptions. It is complex and cannot be fixed with adapted forms of CRTs only. It can also not be fixed with adapted curricula only. Instead, it needs to be a blend of seeing it and not seeing it—education, politics, and society needs to develop glocal, interdisciplinary, cross-cultural, bilingual, and multireligious mindsets and awareness. And multi-faith prayer rooms do not guarantee integration: Instead of a multi-faith prayer room, schools rather need multi-embracing classrooms and curricula because multi-faith prayer rooms do not bridge integration between immigrants and non-immigrants.

The reoccurring debates about headscarves in Germany illustrate the lack of intercultural knowledge and understanding toward Others and their different clothing styles and lifestyles (cf. Şahin 9-10). In order to overcome this anti-attitude toward headscarf-wearing people, educators need to look at veils as part of the cultural language and communication. Integration is not single-sided and integration is also not merely the responsibility of immigrants. Integration is a mutual form of adapting to one another on various levels: culture, religion, values, ideologies, identities, and communication. Furthermore, communication is not solely about acquiring the German language because intercultural understanding begins with not judging headscarf-wearing women as Other, foreign, and not belonging (cf. 191, 415). Outer appearance and clothes are markers that carry meaning that is de- and encoded through (pre-taught) assumptions often formed by (biased, monocultural) curricula and misrepresentations within the media. Appearance can also be a symbol that pre-forms our perception of the Other (cf. 26-29, 35). Moreover, obvious markers cause prejudiced assumptions about social, financial, political, and educational status and capital (cf. 38-39, 193, 404). Those connotations depend on the social *setting* and the habitus immigrants and locals are exposed to (culturally, politically, socially,

economically, and educationally) (cf. 40-41, 94) through education, the ISA, policies, the media, etc.

Therefore, the central issue of the East versus West crisis is that *settings* and standards are predominantly Europeanized, Germanized, Americanized, and Westernized: Popular and influential German feminists such as Alice Schwarzer¹⁰⁰ assume that headscarves stand for oppression without considering the cultural, religious, or even fashion-related aspects behind the veils (cf. 100-02). The Islam, its fashion, as well as its traditions are regarded as “incompatible with Western values and incapable of adaptation” (Chin 195). This is a form of hidden racism and oppression of the ISA that presupposes its Westernized understanding of feminist freedom as ultimate truth: There is no multicultural aspect; there is only the Western norm that is forced on everyone who is part of this *setting*: “Muslim women can be emancipated only if they become Westernized. [...] women need to be emancipated by the West [...] in Germany and under Western cultural rules” (Korteweg et al. 162; cf. Chin 219, 227). In Germany, there are counter activist movements against those biased repressions such as “Muslimah Pride Day” (Şahin 103), “We don’t need you” (ibid.), or “Islam is my choice” (ibid.). Those counter movements are necessary to enforce activism as well as post-activism because racism, oppression, and anti-multiculturalism is still present, as Thilo Sarrazin’s¹⁰¹ quote (from 2009) about Berlin’s Muslim population proves:

*I do not have to respect anyone who lives on charity of the state, who rejects this state, who does not care for a proper apprenticeship of his children, and who constantly **produces small headscarf-girls**. This holds true for 70 percent of the Turks and for 90 percent of the **Arabic population**.* (409, italics and bold in original)

¹⁰⁰ Alice Schwarzer was born 1942 and is a German journalist and feminist. She is also the founder and publisher of the feminist magazine *EMMA*. Schwarzer is pro-headscarf ban in all public sectors.

¹⁰¹ Thilo Sarrazin was born in 1945. He is a German politician and served as senator of finance for the State of Berlin. 2010, Sarrazin published a book about the failure of Germany’s immigration policies; he harshly criticizes and rejects the idea of multiculturalism.

He continues, “[i]n particular female immigrants of Turkish origin are, because of their educational alienation, impossible to integrate due to the high birthrates and delinquency” (ibid.; cf. Korteweg et al. 13).

Capturing the new immigration waves and the complexity of immigration and the mixture of different cultures, religions, ideologies, and identities is challenging in a world that is mainly driven by a moneymaking economy that overarches almost every sector and that targets to create a uniform “it.” “It” means mainstream, adjusted, according to the norm, integrated, conforming to the main ideology, etc. Additionally, it is difficult to develop the *one* properly adjusted curriculum because every community, school, society, and classroom has different dynamics and different immigrant and non-immigrant background stories that need to be (re)considered. Furthermore, educators, politicians, and immigrant/non-immigrant families can always raise awareness about maintaining the uniqueness of cultures, traditions, languages, and religions. It is important to not judge and to not discount different cultures into “right versus wrong” and “us versus them.”

Yet, it is utopian to develop one proper curriculum for all individual circumstances. Hence, educators and policymakers should create several ones or, at least, leave educator’s enough freedom to individually adjust the scaffolding of multiculturally aware curricula. The main focus of newly-developed curricula should be mutual learning, understanding, and exchange in order to create an equal learning atmosphere free from privileged and underprivileged values. To achieve this, teacher education needs to be upgraded (already in university programs) and include diverse key actors and sectors (see Table 2) in order to give people from various backgrounds, cultures, and age groups a valid voice in (re)creating curricula. In this way, curricula contents, methods, and didactics will be more multi- and interculturally-balanced.

Creating those balanced and multiculturally aware curricula might also canvass whether multi-faith prayer rooms at schools are *really* a sign of tolerance for a globally integrated environment: Do multi-faith prayer rooms *really* contribute to integration or do schools just pretend to act globally in order to “belong” to the multiculturalism caused by immigration? This covert form of pretending to be headscarfblind (or colorblind), is not *really* hidden because educators, politicians, immigrant and non-immigrants students and parents are not surprised:

“When it [racism] comes out, they [faculty and students] aren’t that surprised that it is there.” Since the pervasiveness of racism and its impact on society is not a “surprise,” educational researchers should see the importance of examining the issues of race and racism within the school context. In so doing, the many Malcolms and Barbaras [Mos and Peters] will not continue to be silent or silenced when it comes to their school experiences with race and racism. Instead, research conducted through CRT analysis will allow for the deprivileging of mainstream discourses while simultaneously affording the voices, stories, and experiences of the many Malcolms, Barbaras, and Jasmynes [Mos and Peters] to come to the fore. (DeCuir et al. 30)

The reason nobody is *really* surprised that racism “continues to exist in Germany” (Korteweg et al. 145) (and other countries) is because nations seek to maintain their individual belonging. Immigrants and multiculturalism pose a threat to the local and familiar circumstances and, hence, the feeling of belonging. Nations often respond to such unknown threats with scapegoating and forms of right-wing activism that targets immigrants and refugees who are blamed for “robbing Germans of their jobs while [...] abusing the welfare system” (145). Racist depictions are also reinforced by non-right-wing politicians such as Sarrazin who blames Turkish immigrants for “*constantly produc[ing] small headscarf-girls*” (Şahin 409, italics and bold in original) and who stated in a television interview (in 2010), *Ossis* “were dumber than West Germans” (Korteweg et al. 144). Accordingly, such biased misrepresentations cause both, racism among Germans and non-Germans *as well as*

racism among Germans and Germans: “Whereas Osis and Wesis were each other’s “others,” [...] new immigrants became the “other” for all Germans” (ibid.).

Independent from the form of racism and who is Othered and racialized and, hence, inferior and who is not, racism increasingly shifts from (formerly) black versus white to East versus West: There are in-country struggles causing a crisis between East and West. While East was formerly referred to *Osis*, East now, additionally, refers to Middle Easterners. This shift is also expressed in a Berlin *Kreuzberg*¹⁰² saying “when the Wall came down, it collapsed on Turks” (145). Ever since, East versus West struggle with paradoxes and binary oppositions privileging one religion, identity, ideology, culture, religion, etc. over the other, which “is extremely problematic from the viewpoint of integration and exacerbates conflicts [and racism] instead of reducing them” (159).

The main problem of successfully adjusting school curricula theoretically and practically and integrating immigrants without forcing them to deny their identity based on personal, cultural, and religious values, is the West’s definition of belonging to the so-called *Leitkultur*. Especially Muslim women struggle between German and Islam identity and belonging:

I feel German, but excluded because I wear a headscarf. Religion has nothing to do with my own nationality. I can equally be a German woman as a Christian one. But others do not see it that way. [...] For me being German is not related to German blood or to being Christian. Unfortunately, I cannot say that I am German like everybody else because I am a Muslim woman. But being German is a part of my identity and being Muslim and being German do not represent a contradiction to me. (172-73)

This struggle of contradicting identities and belongings is relevant in the case of “foreigners” (people with immigration backgrounds that are not German) but also for inner-German conflicts between (former) East and West German identities. The cases

¹⁰² Berlin *Kreuzberg* is, similar to *Neukölln*, a borough with predominantly Turkish immigrants. The neighborhoods *Neukölln* and *Kreuzberg* are collateral. These two neighborhoods bordered the Wall before unification. They were both located in former West Germany.

of Mo and Oscar illustrate that racism based on ideologies that decide whether one belongs to the mainstream identity or not has always been problematic within societies and their state apparatuses. Although Oscar and Mo could not be more different from one another (age-wise, heritage-wise, education-wise), they both face(d) racism because of their identity and ideology that does not belong to the Westernized standards, lifestyles, educational systems, and ISA. Accordingly, the local cannot be disconnected from the global and vice versa and needs to be considered via and inner- and outer-struggles of regional, national, and international identities.

Concludingly, societies, politics, policies, and education (including teacher training) need to be updated and strive for global *and* local awareness, interdisciplinary, as well as intercultural pre- and post-activist (ex)change by picturing integration on the basis of **PIC SAM** in cooperation with key actors and community-centered programs for both, immigrant and non-immigrant families (see Table 2 and Chapter 10): **Provide** access to better integrated communities and social services, **Increase** the opportunity to out-of-school activities with peers, **Create** better physical and mental health conditions, **Safer** and affordable living and learning environments, **Access** to tutoring options and other resources, and **Medical** treatment that contributes to safe, stable, and healthy physical and mental living conditions after immigration. Besides the rather educational and social components of **PIC SAM**, legal matters also need to become part of the integration process and progress by realizing that “[i]ntegration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible” (Chin 90).

References

- Abraham, Margret, and Bandana Purkayastha. "Making a Difference: Linking Research and Action in Practice, Pedagogy, and Policy for Social Justice: Introduction." *Current Sociology* 60.2 (2012): 123-41. Print.
- Accadis International School Bad Homburg. "Preschool to Secondary School with Accedes—One Step Ahead." *Übersicht Gebühren und Beiträge. Accadis International School Bad Homburg*, 2015. Web. 29 July 2015.¹
- Ahmad, Aijaz. "The Politics of Culture." *Social Scientist* 27.9/10 (1999): 65-69. JSTOR. Web. 1 Sept. 2017.
- Alba, Richard, Jennifer Sloan, and Jessica Sperling. "The Integration Imperative: The Children of Low-Status Immigrants in the Schools of Wealthy Societies." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37.1 (2011): 395-415. Print.
- Albrecht, Maike. "Krach an der Uni Leipzig: Kirche wieder da, Rektor weg?" Unispiegel. *Spiegel Online*, 28 Jan. 2003. Web. 07 Apr. 2015.²
- Alexander, Claire. *Stuart Hall and 'Race.'* London: Routledge, 2011. Print.
- Alexander, Michelle. *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.* New York: New, 2011. Print.
- Alinsky, Saul D. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals.* New York (N.Y.): Vintage, 1989. Print.
- Allington, Richard L. "Literacy for All Children: Michael Doesn't Go down the Hall Anymore." *The Reading Teacher* 46.7 (1993): 602-04. JSTOR. Web. 05 Oct. 2015.
- Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays.* Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review, 1972. Print.
- . *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.* London: Verso, 2014. Print.
- Altmeier, Lisa. "Sprachverwirrung: Deutscher, Türke, Deutschtürke? – Oder Was?" *Gesellschaft. Zeit Online*, 18 Aug. 2012. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.³
- Alrabaa, Sami. "Die Türken in Deutschland sind eine Zeitbombe." *Politically Incorrect. Politically Incorrect*, 30 Mar. 2013. Web. 29 July 2015.⁴
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "The Politics of Identity." *Daedalus* 135.4 *On Identity* (2006): 15-22. JSTOR. Web. 1 Sept. 2017.
- Arnhold, Madlen. *Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.* Rep. Ifo Dresden, Jan. 2009. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.⁵

- Arzubiaga, Angela E., Alfredo J. Artiles, Kathleen A. King, and Nancy Harris-Murri. "Beyond Research on Cultural Minorities: Challenges and Implications of Research as Situated Cultural Practice." *Exceptional Children* 74.3 (2008): 309-27. Print.
- Aschaffenburg, Karen, and Ineke Maas. "Cultural and Educational Careers: The Dynamics of Social Reproduction." *American Sociological Review* 62.4 (1997): 573-87. *JSTOR*. Web. 29 Nov. 2015.
- Avineri, Shlomo. "Marx and the Intellectuals." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28.2 (1967): 269-78. *JSTOR*. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.
- Babe, Robert E. *Cultural Studies and Political Economy: Toward a New Integration*. Lanham: Lexington, 2010. Print.
- Baldwin, James. "Understanding Race and Privilege." *Social Justice* (2016): 1-7. Web. 23 Jan. 2019.
- Bang, Hee Jin. "Newcomer Immigrant Students' Perspectives on What Affects Their Homework Experiences." *The Journal of Educational Research* 104.6 (2011): 408-19. Print.
- Barskanmaz, Cengiz. "Rassismus, Postkolonialismus und Recht—Zu einer Deutschen "Critical Race Theory"" *Kritische Justiz* 41.3 (2008): 296-302. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.⁶
- BBC. "Sarkozy Speaks out Against Burka." *BBC News*. BBC, 22 June 2009. Web. 27 Nov. 2014.
- Belizaire, Lonette S., and Jairo N. Fuertes. "Attachment, Coping, Acculturative Stress, and Quality of Life Among Haitian Immigrants." *Journal of Counseling & Development* 89.1 (2011): 89-97. Print.
- Bell, Derrick. "Affirmative Action: Another Instance of Racial Workings in the United States." *The Journal of Negro Education* 69.1/2 (2000): 145-49. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- . *Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism*. New York: Basic, 1992. Print.
- Berliner, David C. "Effects of Inequality and Poverty vs. Teachers and Schooling on America's Youth." *Teachers College Record* 116.1 (2014): 1-15. Print.
- . "Our Impoverished View of Educational Research." *Teachers College Record* 108.6 (2006): 949-95. Print.
- Bierbrauer, Robin, and Philipp Saul. "Wendekinder – sind wir ein Volk?" *Zeit Online*. Die Zeit, 09 Nov. 2017. Web. 30 Oct. 2018.⁷
- Bird, Alexander, and James Ladyman, eds. *Arguing about Science*. London: Routledge, 2013. Print.

- Boneva, Bonka S., and Irene Hanson Frieze. "Toward a Concept of a Migrant Personality." *Journal of Social Issues* 57.3 (2001): 477-91. Print.
- Brayboy, Bryan McKinley Jones, Angelina E. Castagno, and Emma Maughan. "Chapter 6: Equality and Justice for All? Examining Race in Education Scholarship." *Review of Research in Education* 31.1 (2007): 159-94. Print.
- Brönstrup, Carsten. "Jeder zweite Türke ist Arbeitslos." Berlin. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 27 Aug. 2008. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.⁸
- Brown, Kathleen M., Jen Benkovitz, A. J. Muttillio, and Thad Urban. "Leading Schools of Excellence and Equity: Documenting Effective Strategies in Closing Achievement Gaps." *Teachers College Record* 113.1 (2011): 57-96. Print.
- Brown, Richard K. *Knowledge, Education, and Cultural Change; Papers in the Sociology of Education*. London: Tavistock, 1973. Print.
- Browne, Irene, ed. *Latinas and African American Women at Work: Race, Gender, and Economic Inequality*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999. Print.
- Bunch, George C. "Pedagogical Language Knowledge: Preparing Mainstream Teachers for English Learners in the New Standards Era." *Review of Research in Education* 37.1 (2013): 298-341. Print.
- Burchardi, Konrad B., and Tarek A. Hassan. *The Economic Impact of Social Ties: Evidence from German Reunification*. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2011. Print.
- Burgett, Bruce, and Glenn Hendler. *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*. New York: New York UP, 2007. Print.
- Caprez-Krompæk, Edina. *Entwicklung der Erst- und Zweitsprache im Interkulturellen Kontext: Eine Empirische Untersuchung über den Einfluss des Unterrichts in Heimatlicher Sprache und Kultur (HSK) auf die Sprachentwicklung*. Münster: Waxmann, 2010. Print.⁹
- Calderón, Margarita, Robert Slavin, and Marta Sánchez. "Effective Instruction for English Learners." *The Future of Children* 21.1 (2011): 103-27. Print.
- Carhill, Avary, Carola Suárez-Orozco, and Mariela Páez. "Explaining English Language Proficiency among Adolescent Immigrant Students." *American Educational Research Journal* 45.4 (2008): 1155-79. Print.
- Casanova, Saskias. "The Stigmatization and Resilience of a Female Indigenous Mexican Immigrant." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 34.3 (2012): 375-403. Print.
- Césaire, Aimé. *Discourse on Colonialism*. Trans. Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review, 2001. Print.

- Chin, Rita. *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History*. Princeton: Princeton U Press, 2017. Print.
- Chiu, Yu-Wai, and Jeffrey M. Ring. "Chinese and Vietnamese Immigrant Adolescents under Pressure: Identifying Stressors and Interventions." *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice* 29.5 (1998): 444-49. Print.
- Coleman, James S. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): S95-120. Print.
- Coll, Cynthia García, and Amy Kerivan Marks. *The Immigrant Paradox in Children and Adolescents: Is Becoming American a Developmental Risk?* 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2012. Print.
- and Amy Kerivan Marks. *Immigrant Stories: Ethnicity and Academics in Middle Childhood*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
- Collier, Virginia P., and Wayne P. Thomas N. "The Astounding Effectiveness of Dual Language Education for All." *NABE Journal of Research and Practice* 2.1 (2004): 1-20. Print.
- Cox, Kevin R. "Illusion, Reality, and the Politics of Place." *The Good Society* 10.2 (2001): 12-15. *JSTOR*. Web. 2 Sept. 2017.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds. *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*. New York: New, 1995. Print.
- Crossland, David. "German Turks No Longer Feel Welcome." Europe. *The National*, 31 Aug. 2012. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
- Cummins, Jim. *Negotiating Identities: Education for Empowerment in a Diverse Society*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: California Association for Bilingual Education, 2001. Print.
- Das Islamische Portal. "Niederländischer Politiker Geert Wilders beleidigt Islam als "Kranke Ideologie von Allah und Mohammed"" Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş. *Das Islamische Portal*, 09 Aug. 2007. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.¹⁰
- Davis, Olga I., Thomas K. Nakayama, and Judith N. Martin. "Current and Future Directions in Ethnicity and Methodology." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 24.5 (2000): 525-39. Print.
- DeCuir, Jessica T., and Adrienne D. Dixon. ""So When It Comes Out, They Aren't That Surprised That It Is There": Using Critical Race Theory as a Tool of Analysis of Race and Racism in Education." *Educational Researcher* 33.5 (2004): 26-31. Print.
- de Jong, Ester J., and Candace A. Harper. "Preparing Mainstream Teachers for English Language Learners: Is Being a Good Teacher Good Enough?" *Teacher Education Quarterly* Spring (2005): 101-24. Print.

- Delgado, Richard, and Jean Stefancic. "Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography." *Virginia Law Review* 79.2 (1993): 461-516. JSTOR. Web. 01 May 2015.
- *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. New York: New York UP, 2012. Print.
- Dempsey, Judy. "A Difficult Choice for Turks in Germany." Letter from Europe. *The New York Times*, 15 Apr. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
- Desimone, Laura M., and Daniel Long. "Teacher Effects and the Achievement Gap: Do Teacher and Teaching Quality Influence the Achievement Gap between Black and White and High- and Low-SES Students in the Early Grades?" *Teachers College Record* 112.12 (2010): 3024-73. Print.
- Detjen, Joachim. *Politische Bildung: Geschichte und Gegenwart in Deutschland*. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2013. Print.¹¹
- Deutsch Türkisches Journal. "11 Deutsch-Türken ziehen in den Deutschen Bundestag ein." DTJ Online. *Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, 23 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 June 2015.
- "Politische Instabilität könnte Einkommensstruktur schädigen. Türkei: Unruhen beeinflussen die Wirtschaft negativ." DTJ Online. *Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, 10 June 2013. Web. 29 July 2015.¹²
- Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten. "Soziale Unruhen 2014: Türkei gehört jetzt zu den Hoch-Risiko-Staaten." Gesellschaft. *Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten*, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 29 July 2015.
- "Weg aus Deutschland: Fast 200.000 Türken gehen in vier Jahren." Rückwanderung. *Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten*, 14 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.¹³
- DiCerbo, Patricia A., Kristina A. Anstrom, Lottie L. Baker, and Charlene Rivera. "A Review of the Literature on Teaching Academic English to English Language Learners." *Review of Educational Research* 84.3 (2014): 446-82. Print.
- Die Welt. "Schule muss Gebetsraum für Muslime Organisieren." *Politik—Urteil in Berlin. Die Welt*, 29 Sept. 2009. Web. 27 June 2015.¹⁴
- Dion, Karen K., and Kenneth L. Dion. "Gender and Cultural Adaptations in Immigrant Families." *Journal of Social Issues* 57.3 (2001): 511-21. Print.
- Dörfler, Thomas. "On the Problematics between Eastern and Western Germany." *Thomas Dörfler—On the Problematics between Eastern and Western Germany*. Academia.edu, 27 Jan. 2015. Web. 02 May 2015.
- Dryden-Peterson, Sarah. "Bridging Home: Building Relationships between Immigrant and Long-Time Resident Youth." *Teachers College Record* 112.9 (2010): 2320-51. Print.

- du Gay, Paul, Stuart Hall, Linda Janes, Hugh Mackay, and Keith Negus. *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2013. Print.
- Duncan, Greg J., and Richard J. Murnane, eds. *Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children's Life Chances*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011. Print.
- Duthel, Heinz. *Islam in Deutschland: So sieht die Zukunft Deutschlands und Europa aus*. Norderstedt: on Demand, 2013. Print.¹⁵
- Eagleton, Terry. *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso, 1991. Print.
- Elias, Norbert. *On Civilization, Power, and Knowledge*. Ed. Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago, 1998. Print.
- Espinoza, Roberta. *Pivotal Moments: How Educators Can Put All Students on the Path to College*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education, 2011. Print.
- Fan, Stephen Shie-Wei. "Immigration Law and the Promise of Critical Race Theory: Opening the Academy to the Choices of Aliens and Immigrants." *Columbia Law Review* 97.4 (1997): 1202-40. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove, 2008. Print.
- Feagin, Joe, and Sean Elias. "Rethinking Racial Formation: A Systematic Racism Critique." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36.6 (2013): 931-60. Print.
- Featherstone, Mike, Roland Robertson, and Scott Lash. *Global Modernities*. London: Sage, 1997. Print.
- Feliciano, Cynthia. "The Benefits of Biculturalism: Exposure to Immigrant Culture and Dropping out of School among Asian and Latino Youths." *Social Science Quarterly* 82.4 (2001): 865-79. Print.
- Fisher, Douglas. "This Issue: Inclusive Schooling Practices: From Why to How." *Theory into Practice* 45.3 (2006): 205-06. *JSTOR*. Web. 05 Oct. 2015.
- Francese, Joseph. *Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social Theory*. London: Routledge, 2009. Print.
- Freeman, Rebecca. "Contextual Challenges to Dual-Language Education: A Case Study of a Developing Middle School Program." *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 31.2 (2000): 202-29. Print.
- Fulbrook, Mary. "Popular Discontent and Political Activism in the GDR." *Contemporary European History* 2.3 (1993): 265-82. *JSTOR*. Web. 2 May 2015.

- Furth, Hans G. *Desire for Society: Children's Knowledge as Social Imagination*. New York: Plenum, 1996. Print.
- Fuss, Diana. "Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification." *Diacritics* 24.2/3 (1994): 19-42. JSTOR. Web. 01. Sept. 2017.
- Gándara, Patricia, and Megan Hopkins. *Forbidden Language: English Learners and Restrictive Language Policies*. New York: Teachers College, 2010. Print.
- and Russeell W. Rumberger. "Immigration, Language, and Education: How Does Language Policy Structure Opportunity?" *Teachers College Record*. 111.3 (2009): 750-82. Print.
- Geißler, Rainer, and Sonja Weber-Menges. "Migrantenkinder im Bildungssystem: Doppelt Benachteiligt." *Bildung und Chancen*. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 24 Nov. 2008. Web. 26 June 2015.¹⁶
- Gerstl-Pepin, Cynthia I. "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Media, Democracy, and the Politics of Education." *Peabody Journal of Education* 82.1. (2007): 1-9. JSTOR. Web. 12 Feb. 2018.
- Gestwicki, Carol. *Home, School, & Community Relations*. 8th ed. Boston MA: Wadsworth Engage Learning, 2013. Print.
- Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*. Berkeley: U of California, 2007. Print.
- Gökariksel, Banu, and Anna Secor. "The Veil, Desire, and the Gaze: Turning the Inside Out." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 40.1 (2014): 177-200. JSTOR. Web. 11 Feb. 2018.
- Goode, Joshua. *Impurity of Blood: Defining Race in Spain, 1870-1930*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2009. Print.
- Goodrich, Lauren, and Marc Lanthemann. "The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy Strategy." *Geopolitical Weekly*. Strat for Global Intelligence, 12 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015.
- Goodstein, Laurie. "Forecast Sees Muslim Population Leveling Off." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 27 Jan. 2011. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. Print.
- Gurevitch, Michael. "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies." *Culture, Society, and the Media*. Ed. Tony Bennett, James Curran, and Janet Woollacott. London: Methuen, 1982. 56-90. Print.

- Hagelskamp, Carolin, Carola Suárez-Orozco, and Diane Hughes. "Migrating to Opportunities: How Family Migration Motivations Shape Academic Trajectories among Newcomer Immigrant Youth." *Journal of Social Issues* 66.4 (2010): 717-39. Print.
- Hall, Stuart. *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. Ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. London: Routledge, 1996. Print.
- "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates." *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 2.2 (1985): 91-114. Print.
- Halpern, Robert. "After-School Programs for Low-Income Children: Promise and Challenges." *The Future of Children* 9.2 (1999): 81-95. Print.
- Han, Béatrice. *Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical*. Trans. Edward Pile. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. Print.
- Haney-López, Ian F. "The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice." *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 29 (1994): 1-62. Web.
- Harmsen, Torsten. "Der Geist der Gesprengten Paulinerkirche." Streit in Sachsen: Der Leipziger Uni-Rektor tritt Zurück. *Berliner Zeitung*, 31 Jan. 2003. Web. 26 Apr. 2015.¹⁷
- Harris, Cheryl I. "Whiteness as Property." *Harvard Law Review* 106.8 (1993): 1707-91. *JSTOR*. Web. 26 Apr. 2015.
- Hatlapa, Ruth, and Andrei S. Markovits. "Obamamania and Anti-Americanism as Complementary Concepts in Contemporary German Discourse." *German Politics & Society Ger Polit Soc* 28.1 (2010): 69-94. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 July 2015.
- Hawkins, Simon. "Hijab: Feminine Allure and Charm to Men in Tunis." *Ethnology* 47.1 (2008): 1-21. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Feb. 2018.
- Hebel, Christina, and Christina Elmer. "Muslime integrieren sich, Deutsche schotten sich ab." Politik. *Spiegel Online*, 8 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.¹⁸
- Heider, Don. *White News: Why Local News Programs Don't Cover People of Color*. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L., and Vesla Weaver. "The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order." *Social Forces* 86.2 (2007): 643-70. Print.
- Hofstein, Francis. "The Institution of Lacan." *Group* 34.2 (2010): 165-73. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Feb. 2018.
- Holzwarth, Henrike. "Fast so viele Muttersprachen wie Schüler—Sprachliche Integration in Deutschland." *Mehrsprachigkeit—Sprachen ohne Grenzen*. Goethe-Institut, Mar. 2009. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.¹⁹

- Hooks, Bell. *Belonging: A Culture of Place*. New York: Routledge, 2009. Print.
- Horrocks, David, and Eva Kolinsky. *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1996. Print.
- Horvat, Erin McNamara, and Carla O'Connor. *Beyond Acting White: Reframing the Debate on Black Student Achievement*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Print.
- Hunter, James Davison. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics*. New York: Basic, 1991. Print.
- Hussein, Abdirahman A. *Edward Said: Criticism and Society*. London: Verso, 2004. Print.
- Içduygu, Ahmet, and Deniz Sert. "Historical Trends in Emigration and Immigration." *Focus-Migration: Turkey (Update 04 2009)*. Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsinstitut, Apr. 2009. Web. 19 Apr. 2015.
- Iskander, Adel, and Hakem Rustom. *Edward Said: A Legacy of Emancipation and Representation*. Berkeley: U of California, 2010. Print.
- Isserles, Robin, and Heather Dalmage. "Cultural Capital as Rules and Resistance: Bringing It Home in the Introductory Classroom." *Teaching Sociology* 28.2 (2000): 160-65. Print.
- Jackson, Paul. *DDR, Das Ende eines Staates*. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1994. Print.²⁰
- Jensen, Robert. *The Heart of Whiteness: Confronting Race, Racism, and White Privilege*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights, 2005. Print.
- Kaiser, Stefan. "Sozialleistungen für Zuwanderer: Das bekommen Ausländer in Deutschland." *Wirtschaft. Spiegel Online*, 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 29 July 2015.²¹
- Kao, Grace. "Social Capital and Its Relevance to Minority and Immigrant Populations." *Sociology of Education* 77.2 (2004): 172-75. Print.
- Kreller, Anika. "Draußen vor der Tür." *Gesellschaft. Zeit Online*, 19 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.²²
- Khan, Mussarat, and Kathryn Ecklund. "Attitudes Toward Muslim Americans Post-9/11." *Journal of Muslim Mental Health* 7.1 (2012): 1-16. Print.
- Kiang, Lisa, Jamie Lee Peterson, and Taylor L. Thompson. "Ethnic Peer Preferences Among Asian American Adolescents in Emerging Immigrant Communities." *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 21.4 (2011): 754-61. Print.

- Kirst, Michael W., and Edith K. Mosher. "Politics of Education." *Review of Educational Research* 39.5, Methodology of Educational Research (1969): 623-40. *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Feb. 2018.
- Köhler, Benjamin. "FreiRaum Ostdeutschland: Zwischen Transformation und Umbruch." *Krisen, Umbrüche und Wandel*. Soziologie Magazin Publizieren statt Archivieren, 3 July 2011. Web. 21 July 2015.²³
- Korteweg, Anna C., and Gökçe Yurdakul. *The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2014. Print.
- Kramer, Bernd. "Quotenforderung im Check: Schaden Flüchtlinge Wirklich Deutschen Schülern?" *Schulspiegel*. *Spiegel Online*, 16 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.²⁴
- Krips, Henry. "Fetish and the Native Subject." *boundary 2* 24.1 (1997): 113-36. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Feb. 2018.
- Küchler, Laura. "Auch ohne EU-Beitritt und Pass: Sozialleistungen für alle Türken in der EU." *Hintergründe*. *Kopp Online*, 2 June 2012. Web. 29 July 2015.²⁵
- Laclau, Ernesto. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso, 2005. Print.
- Ladson-Billings, Gloria. "Just What Is Critical Race Theory, and What's It Doing in a Nice Field Like Education?" *Race Is...Race Isn't: Critical Race Theory and Qualitative Studies in Education*. By Laurence Parker and Donna Deyhle. Ed. 3 Sofia Villenas. Boulder: Westview, 1999. 7-30. Print.
- Lareau, Annette. "Invisible Inequality: Social Class and Childrearing in Black Families and White Families." *American Sociological Review* 67.5 (2002): 747-76. Print.
- Lau, Jörg. "Warum Muslimische Gebetsräume nicht in unsere Schulen gehören." Ein Blog über Religion und Politik. *Zeit Online*, 28 May 2010. Web. 27 June 2015.²⁶
- Lauer, C., D. Siems, and D. Ehrentraut. "Türken sind die Sorgenkinder der Integration." *Politik: Migrantenstudie*. *Die Welt*, 17 Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.²⁷
- Lazos Vargas, Sylvia R. "Critical Race Theory in Education: Theory, Praxis, and Recommendations." *Counterpoints* 195 (2003): 1-18. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Lentricchia, Frank, and Thomas McLaughlin, eds. *Critical Terms for Literary Study*. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1995. Print.
- LeVine, Mark. *Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam*. New York: Three Rivers, 2008. Print.

- Leyton, Daniel. "Social Structure, Its Epistemological Uses, and the Construction of the Subject in Bourdieu's Sociology." *Universum* 29.2 (2014): 169-83. Print.
- Light, Ivan Hubert., and Steven J. Gold. *Ethnic Economies*. San Diego: Academic, 2000. Print.
- Lightfoot, Jonathan. "Race, Class, Gender, Intelligence, and Religion Perspectives." *Race, Gender & Class* 17.1/2 (2010): 31-38. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Lindquist, Julie. "Class Ethos and the Politics of Inquiry: What the Barroom Can Teach Us about the Classroom." *College Composition and Communication* 51.2 (1999): 225-47. *JSTOR*. Web. 1 Sept. 2017.
- Lynn, Marvin, and Laurence Parker. "Critical Race Studies in Education: Examining a Decade of Research on U.S. Schools." *The Urban Review* 38.4 (2006): 257-90. Print.
- Macedo, Donaldo P., and Panayota Gounari, eds. *The Globalization of Racism*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2006. Print.
- MacLeod, Jay. *Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood*. 3rd ed. Boulder: Westview, 2009. Print.
- Mar-Molinero, Clare, and Patrick Stevenson, eds. *Language Ideologies, Policies and Practices: Language and the Future of Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.
- Marx, Karl. "Part I: Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook: Idealism and Materialism." *The German Ideology*. Marxists.org, n.d. Web. 06 Mar. 2016.
- McNulty, Tracy. "The Other Jouissance, A Gay Sçavoir." *Qui Parle* 9.2 (1996): 126-59. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Feb. 2018.
- Medvedeva, Maria. "Perceived Discrimination and Linguistic Adaptation of Adolescent Children of Immigrants." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 39.8 (2010): 940-52. Print.
- Mehrotra, Meeta, and Toni M. Calasanti. "The Family as a Site for Gendered Ethnic Identity Work Among Asian Indian Immigrants." *Journal of Family Issues* 31.6 (2010): 778-807. Print.
- Menkens, Sabine. "Wie Flüchtlingskinder in Willkommensklassen Lernen." *Politik. Zeit Online*, 14 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.²⁸
- Milbank, John, Slavoj Žižek, and Creston Davis. *Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010. Print.

- Moll, Luis C. "Mobilizing Culture, Language, and Educational Practices: Fulfilling the Promises of Mendez and Brown." *Educational Researcher* 39.6 (2010): 451-60. Print.
- Mowafi, M., and M. Khawaja. "Poverty." *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 59.4 (2005): 260-64. JSTOR. Web. 28 Nov. 2015.
- Morris, Meaghan, and Mette Hjort. *Creativity and Academic Activism: Instituting Cultural Studies*. Durham: Duke UP, 2012. Print.
- Moses, Michelle S. "Chapter 1: The Heart of the Matter: Philosophy and Educational Research." *Review of Research in Education* 26.1 (2002): 1-21. Print.
- Mueller, Claus. "Integrating Turkish Communities: A German Dilemma." *Population Research and Policy Review* 25.5-6 (2007): 419-41. JSTOR. Web. 19 Apr. 2015.
- Musharbash, Yassin. "Islamophobia is Racism, Pure and Simple." *The Guardian*. The Guardian, 10 Dec. 2014. Web. 8 Jan. 2018.
- Nash, Roy. "Bourdieu on Education and Social and Cultural Reproduction." *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 11.4 (1990): 431-47. JSTOR. Web. 11 Dec. 2015.
- National Geographic. "Types of Migration." What is Human Migration? (2001): Xpeditions. *National Geographic*, 2005. Web. 6 Nov. 2015.
- Nelson, Cara, and Lawrence Grossberg, eds. *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois, 1988. Print.
- Neubacher, Alexander, and Michael Sauga. "Germany's Disappointing Reunification: How the East was Lost." *Spiegel Online*. Spiegel Online International, 1 July 2010. Web. 21 July 2015.
- Nguyen, Hien, Jennine S. Rawana, and David B. Flora. "Risk and Protective Predictors of Trajectories of Depressive Symptoms Among Adolescents from Immigrant Backgrounds." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 40.11 (2011): 1544-58. Print.
- Norddeutscher Rundfunk. "Hintergrund: Flüchtlinge in Norddeutschland." *Nachrichten. Norddeutscher Rundfunk*, 3 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 Feb. 2016.²⁹
- Norris, Norman Dale. *The Promise and Failure of Progressive Education*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Education, 2004. Print.
- Oakes, Jeannie, and Marisa Saunders. "Education's Most Basic Tools: Access to Textbooks and Instructional Materials in California's Public Schools." *Teachers College Record* 106.10 (2004): 1967-88. Print.

- Orellana, Marjorie Faulstich. "Bilingual Youth: Language Demands of a Globalized Future." The Blog. *The Huffington Post*, 17 Oct. 2011. Web. 04 Aug. 2015.
- . *Translating Childhoods: Immigrant Youth, Language, and Culture*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2009. Print.
- Oxford English Dictionary. "Definition of Activism in English." *Activism*. Oxford Dictionaries, n.d. Web. 04 Apr. 2015.
- Oxford English Dictionary. "Definition of Illusion in English." *Illusion*. Oxford Dictionaries, n.d. Web. 14 Jan. 2019.
- Padilla, Amado M., Kathryn J. Lindholm, Andrew Chen, Richard Durán, Kenji Hakuta, Wallace Lambert, and G. Richard Tucker. "The English-Only Movement: Myths, Reality, and Implications for Psychology." *American Psychologist* 46.2 (1991): 120-30. Print.
- Parker, Dennis. "The Great School Myth: Everybody's Grandfather Made It...And without Bilingual Education." *California Tomorrow* [Los Angeles] 1986: 16-17. Print.
- Parker, Laurence. "Critical Race Theory in Education: Possibilities and Problems." *Counterpoints* 168 (2003): 184-98. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Pears, Elizabeth. "'Black Americans Still Treated like Second Class Citizens'" *The Voice*, 6 Mar. 2015. Web. 21 July 2015.
- Pearson, Erica. "Immigrants are still Living the Dream, as Second Generation Americans Have Higher Salaries and More Education than Parents." *NY Daily News*. NY Daily News, 7 Feb. 2013. Web. 6 July 2013.
- Pérez, William. *Americans by Heart: Undocumented Latino Students and the Promise of Higher Education*. Ed. James A. Banks. New York: Teachers College, 2012. Print.
- Petronicolos, Loucas, and William S. New. "Anti-Immigrant Legislation, Social Justice, and the Right to Equal Educational Opportunity." *American Educational Research Journal* 36.3 (1999): 373-408. Print.
- Pew Research Center. "The Growth of Germany's Muslim Population." *Pew Research Center Religion & Public Life*. Pew Research Center, 29 Nov. 2017. Web. 27 Dec. 2018.
- Pickett, Brent L. "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance." *Polity* 28.4 (1996): 445-66. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Nov. 2014.
- Pines, Christopher L. *Ideology and False Consciousness: Marx and His Historical Progenitors*. Albany: State U of New York, 1993. Print.

- Pong, Suet-Ling, and Nancy S. Landale. "Academic Achievement of Legal Immigrants' Children: The Roles of Parents' Pre- and Postmigration Characteristics in Origin Group Differences." *Child Development* 83.5 (2012): 1543-59. Print.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: U of California, 2001. Print.
- Potochnick, Stephanie R., and Krista M. Perreira. "Depression and Anxiety Among First-Generation Immigrant Latino Youth: Key Correlates and Implications for Future Research." *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 198.7 (2010): 470-77. Print.
- Qin, Desirée B. "Being "Good" or Being "Popular:" Gender and Ethnic Identity Negotiations of Chinese Immigrant Adolescents." *Journal of Adolescent Research* 24.1 (2009): 37-66. Print.
- "Gendered Processes of Adaptation: Understanding Parent-Child Relations in Chinese Immigrant Families." *Sex Roles* 60. 7-8 (2008): 467-81. Print.
- Ragab, Noha. "Un-Unification? East, West Germans Still Adjusting." *Guest Column. The Chronicle*, 20 Sept. 1995. Web. 02 May 2015.
- Raghavan, Chemba S., Sara Harkness, and Charles M. Super. "Parental Ethnotheories in the Context of Immigration: Asian Indian Immigrant and Euro-American Mothers and Daughters in an American Town." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 41.4 (2010): 617-32. Print.
- Reimann, Anna. "Globale Studie: Wo der Islam sich Ausbreitet." *Spiegel Online Politik. Der Spiegel*, 27 Jan. 2011. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.
- "Umgang mit Pegida: Forscher fordern neues Deutschland-Bild in Lehrplänen." *Politik. Spiegel Online*, 5 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 June 2015.³⁰
- Reinbold, Fabian. "Kommentar zu Protesten in Dresden: Danke, Pegida, das war's!" *Spiegel Online. Politik*, 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 15 Feb. 2015.
- "Streit um "Lampedusa-Gruppe:" "Ich bin doch kein Tier."" *Spiegel Online*, 17 Oct. 2013. Web. 17 Nov. 2014
- Richter, Christoph. "Ostdeutsche und Mauerfall: Das Trauma der Kränkung." *Deutschlandfunk*. 09 Nov. 2017. Web. 30 Oct. 2018.³¹
- Rigney, Lester-Irabinna. "Internationalization of an Indigenous Anticolonial Cultural Critique of Research Methodologies: A Guide to Indigenist Research Methodology and Its Principles." *Wicazo Sa Review* 14.2 (1999): 109-21. Print.
- Ritzer, George, and Zeynep Atalay. *Readings in Globalization: Key Concepts and Major Debates*. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Print.
- Rocard, Michel. "German Reunification and the New Europe." *Social Europe*, 14 Oct. 2010. Web. 21 July 2015.

- Röll, Christine. *Interkulturelles Lernen in der Erwachsenenbildung: Eine Methodensammlung zur Entwicklung von Interkulturellem Bewusstsein*. Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2010. Print.³²
- Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. "The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification." *Political Theory* 22.1 (1994): 152-66. *JSTOR*. Web. 01 Sept. 2017.
- Rosaldo, Renato. "Cultural Citizenship and Educational Democracy." *Cultural Anthropology* 9.3 (1994): 402-11. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Apr. 2015.
- Ross, E. Wayne. "Negotiating the Politics of Citizenship Education." *Political Science and Politics* 37.2 (2004): 249-51. *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Feb. 2018.
- Rutherford, Jonathan. *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990. Print.
- Safty, Adel. *Value Leadership and Capacity Building*. Istanbul: Universal, 2003. Print.
- Şahin, Reyhan. *Die Bedeutung des Muslimischen Kopftuchs: Eine Kleidungssemiotische Untersuchung Kopftuch Tragender Musliminnen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2014. Print.³³
- Şahinöz, Cemil. *Leben und Arbeiten mit Türkischen und Muslimischen Familien*. 2nd ed. Reutlingen: Achalm Wissenschafts Verlag, 2010. Print.³⁴
- Salkind, Neil J., and Kristin Rasmussen, eds. *Encyclopedia of Educational Psychology*. Vol. 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008. Print.
- Sánchez, Patricia, and Margarita Machado-Casas. "At the Intersection of Transnationalism, Latina/o Immigrants, and Education." *The High School Journal* 92.4 (2009): 3-15. Print.
- Sanghani, Radhika. "Burka Bans: The Countries where Muslim Women can't wear Veils." *The Telegraph*. Telegraph Media Group, 17 Aug. 2017. Web. 16 Jan. 2019.
- Scally, Derek. "Remembering How the Fall of the Wall Began in a Leipzig Church." Leipzig Letter. *The Irish Times*, 7 Oct. 2009. Web. 2 May 2015.
- Scanlan, Martin, and Francesca A. López. *Leadership for Culturally and Linguistically Responsive Schools*. New York: Routledge, 2015. Print.
- Schaub, Maryellen, and David P. Baker. "IS SOCIAL CAPITAL THE SELF-ESTEEM OF THE 1990s?" *Schooling and Social Capital in Diverse Cultures Research in the Sociology of Education* 13 (2002): 125-32. Print.
- Schneider, Jens. "Berlin: Sex, Drogen und Gewalt in der Bibliothek." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Süddeutsche Zeitung Panorama, 3 Mar. 2015. Web. 19 Apr. 2015.³⁵

- Sezgin, Zeynep. "Turkish Migrants' Organizations: Promoting Tolerance Toward the Diversity of Turkish Migrants in Germany." *International Journal of Sociology* 38.2 (2008): 78-95. Print.
- Sharma, Aradhana, and Anil Gupta, eds. *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. Print.
- Simons, Massimiliano. "Beyond Ideology: Althusser, Foucault and French Epistemology." *Journal of History, Sociology and Philosophy of Science* 3 (2015): 62-77. Print.
- Scheurich, James Joseph, and Michelle D. Young. "Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?" *Educational Researcher* 26.4 (1997): 4-16. Print.
- Siegel, Harvey. "Epistemological Diversity and Education Research: Much Ado about Nothing Much?" *Educational Researcher* 35.3 (2006): 3-12. Print.
- Schipperges, Ines. "Interreligiöser Unterricht: Religionen Verbinden statt Trennen." Gesellschaft. *Zeit Online*, 24 May 2018. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.³⁶
- Schirmer, Barbara R., Jay Casbon, and Lindy L. Twiss. "Diverse Learners in the Classroom: Innovative Literacy Practices for ESL Learners." *The Reading Teacher* 49.5 (1996): 412-14. *JSTOR*. Web. 05 Oct. 2015.
- Schmidt, Thomas E. "Demokratie: Nennt sie Faschisten." Demokratie. *Zeit Online*, 13 Sept. 2018. Web. 12 Dec. 2018.³⁷
- Short, Kathryn H., and Charlotte Johnston. "Stress, Maternal Distress, and Children's Adjustment following Immigration: The Buffering Role of Social Support." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 65.3 (1997): 494-503. Print.
- Sniderman, Paul M., Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tetlock, and Ann Kendrick. "The New Racism." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.2 (1991): 423-47. *JSTOR*. Web. 17 Nov. 2014.
- Sollors, Werner. *Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture*. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. Print.
- Solórzano, Daniel G., and Adrienne D. Dixon. "Critical Race Theory's Intellectual Roots: My Email Epistolary with Derrick Bell." *Handbook of Critical Race Theory in Education*. Ed. Marvin Lynn. New York: Routledge, 2013. 48-69. Print.
- Spiegel Online. "Urteil: Kopftuch-Verbot an Deutschen Schulen Bestätigt." Politik. *Spiegel Online*, 04 July 2002. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.³⁸
- Stanton-Salazar, Ricardo D. *Manufacturing Hope and Despair: The School and Kin Support Networks of U.S.-Mexican Youth*. New York: Teachers College, 2001. Print.

- Stevenson, David Lee, and David P. Baker. "Shadow Education and Allocation in Formal Schooling: Transition to University in Japan." *American Journal of Sociology* 97.6 (1992): 1639-57. *JSTOR*. Web. 04 Nov. 2015.
- Stoldt, Till-Reimer. "Moscheebauten erregen ganz Deutschland." *Politik und Religion*. Die Welt, 21 Sept. 2007. Web. 15 Feb. 2015.³⁹
- Suárez-Orozco, Carola, and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco. *Children of Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
- Hee Jin Bang, and Marie Onaga. "Contributions to Variations in Academic Trajectories amongst Recent Immigrant Youth." *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 34.6 (2010): 500-10. Print.
- Hee Jin Bang, and Ha Yeon Kim. "I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth." *Journal of Adolescent Research* 26.2 (2011): 222-57. Print.
- Carola, Jean Rhodes, and Michael Milburn. "Unraveling the Immigrant Paradox: Academic Engagement and Disengagement Among Recently Arrived Immigrant Youth." *Youth and Society* 41.2 (2009): 151-85. Print.
- Tate IV, William F. "Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications." *Review of Research in Education* 22 (1997): 195-247. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. *The New Transnational Activism*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print.
- Taylor, Edward. "A Primer on Critical Race Theory." *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 19 (1998): 122-24. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Taylor, Ronald D., and Margaret C. Wang. *Resilience Across Contexts: Family, Work, Culture, and Community*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000. Print.
- Tebble, Adam James. "Exclusion for Democracy." *Political Theory* 34.4 (2006) 463-87. *JSTOR*. Web. 2 Sept. 2017.
- Tehrani, John. *Whitewashed: America's Invisible Middle Eastern Minority*. New York: New York UP, 2009. Print.
- The Telegraph. "Reverend Jesse Jackson: 'Black People Are Still Second Class Citizens.'" *The Telegraph*. Telegraph Media Group, 4 Jan. 2012. Web. 21 July 2015.
- Thüringer Allgemeine. "Vorurteile gegen Ost oder West: Die häufigsten Klischees." *Thüringer Allgemeine*, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015.⁴⁰
- Tobias, Saul. "Hegel and the Politics of Recognition." *The Owl of Minerva* 38.1/2 (2006): 101-26. Print.

- Turney, Kristin, and Grace Kao. "Barriers to School Involvement: Are Immigrant Parents Disadvantaged?" *The Journal of Educational Research* 102.4 (2009): 257-71. Print.
- Turpin-Petrosino, Carolyn. *Understanding Hate Crimes: Acts, Motives, Offenders, Victims, and Justice*. London: Routledge, 2015. Print.
- Van Ausdale, Debra, and Joe R. Feagin. *The First R: How Children Learn Race and Racism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Print.
- Velasco, Patricia. "Indigenous Students in Bilingual Spanish–English Classrooms in New York: A Teacher's Mediation Strategies." *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 2010.206 (2010): 255-71. Print.
- Verlag das Netz. "Mehrsprachige Kinder in Einsprachigen Kindergärten." Kinder in Europa. *Verlag das Netz*, July 2012. Web. 29 July 2015.⁴¹
- Vitzthum, Thomas. "Schulsystem bremst Deutschlehrer für Flüchtlinge aus." *Politik. Die Welt*, 19 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.⁴²
- Vogt, Sylvia. "Deutschlehrer Kritisieren Lehrpläne." *Schule. Der Tagesspiegel*, 23 Mar. 2015. Web. 02 Jan. 2019.⁴³
- Wagener, Volker. "Germany's Nervous Mainstream Shifts Rightward." *Top Stories Germany. Deutsche Welle*, 2 Jan. 2016. Web. 22 Feb. 2016.
- Wallace, Ian. *The GDR in the 1980s*. Dundee: GDR Monitor, 1984. Print.
- Weber, Blanka. "Lehrer Ost = Lehrer West?" *Deutschlandradio Kultur*, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015.⁴⁴
- West, Cornel. *Race Matters*. New York: Vintage, 2001. Print.
- Witkin, Robert W. *Adorno on Popular Culture*. London: Routledge, 2003. Print.
- Wikipedia Deutsch. "Aktivismus (Kurt Hiller)." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 14 Feb. 2015.
- English. "Activism." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 14 Feb. 2015.
- Français. "Activisme Politique." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 14 Feb. 2015.
- Wikipedia Deutsch. "Einwanderung." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.
- English. "Immigration." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.
- Français. "L'Immigration." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.

- Wecker, Katharina. "A New University Hopes to Give Refugees Educational Wings." News and Opinion about Arabic Higher Education. *Al-Fanar Media*, 25 May 2015. Web. 02 Dec. 2015.
- Wells, Amy Stuart, Jennifer Jellison Holme, Awo Korantemaa Atanda, and Anita Tijerina Revilla. "Tackling Racial Segregation One Policy at a Time: Why School Desegregation Only Went so Far." *Teachers College Record* 107.9 (2005): 2141-77. Print.
- Wells, Ryan. "Children of Immigrants and Educational Expectations: The Roles of School Composition." *Teachers College Record* 112.6 (2010): 1679-704. Print.
- Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. "Ostdeutsche verdienen ein Drittel weniger." *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Der Westen, 13 May 2009. Web. 21 July 2015.⁴⁵
- White, Dan S. *Lost Comrades: Socialists of the Front Generation, 1918-1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992. Print.
- Wiarda, Jan-Martin. "Verschmähtes Ostdeutschland." Hochschullandschaft. *Zeit Online*, 13 Dec. 2007. Web. 21 July 2015.⁴⁶
- Williams, Raymond. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York: Oxford UP, 1983. Print.
- Wurgaft, Lewis D. *The Activists: Kurt Hiller and the Politics of Action on the German Left, 1914-1933*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1977. Print.
- Yoshikawa, Hirokazu, and Ariel Kalil. "The Effects of Parental Undocumented Status on the Developmental Contexts of Young Children in Immigrant Families." *Child Development Perspectives* 5.4 (2011): 291-97. Print.
- Yosso, Tara J., Laurence Parker, Daniel G. Solorzano, and Marvin Lynn. "From Jim Crow to Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical Race Discussion of Racialized Rationales and Access to Higher Education." *Review of Research in Education* 28 (2004): 1-25. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
- Zinnkann, Hans, and Wibke Busch. "Mehr Wissen für Mehr Toleranz." Informationen. Landtag NRW, 4 Feb. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.⁴⁷
- Žižek, Slavoj. *Jacques Lacan: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory*. Vol. III Society, Politics, Ideology. London: Routledge, 2003. Print. Society, Politics, Ideology.
- . *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso, 1989. Print.
- Zong, Jie, and Jeanne Batalova. "Mexican Immigrants in the United States." *Migration Information Source*. Migration Policy Institute, 09 Oct. 2014. Web. 23 Nov. 2015.

Zuberi, Tukufu, and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. *White Logic, White Methods: Racism and Methodology*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Print.

Zúñiga, Víctor, and Rubén Hernández-León. *New Destinations: Mexican Immigration in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. Print.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ Accadis International School Bad Homburg. “Preschool to Secondary School with Accedes—One Step Ahead.” *Overview Fees and Dues. Accadis International School Bad Homburg*, 2015. Web. 29 July 2015.
 - ² Albrecht, Maike. “Spat at Leipzig University: Church returned, Principal gone?” *Unispiegel. Spiegel Online*, 28 Jan. 2003. Web. 07 Apr. 2015.
 - ³ Altmeier, Lisa. “Language Confusion: German, Turk, German-Turk? – Or what?” *Society. Zeit Online*, 18 Aug. 2012. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
 - ⁴ Arabaa, Sami. “The Turks in Germany are a Ticking Time Bomb.” *Politically Incorrect. Politically Incorrect*, 30 Mar. 2013. Web. 29 July 2015.
 - ⁵ Arnhold, Madlen. *Institute for Economic Research Registered Association Rep.* Ifo Dresden, Jan. 2009. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.
 - ⁶ Barskanmaz, Cengiz. “Racism, Postcolonialism and Justice — On a German “Critical Race Theory”” *Kritische Justiz* 41.3 (2008): 296-302. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 July 2016.
 - ⁷ Bierbrauer, Robin, and Philipp Saul. “Wendekinder – Are we one Nation?” *Zeit Online. Die Zeit*, 09 Nov. 2017. Web. 30 Oct. 2018.
 - ⁸ Brönstrup, Carsten. “Every Second Turk is Jobless.” Berlin. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 27 Aug. 2008. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
 - ⁹ Caprez-Krompæk, Edina. *Development of Native and Second Language in the Intercultural Context: An Empirical Observation of the Influence of Language Lessons in Local Language and Culture (HSK) on Language Development*. Münster: Waxmann, 2010. Print.
 - ¹⁰ Das Islamische Portal. “Dutch Politician Geert Wilders insults Islam as “Ill-Ideology of Allah and Mohammed”” *Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş. Das Islamische Portal*, 09 Aug. 2007. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.
 - ¹¹ Detjen, Joachim. *Political Education: History and Present in Germany*. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2013. Print.
 - ¹² Deutsch Türkisches Journal. “11 German-Turks Enter the German Bundestag.” *DTJ Online. Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, 23 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 June 2015.
 - “Political Instability could Damage the Income Structure. Turkey: Riots Negatively Affect the Economy.” *Deutsch Türkisches Journal*, 10 June 2013. Web. 29 July 2015.

-
- ¹³ Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten. "Social Riots 2014: Turkey Belongs to the High Risk States." Society. *Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten*, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 29 July 2015.
- "Leaving Germany: Almost 200.000 Turks leave in Four Years." *Reverse Immigration*. Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten, 14 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
- ¹⁴ Die Welt. "School Needs to Organize Prayer Room for Muslims." Politics—Verdict in Berlin. *Die Welt*, 29 Sept. 2009. Web. 27 June 2015.
- ¹⁵ Duthel, Heinz. *Islam in Germany: This is How the Future of Germany and Europe Looks*. Norderstedt: on Demand, 2013. Print.
- ¹⁶ Geißler, Rainer, and Sonja Weber-Menges. "Migrant Children in the Education System: Double Disadvantaged." *Education and Chances. Federal Center for Political Education*, 24 Nov. 2008. Web. 26 June 2015.
- ¹⁷ Harmsen, Torsten. "The Ghost of the Imploded St. Pauli Church." Conflicts in Saxony: The Leipzig University Principal Resigns. *Berliner Zeitung*, 31 Jan. 2003. Web. 26 Apr. 2015.
- ¹⁸ Hebel, Christina, and Christina Elmer. "Muslims Integrate Themselves, Germans Isolate Themselves." Politics. *Spiegel Online*, 8 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
- ¹⁹ Holzwarth, Henrike. "Almost as Many Native Languages as Pupils—Linguistic Integration in Germany." *Multilingualism—Languages without Borders*. Goethe-Institute, Mar. 2009. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
- ²⁰ Jackson, Paul. *GDR, The End of a State*. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1994. Print.
- ²¹ Kaiser, Stefan. "Social Benefits for Immigrants: This is what Foreigners get in Germany." Economy. *Spiegel Online*, 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 29 July 2015.
- ²² Kreller, Anika. "Outside in Front of the Door." Society. *Zeit Online*, 19 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.
- ²³ Köhler, Benjamin. "Scope for Development East Germany: Between Transformation and Change." *Crises, Changes, and Transition*. Publishing Sociology Magazine instead of Archiving, 3 July 2011. Web. 21 July 2015.
- ²⁴ Kramer, Bernd. "Checking the Demand of Quotas: Do Refugees Really Damage German Pupils?" *Schulspiegel. Spiegel Online*, 16 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.
- ²⁵ Küchler, Laura. "Also without Accession to the EU and Passport: Social Benefits for All Turks in the EU." Backgrounds. *Kopp Online*, 2 June 2012. Web. 29 July 2015.

-
- ²⁶ Lau, Jörg. "Why Muslim Prayer Rooms do not Belong in Our Schools." A Blog about Religions and Politics. *Zeit Online*, 28 May 2010. Web. 27 June 2015.
- ²⁷ Lauer, C., D. Siems, and D. Ehrentraut. "Turks are the Children of Sorrow of Integration." Politics: Migrant Study. *Die Welt*, 17 Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
- ²⁸ Menkens, Sabine. "How Refugee Children Lean in Welcome Classes." Politics. *Zeit Online*, 14 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.
- ²⁹ Norddeutscher Rundfunk. "Background: Refugees in North Germany." *News. Norddeutscher Rundfunk*, 3 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 Feb. 2016.
- ³⁰ Reimann, Anna. "Global Study: Where the Islam Grows." Spiegel Online Politics. *Der Spiegel*, 27 Jan. 2011. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.
- "Dealing with Pegida: Researchers Demand New Germany-Image in Curricula." Politics. *Spiegel Online*, 5 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 June 2015.
- ³¹ Richter, Christoph. "East Germans and Fall of the Wall: The Trauma of the Humiliation." *Deutschlandfunk*. 09 Nov. 2017. Web. 30 Oct. 2018.
- ³² Röhl, Christine. *Intercultural Learning in Adult Education: A Collection of Methods for the Development of Intercultural Awareness*. Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2010. Print.
- ³³ Şahin, Reyhan. *The Meaning of the Muslim Headscarf: A Clothes-Semiotic Study of Headscarf-Wearing Muslim Women in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2014. Print.
- ³⁴ Şahinöz, Cemil. *Living and Working with Turkish and Muslim Families*. 2nd ed. Reutlingen: Achalm Wissenschafts Verlag, 2010. Print.
- ³⁵ Schneider, Jens. "Berlin: Sex, Drugs, and Violence in the Library." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. South Germany Newspaper Panorama, 3 Mar. 2015. Web. 19 Apr. 2015.
- ³⁶ Schipperges, Ines. "Interreligious Lessons: Connecting Religions Instead of Separating." Society. *Zeit Online*, 24 May 2018. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
- ³⁷ Schmidt, Thomas E. "Democracy: Call them Fascists." Democracy. *Zeit Online*, 13 Sept. 2018. Web. 12 Dec. 2018.
- ³⁸ Spiegel Online. "Verdict: Headscarf Ban on German Schools Confirmed." Politics. *Spiegel Online*, 04 July 2002. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.
- ³⁹ Stoldt, Till-Reimer. "Building Mosques Irritate All of Germany." Politics and Religion. *Die Welt*, 21 Sept. 2007. Web. 15 Feb. 2015.
- ⁴⁰ Thüringer Allgemeine. "Prejudices against East or West: The Most Common Clichés." *Thüringer Allgemeine*, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015.

-
- ⁴¹ Verlag das Netz. "Multilingual Kids in Monolingual Kindergartens." Kids in Europe. *Verlag das Netz*, July 2012. Web. 29 July 2015.
- ⁴² Vitzthum, Thomas. "School System Outbreaks German Teachers for Refugees." Politics. *Die Welt*, 19 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2016.
- ⁴³ Vogt, Sylvia. "German Teachers criticize Curricula." School. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 23 Mar. 2015. Web. 02 Jan. 2019.
- ⁴⁴ Weber, Blanka. "Teacher East = Teacher West?" *Deutschlandradio Kultur*, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015.
- ⁴⁵ Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. "East Germans Earn a Third Less." *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Der Westen, 13 May 2009. Web. 21 July 2015.
- ⁴⁶ Wiarda, Jan-Martin. "Rejected East Germany." Hochschullandschaft. *Zeit Online*, 13 Dec. 2007. Web. 21 July 2015.
- ⁴⁷ Zinnkann, Hans, and Wibke Busch. "More Knowledge for More Tolerance." Information. Landtag NRW, 4 Feb. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.