- AutorIn
- Andreas Diekmann
- Thomas Voss
- Titel
- Social norms and reciprocity
- Zitierfähige Url:
- https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-208162
- Schriftenreihe
- Arbeitsbericht des Instituts für Soziologie#Arbeitsbericht des Instituts für Soziologie ; 33
- Bandnummer
- 33
- Erstveröffentlichung
- 2003
- Abstract (DE)
- In a norm game, under certain conditions, there exist Nash equilibria of mutual cooperation. Experimental work demonstrates that even in one-shot situations the level and proportion of cooperative behavior increases if an punishment option is available to the players of a public goods game. It is therefore important to analyze conditions such that this is consistent with a rational choice approach. The paper is meant as a first step toward this task. The main result will be that nonstandard assumptions about human motivations or preferences can explain norms with sanctions even in one-shot situations. This is shown by an analysis of the norm game with two well-known recent models of fairness from behavioral game theory.
- Freie Schlagwörter (DE)
- soziale Norm, soziales Verhalten, Normverletzung, Sanktion, Handlungsspielraum, Spieltheorie
- Freie Schlagwörter (EN)
- social norm, social behaviour, norm violation, sanction, scope of action, game theory
- Klassifikation (DDC)
- 301
- 304
- Herausgeber (Institution)
- Universität Leipzig
- URN Qucosa
- urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-208162
- Veröffentlichungsdatum Qucosa
- 25.08.2016
- Dokumenttyp
- Forschungsbericht
- Sprache des Dokumentes
- Englisch
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction; Cooperation in a norm game; Non-standard preferences in the one-shot norm game; Conclusions