Dataveillance in Societies of Control: Of Migration, Hacking and Humus

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We are humus, not Homo, not anthropos; we are compost, not posthuman.
Donna Haraway (2016a: 55)

In 2018, the Peng! Collective announced the hacking of the German Federal Printing Office with their campaign “Mask.ID”. By using a software electronically combining the data of two people, they were able to get a passport issued that included a photo made up of different biometric facial images: of EU Commissioner for foreign affairs and security policy, Federica Mogherini, and of a person of the collective (Das Peng! Kollektiv 2018). The idea was that theoretically these two people could use the same passport and travel around the world with it. In the second phase of the project, Mask.ID morphed pictures of Europeans with those of Libyan residents and sent five of these passports via the German mail service DHL to Libya – with the hope of allowing people to cross the border with them. Since then, the collective has been inviting people on the website https://maskid/ to send in photos which they would morph with others in order to receive Mask.IDs. Mask.ID has managed to steer the attention towards Europe’s cooperation with networks in Libya and the many migrants arriving in the failed state only to be kept in camps with some of the most severe human rights violations and atrocities done to people in precarious transit positions. At the same time, the project has highlighted the intensification of e-bordering within the EU-border regime in which biometric identification and verification, or governing mobility by data, have become key issues within orders of control. The project also points towards how easily agencies and political actors can potentially access and manipulate the vast personal data stored so far: European databases are currently merging under the heading “interoperability”, meaning that for the purpose of migration management and crime fighting, the legal basis and technical infrastructure are created to connect and access varying EU-databases (Statewatch 2019). Mask.ID is an intervention into these developments of “dataveillance” (Clarke 1988), meaning surveillance and control increasingly linked to the collection and sorting of data. “Take back your identity” is posited on the website as something that is achieved by acknowledging being “singular-plural” and using the notion of “being-with” as a polit-
ical technology (Nancy 2000). As Nancy states: “‘With’ is the sharing of time-space; it is the at-the-same-time-in-the-same-place as itself, in itself, shattered. It is the instant scaling back of the principle of identity” (2000: 35). In the context of Mask.ID, empowering oneself with data means to morph and share, and being a no-border activist means caring for the digital selves with which migration management has for long been operating.

The following thoughts take dataveillance and the general “technecologies” (Brunner et al. 2018) in which migration is enmeshed as a starting point to think about control societies and political action. Deleuze’s short “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (Deleuze 1992) has had a major impact on the way surveillance has been conceptualized within a growing body of research and activism concerned with the relationship between technology, data and power. Deleuze indeed hit a nerve with his postscript within the security, surveillance and governmentality community for conceptualizing modern modes of surveillance and control. This paper will therefore point towards some key concepts developed on the basis of Deleuzian and Guattarian thought relevant within studies of digital borders and migration theory with special reference to Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Surveillance Studies, in order to analyze and critique migration management in Europe today. The paper highlights the proliferation and usage of data in relation to security, migration movement and the general biopolitical management of life. Mask.ID will be taken as a vantage point for thinking about the ways political struggles can be conceptualized in an increasingly digitized and datafied mode of migration control, which not only fixates identities to biometric technology and regulates the respective rights of individuals (Amoore 2008), but also continuously assembles and reconfigures data about dividualized subjects.

Mask.ID highlights how the digital border and dataveillance effectuate how specific people can be stuck in camps beyond the European territory, taking ever more dangerous routes across borders. It will be argued that control via data management and biometric technology are constitutive of “racializing assemblages” (Weheliye 2014), here understood as the algorithmic and sorting modalities in which dehumanization is practiced and lived. This text specifically attends to the connectivities that generate phenomena known as borders, bodies or moving subjects in which data is, among other things, constituted as the locus through which they are called into being for control. This means that migration management increasingly rests upon information exchange and “datafication”, creating a technologically mediated perception of border phenomena lying at the core of governing cross-border mobility today (Broeders/Dijstelbloem 2016). Giving special attention to convivial relations is what is truly meant by the mentioned technecologies: they highlight the material, social, technological and political milieus in which existing or moving are possible. This means that one has to take assemblages – or the “multiplicities of multiplicities forming a single assemblage” (Deleuze/Guattari 2005: 34) – into account in which data is continually cut together and apart and func-
tionally reworked in different regimes of control. My specific interest lies in the workings of a border management that operates at the expense of certain migration movements and locations of the world. The constitution and sanctioning of migration as a security threat as performed by the EU goes hand in hand with a parallel process of datafication of border control in which demarcations of risk factors can be referred to populations targeted for exclusion, segregation or death. The technecologies of migration and border management in the EU show a reintensification of racialization within border control, recognizable, among other things, in the way Europe deals with migrants coming from and through Libya. The campaign of the Peng! Collective can thus be regarded as an interface, connecting issues of the digital border and technologically informed racializing assemblages that hinder the movements of certain people with affective and logistic weapons meant to challenge these power structures. I will therefore present some thoughts on dataveillance and migration management before introducing what, with recourse to compost feminism (Haraway 2015, 2016a, 2016b), and for lack of better words, I have termed “Hacking and Humus”.

**Digital Border**

Modern technologies feature prominently within the surveillance and management of migration and international mobility, creating a variety of data derived from satellites, body scanners, MRIs, radar units, big data analysis, infrared cameras, biometrics and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Any movement across borders will, in one way or another, come into contact with, or utilize, technology, creating different technological zones (Barry 2001) – be it at the airport or on the Mediterranean Sea – in which surveillance technologies and networked databases register, visualize, monitor and profile people on the move. Some have therefore highlighted how the border, commonly associated with dividing lines involving a certain hard materiality of fences or border patrol personnel, has become virtual and located “everywhere” (Lyon 2005), stretching space and time by storage, exchange and anticipation (Johnson et al. 2011: 62). Yet others point out that the digitalization of the border is increasingly characterized by the ability to produce networks, enhancing and changing border control into a form of datafication, where “eventually, most information, irrespective of its original technological nature, ends up in the great information equalizer that is the database” (Broeders/Dijstelbloem 2016: 244). In the case of the European Union, one can observe increasing investments into surveillance and control technologies gathering data on mobility, reaching from the databases and information management systems of the SIS I+II, Eurodac, the VIS or the Border Surveillance System Eurosur, PNR passenger data, up to the development of yet newer ICTs, such as the Entry-Exit System. All these systems make up what has been described as the digital borders of the EU (Broeders 2007;
Dijstelbloem/Meijer 2011). Under the heading “Interoperability” the EU furthermore plans a development of the technical infrastructures and control capacities of existing ICTs, increasing the capability to link datasets stored in different databases (Bossong 2018). Migration management through computational means and information gathering and exchange can be described with what Deleuze has termed ‘modulation’:

*Enclosures are *molds*, distinct castings, but controls are a *modulation*, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point (1992: 4).

The examination of people standing at the border has been replaced by continuous networked technological control. The enclosure that is the database is simultaneously a space of modulation in which data can continuously be added, rearranged and sorted algorithmically, while surveillance systems like Eurosur or data mining of social media usage can perpetually process huge data sets to produce yet new mappings and cartographies of migration movements. On the one hand, this mode of control can be regarded as a reaction to the ever-changing tactics and routes of migration that make border crossings possible. Border control has thus been conceptualized as operating like a firewall or “antivirus software, not just because it aspires to filter and secure its interior, but also because its fate is to toil in the shadow of the restless hacker” (Walters 2006: 200). On the other hand, this form of control entails a difference in method: where discipline, as outlined by Foucault, was aimed at the development of a technocratic form of governing and self-governance with the long-time goal of shaping behavior and installing mechanisms of “normation”¹ within society as a whole, control anticipates disruptions and frictions, and installs a more market-oriented monitoring and assessment of specific parts of phenomena. Migration management via biometric technology, for example, means that “body-bits” (Pugliese 2010: 23) such as fingerprints have become a focal point in managerial techniques regulating migration in contrast to the individual or the population that take center stage within disciplinary societies or security dispositifs (Foucault 2013, 2014).

One key concept developed to grasp the heterogeneity and the workings of migration and mobility management in reference to the postscript and Deleuze and Guattari’s work on *agencements* is that of the *surveillant assemblage* (Haggerty/Ericson 2000; Bo-

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¹ Michel Foucault specified that mechanisms of disciplinary techniques are best described as “normation” rather than “normalisation”. Although disciplinary power normalizes, these processes of normalization are characterized by a fundamental and original link to a norm: the normal and abnormal are determined in reference to this previously constructed norm. Because disciplinary normalization is marked by this initial connection, Foucault suggested to speak of “normation” in reference to disciplinary power and in contrast to security dispositifs, where the normal is constructed as statistical average value. In the case of the latter, it is not the norm that determines the normal, but the normal that determines the norm (Foucault 2014: 89-90).
The surveillant assemblage, for one thing, highlights that one can trace a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems. Assemblages consist of a multiplicity of heterogeneous phenomena working in concert with one another, integrating practices, technologies and different more discrete assemblages into them (Haggerty/Ericson 2000: 608). Surveillant assemblages increase the surveillance capacity by breaking up more centralized or hierarchical logics of surveillance, be it of the state or institutions (previously associated with the panoptic logic of Big Brother), in favor of the incorporation of various decentralized actors. In the case of migration, this mechanism of surveillance has been called a form of “remote control” (Zolberg 1999) reaching “away from the border and outside the state” (Guiraudon/Lahav 2000), where the observation of café owners of harbors, data stored in the Eurodac database, satellite images or information from NGOs have become part of the information network of surveillance. Surveillance assemblages link biometric databases, information on RFID chips in passports, watch lists or risk calculations with border control posts, consulate and field officers or fishermen working in the Mediterranean Sea. Surveillance assemblages also mean a transition to the global level. No longer bound to specific states or institutions, they have been linked to the global scale and the flexible market logics of neoliberalism (Murakami Wood 2013; Ong/Collier 2007). While the panoptic view disciplined people by making surveillance felt – be it by a physical presence, an imaginary one or by self-observation – control rather operates with opaque networks and surveillance often unperceivable to people (Haggerty 2006; Yar 2003; Lyon 1994, 2006; Galičm/Timan/Koops 2017). Dataveillance has been specifically linked to this form of power that has become more abstract and in which people often do not know where their data circulate and what exactly is done with it. Specifically in the case of migration, many people have become very aware of their personal data, as dataveillance is able to develop daily regimes that mold the environment of people on the move by creating scales of access. The registration paradigm within the Schengen Area enforcing the Dublin Regime or the increasing gathering of information on migrants en route to Europe, such as by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or Frontex in countries in Africa, are only two examples of this need for care concerning the consequences of sharing one’s data.

Much has been said about the relationship between discipline, which is often related to in- and exclusion, and control that rather involves cybernetic optimization and assimilation by incentive. Some have differentiated between discipline and control and conceptualized them as two forms of power – one evolving into the other – while others have thought of them as two co-existing models in action simultaneously, or have understood control as a form of power with which discipline has transcended spaces of enclosure only to become ubiquitous (Hardt 1995; Kammerer 2011; Elmer 2012; Kelly 2015;
Disciplinary power has been understood as emerging throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and working by organizing individuals in spaces – the school, the factory or the prison – with the aim of producing docile bodies by means of precise observations, corrections and training. Concerning the relationship between discipline and control, it would be misguided to take the postscript too literally and come to the conclusion that discipline only has to do with institutions or that mechanisms of control may have replaced those of discipline. When considering migration management, one can clearly detect how spaces of confinement or enclosure, encouraging subjects to govern themselves and creating docile bodies, increasingly meet techniques of control which encode mobility with scales of access, treating persons, as William Walters notices, “rather like baggage, mail or living matter” (2000: 198). The migration camps, hot spots, registration and detention centers situated near and far from the EU border involve enhanced panoptic forms of governing and discipline within the management of migration that have undergone a revival within EU-migration politics in recent years. These spaces are closely linked to dataveillance and logics of control building on technologically informed surveillance assemblages as they entail biometric databases, offer information to Frontex officers for risk assessments or feed into the sources of data to create the “situational awareness” the Eurosur project aims to achieve (Walters 2016). Speaking of bordering today means accounting for the reinvigoration of walls and fences in Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Hungary or the USA just as much as the diffusion of the border into the networks, flows and codes that rearrange and modulate the technecological environments by, and in, which people move.

DataBody

Regarding the relation between flows and codes and migration management, the use of biometric techniques is one of the most prominent examples of dataveillance and control today. Migrants registered in one or more of the EU databases may be stuck in camps or beyond the European borders, while their data can easily cross borders and circulate within the Schengen area, creating an assemblage in which fixation and mobility coincide. Louise Amoore sees access or denial to resources, rights or territory based on the scan of body parts as a significant turn to scientific and managerial techniques in the management of mobility (Amoore 2006). It marks a strengthening of biopower “such that the body, in effect, becomes the carrier of the border as it is inscribed with multiple encoded boundaries of access” (ibid.: 347). While the biometric border may be deterritorialized into the body of migrants, fragments of the bodies of people registered become part of migration control in the form of data management. Given the assemblage of data, the surveillance of border flows and the use of technologies, for example in the
form of chips containing information on visa restrictions in passports, the “attention has shifted to data flows rather than the actual moving bodies” (Broeders/Dijstelbloem 2016: 244).

Building on the notion of control societies, Haggerty and Ericson point to the way surveillant assemblages operate by “abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows” (2000: 606). These flows can then be reassembled into what they call “Flesh-technology-information-amalgams” or “data doubles” (Haggerty/Ericson 2000: 611, 606) or what others have called “functional hybrids” (Hier 2002: 400), which can be targets for intervention. Also, within feminist science and technology studies, the intersections of bodies and technologies have for long been negotiated as assemblages (Suchman 2008) or cyborgs (Haraway 1991). Surveillant assemblages transcend human corporeality and turn flesh into information (Haggerty/Ericson 2000: 613). This assembled information can function as a kind of additional self that is able to circulate in very different areas of calculation and serves as a marker of accessibility. Data doubles influence rights of entry and residence permits, they feed predictive policing software, are important for credit ratings or banal advertisements people encounter on social media and streaming sites. In the case of biometrics, “the machine-readable body” (Van der Ploeg 1999, 2003), or, more specifically, the inscribed body-bit, has therefore been conceptualized as a password granting or denying access (Aas 2006; Lyon 2001). Paradigmatic for this is the storage and exchange of biometric information within the Eurodac database as a key tool for enforcing the Dublin Regime in Europe. Many activist interventions of migrants have therefore entailed erasing the data stored on them in databases. The Eurodac Database and the Visa and Schengen Information Systems feature prominently within migrant struggles, as freedom of movement and accessibility have been closely linked to the right to one’s own data. Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos have therefore coined the term digital deportability, which means that the possibility to be deported from the Schengen Area has, as they write, become pervasive within the smooth space of the data flow, where abstractions of migration circulate as the sum of data doubles (see Kuster/Tsianos 2013).

What all these examples highlight is how actual persons and even their bodies as full entities have become less relevant as anchor points for surveillance, even if specific individuals and bodies can be affected by this turn to data. Control societies tend to treat bodies as information or fragmented material and do not necessarily target individuals or rely on the means of disciplinary power and individual subjection. In Deleuze’s words, control deals with codes and passwords and singles people or subjects out, “which in no way attests to individuation – as they say – but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a ‘dividual’ material to be controlled” (1992: 7; see also Dodge/Kitchin 2005). Individuals have become dividuals, according to Deleuze, and masses have become “samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (1992: 5). Refraining from the individ-
In a similar vein, different forms of profiling and social sorting are a means of risk management (Lyon 2003; Ceyhan 2008). Two examples are visa-restrictions and counter-terrorism measures that filter risk alerts (Bigo/Guild 2005; Amoore/de Goede 2008). Visa restrictions of the EU have created a ‘negative list’ of countries – to the effect
that some people are in need of a visa or will be prohibited from having one issued. This negative list is based on risk-factors that include poverty rates, religion, colonial history or current state of politics, meaning that many people from former colonies, Muslim countries, countries in conflict or poor areas will not be able to enter the Schengen Area to apply for asylum since they are designated as “risk groups” more likely to become so-called ‘visa-overstayers’ or are marked as a potential terrorist threat (M’charek et al. 2014; Van Houtum 2010). Similarly, with risk alerts in the so-called ‘war on terror,’ a disengagement with individuals per se can be observed, meaning that the “indivisible” distinct entity of the individual with its very own life story and past actions is less the target of intelligence operations than categories of risk. In the case of risk alerts, specific surnames, language skills, travel routes or religious affiliations are linked to risk potentials. This implies a potentially dangerous, dividuated subject that is created from an amalgam of fragmented elements of other subjects and objects (Amoore 2013).

These examples show four important mechanisms: firstly, one must take into account how algorithmic processes continually divide and recombine data which then can be assembled into a seemingly stable entity (called a “data double”). This fluidity is also mirrored in the many names that have been given to some of the outcomes and processes of data management, in an attempt to semantically come to terms with different algorithmic phenomena: data shadow, data trail, data flows, body-bits etc. We are continually cut apart and put together again within algorithmic processes.3

Secondly, these modes of control point to a difference in time and temporality. Deleuze has written that in disciplinary societies “one is always starting again, while in control societies one is never finished with anything” (1992: 5). Risk management can be taken as a prime example of this logic of control, as it continuously anticipates risks and threats and strives to pre-emptively tame their virtual dimensions by transforming them into scales of calculability (Amoore 2013; De Goede 2008; Anderson 2010; Bröckling 2008; McCulloch/Wilson 2016).4 In this way, the present data is always saturated

3 On entanglement and agential cuts, see Barad 2015: 394.
4 In the Deleuzian sense, the virtual should not be conflated with ‘digital’ (as is suggested with the common notions of “virtual reality” or a virtual duplicated cyberspace) nor with the ‘possible’. Deleuze writes: “The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a ‘realisation’. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualisation” (1994: 211). Although the technecological systems of risk management strive to anticipate an infinitude of possibilities that could be confused with Deleuze’s notion of the virtual, they ultimately govern the possible by setting preconditions that embed the virtual in information systems of control. In this way, ‘control’ tames or silences the virtual because it is a numerically generated notion of the virtual, intrinsically linked to codes, iterations and conventional appropriations of the visible and sayable, as Michaela Ott highlights (Ott 2010: 180). Concerning the conflation of the virtual and the digital, Brian Massumi writes: “The medium of the digital is possibility, not virtuality, and not even potential. It doesn’t bother approximating potential, as does probability. Digital coding per se is possibilistic to the limit” (2002: 137). What finally appears as the virtual realm of the algorithm or of imaginary techniques of risk profiling needs to be more precisely understood as an economy of “dividing, separating, and acting upon arrays of possible futures” (Amoore...
with the heterogeneity of possible futures – futures that continuously can be actualized in the present.

Thirdly, a point that the postscript and many authors within surveillance theory hardly account for is the way in which dataveillance plays a crucial part in creating and reproducing different racializing assemblages. Racializing assemblages, as Weheliye and others have argued, do not construe race as a biological or cultural classification but as a “conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (Weheliye 2014: 3). As such, racializing assemblages point to the modalities in which dehumanization practices – the practices of creating “not-quite-humans” – need to be understood as sets of relations where nonwhite subjects are set apart from the categories of the human as performed in the west (Weheliye 2014). Weheliye argues that the “governing perception of humanity” has been constructed as “synonymous with western Man”, creating distinctions between groups and hierarchized conceptions of ‘human’ difference in which racialization serves as a “master code” in distinguishing between good or fully-human and bad or not-quite human (2014: 5, 23, 27). As with the case of the Visa Information System and risk profiling, one can trace how technological systems of managing borders and populations that are marketed as “human free” technological advancement, and therefore allegedly “free of racial bias”, re-produce racial differences by algorithmic and technocratic practices: When taking the visa regime into account, one cannot but notice that predominantly Black and Brown people from poor countries, Muslim states or countries in conflict are deemed a risk factor, while risk alerts in the war on terror reproduce anti-Muslim racism. A similar case can be made with the Eurodac database, which contains information on border crossers and applicants for asylum and creates the stated digital deportability for a considerable amount of people unable to claim the privilege of being white as discursively installed by western power structures. In addition, the highest percentage of data on persons within the Schengen Information System generally relates to third-country nationals. As Florian Geyer argues, the majority of data in information systems concerning law enforcement in the EU is linked to third-country nationals, meaning that they are more likely to be put under criminal investigation, “simply because no comparable centralized EU-database for EU nationals” even exists (2008: 10).

These examples do not amount to a simple logic of exclusion; contemporary border-and migration regimes rather aim at flexibly filtering, selecting and channeling migration movements (see Mezzadra/Neilson 2013: 165). Within the EU, the topic of “migration management” has received heightened attention since the early 2000s: The rationale of migration management is to simultaneously facilitate wanted mobility while at the same time to hinder or channel the mobility of some deemed less ‘utilizable’ or
'risky' to the EU (see Buckel/Georgi/Kannankulam/Wessel 2014: 82). This management is connected to different labor force strategies both seeking to recruit highly skilled labor forces and to exploit illegalized labor forces. The economy of migration policy linked to the flexible market logics of global capitalism differentially includes migrants into regimes of labor that can consist of simple forms of legal migration to the EU. Yet, considering that the legal means to enter the EU – be it with a “Blue Card” or so-called ‘mobility partnerships’ – are very scarce for a large amount of people, migration scholars speak of gradual and violent forms of inclusion through illegalization, detention, temporary residence permits and generally changing legal statuses (see Kasparek 2016: 23; Cuttitta 2010: 28).

A common misconception concerning migration management is the assumption that neoliberal logics encourage a ‘colorblindness’ in which economic factors outweigh racial categorizations, not least because the global labor economy is dependent on labor forces from different areas of the world. What needs to be acknowledged, though, is that firstly, the homogenization of rights of “first class citizens” of the EU, including their economic and social differentiations, are already part of racializing assemblages that produce varying scales of access for migrants in which ‘brain drain’, illegalization, temporary work permits, detention etc. are an exploitative requisite to be included in the EU (see Kasparek/Tsianos 2015: 8). Secondly, although migration management discursively installs a regulated openness towards international migration, the latter is strictly framed as a potential resource for the EU in terms of economic viability or selective benefits (Geiger 2012; Georgi 2010). This blatant reduction of migrants to their “profitability” to the EU is already part of discriminatory practices. Thirdly, migration and risk management have been productive in creating the “illegal migrant” as the figure to be most brutally prevented from entering the EU (Walters 2010). Empirical studies within migration research have shown that certain groups are more likely to fall within the highly combated category of the ‘illegal migrant’ than others and are constructed along humanitarian logics of ‘vulnerability’ vs. ‘threat’: A good example are the hierarchical divisions between Syrian women, children or heterosexual families that were regarded as worthy of ‘saving’ and as ‘includable’ during the ‘summer of migration’ of 2015, while predominantly single, male sub-Saharan economic migrants were labeled as a potential threat to the economic, social and even sexual fabric of the EU (Ticktin 2011; Kämpf/Rogers [forthcoming]). As Frederic Vandenberghe has explicated, unlike older notions of imperial capitalism with its colonial system of exploitation and accumulation of surplus value,

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5 The political models concerning migration as well as their respective labor force strategies have differed between areas of the EU and changed throughout the years: According to Bernd Kasparek and Vassilis Tsianos debates on “high-skilled migrants” were predominantly pushed forward in the northern part of the EU, where the demand for unskilled manual labor is low. In the southern and south-eastern parts of the EU, the border has always been selectively porous through different regimes of illegalized or periodically legalized migration movements, most commonly displayed in the agricultural sector and its need for seasonal workers (Kasparek/Tsianos 2015: 7).
contemporary capitalism has colonized the ‘life-world’ rather than the world in an administrative and economic logic (2008: 883): “To overcome its dependency on labour, it has to shift from an extensive to a more intensive form of production and integrate the other spheres of life and, ultimately, the production of life itself, into its axiomatic.” (ibid.: 884). Although migrant individuals are summoned to become innovative and flexible entrepreneurs of their own life, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson have stressed that this does not mean that “capital’s axiomatic has created a smooth global capitalism” (2013: 302); this axiomatic rather works through producing radically heterogeneous conditions – a multiplication of (human) labor – where the deterritorialization of the global economy intertwines with political and legal borders and encounters different political, social and cultural settings.

Understanding migration management as a technocratic form of government without including the racialized assemblages that are deeply entrenched in the “mutation of capitalism” (Deleuze 1992: 6) misses to account for governmental forms engaged in the precarization of populations (Lorey 2015). Although precarization traverses neoliberal Western nations and can no longer be regarded as limited to peripheries or the Other per se, the European legal bases – such as the Visa and the Dublin Regimes – the externalization of border control to third countries or the surveillant assemblages capturing data of migrants in the EU create qualitatively different forms of precarity for migrants. One can understand governmental precarization as a form of governing migration, which, for example, illustrates how illegalized migrants become exploited and controlled as seasonal workers in a flexibilized labor market. At the same time, a narrow reference to the capitalist global economy is insufficient in explaining why illegalized border crossers are currently stripped of basic human rights through push-backs or intermediate suspensions of the right to asylum in the southern and south-eastern border zones of the EU, how continuous testaments of severe police violence, torture and neglect are tolerated by European political authorities, how migrants can be shot at or left to die in Search and Rescue Zones or why the Mediterranean Sea is one of the most surveilled and at the same time deadliest border zones on earth. With reference to the racializing assemblages of risk and migration management, some of the most elusive forms of racialization within data management can just as much be described as some of the most banal examples of reinvigorated racist discrimination and dehumanizing degradation at border sites.

Coming back to the issue of information technologies and dataveillance, one can see, on the one hand, how specific databases have become part of a political technology targeting only certain fragments of risk and have thereby not only intensified racialized power structures, but encoded them into datasets as a source of digital truth. On the other hand, and specifically in the case of biometrics, the EU has installed the principle of “no registration, no rights”, meaning that people unable or unwilling to register in
certain databases are regarded as illegal. Biometric technology as performed in the EU today still has difficulties enrolling people with dark skin, brown eyes, hands damaged by manual labor etc. into the systems structured as prerequisite to legal rights, creating an “infrastructural whiteness” (Pugliese 2010: 56) or ways of operating in which “these technologies work best for blue-eyed males with good eyesight and no disabilities, neither too young nor too old, a Goldilocks subject who is ‘jussstright’” (Magnet 2011: 31). The combination of algorithmic risk profiling, sorting by country or linking the “right to have rights” to becoming part of the biometric biomass stored in databases installs different measurements or scales of who is worthy of in- and exclusion; who may have to take life-threatening routes into the EU; who may receive basic rights of entry, residence or healthcare; who may be addressed as a subject or acknowledged as a person in the eyes of society or law; or who may be placed on a kill-list of the drone war. Being marked as a risk potential or threat in the immanent space of the digital can mean to slip beyond the condition or rationale of humanization and citizenship (Butler 2009).

This finally leads to the last point: In the logic of precaution and anticipating risk, the burden of proof is reversed – one does not have to prove that a threat exists, but that there is none. This is one way we can understand Deleuze’s sentence “Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt” (1992: 6). People deemed as potentially “risky” via algorithmically processed risk factors are always indebted to prove an innocence towards something that has not yet happened or that is a threat potential created by an assemblage of oneself and others (as is the case with sorting people by ‘risky countries’ or assembling risk alerts, such as ‘Muslim’, travel route etc.). One of the decisive changes within contemporary security logics is that security is not primarily thought of in military terms (e.g. a threat of war), but rather is involved in defining a continuum of threats ranging from terrorism via organized crime to ‘illegal immigration’ (see Kaufman 2011: 101). A striking example for cascades of threats associated with illegalized migration that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex labels as risk potentials is given by one of their officers:

You don’t want someone coming from a specific country ... put a bomb in the metro station and make it explode. You don’t want people to earn money in the UK working illegally in a restaurant and then sending the money somewhere to finance some illegal activities, drug trafficking, or for buying, purchasing drugs or for trafficking human beings. You don’t want people who come with the contagious diseases.... There are various dimensions of border control (Anonymous employee of Frontex, quoted in Perkowski 2018: 461).

The arrival of ‘illegal migrants’ to the Schengen area is described as a potential for numerous risks, ranging from terrorist attacks, drug and human trafficking and transnational illegal networks to infection. Risk determinations stage themselves as mathematical probability calculations based on a thorough empiricism of threats, but they also in-
clude techniques meant “to create an imaginary cartography of the future” (Aradau/Lobo-Guerrero/van Munster 2008: 151) that exceeds knowability. These techniques involve construction and interpretation and are also infused with an amalgam of historical-cultural and racialized stigmas of differentially constructed ‘illegal’ and mobile “Others”, whose incorporation into the EU is represented as biopolitical risks to different communities. Thus, risk analyses represent a crucial signifying practice within migration and border regimes, where racialized and colonial historic fantasies are inscribed into the epistemic production of the future. As Jutta Weber argues, the more risks are identified and classified by means of allegedly innovative imaginative techniques, the more demands for ultimately quite unimaginative proposals of high-tech surveillance and maximum measures can be rendered plausible (2014: 87). What is crucial for understanding the racializing assemblages in the logic of risk in reference to migratory movements, is to acknowledge their biopolitical and moral economy. Illegalized migration is linked to the aforementioned presence of more or less identifiable dangers, while, at the same time, also being discursified as precarious life in need of protection: Migrants are flexibly considered as ‘risky groups’ and ‘groups at risk’ (Aradau 2004). Especially irregular migration therefore becomes an ambivalent figure of endangered and dangerous life in regimes of control, creating a “zone of vulnerability” in which logics of protection and precarization simultaneously take effect (see Laufenberg 2014: 10). According to Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Rens van Munster risk management organizes populations in form of ‘risk pools’ and “instantiate a political economy of profit and protection rather than an ethos of danger” (2008: 151). As they explicate with the example of groups at risk for HIV/AIDS, these groups are nonetheless statistically proclaimed as ‘dangerous’, thereby “reinforcing gendered and racialized imaginaries of the subject” (ibid.: 152). This ambivalent framing of migration as ‘risky’ or ‘at risk’ makes it possible for Frontex and European political bodies to selectively present themselves as humanitarian ‘saviors’ or to completely disregard their legal responsibilities to save lives.

In the case of the European border regime and its cooperation with third countries in Africa in order to hinder the movement of predominantly sub-Saharan migrants, specifications need to be made regarding what has been called the “Black Mediterranean” (Di Maio 2014; Proglio 2018). The term “Black Mediterranean” has been coined to highlight the long-standing migration movements and encounters between Africa and Europe in which the Mediterranean has featured as a fluid but asymmetrical space of social and cultural connection (Grimaldi 2019: 416). As Grimaldi argues, the current Mediterranean crossings are part of Europe’s history of colonialism and transatlantic slavery, making visible the relationship between racial violence and Europe in the present configurations of control (ibid.). Concerning the transit route through Libya, being enclosed and in debt is hardly mutually exclusive. As Mask.ID demonstrates by highlighting the relation between EU migration management and Libya, the debt of migrants from many African countries having to prove they are no risk to the European Union or that they are differ-
entially stripped of their status as human subjects in camps, illegality or slavery can lead to diverse and far reaching forms of confinement. The paradigms elaborating on the concept of the human can create gradual forms of enclosure or capture: On the one hand, they entail logics in which non-Western, nonwhite peoples can only be assimilated as “honorary humans” (Wynter 2003: 329) by enrolling images of their bodies into databases like Eurodac or VIS specifically made for asylum and border crossing. On the other hand, and at worst, nonwhite people are forcibly denied the status of human by means of a rapidly expanding illegality industry and security- or surveillance-industrial complex (Hayes 2009, 2012) that create precarious, confined or deadly circumstances for migrants. As Saidiya Hartman writes, in the history of racism, the freedom given to a person enslaved by whites was regarded as a gift for which the freed had to be thankful (Hartman 1997). According to Isabel Lorey, this put them in debt of having to be grateful until the present day and created an inverse responsibility. As she writes with reference to Hartman: “in the logic of debt only the indebted individual is responsible for the doings of the past. […] Enduring black debt serves the linear historiography of the white victors” (2018: n.p.). Algorithmic risk profiling, the visa regime, dataveillance of Frontex liaison officers gathering information in Agadez, IOM workers gathering information on migrants near the Sahara desert or surveillance systems like Eurosur capturing visual data off the Libyan coast are part of the technologically informed assemblages that actualize Black debt within the datafied phenomenon that is migration. The current neglect of the severe human rights violations in Libya, the willingness to work with Libyan coast guard militias in the Mediterranean Sea, the installment of the Eurosur project and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia to reduce border crossings in connection with the biometrification of the border controlling access via ICTs all together not only show how the responsibility for past and present doings is ignored or diverted to migrants and “smugglers”, but also how control logics are associated with processes of dehumanization. Although it is very difficult for organizations like Human Rights Watch to access the country, it has become widely known that migrants, especially from sub-Saharan Africa, are raped, killed, held for ransom and sold off as slaves within Libya (Hayden 2019; Stierl 2019; Semsrott 2018). European politics knowingly take part in these modern forms of slavery by encoding Black debt into their security logics. One aspect concerning the conditions of specifically Black migration movements is a prevailing disregard for the vulnerability of these groups in transit. On the one hand, their movements across dangerous routes are considered to signify a lack of self-management, to the effect that these groups are labeled incapable of governing themselves as self-optimized, responsible and risk aware entrepreneurial ‘modern’ subjects (Bröckling 2007). Within public and political discussions legitimizing restrictive measures towards migration movements, these migrants are thus entrenched in a moral discourse, where they are expected to take more “responsibility” for their lives, being ultimately blamed for their own deaths and precarity, although the above mentioned subjectivity is paradoxically
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stripped from them. On the other hand, within “border spectacles” (de Genova 2013), the figure of the (illegalized) single Black male economic migrant has discursively come to represent a figure most ‘deviant’ to the imagined European community, to the effect that female Black migration is discursively pushed to the margins and both groups are seldomly considered as “at risk” along routes through the Sahara desert or in camps in Libya. Judith Butler has tried to deliver a framework to understand how these mechanisms are linked to claims to “humanness” (Butler 2006, 2009). People tortured, enslaved or trafficked in illegality industries following their choice to migrate are kept “outside the civilizational trajectory that secures the human, which gives the defenders of civilization the ‘right’ to exclude them more violently” (Butler 2009: 130). What we can see in these cases are the simultaneous workings of surveillance, capture and information gathering paired with a selective ignorance regarding certain lives that are kidnapped or perish on dangerous routes on the move. Considering that information gathering is at the heart of migration management and its externalization of control to third countries, it is striking that migrants themselves, including their families, friends and acquaintances met in mobility, are the ones who predominantly have to publish information on the names, the life stories or locations of people who have disappeared or died in transit.

These circumstances are the backdrop for what members of the Watch The Med Alarmphone project have considered one of the highlights of 20 years of No Border Camps: A fearless mole, they write, created a mole hill right next to a presenter at a Transborder Camp. Ever since, they have taken the “mole as a symbol of inspiration to continue to work on the daily construction and extension of the ‘Underground Railroad’ for and with flight and migration movements” (Alarmphone 2019: 125). Referring to the contemporary underground railroads in their work to support migration movements, they engage in the linkages between the Black Atlantic and the Black Mediterranean that demand acknowledgment of the connection between the past and the present. For Deleuze, the “old monetary mole” (1992: 5) was a metaphor for money and capitalist accumulation; an animal linked to spaces of enclosure and disciplinary power, which also referenced Marx’s mentioning of the mole as a symbol of nineteenth-century proletarian struggles (Hardt/Negri 2000: 57). According to Deleuze, the serpent is the animal of societies of control that has replaced the structured tunnels and accumulated dirt hills of the mole with the undulations of the snake (Deleuze 1992: 6). This transition has had an impact on the way political struggles are thought and practiced today. As the Watch The Med Alarmphone project so strikingly exemplifies, their struggles for the free movement of people and rights to stay take the form of a vast continuous transnational network of activists and technological tools. Their work addresses the technological environments in which people move by working with migrants in concert with Thuraya Satellite Phones, GPS-Tracking, surveilling the movement of ship transponders, informing people about registering in the Eurodac database and achieving a public outreach via
social media. In a sense, their ‘underground passageways’ are achieved by changing the milieus of transit on the very surface: they consistently adapt to migration movements and respective control regimes by creating material and social infrastructures to cross borders safely and by offering shifting methods of creating public awareness. Rather than accentuating the mole per se, their work is more linked to the way Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize burrows as rhizomes “in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout” (Deleuze/Guattari 2005: 6-7). If we are to grasp how current power structures operate within migration and border management, we need to acknowledge the ways in which technecologies modulate how dividualized subjects and fragmented body-bits become part of racializing assemblages of control that feed into the biopolitical management of who can claim the status of human, who may receive personhood or how subjectivities are produced, standardized and algorithmically addressed. This has not least to do with questions of entanglements and practices of human and nonhuman boundary-making, where some people are more susceptible to being captured by repressive regimes of control than others. This inevitably gives insight into how responsibilities are negotiated and, more specifically, how people become indebted in more hierarchical and repressive structures via dataveillance and risk management. A responsible political stance can only be achieved in relation to the regimes that are linked to the management of data that create distinct truths and regulations through technological collection, storage and processing.

**Logistics and Affects of Mobility: Hacking and Humus**

As the Peng! Collective proclaims, it uses “weapons of mass disruption” to steer the attention to radical messages. Mask.ID is at once a form of symbolic politics addressing issues of migration and an intervention into the logistics of border crossing. With the creation of morphed biometric facial images for identification, the passport, a common tool for identity governance in today’s securitized capitalist systems of mobility, is used as a plane of reference. Mask.ID, then, offers a very practical way of thinking about possibilities for political action concerning the intersection of identification and movement. Although Mask.IDs sent to Libya will most likely not be able to trick advanced biometric systems placed in many airports within the EU and elsewhere, it might prove sufficient to certain forms of cross-border movement and control, creating the possibility that people are only detected once they have already reached the Schengen Area. Feasibility aside, what this campaign manages to highlight are the logistics and infrastructures put in place to facilitate and hinder movements across borders. The passport is an object incorporating facial images, fingerprints, personal data, information on visa-restrictions etc., constituting a node within the vast surveillance and information networks controlling mobility today. To think about migration must therefore always include the infra-
structures and logistics that make traveling possible. This means accounting for the objects, technologies, vehicles and data by which people move both materially and virtually. Specifically, biometrics are enabled and legitimized by the relationship between the materiality and uniqueness of the body and the possibilities of digital storage and connectivity. Put simply, we all have a body with unique traits that can be identified and shared in surveillance assemblages in order to improve border control. Mask.ID undermines this logic by merging unique traits of two people into one mode of identification. Morphing, then, becomes an example of a “processual micropolitics”, a political action marked by a willingness to incorporate dividuality into a form of self-modulation (Guattari/Rolnik 2008: 42). Félix Guattari and Suely Rolnik once conceptualized “processes of singularization” as a way of rejecting the standardized production of capitalist subjectivity and “all these modes of preestablished encoding, all these modes of manipulation and remote control” (2008: 23). They characterized these processes as an “experience of a subject-group” that constructs its own types of practical and theoretical references, whether in “terms of economy, knowledge, technology or segregations and prestige that are disseminated” (2008: 62). Creating a passport is definitely not what Guattari and Rolnik had in mind, as they envisaged these processes to be relatively independent of existing systems of power – something that clearly differs from Mask.ID’s aim. The point I want to make is that the intervention of Mask.ID is logistical and affective with regard to connectivity and political action. Mask.ID manifests itself as a dissident desire for, and practice of, producing better conditions not just for collective life, but also for embodied as well as datafied movement. It links the political to “mobile commons” understood as the “simultaneous movement of objects, capital, information and material things” on the global just as much as on the local level in order to recognize “how their combined movement may engender the economic and social patterning of life” (Trimikliotis/Parsanoglou/Tsianos 2015: 10). Mask.ID not only infiltrated the German federal printing office, its goal also lies in hacking the affective and political registers of the public sphere concerning migration, movement and much of the securitization processes (including dataveillance or the cooperation with repressive regimes like Libya). It achieves this equally through public outreach and a form of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ that disrupt the common power structures of capture, detection and profiling (Deleuze/Guattari 2005: 279; Papadopoulos/Stephenson/Tsianos 2008). Mask.ID operates by creating functional hybrids and by using the modulation of control – which Deleuze understood as the “new monster” (1992: 4) – as a line of flight that leads away from identification and restricted movement.

In what follows, I wish to complement the thoughts of many authors on control societies with the notion of the cyborg and concepts created in the context of compost feminism. Compost feminism advocates a thinking in terms of *agencement*, of being-with or of becoming with each other (Haraway 2008, 2015, 2016; see also Nancy 2000; Barad 2007). This form of thinking not only stresses the importance of including materiality so
vital for control mechanisms today, but also of living and dying, addressing questions of who is regarded as disposable without sticking to depressive or tragic discourses often attached to humanitarian forms of government. Camps in Libya and the situation of migrants crossing the Mediterranean are part of technologically informed racializing assemblages in which mortality is widespread. Yet again, linking certain zones of the world specifically to finitude may overshadow the hegemonic necropolitics in play and fuel neocolonial fantasies of areas where living is deemed impossible (Mbembe 2003). As Mbembe has highlighted, control goes along with intensified practices of zoning, which include a militarization of borders, a fragmentation of territories and bodies, the creation of more or less autonomous spaces and practices in which informal laws and different authorities create scales of accessibility that he calls an “imperialism of disorganization” (2017: 5). In the case of migration management in Europe today and its cooperation with countries like Libya, societies of control need to be related to all kinds of loose social groupings not always summarized under ‘societies’ in the strictest sense of the term: The border control mechanisms operate smoothly with militias, informal networks of the illegality industry, intermediate camps and heterogeneous patterns of social relations. Mask.ID intervenes by acknowledging the challenging situation of many people on the move, as there is no infrastructure to cross borders safely, and the migrants’ willingness to enact their freedom of movement encounters control mechanisms and power structures bringing them into dehumanizing situations.

This is what I mean by hacking and humus: If the “cyborg is our ontology” (Haraway 1991: 150), existence is technecological and control operates by digitally cutting our data apart and reassembling it in surveillance assemblages, then there is a responsibility to acknowledge and politicize the ways in which we are connected. There is a fundamental sociality of embodied and datafied life in this line of thought: We cannot think of ourselves as bounded beings; rather, we are “periodically undone” by our surroundings (Butler 2006: 28). This is part of what is suggested with the term compost, as an alternative to the concept of the ‘posthuman’: it challenges human exceptionalism and bounded individualism in favor of a relational thinking that includes human, non-human and not-quite human actors (Haraway 2016b). This is especially important in the context of migration control, because the struggles concerning migration are predominantly linked to human rights. Although political interventions demanding basic human rights for migrants are highly important and vital for the legal and social positioning of migrants in border and migration regimes, it is necessary to develop political actions that acknowledge the centuries-old practices of dehumanization that still flexibly prevail in migration management today and that are a prerequisite for the derealization of basic human rights for some. Donna Haraway’s ‘Cyborg’ and ‘Companion Species’ manifestos as well as her compost feminism offer an alternative thinking that places the non-human and the not-quite human as the basis for social and political action. Thus, political activism needs to divert from the normative category of the human from which migrants are
selectively excluded and start from the basic condition of the non-human “to make possible partial and robust biological-cultural-political-technological recuperation and re-composition” (Haraway 2015: 160). Morphing, fragmenting pieces of facial images, hacking federal printing organizations and sharing a passport take up compost feminism and acknowledge that being is always “with”, even when differentially in- or excluded or divided in regimes of power. Mask.ID plays with the complicated surfaces of power and yet acknowledges that “chipping and shredding and layering like a mad gardener, make a much hotter compost pile for still possible pasts, presents, and futures” (Haraway 2016b: n.p.). What the Peng! Collective does is not so much avoid dataveillance in societies of control, but try to logistically and affectively enact ‘response-ability’ – an ability to respond (Haraway/Kenney 2015). Haraway’s concept of response-ability has nothing to do with the classic humanist logic of being responsible for one’s own choices; it is rather about creating “partial connections” (Haraway 2003: 8), about participating in a collective practice of respect or care by developing a capability to respond to something, even in a context of not necessarily understanding what is happening (Haraway 2008; Haraway in Franklin 2017). In this sense, hacking and humus resonate with politics that respond to the digital realms of control which – as they are part of the data management systems undisclosed to the public – are seldomly understood and typically defy democratic debate. These politics also respond to the racializing assemblages in which people are denied the status of human subjects. As Mask.ID so practically has exemplified, response-ability is thought of as “irreducibly collective and to-be-made” (Haraway/Kenney 2015: n.p.). It is not without significance that Deleuze and Guattari’s as well as Haraway’s texts are full of couplings of animals, plants and machines, where – often confusing to readers – wasps become orchids as rhizomatic machines or cyborgs become compost or humus. This line of thought invites us to think of them as material things and figures at once in order to deconstruct or deterritorialize the powerful notions that underly control regimes and to give way to re-sponsible forms of resistance.

Deleuze stated that “The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a molehill” (1992: 7). If we think about technecologies and political struggles, why don’t we begin by thinking about the soil that connects the two critters?

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